SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J.---This appeal has been directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 12-11-1996, whereby the judgment of the learned District Judge, Mirpur, was set aside and that of the trial Court was restored in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
2. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the appellant, herein, filed an application under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Rent Restriction Act (hereinafter shall be referred as Rent Restriction Act) for the ejectment of Abdul Majeed, respondent, from shops Nos. 12 and 13, situate in Paramount Shopping Centre, Sector B-1, Mirpur Town, alleging that he had purchased the aforesaid shops from previous owners and he required the possession of the same for running his own business. It was also alleged in the application that after purchasing the shops, he had asked the respondent-defendant to vacate the shops who had promised to do the needful within a week but subsequently, he refused to hand over the possession of the shops to the appellant. Consequently, he filed an application for the ejectment of the respondent to the Rent Controller. After necessary proceedings, the Rent Controller dismissed the application for ejectment on the ground that the plea of the appellant that he required the shops for running his own business was not made in good faith, inter alia, on the ground that previously he had been running the business as a baker under the title of 'City Bakers' within a distance of about 200/300 yards from the shops in question but he vacated the same only few months prior to purchasing the shops in question. The appellant, herein, filed an appeal before the District Judge against the order of the Rent Controller who accepted the appeal, set aside the order of the Rent Controller and ordered the ejectment of the respondent observing that the shops in question were needed by the appellant for his personal use. A writ petition was filed by Abdul Majeed, respondent, in the High Court challenging the order of the District Judge. The writ petition was accepted and the order of the District Judge was set aside while that of the Rent Controller was restored.
3. We have heard the arguments and perused the file. It has been contended by Mr. Abdul Majeed Mallick, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellant, that the High Court has committed error by vacating the findings of the District Judge, The learned counsel has argued that there was no misreading or non-reading of evidence and, thus, the findings of the appellate authority could not be vacated in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction. He has taken us through the record to substantiate his contention that in fact the order passed by the Rent Controller was emotional and was based on irrelevant facts, whereas the order passed by the District Judge suffered from no legal infirmity. The learned counsel has taken pain to persuade us that in the circumstances of the case, the statement of the appellant that he needed the shops for running his own business was sufficient to prove the bona fides of the appellant. The learned counsel has submitted following authorities in support of his contentions:- 1985 CLC 614), the findings of the Additional District Judge were set aside in exercise of writ jurisdiction observing that he had not noticed the factum of safeguards provided under section 13(4) of the. Rent Restriction Ordinance, rather he was not even conscious of it. It was further observed that as the findings on the point of fact went in favour of the landlord and were subsequently reversed by the Additional District Judge purely on conjectural and untenable grounds, the same were not maintainable because of a legal error apparent on the face of record.
1989 CLC 49), it was held that as the need for personal requirement by the landlord was supported by two witnesses and the landlord also stated that he had no intention to raise the rent, the High Court refused to interfere in the finding of the Court below in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction; the Supreme Court also declined the petition for leave to appeal against the order of the High Court.
1989 MLD 4798), it was observed that the finding on the question of bona fide need is based on evidence arid does not suffer from any misreading or non-reading of evidence so as to attract the interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction. However, the case was remanded on the ground that cross-objections filed by the landlord before the appellate authority were not considered and decided.
1980 SCMR 767), the petition for leave to appeal was refused by the Supreme Court observing that the finding-of the High Court upholding the order of the Rent Controller did not suffer from any legal infirmity and, thus, there was no ground for allowing petition for leave to appeal.
PLD 1985 SC 148), it was observed that while proceeding under the provisions of West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, no particular procedure is to be followed. The only requirement in the statute is that the ejectment of defendant should be ordered if the Rent Controller is satisfied that the ejectment of the tenant was warranted under law. It was further observed that the Rent Controller, while discharging his functions under the Ordinance, is not required to act judicially; he has only to act in quasi-judicial capacity. Thus, it was held that the, provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure need not be meticulously followed. It was further observed that as the finding of fact recorded by the District Judge with regard to the bona fide of the personal need of the landlord, did not suffer from any legal infirmity, the same could not be assailed before the High Court by invoking Constitutional jurisdiction. The petition for leave to appeal against the order of the High Court passed in exercise of writ jurisdiction was refused by the Supreme Court.
