' This is a landlord's second appeal under section 15 of the Punjab Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 against the order of the Rent Controller dated 18-12-1994 which was upheld in appeal by the learned Additional District Judge, Faisalabad by virtue of which the appellant's application under section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 seeking eviction of the respondent from shop bearing No,P-155/3, Chiniot Bazar, Faisalabad, was dismissed.
2. The eviction petition was filed on 11-3-1992 in which the appellant sought ejectment of the respondent on the grounds of default in payment of rent, damage to the property resulting in deterioration of its value and utility and personal need. In the reply filed by the respondent, all these averments were disputed which led to the framing of the following issuesi--
(i) Whether the petition has been filed mala fidely just to increase the rate of rent? OPR
(ii) Whether the respondent/tenant has defaulted in payment of rent? If so, for what period? OPA
(iii) Whether the shop in question is required for the personal use of the petitioner/landlord bonafidely? OPA
(iv) Whether the respondent/tenant has damaged the shop in question and has impaired its value? OPA
(v) Relief.
3. In order to prove his case, the appellant examined A.W.1 Muhammad Sardar Khan and appeared, himself as A.W.2. In rebuttal the respondent produced Syed Muhammad Latif Arif, R.W.1, Muhammad Taqi Naz, R.W.2, Nazam-ud-Din as R.W.3 and appeared himself as R.W.4.
4. By his order dated 18-12-1994, the learned Rent Controller decided all the issues against the landlord and dismissed the ejectment petition. On issue of personal need it was held that the stand in the ejectment petition was inconsistent with the statement of the landlord in evidence and as such not worthy of any reliance. It was also observed that the appellant was a Government servant and was due to retire in 1995 and as such could not claim eviction of the respondent for his own use. On appeal these findings of the Rent Controller on all issues were affirmed by the learned Additional District Judge on 19-2-1997.
5. Before this Court the learned counsel for the appellant has challenged the decision of the Rent Controller on issue No,3 and has pressed for the eviction of respondent on the ground of personal need of the landlord. He submitted that the appellant had retired during the pendency of appeal before the Additional District Judge and this development should have been taken notice of and given due effect to by the Appellate Court especially when the appellant had placed on record the notification of his retirement.
6. The learned counsel for the respondent has defended the impugned orders and has argued that the appellant has been taking inconsistent and contradictory pleas inasmuch as though in the application for eviction, the need set up was that of the wife and children of the landlord but during the course of evidence, requirement by the appellant for himself was sought to be established. It was emphasised that admittedly the appellant was in Government service at the time of filing of ejectment petition and as such the so-called need was not in existence and was in any case not bona fide.
7. From a perusal of the two impugned orders, it is evident that the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge while dismissing the ejectment petition were primarily impressed by the fact that in the application for eviction the appellant had pleaded the need of his wife and children while during the course of evidence he had tried to establish his own need and as such there was irreconcilable consistency. The other reason for non-suiting the appellant was that he was in Government service.
8. None of the above two grounds are tenable in law. Even though the landlord may have pleaded in the ejectment petition that the shop was required for the use of his wife and children yet there is no bar in the way of the appellant to plead in evidence that the shop was needed by him. The need of the children is nothing but an extension of the need of landlord and as such the question of any inconsistency does not arise. If a landlord can satisfy the Rent Controller by leading cogent evidence that he needed the shop for himself he cannot be refused relief merely on the ground that in the eviction application he had not spelt out his own need. The technical rule of pleadings laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable to the proceedings before the Rent Controller and cannot be made basis for denying relief to a suitor. If any authority is needed, reference may be made to Punjab Hardware and Machine Tools Ltd., Karachi v. Wazir Ali (PLD 1976 Karachi 233), Amir Ali v. Mrs, Alima Ahmad (PLD 1981 Karachi 150) and Haji Lal Bux v. Mistry Allandad (1980 CLC 984). In Zahoor Din v. Mirza Ayub Baig (1981 SCMR 1081) the question before the Supreme Court was as to whether a landlord who had pleaded in the ejectment petition his own personal need could be allowed to set up the need of his children during evidence. While repelling almost similar plea to that which has been raised on behalf of the respondent before this Court, it was observed by the Supreme Court that:-- "... ...It would be seen that the requirement of his children is really in the nature of an extension of the personal requirement of the landlord himself, as the property does not belong to his children, and yet the law permits him to ask for its vacation if it is needed for their occupation in good faith. It follows, therefore, that even if in the ejectment application it is not specifically stated that the requirement is for the occupation of any of his children, a landlord would still be entitled to spell out this need in evidence... ..."
9. Again in Dilshad Muhammad v. Mst. Zubaida Begum (1981 SCMR 895) the Supreme Court of Pakistan was pleased to approve the view taken by the High Court in the following words:- "Ch. Qadir Bakhsh, in support of this petition has submitted that the respondent-landlady has not been able to prove that she needed the shop in dispute in good faith for her personal requirement.
