' This civil revision arises out of the judgment dated 8-12-1982 of the learned District Judge, Sheikhupura, in execution proceedings of an ejectment matter.
2. The facts relevant for the disposal of this civil revision, as per record, are that Sardar Khan, predecessor-in-interest of the respondents herein leased out a Kotbari with a courtyard forming part of Property No, BVI-SI-8-A, known as Ladha Mal Factory, Waris Road, Ward No, 6, Sheikhupura, at a rent of Rs, 25 per month, vide lease deed dated 24-8-1977 (Exh. A/1). He sought ejectment of the petitioner herein on 21-2-1979, under section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959) (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance), inter alia on the ground of personal requirement. The petitioner in his written statement dated 18-4.1979 did not dispute the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. No objection was taken as to the nature of the property or jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. The learned Rent Controller vide order dated 12-3-1980, decided issue No, 3, relating to personal need of the landlord and accepted the application, holding that "the house in question is required by the petitioner for his bona fide personal use". The petitioner filed an appeal against the aforesaid order. It was averred in the memorandum of appeal that eviction of the petitioner herein from the disputed 'house' for personal need of the landlord was not proved on record and that only malba and machinery of the factory was transferred to him. The ownership of the land underneath vested in the Government. The learned Additional District Judge, Sheikhupure, vide judgment dated 3-7-1980, repelled the contention as to the non-applicability of the provisions of the Ordinance, on the ground that it was never alleged before the Rent Controller that the disputed property formed part of the factory and that the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller was never challenged before him. The case was, however, remanded to the Rent Controller to re-write judgment on issue No, 3, relating to personal need.
After remand, the petitioner moved an application dated 2-9-1980, for amendment of the written statement so as to include the objection of lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the property, in dispute, was a factory. The amendment was disallowed by the learned Rent Controller by order dated 25-11-1980, on the ground that it was beyond the scope of the remand order, in that, the case had been remanded to him only to re-write judgment on issue No,
3. However, the issue of personal need of the landlord was decided against the latter and the learned Rent Controller dismissed the ejectment application by order dated 19-2-1981. Against this order, the landlord preferred an appeal on 12-3-1981, which was accepted by the learned Additional District Judge, Sheikhupura, by order dated 2-3-1982. In consequence, the landlord filed an application for execution of the ejectment order. The petitioner filed an objection to it on 3-5-1982, inter alia contending that the decree-holder was not entitled to be put into possession of the disputed property in the garb of the execution proceedings, in that, the property, in dispute, vested in the Provincial Government, who had already assumed physical control of the same. It was also averred that the property, in dispute, was deemed to be a factory or part of the factory and, therefore, outside the domain of the Ordinance. The executing Court overruled the objections by order dated 13-7-1982. The petitioner filed appeal against this order. During the pendedcy of the appeal the landlord died. The appeal was dismissed by the learned District Judge, Sheikhupura. On revision, this Court remanded the case. The respondents herein, successors-in-interest of the landlord, challenged the order before the Supreme Court, whereby the matter was remanded to this Court for deciding finally the following questions :-
(1) Whether the death of the landlord during the execution proceedings will deprive his successors- in-interest and/or heirs of the fruit/benefit of the eviction order passed against the tenant on ground of personal requirement of the landlord ;
(2) Whether the fact that the building in dispute was a part of the premises of a factory, if established, will make any difference so far as the power of Rent Controller to evict the tenant under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance, is concerned ;
(3) Whether the alleged change of ownership of the land under the building from which the tenant was ordered to be evicted, before the execution of the order of ejectment, will make any difference in so far as the eviction from the building is concerned.
3. Ch. Muhammad Hassan, learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the provisions of clauses (a),. (e) and (g) of section 2 and section 13 (3) (a) (i) (a) and (it) (a) of the Ordinance and placed reliance on Muhammad Ashraf v. Mst. Azizan (1) and Abdul Rehman v. Fazal Karim (2), to contend that an order of ejectment passed against a tenant of non-residential building on the ground that the rented premises were required by the landlord for his own use would not enure for the benefit of the legal representatives of the
(1) PLD 1981 Lab. 201 (2) 1980 SCMR. 758 landlord after his death, because it was a personal right which died with the landlord. It is not heritable and never becomes part of the estate of the deceased which he leaves behind. Even if the landlord is alive, the decree which he obtains is subject to the statutory requirements of subsection (4) of section 13 of the Ordinance which provides that he must occupy the building or the rented land within one month of the date of obtaining possession.