4. The arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant were strenuously controverted by Ch. Muhammad Azam, Advocate, the learned counsel for respondent No. k. He has argued that the findings of the Rent Controller were given after taking into consideration attending circumstances of the case after the deep appreciation of evidence on the record. The learned counsel has argued that the witnesses produced by the appellant do not state that the appellant needed shops in question for running his personal business. He has argued that prior to purchasing the shops in question, the appellant vacated the shops in which he had been running business under the title of 'City Bakers' in the same vicinity merely to get the possession of the shops in question not for his personal use but with the ulterior motives of ruining the business of the respondent. He has argued that it is amply proved from the record that the respondent spent huge amount on the renovation of the shops in dispute and had an enviable good-will and a flourishing business as a baker. He has submitted that the appellant approached the respondent, Abdul Majeed, to supply him goods prepared by him as baker so that he might sell the same at his bakery. The respondent agreed to do so only on the condition that the appellant would sell the said goods with the title of 'Pakeeza Bakers'; this infuriated the appellant and, thus, he sold his previous business which he was running as 'City Bakers' and purchased the shops in question to wreak vengeance upon the respondent. He has further contended that after buying the shops in dispute, he proceeded to England and established his business there, as is evident from the statement of Muhammad Siddique, a witness for the appellant. The learned counsel further strenuously argued that all these factors were considered by the Rent Controller while dismissing the application for ejectment as being mala fide whereas the District Judge did not consider the question of 'good faith' of the appellant at all and reversed the findings of the Rent Controller merely on the ground that if the appellant had previously left his business as baker, there was no bar to him to start the said business afresh in the shops which he had purchased. The learned counsel has further argued that the approach of the District Judge in setting aside the order of the Rent Controller was not warranted by law and was in complete disregard to the requirement of 'good faith' envisaged under section 14 of the Rent Restriction Act. The learned counsel maintained that the Rent Controller has rightly come to the conclusion that the application for ejectment was not made in good faith but was actuated by malice whereas the District Judge did not even consider the question of 'good faith' at all while ordering the ejectment of the respondent from the premises.
Therefore, the High Court rightly vacated the findings of the District Judge in exercise of writ jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the respondent has cited following authorities in support of his contentions: PLD 1982 SC (AJ&K) 1), it was observed that the finding of the Additional Custodian were based on no evidence and were not immune from review by the High Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction. , "Arguing on behalf of the appellants, Sardar Rafique Mahmood Khan, vehemently contended that learned Judge in.The High Court wrongly vacated the findings of fact recorded by the learned Custodian of Evacuee Property who had exclusive jurisdiction under the relevant law to decide the questions involved in the matter. He contended that the findings of fact of such functionaries are sacrosanct and cannot be disturbed by the High Court while exercising writ jurisdiction. He particularly objected to the finding recorded in. The judgment under appeal that the name of Hussain Khan in the allotment chit of 15-5-1951 is a 'brazen fabrication'. The sanctity of findings of fact of tribunals or functionaries of exclusive jurisdiction is undisputed but we are unable to agree with the proposition that such findings cannot be disturbed at all. The correct state of law is that a finding of fact cannot be disturbed in writ jurisdiction except when the Court comes to the conclusion that it is based on no evidence as held in Muhammad Aslam v. Atta Muhammad (1969 SCMR 16) or, as laid down in, N.M. Khan v. C.S. & R.C. (1970 SCMR 158), where it is based on erroneous deduction from facts which manifestly could not support such an inference or, as held in Chief Election Commissioner v. Ch. Abdul Majid (PLD 1986 SC (AJ&K) 120), if it is patently wrong, is based on inadmissible evidence or, there is gross non-reading or misreading of evidence. However, we agree with the learned counsel that the learned Judge in the High Court has wrongly recorded the finding that Hussain Khan's name was inserted by fabrication. No evidence was on the file of the High Court on the question of fabrication. The High Court did not itself record any finding on this point. How then such a finding could be recorded, we are unable to see. Therefore, we vacate this finding. "
"We have given our due consideration to the question as to under what circumstances the findings given by a tribunal of special jurisdiction can be assailed by invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. It is correct that there is marked difference between the appellate and the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The High Court while exercising the writ jurisdiction should not assume the role of a Court of appeal but all the same findings of the tribunal of special jurisdiction are open to challenge in writ jurisdiction if the findings are patently wrong or based on inadmissible evidence or there is gross non-reading or misreading of evidence. In such cases the error would be 'error of law' and the same can be rightly rectified in exercise of writ jurisdiction."
1972 SCMR 437), it was observed that the question whether the landlord does or does not require certain premises for his bona fide requirements, is one of the questions of fact. The findings on the point in the case were recorded by the Controller in owner's favour but the first appellate Court reversed the findings on conjectural ground. Consequently, the High Court set aside the findings of the first appellate Court and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal observing that the High Court was justified in setting aside the findings recorded by the first appellate Court.
5. The learned counsel for the respondent has further argued that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the appellant needed the shops for running his personal business in good faith, he was not entitled to the relief under law, because it is an admitted fact that he had vacated the previous premises on which he was running his business as baker under the title of 'City Bakers'.
The learned counsel has drawn our attention to the provisions contained in section 14(3)(a)(ii)(c) of Rent Restriction Act which envisages that the landlord can seek the ejectment of the tenant on the ground of personal need only if he had not vacated 'such building' or 'rented land' without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Rent Restriction Act. But, as stated earlier, the appellant sold his business in ~ the vicinity about six months prior to the buying of the shops in question.
