1. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C. J.--The respondent purchasedpremises No. 142/9, Dastgir Colony. Federal `B' Area, Karachi, 3n 1967. The petitionerwas a tenant under the vendor at that time 'thereafter, the purchaser applied in 1969 for the eviction of the petitioner from the premises on the ground of default and bona fide personal use.
2. The respondent stated in the ejectment petition that he has no accommodation elsewhere in Karachi and that he was staying in the Doctors' Mess, Civil Hospital, Karachi. He also claimed that as one of his brothers had become disabled and a permanent wheel-chair patient, lie cannot be kept in any place other that the ground floor of a house and that too only after major alterations thereof, which could only be carried out in their own house.
3. Mr. Najam Parvez was, however, found to be staying in a rented promises in the PECH Society, on payment of a rental of Rs. 450 per month, but the landlord of the said premises had already let out the portion occupied by the said respondent to the P. W. D. Who wanted it for one of their employees in the Plant Protection Department. The said respondent also stated that he had since: married and even the rented accommodation available to him was not sufficient"
4. The trial Court found that there was neither any default nor any bona fide need for the premises.
5. On appeal, however, the learned District Judge set aside the order of the Rent Controller anti held that there was bona-fide personal need. This has beers confirmed by the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan in second appeal.
6. The petitioner now seeks special leave to appeal and it is contended oil his behalf that since one of the needs set up by the landlord was the need of a disabled brother, who wanted not only to, reside in the premises but also to use it for commercial purposes, namely, to set up a Radio Repair Shop, there was no bona fide personal need of the landlord himself.
7. The need of a brother, it is said is not observed by the provisions of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. 'The words "own occupation" have not been defined but they have to be interpreted in a restricted manner so as to be confined to the personal requirement of the individual landlord alone. His own needs cannot include the needs of his family members.
8. We are unable to agree for the personal needs of the landlord would include the: need of those dependent upon him. In the present case even the personal use of --he landlord is there in addition to the need of the brother.Hence it cannot be said that the eviction is. Required only for the need of the brother, who is not covered by the definition of "own occupation" or who did not come within the category of dependents.
9. The landlord has also stated that be has since married and therefore the accommodation at present available to him is not sufficient. There is no denial of this fact. It would be reasonable to assume that a person would need larger accommodation after marriage.
10. The next contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that since the landlord was living in rented premises, he was in occupation of another residential building suitable for his needs in the same urban area and, therefore, he was not entitled to evict the petitioner. The requirement that the landlord should not be in occupation of another residential building suitable for his need at the time does not, in our view, extend to cover rented premises, .For, otherwise the result would be that no landlord would be able to get his own premises vacated for his own occupation unless he can show that be is actually on the streets and has no place to live at all. It would be more reasonable to hold that the other residential accommodation, which the landlord is occupying at the time, must be shown to be his own and not merely rented premises.
11. The law in the United Kingdom somewhat different. There the case of a person who purchases a premises after the coming into force of the special law has been dealt with separately. In the law prevailing ill this country, there is no such separate treatment and, therefore, it 4 reasonable to assume that the legislature did not intend to disqualify a person occupying a rented premises from getting hit own premises vacated for his own use and occupation.
12. These am the only two points urged in support of this petition and since we have come to the conclusion that there Is no substance In either of them, this petition is dismissed, but we give the, petitioner three months time to vacate the premises.