4. In Muhammad Ashraf's case eviction was sought by the landlord in respect of a rented shop i,e, a non-residential building for his own use. The Rent Controller accepted the application. This order was challenged in appeal. During pendency of the appeal, the landlord died and his legal representatives were brought on record. A question arose whether the order of ejectment passed against a tenant of non-residential building on the ground that the rented premises were required by the landlord in good faith for his own use, can enure for the benefit of the landlord's heirs after his death. It was observed : "An order of ejectment passed against a tenant of a non-residential building, on the ground that the rented premises were required in good faith by the landlord for his own use, would not enure to the benefit of the legal representatives of the landlord after his death for another reason also inasmuch as it would not be possible to meet the requirement of subsection (4) of section 13 of the Ordinance which lays down that the landlord must occupy the rented premises within one month of the date of obtaining possession because otherwise the tenant who is evicted, may apply to the Controller for an order for restoration of the possession of the rented premises. An order of ejectment passed against a tenant of a residential building can be executed by the legal representatives, even after the death of the landlord, though the rented premises were got vacated by him for his own occupation because the rented premises could also be occupied by his family in view of the interpretation of the expression "for his own occupation" as noticed in the cases referred to above. The requirement of subsection (4) of section 13 of the Ordinance would also be met if in execution of an order of ejectment, possession of the rented premises is obtained by the legal representatives of the deceased landlord for the aforementioned reason."
' In the instant case, the order of ejectment had attained finality during lifetime of the landlord who died during the course of execution proceedings. The ratio laid down in the precedent case is, therefore, not attracted to the facts of the present case.
5. In Abdul Rehman's case, the building let out was a shop. The landlord sought eviction inter alia on the ground of personal need for running his tailoring business. The application was dismissed by the Rent Controller, but allowed by the District Judge in appeal. The tenant filed second appeal in the High Court. During pendency of that appeal, the landlord died. The tenant made an application for producing additional evidence to show that legal representatives of the landlord did not need the demised premises. This application was disallowed. On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the High Court for permitting both the parties to produce evidence on the question as to whether or not the respondents were entitled to the demised premises under section 13(3) (II) of the Ordinance. This case also does not advance the petitioner's case, in that, the additional evidence in view of the changed situation was allowed to be adduced by the parties during the pendency of ejectment proceedings. Here the petitioner has neither sought such a permission nor it can be granted during the course of execution proceedings. Furthermore, there is evidence on record to show that the original landlord required the premises, in dispute, for his own use, as well as, for the use of his sons.
' In pursuance of the remand order of the Supreme Court, in the aforementioned case, the learned Single Judge of the Sind High Court in Abdul Rehman v. Fazal Karim (1) observed :- "It was not necessary for the original respondent to specifically mention, in his application, that he also required the premises for the use of his sons, as if he succeeded in his application, his sons could have also used the premises in question alongwith their father. But since original respondent died before the ejectment of the appellant, this question required specific finding, for sustaining the impugned judgment dated 7th July, 1971, and it.Was because of this, that Hon'ble Supreme Court remanded back the above appeal, for recording fresh additional evidence on this point, before disposing of above appeal, in order to save multiplicity of proceedings and to cut down unnecessary fresh litigation between the parties."
6. The first question raised in this civil revision has been discussed in a number of cases by the Superior Courts of this country, which I propose to examine hereinafter :
(I) In Irshad All v. Muhammad Umar (2), landlady sought eviction of her tenant from a rented shop inter alia on the ground of her personal bona fide need. Landlady died during the pendency of appeal before the appellate authority. Her legal representatives were substituted in her place. In this background, the learned Single Judge of the Sind High Court observed : "The personal and bona fide requirement put forth by the deceased, in my view, cannot be held to be the personal and bona fide requirement of the present appellants in the circumstances of the case. There is nothing in the evidence to show that the deceased wanted to acquire the premises for a business to be rtas by the present appellants. I am accordingly of the view that the ground of personal and bona fide requirement as put forth in the application cannot be availed of by the present appellants after the death of the deceased."