6. Mr. Abdul Majeed Mallick, the learned counsel for the appellant, in reply, submitted that the aforesaid provisions would be attracted only if the previously vacated building was in the ownership of the landlord and not a rented building. He has relied upon a case reported as Abdul Aziz v. Muhammad Ibrahim (PLD 1977 SC 442), wherein while dealing with the scope of section 13(3)
(a)(ii)(b) of West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, in relation to the expression 'any other such building' in sub-clause (ii)(b), it was observed that the 'building' would mean only a building which is owned by the landlord and not a rented building. While dealing with the proposition, it was observed as under:- "In the introductory part of clause (ii) the word 'non-residential building' can have no other meaning except that which is owned by the landlord for it is in respect of that building that he is required to make an application for any order directing the tenant to put him in possession in terms of clause (a) of section 13(3) of the Ordinance. In sub-clause (b) the word 'building' occurs twice and each time it is prefixed by the word 'such'. Considering its implication that it refers generally and naturally to its last antecedent the use of this word is with a definite purpose, i.e., to identify the ownership of the building with that - before mentioned in the introductory part of clause (ii). In this connection we would also refer to the rule as to how the word 'such' should be construed as stated by Maxwell in his book on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition at page 30:- 'Where the word 'such' occurs in a section it must not be ignored, but must be read as referring back to the preceding provisions, even though this gives rise to a result which appears anomalous.'
The conclusion, therefore, is irresistible that the word building can have no other meaning except that which is owned by the landlord. This is in accord with the rule of construction i.e., to intend the Legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed."
Identical view was expressed in case reported as Abdul Salam Akhtar v. Dr. Najam Parvez (1976 SCMR 52).
7. The first question which needs resolution is as to whether irrespective of the question of good `faith of the landlord in seeking the ejectment for his personal use, the appellant, herein, was legally entitled to seek ejectment in view of the fact that he had previously vacated rented building about six months prior to seeking the ejectment in question. It may be stated here that the word 'building' has been defined in section 2 of the Rent Restriction Act as under:- "'Building' means any building or part of a building let for any purpose, whether being actually used for that purpose or not, including any land, godowns, outhouses, together with furniture let therewith but does not include a room in a 'sarai', hotel, hostel or boarding house;"
It is evident that according to the aforesaid definition the word 'building' wherever it occurs in the Rent Restriction Act would mean the building which A was let for any purpose whether the same was actually used for that purpose or not. Thus, under subsection (2) of section 2 of the Rent Restriction Act, the word 'building' would be read in the meaning given to it in the aforesaid definition, provided there is nothing repugnant to the subject or the context. The close perusal of section 14 and particularly the provisions contained in section 14(3)(a)(ii)(c) of Rent Restriction Act would show that the word 'building' would mean a rented building as given in the definition of the word under, section 2 of the Act. After giving the meanings of the ~ word in the said definition, it was not necessary to mention the word 'rented either in clause (b) or (c), because after the definition of the word 'building' any such expression p would have been superfluous and against the rule of drafting. Therefore, we are unable to subscribe to the view taken in case reported as Abdul Aziz v.
Muhammad Ibrahim (PLD 1977 SC 442), referred to above, that the word 'building' would mean a building which is in the ownership of the landlord and not a rented building. The view taken in the aforesaid case runs counter to the meanings given in the definition of the word given in the Rent Restriction Act. Thus, we are of the considered view that when it is admitted that the appellant -- landlord had vacated previous premises about six months prior to seeking ejectment of the respondent, he was not entitled to relief prayed for, even if he~ was in genuine need for running his own business in the shops in dispute.
8.The next question which needs resolution is that whether the High Court was not legally justified in vacating the findings given by the District Judge. It has already been stated that the learned District Judge has not adverted to the question of bona fides of the appellant at all while reversing the findings of the Rent Controller, despite the fact that the moot point in the case was the 'good faith' of the landlord; the bare statement of the landlord to the effect that e he needed shops for running his own business did not prove the requirement of law in the circumstances of the case.
The District Judge has given no reasons which led him to reverse the findings of the Rent Controller.
Thus, in view of the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the respondent, referred to above, the High Court has rightly set aside the findings of the District Judge as being without lawful authority and restored that of Rent Controller. It is now settled principle of law, as is evident from the cases decided by this Court, namely, Mirza Muhammad Afzal Khan v. Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir (PLD 1982 SC (AJ&K) 1), Muhammad Shafi Khan v. Ghulam Din (PLD 1992 SC (AJ&K) 58), Chief Election Commissioner, Azad Jammu and Kashmir v. Ch. Abdul Majid (PLD 1986 SC (AJ&K) 120), referred to above, that if an order of Special Tribunal or forum is. Based on no evidence, or it suffers from a patent mistake or the order has not been passed keeping in view C the relevant provisions of law, that is open to review in Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court.
The result of the above discussion is that finding no force in this appeal, it is hereby dismissed with costs.