1. The two Courts below in this case concurrently found that the require--ment of the premises by the respondent for one of her sons was bona fide and accordingly ordered the eviction of the appellant front the premises.
2. The learned counsel for the appellant Mr. H. A. Rehmani contended before me that the findings of the two Courts below though concurrent are vitiated on the ground that they have misread the evidence of Muhammad Junaid for whose benefit the application was filed by respondent. It was argued that Muhammad Junaid when examined in Court did. Not say in so many words that the premises in question was required by him for his own occupation. All that was said by him in the evidence was to the following effect :- "My mother desires to get the house in question for my personal use and " for my brother Muhammad Shoaib. "
3. On this piece of evidence, the learned counsel contended that it was merely a case of "desire", which cannot be equated with the word "requirement" contemplated under section 13 of the Sind Rent Restriction Act and as such the Courts below were wrong in holding that the premises were "required" by the landlady for the occupation of her son Muhammad Junaid. It was further contended by the learned counsel that at the time Muhammad Junaid was examined in the Court he had already shifted to a rented premises and it was not established on record that the premises then occupied by him were not suitable for his needs. The learned counsel accordingly contended that the two Courts below should have given a positive finding as to the suit--ability of the premises occupied by the son of respondent before ordering the ejectment of appellant from the premises. In support of his contention the learned counsel relied upon the case of Muhammad Asghar v. Jamila Khatoon (1), in which it was observed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court that mere fact that a landlord is occupying a rented premises by itself does not justify the conclusion that the need of landlord was bona fide. On the basis of this authority the learned counsel contended that the words "he is not occupying another residential building, suitable for his needs" in section 13(3) (a) (1) (b) should be so construed as meaning even a rented premises in occupation of the landlord or his children. The case cited by the learned counsel is hardly an authority for the proposition canvassed before me. Besides, the facts of the above case are quite distinguishable as the Court did there not believe the statement of landlady that she was living in a rented premises. This point was decided by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Abdu!
4. Aziz v. Muhammad Ibrahim (2). In this case their Lord--ships of the Supreme Court while considering the request of a landlord for a non-residential building with reference to the language used in section 13 (3) (a) (ii) (b) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, observed at page 444 that "non-residential building" in clause (ii) can have no other meaning except that which is owned by landlord. Their Lordships further held that similarly the words "another building" used in section 13(3) (a) (i) (b) of the Ordinance should not be construed to extend to cover a rented premises and accordingly confirmed the view expressed by that Court in the case of Abdul Salam Akhtar v. Dr. Najam Pervez (3). The learned counsel attempted to argue that the rule laid down in the above--cited Supreme Court case will apply only in cases where the, landlord applied for eviction of tenant on the ground of his personal requirement and not in, cases where the application is made for the benefit of any of his children. I am unable to find anything in the language of the sectionto justify this distinction. In my view on the language of the section he-- their an application is made b y the landlord for ejectment in respect of a residential premises for his own use and occupation or for the use and occupation of any of his children, the words "another residential building" used in section 13(3) (a) (i) (b) will not extend to cover a "rented premises" in occupation of landlord or such of his children for whose benefit the application is made. I accordingly hold that while considering the suit ability or otherwise of the residential building occupied by a landlord's child in an application for ejectment filed by a landlord for use and occupation of a residential building by such child, the building in occupa--petition of such child should be one owned by the landlord and not a rented premises. I am further of the view that the question of bona fide requirement is purely a question of fact and the two Courts below have concurrently found that the premises was required bona fide by the land--lady for her son, it was not open to review by this Court in IInd Appeal, unless the findings of the two Courts below was based on misreading of evidence or the Courts below committed an error in the procedure prescribed by law which effected the ultimate decision of the case on merit. The argument of the learned counsel that the son of landlady while in the witness-box did not say in so many words that he needed the premises for his own use cannot be described as misreading or evidence by the two Courts below. The statement of landlady's son that his mother "desired" the premises to be vacated so that he and his brother may occupy the same coupled with other evidence on record sufficiently estab--lished the requirement of landlady and in my view it cannot be said that on the evidence on record the conclusion reached by the two Courts below could not be sustained. Even if another view of the evidence was possible, it would not be a ground for interfering with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the two Courts below. The contention of the learned counsel that since the child was occupying a rented premises and it was not established on record that the premises were not suitable for his needs, has no merit in view of the above discussion.
(1) 1979 CLC 367 . . (2) PLD 1977 SC 442
(3) 1976 SCMR 52 I see no substance in the appeal which is dismissed in limine but I grant four months' time to appellant to vacate the premises.