(The underlining is mine)
(ii) Refer Messrs. Ally Brothers & Company v. The Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi (3), wherein the landlady sought eviction of a tenant from a shop for her own personal use. She obtained a final order of ejectment during her lifetime but died before it was executed. The learned Single Judge observed : "In the case in hand, the landlady was alive when her prayer for ejectment was accepted by the two competent Courts of exclusive jurisdiction i. e. The learned Rent Controller and the appellate authority, the learned Additional District Judge vide orders, dated 18th December, 1982 and 17th April, 1983, respectively. She was even alive when the writ petition fifed against her was dismissed in limine by the learned Judge on 5th June, 1983 because she died two days' later on [Here in italics)
(1) 1982 CLC 2641 (2) PLD 1981 Kar. 273
(3) 1983 CLC 1897 7th June, 1983. Therefore, the order of ejectment of the petitioner has become final during her lifetime. If after the final orders passed by the competent Courts of exclusive jurisdiction and upheld by High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction, an unsuccessful litigant continues to carry on the litigation, that will not mean that the successful party must survive till eternity or until the successful litigant exhausts himself. If it were the law, there will never be an end to litigation. The right to repossess her property having come to vest in her lifetime, will passon to her heirs on her demise. Therefore, there is no force in the contention that ejectment orders have become infructuous."
(iii) Refer Muhammad Ismail v. Muhammad Ibrabim (1) wherein it was observed : "There is distinction between personal requirement for business and personal requirement for a residence. If a landlord applies for a personal requirement for a shop for starting business and if he expires leaving behind only a widow or daughters without any major male issue or if he was a doctor wanted to start a clinic after his death that personal requirement will no longer be there.
However, in case if a landlord needs a house for accommodating himself and his other members of the family, I. e. Wile and the children, after the death of the landlord the personal requirement will remain intact because he leaves behind the widow and the children. In the instant case legal heirs of the deceased-respondent are not obliged to live in the house belonging to their grandmother which would devolve on them and on their two aunts left behind."
(iv) In Sardar All Ghori v. Sh. Maqbool Elahi (2), it was observed : "That the personal requirement of the landlord who wanted the tenement let out for establishing a Limited Company and creation of trust was no longer thereafter his death."
7. Ia all the cases referred to in para. 6 except Messrs Ally Brothers & Company's case, the landlord who sought ejectment for personal use had died prior to the conclusion of the proceedings before the authorities under the Ordinance. Here the landlord was alive when final order of ejectment was passed in his favour by the appellate authority. The ratio laid down in Messrs Ally Brothers & Commpany's case is directly attracted to the facts of the present case. The Supreme Court also declined to grant leave against this judgment in Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No, 530- R/83, decided on 5-2-1984.
8. After closer examination of the precedents referred to above, the legal position which emerges is that personal requirement of a landlord for business is distinguishable from that of a residence. In case of residence, the personal need includes the need of those dependent on the landlord and the mere death of the landlord during pendency of the ejectment proceedings under the Ordinance would not effect the requirement of his dependents. In case of personal requirement for business, the death of the landlord during the pendency of proceedings under the Ordinance, may or may not affect the requirement of his children depending upon the facts of each case. For example, if a landlord applies for personal requirement of non-residential building and dies during the course of ejectment proceedings, the
(1) 1983 CLC 961 (2) 1982 CLC 748 personal requirement will not remain intact if he leaves no male issue. It case, the landlord is survived by his male heirs and there is evidence on record to show that the landlord required the premises for a business to be run by him or by male issues or by both, the death of the landlord would not affect the personal requirement of the survivors. In case, there is no evidence, the legal representatives of the deceased-landlord and the tenant may be permitted to lead additional evidence in view of the changed situation caused by the death of the landlord during the pendency of ejectment proceedings. If, however, an order of ejectment passed under the Ordinance, on personal need, either for business or for residence attain finality during the lifetime of the landlord, the right so vested in him will be inherited by his heirs. Where the landlord dies during the course of execution proceedings, his successors-in-interest and/or heirs cannot be deprived of the benefit of eviction order passed against the tenant on the ground of personal requirement of the landlord, in that, they step into the shoes of the landlord. The execution proceedings do not abate upon the death of the landlord. The provisions of subsection (4) of section 13 of the Ordinance create no hurdle if in execution of an order of ejectment, possession of the rented premises is obtained by the legal representative of the deceased-landlord, in that, the term "landlord", as defined in section (c) of the Ordinance, includes even a person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land and every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord. The respondents being th heirs/legal representatives of Sardar Khan, deceased-landlord, were deemed to be "landlord" within the meaning of section 2 (c) of the Ordinance.
