This second appeal arises out of the order dated 8-10-1977 whereby the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore dismissed the appeal Against the order of the Rent Controller and directed the tenant-appellant to vacate the premises.
2. In the application for ejectment of the tenant, the respondent landlord pleaded that he required the house in dispute for the use of his children and that the tenant had committed acts which impaired materially the value of the property. The application was resisted by the appellant-- tenant refuting the allegations leveled against him. The Rent Controller found that tenant was not guilty of damaging the property, but on the point of personal need, he was of the view that the landlord required the house in dispute for accommodating his children. The application was allowed giving a cause to the tenant to make an appeal to the learned Additional .District Judge, but the same did not succeed. Hence this second appeal. ?). The learned counsel contended that the disposal of the appeal should have been kept pending by the learned Additional District Judge till the time the dispute of title of Mst. Khurshid Begum, from whom the respondent bad allegedly purchased the house in dispute, was ultimately derided by the civil Court. He stated that the alleged alienation in favour of the respondent was disputed and the fate of the respondent's status was very much dependent on the decision of that suit. It was averted that the appellant had made an application for staying the proceedings of the present case till the suit between Mst. Khurshid Begum and the respondent was finally decided, and that the learned Additional District Judge had actually moved for the disposal alongwith suit, but without notice to the appellant, , the learned District Judge had, by his administrative order, rejected the move holding that this matter had nothing to do with the suit. All what the learned counsel wanted to emphasize was that the learned Additional District Judge, on return of the case, had virtually failed to give a decision on the tenant's application.
4. I have seen the file. By his order dated 22-9-1977 the learned Additional District Judge sent appeal to the District Judge for the decision with the suit, but the learned District Judge returned the appeal o 25-9-1977 holding that there was nothing common between the appeal and the appeal filed by Mst. Khurshid Begum to impugn the order dismissing he application for restoration of the suit dismissed in default. The order was announced in the presence of the learned counsel of the parties, I find that order was just and did not suffer from any legal defect. It cannot, there--fore, be disputed in this appeal. It is also not correct to say that the learned Additional District Judge did not advert to the application filed by the tenant. The application came under his serious consideration and he held that it was without a substance inasmuch as the objection was not taken in the memorandum of appeal. It was further observed that the respondent had purchased the house in dispute through a sale deed which was not by then set aside, and unless cancelled the sale-deed was valid document which had conferred title of the property on the respondent.
Admittedly after having purchased the house, the respondent had served on the appellant a notice under section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, whereby he intimated the tenant of having purchased the house. In the circumstances there was no substance in the application especially when there was then no suit pending in the Civil Court in respect of the disputed title.
5. The learned counsel on the strength of Muhammad Hussain v. Muhammad Bashir and others (PLD 1974 Lab. 446) stated that ejectment of the tenant could not be ordered without in the first instance, passing an order under section 13 (6) of the Ordinance directing the tenant to deposit arrears of rent and future rent. That case having different facts, cannot be safely applied to the instant case. It is settled law that provisions contained in section 13 (6) of the Ordinance are meant for the benefit of the landlord and it can be waived on general principles. It is held in Jalal Din and another v. Aziz-ud-Din and another (PLD 1963 Lab. 436) that of course, there can be no estoppel against the provisions of a statute, but there is considerable force in the contention that as the provisions of section 13 (6) of the Ordinance are for the benefit of the landlords, on general principle their application may be waived by them. The same view is taken in Zahurul Hassan & Brothers v. Abdul Hussain an another (PLD 1977 Kar. 262). The Ordinance though primarily meant to restrict the eviction of the tenant from certain premises in urban areas, but it does provide safeguards for certain interests of the landlords as well. The landlords are assured to be compensated with the possession of the demised premises if the e tenant commits breach of his liability to pay rent during the pendency of a rent application. Such quick remedy is provided by section 13 (6) of the Ordinance. The provision is, therefore, obviously remedial in nature and cannot be termed penal. In the circumstances, the remedial provisions can conveniently be waived by a party for whose benefit it is introduced.
6. I do not agree with the argument that the sons for whose need the house was sought to be vacated were not examined and their good faith was not proved on record. Malik Nisar Muhammad and another v. Abdul Rauf (1972 SCMR 561) and Abdul Salam Akhtar v. Dr. Najam Parvez (1976 SCMR 52) deal with this aspect. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the personal needs of the landlord would include the need of those dependent upon him. It shall not be out of place to mention here that the need is essentially of the landlord, may it be for the landlord, himself or for his children. There is thus a sufficient compliance of law if the landlord has himself appeared to prove good faith.
7. For the foregoing reasons there is no force in appeal and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs. The appellant is provided 20 days to vacate the premises.