The dispute between the parties in this writ petition relates to a shop situate is Sadar Bazar, Lahore Cantonment. It was owned by one Altaf Hussain Ahmad and was in the possession of the petitioner as tenant under the owner. By a registered deed, dated 7-2-1973, Altaf Hussain Ahmad sold the shop in favour of his were, Mst. Anwar. On 15-4-1974 Met. Anwar filed an application before the Rent Controller, Lahore Cantonment, for the eviction of the petitioner from the said shop. She based her application on two grounds, namely, (i) the petitioner was a defaulter in the payment of rent, and
(ii) the shop was required by her for the use and occupation of her son. Ry an order dated 5-10- 1977. The Rent Controller dismissed the application, holding that the petitioner was not a defaulter in the payment of rent and that her claim that she required the shop for personal require--ment was not bona fide. He further held that under the relevant law, too, she could not get the shop vacated for the use and occupation of her son.
2. From the order of the Rent Controller Mst. Anwar went in appeal before the District Judge. She died during the pendency of the appeal. Consequently, in her place, her husband and her two sons were impleaded as appellants. By his order, dated 4-4-1981, the learned District Judge accepted the appeal and directed the eviction of the petitioner. The learned District Judge uphold the finding of the Rent Controller that the petitioner was not a defaulter in the payment of rent but on the issue of personal requirement he took notice of the fact that consequent upon the death of Mst. Anwar her son for whose use she wanted to get the shop vacated had himself become one of the appellants before him. He also found that the shop was genuinely needed by the son to run an independent business. The petitioner has challenged the legality of the order of the learned District Judge.
3. The first contention on behalf of the petitioner is that under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, Mst. Anwar could not seek his eviction on the ground that she required it for the use and occupation of her son. In this context he referred to clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (4) of section 17 of the Act. Clause (a) relates to residential buildings and clause (b) deals with commercial buildings. The shop in dispute here is admittedly -a commercial building within the meaning of clause (b) of sub--section (4) of section 17 of the Act. Under clause (a) of subsection (4), ibid, a landlord can seek eviction of his tenant from a residential building if he requires it for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family. Under clause (b) of the same subsection a landlord can seek eviction of his tenant from a commercial building if he requires it in good faith for his own use. It is to be noticed that the words `for the occupation of any member of his family' as occurring in clause (a) have not been repeated in clause (b). The omission appears to be intentional and therefore I am inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that Mst. Anwar could not seek his eviction from the shop on the ground that it was required for the use and occupation of a member of her family, that is, her son.
4. The learned counsel for respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 submitted that the words `for his own use' as occurring in clause (b), ibid, ought to be liberally interpreted so as to include the names of such members of the landlord's family also who were entirely dependent upon 'him. In support of his contention he referred to the cases of Lal Bux v. Mistri Allahdad (1980 CLC 984), Abbas v. Khalida Khatoon (1979 CLC 660), Fazal Hussain v. Mistri Taj Din (PLD 1978 Lab. 728) and Abdul Salam Akhtar v. Najam Pervez (1976 SCMR 52). All these cases are easily distinguishable. Lal Bux v. Hlistri Allahdad and Abbas v. Khalida Khatoon relate to residential premises and not to commercial buildings. Fazal Hussain v. Mistri Taj Din and Abdul Salam Akhtar v. Najam Pervez were decided in accordance with the provisions of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance which in respect of non-residential buildings offers a comparatively broader ground to the landlords for seeking evictions of their tenants. Thus, under the Ordinance he can ask for the eviction of his tenant if he requires the premises for the use of even his male children. I should therefore think that these cases are not relevant to the controversy before me.
5. As already pointed out, before the appeal could be decided by the learned District Judge the son of Mst. Anwar for whose use and occupation she sought the eviction of the petitioner became on his own one of the appellants in the appeal. Now the question is whether the learned District Judge was competent to take notice of this changed position in determined the liability of the petitioner to eviction. In this regard the ordinary rule is that the accrual of cause of action must in point of time be anterior to ' the institution of the suit and the rights of the parties ought to be determined as they were on the day of the filing of the suit and not on the basis o rights which may accrue to them at any time thereafter. However, in order to shorten litigation or to obviate multiplicity of litigation or to do complete justice between the parties this rule does admit of certain exceptions.
Thus, in Amina Begum v. Ghulam Dastgir (PLD 1978 SC 220) Muhammad Akram, J., observed :- "Indeed in our considered opinion a discretion is vested in this behalf in the Courts to be judicially exercised in proper cases in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, to shorten litigation, and to do complete justice between the parties and mould the relief according to the altered circumstances in the larger interest of justice."
6. It may also be mentioned that even if the order of the learned District Judge suffers from any illegality the effect of its quashment would be that the parties would be forced to another round of litigation in respect of a controversy which has already been the subject matter of a full-fledged trial. I do not think that the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court should be exercised in a manner that would promote litigation.
7. For the reasons stated I would dismiss this petition with costs.