9. Be that as it may, in the instant case, the personal requirement of the surviving male children was joint and indivisible with that of the deceased-landlord. The need did not extinguish with the death. It is true that the deceased landlord made no averments in the ejectment application that he required the premises for the use of his male children but this omission by itself would not be fatal to his case, in that, he clarified hi need while appearing as A. W. 3 that the premises were also required for his unemployed children. There was no legal bar on him to particularize his need in evidence. The same view has been consistently taken by the Supreme Court. Refer Zahoor Din v.
Mirza Yaqub Baig (1), Malik Nisar Muhammad v. Abdul Rauf (2), Abdul Saleem Akhtar v. Dr. Najam Parvez (3) and Dilshad Muhammad v. Mg. Zubaida Begum (4). Also refer Muhammad Uris v.
Ziauddin (5), wherein it was held that rules of pleadings are not strictly applicable to the proceedings before the Rent Controller.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that as per averments made in paras. (I) and (4) part 'dal' (7) of the ejectment application, the property, in dispute, formed part of a factory and, therefore, it was neither a "building" nor "rented land" as defined in clauses (a) and ( f ) of section 2 of the Ordinance, as such, no relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties within the purview of section 13 of the Ordinance. He placed reliance on Muqammad Daud v. Sher Bahadur Khan (6) and Baru v. Niadar (7), for the proposition that for the purposes of determining jurisdiction what needs to be considered is the averments in the plaint and not any
(1) 1981 SCMR 1081 (2) 1972 SCMR 561
(3) 1976 SCMR 52 (4) 1981 SCMR 895 (5s; 1982 CLC 4 (6) PLD 1963 (W. P.) Pesh. 217
(7) AIR 1952 Lab. 217 ' defence that may be taken up by the opposite-party, therefore, the admission of the petitioner in his written statement in para. 3, where he described the disputed premises as a house "URDU TEXT" is irrelevant for the purposes of determining the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. The precise submission is that the learned Rent Controller lacked jurisdiction to direct ejectment of the petitioner from the property, in dispute, which was a factory and, therefore, his order was a nullity.
Reliance was placed on Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Muhammad Saeed (1), Sardar Bhagwan Singh v. Lala Barkat Ram (2) and Messrs Mullick Brothers v. Haji Muhammad & Brothers (3), to contend that no question of estoppel arises if the proceedings are coram non judice and suffer from inherent lack of jurisdiction and the executing Court can go behind the decree and refuse to execute it if the same was passed without jurisdiction. The question of executability of an order or decree can be raised even in execution proceedings and it is open to the party against whom it is sought to be executed to show that it is a nullity, void or has been made without jurisdiction or that it is incapable of execution. Learned counsel also referred to para. 2032 of Phipson on Evidence, Eleventh Edition, at page 924, wherein it was observed :- "Estoppels are of three kinds : (1) By record ; (2) by deed ; and (3) ' by conduct Estoppels of all kinds, however, are subject to one general rule ; they cannot override the law of the land. Thus, where a particular formality is required by statute, no estoppel will cure the defect and jurisdiction cannot be given to the Court, by estoppel, where statute denies it. So, even a judicial record or deed is always impeachable for fraud or illegality."
' The pith and substance, of the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the order of ejectment being void and nen-existent, the subsequent orders passed by the authorities under the Ordinance together with the superstructure of rights and obligations built upon them are void ab initio, in the light of the ratio laid down in Yousaf All v., Muhammad Aslam Zia (4).
11. There is no cavil with the proposition laid down in the precedent cited at the Bar that there is no estoppel against 'statute. Executing Court can refuse to execute a decree which is a nullity. The person against whom it is sought to be executed can competently show that it suffers from inherent lack of jurisdiction. It is also well-settled that landlord is to prove his own case regardless of any defence that may be taken up by the tenant. The principles are not attracted here. It is an admitted fact that no factory has been leased out to the petitioner but only a portion of the building comprising of a kothari and a courtyard. The averments made in the ejectment application are not inconsistent with the covenants made in the lease-deed. The mere mention in the ejectment application that the building, in dispute, formed part of the property where a factory was located, would not ips facto convert the building, in dispute, into a factory. The description merely indicated the location and identification of the premises, in dispute.
12. The term "building" as defined in clause (a) of section 2 of the Ordinance, means any building or part of a building let for any purpose, whether being actually used for that purpose or not, including any land, godowns, outhouses, together with furniture let therewith but does not include a room in a "serai, hotel, hostel or boarding house. The portion in
(1) PLD 1961 SC 192 (2) AIR 1948 Lah. 129
(3) PLD 1955. Sind 297 (4) PLD 1958 SC 104 dispute was, therefore, a building by itself within the ambit of section 2(a) of the Ordinance. Refer Messrs Rahman Cotton Factory v. Messrs Nichimen Co. Ltd. (1), wherein it was held that West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Act (President's Act IX of 1957) excludes from its operation what were properly known as a factory equipped with machinery requisite for manufacturing process. In essence in all such cases, the lease is for the use of the machinery which is permanently fixed in certain defined premises and not of the premises simpliciter. Here the lease is for the premises simpliciter and, therefore, it does not come within the ambit of word 'factory'. Thus visualised, the order of eviction cannot be treated as a nullity merely because the building, in dispute, was described as a part of the premises of a factory.
13. Let me now examine the third point. During pendency of ejectment proceedings before the appellate authority, it was alleged that change of ownership of the land under the building from which the tenant was sought to be evicted has come about with the result that the Provincial Government allegedly became owner of the land and the ownership of the landlord was allegedly restricted to only superstructure and the machinery transferred to him. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since ownership of the land vested with the Provincial Government, the petitioner is not liable to be evicted, in that, the lands vested in the Provincial and Central Government, are exempt from the operation of the Ordinance, in view of Notification No, HG- 10.2/59, dated 12-3-1959, issued under section 3 thereof. If an ejectment order is executed against the petitioner, he will also be evicted from the land of which the respondents are not the owners.
Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to paragraph 2038 from Phipson on Evidence, Eleventh Edition, to contend that a landlord is estopped from alleging his want of title to the premises, but the tenant may show that such title has expired or that a parcel of land about which he and the lessor are disputing was never comprised within the lease at all, or that he has been evicted by title paramount to his landlord. Reference was also made to Ram Rakha Ma! v. Munna Lal Maidhan (2), Kumar Krishna Prosad Lad Singha v. Baraboni Coal Concern Ltd. (3), in which the same principle was reiterated. Ch. Muhammad Hassan also strongly relied on Sultan Ahmed Sharlf v. Mathura Mohan Chowdhury (4) and Pasupati Ramabhudra Raju v. Ayithua Ramana (5), to contend that in terms of section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Executing Court can take note of the altered circumstances, but whether or not in a particular case it should allow execution to proceed, depended upon circumstances of each case.
14. The precedents sited above are not attracted in this case. It is well-settled that a tenant cannot deny validity of his tenancy. Once a person has accepted another as landlord and entered into possession of the premises as tenant, he cannot be allowed to challenge title of his landlord. Refe Kalimullah v. Amin Hazin (6), Messrs Urdu Digest Printers v. Hakeem Muhammad Idrees (7) and Mst.
Shaukat Sultana v. Mst. Zohra (8). The condition of ownership of building or rented land is not a condition precedent for creating the relationship of landlord and tenant within the meaning of clause (c) of section 2 of the Ordinance. Refer Muhammad Ali v. Abdul
(1) PLD 1976 SC 781 (2) AIR 1931 P C 243
(3) AIR 1937 P C 251 (4) PLD 195& Dacca 36
(5) AIR 1952 Mad. 125 (6) 1976 SCMk 77
(7) 1982 CLC 470 (8) 1982 CLC 1761 ' Rehman (1), Mst. Razia Butt v. Ghulam Raza (2), Muhammad Shari( v. Muhammad Amin (3), Bagh- e-Shah v. Sh. Muhammad Akhtar Hussain (4) and Allah Wasaya v. Sultan Ahmed (5). Furthermore, the petitioner has not' received any notice from the Provincial Government to quit the premises in view of alleged change of ownership of the land nor any notice under section 13-A of the Ordinance regarding change of alleged ownership of the premises, in dispute, therefore, relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties which is protected by the principle enshrined in section 116 of the Evidence Act, would not automatically come to an end. Be that as it may, the superstructure of the premises, in dispute, admittedly vested in the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. It was admittedly in occupation of the petitioner as a tenant therefore, he is estopped from pleading absence of relationship of landlord and tenant. This view is fortified by the judgment of the Supreme Court in M. S. Khan v. Ch. Muhammad Afzal (6). Also refer Khulid Mahmood v. Ch. Ghulam Muhammad (7). In the precedent case during execution of an order of ejectment, the tenant filed a similar objection that the land under the house belonged to the Provincial Government and it was only the superstructure thereof which had been transferred to the landlord, the tenant could not be ejected from the aforesaid land. The objection was repelled by the executing Court, the appeal and revision against this order also failed. It was held that :- . . ... It is true that (according to what has been stated in the impugned order) only the superstructure of the house in question had been transferred to the respondent and the land under the superstructure, which belongs to the Provincial Government, had not been transferred to him but it is not physically possible to give effect to the order for the ejectment of the petitioners from the house by allowing them to retain possession of the land underneath. If the petitioners are allowed to drag their feet as desired by them, it will set at naught the order of their ejectment which has stood the test of scrutiny right upto the Supreme Court, and their case will be exploited by many others to frustrate such orders. For instance, in the case of a building having more than one storey belonging to different persons a tenant in occupation of an apartment on a floor other than the ground would, in the event of an order of ejectment having been passed against him, refuse to vacate the apartment on the plea that the floor of his apartment happened to be the roof of another apartment which was not owned by the landlord who had obtained the order of ejectment against him. Similarly, if a person in adverse possession of any land builds a house thereon and leases out the same to a tenant he will not, in case an order of eviction is. Passed against the tenant, be able to secure execution of the order if the tenant declines to vacate the house on the ground that the land beneath the house did not belong to the person owning the house. Obviously, such like bottlenecks in the administration of law on the subject, namely, the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, would offend against the spirit of that law."
15. The same view was taken in Qambar All Shah v. Mst. Khiraj Begum (8). The petitioner also unsuccessfully raised the question of defective
(1) 1980 SCMR 29 (2) PLD 1979 Quetta 157
(3) PLD 1977 Lah. 516 (4) PLD 1977 Kar. 460
(5) PLD 1976 Lah. 62 (6) 1975 L N SC 517
(7) PLD 1979 Lah. 675 (8) PLD 1983 Quetta 17 ' title of the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents before the appellate authority during the course of ejectment proceedings. He, therefore, cannot be allowed to reagitate this point before the executing Court as that would have the effect of re-hearing the ejectment application which is beyond the scope of the executing Court. Refer Mst. Khurshid Begum v. Mt. Ghulam, Kubra (1).
Reference may also be made to the dictum laid down in S.A. Waheed v. The Dayal Singh College Trust Society (2), wherein it was held that: "If the agreement of tenancy be admitted and it be admitted further that the tenant was put in possession, he would be bound to pay rent to the plaintiff irrespective of whether the plaintiff was or was not the owner of the property. Under section 116 of the Evidence Act no tenant is entitled during the continuance of the tenancy to deny the title of the landlord."
16. Having given my anxious consideration to the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and after carefully examining the case-law referred above, I am inclined to hold that the death of the landlord during the execution proceedings will not deprive his successors-in-interest or heirs of the fruit/benefit of the eviction order passed against the tenant on ground of personal requirement of the landlord : the mere fact that the building, in dispute, was a part of the premises of a factory will not make any difference so far as the power of the Rent Controller to evict the tenant from the disputed premises, under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance, is concerned and the alleged change of ownership of land under the building from which the tenant was ordered to. Be evicted before the execution of the order of ejectment, will not make any difference in so far as the eviction from the building, in dispute, is concerned.
' For the foregoing reasons, the revision petition is dismissed with costs.
(1) 1982 SCMR 90 (2) PLD 1955 Lah. 570