In her application she stated that she needed the shop in question for her personal use but in her statement before the Court she took a different stand, namely, that she required the shop for the use of her son, who was admittedly pursuing his business in Karachi and further he was also not examined 'although the eviction of the petitioner was being sought for his benefit'. In these circumstance, it was submitted that the finding of the Courts below on issue No,2 was erroneous.
' We observe that this very point was raised in the Courts below and has been adequately dealt with in the judgment passed by the said Courts, especially by the High Court. We are in agreement with the view taken by the learned Judge in the High Court that the petitioner was fully aware of the stand of the respondent-landlady on this point and was not taken by surprise at the evidence stage. We also agree with the High Court that the non-appearance of the son of the landlady was not fatal to the claim of the respondent and that the landlady had in the circumstances amply established that she required the shop in good faith for the use and occupation of her son."
' Two other judgments of the Supreme Court on this point are, Abdul Salam Akhtar v. Dr. Najam Pervaiz (1976 SCMR 52) and Malik Nisar Muhammad and another v. Abdul Rauf (1972 SCMR 561).
This Court in Mst. Mumtaz Nasim v. Additional District Judge and others (1992 CLC 306) and Wali Muhammad v. Zainab Khatoon (1983 CLC 321).
10. It follows from the above-cited cases that it is not necessary for the landlord to spell out the details of the personal need and that the ejectment petition cannot be dismissed on the ground that in the application, need of one person has been pleaded while during the evidence it was stated that the premises were required for the use of another person. As already observed, the need of the children is in fact an extension of the landlord's need and, therefore, there is no question of any contradictory stand being taken by the landlord. There is also merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the subsequent development which took place due to retirement of the landlord from service during the pendency of the appeal could not have been ignored. It is a sanitary principle that the Court is entitled to take notice of the events which took place during the pendency of proceedings. This is essential in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation and to cut short the dispute. This aspect was considered by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Mst. Amina Begum and others v. Mehar Ghulam Dastagir (PLD 1978 SC 220) and it was observed that ... ... In arriving at the conclusion the Court observed that: It is now well settled that in proper cases the Court is entitled to take note of the subsequent events and grant relief to the parties accordingly, if by so doing it can shorten litigation and best attain the ends of justice'. The Court on a detailed examination of the case-law was of the opinion that the reported case in Ramgayya Naidu v. Basanna Siman was no longer good law and also did not follow the ratio in Romanandon Chatti v. Pulikutti Serwan as its authority was considerably shaken by the several decisions to the contrary.
' Indeed in our considered opinion a discretion is vested in this behalf in the Courts to be judicially exercised in proper cases in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, to shorten litigation and to do complete justice between the parties and would the relief according to the altered circumstances in the larger interest of justice."
' Reference may also be made to Sh. Fazal Muhammad v. Sheikh Muhammad Shafi and others (1983 CLC 261) and Iftikhar Ahmad Sheikh v. Ch. Muhammad Din etc. (PLD 1990 Lahore 461).
11. While on the above subject it is also to be noted that the respondent' cannot claim that any prejudice has been caused to him in case the landlord was to succeed on the ground of his own personal need. While appearing as his own witness the landlord has deposed that he was due to retire from service and wanted to occupy the shop himself. The evidence of the respondent was recorded subsequent to the statement of the landlord and he could have led evidence to rebut his statement. Additionally, if the landlord is asked to file a separate petition on the ground of his retirement from service and his own requirement it would result in multiplicity of litigation which must be avoided.
12. It is an undisputed fact that the landlord at the time of filing of the ejectment petition was a Government servant but he retired on 7-12-1994. This fact is proved not only by the notification of retirement which was placed on record of the Additional District Judge but also by the evidence led before the Rent Controller. The appellant landlord while appearing as A.W.2 had deposed in his statement which was recorded on 8-6-1993 that he was to retire in 2 years and required the shop for his own need. During the pendency of proceedings before the Additional District Judge the appellant attained the age of superannuation and stood retired.
13. Even if the need of the landlord was premature at the time of filing of the ejectment petition the same had matured during the pendency of the first appeal and should not have been ignored by the Additional District Judge without assigning any valid reason. It is also to be noted that there is nothing in law which prevents a landlord who is in Government service or is even otherwise gainful employee to leave the employment before filing an ejectment petition. On the other hand, it stands firmly established that a landlord is not required to sit idle during the pendency of proceedings before the Rent Controller for eviction. (See Fazal Azim and another v. Tariq Mahmood and another (PLD 1982 SC 218) and Karimullah v. Khalilur Rehman and another (PLD 1982 Karachi 617).
14. The requirement of law in this behalf is that at the time when the eviction order is passed possession is obtained in execution of the said order and the landlord should be in a position to occupy the premises for his own need. Sufficient safeguard in the form of section 15(6) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 is provided to the tenant in the event, the premises in question is not occupied for his own use by the landlord. It is not the case of the respondent and has not been argued before this Court that the landlord is presently in occupation of any other shop or is otherwise employed and is not in a position to occupy the shop. It is unfortunate that neither the Rent Controller nor the Additional District Judge examined that case in its true perspective and failed to take notice of the law declared in the cited cases by the superior Courts of the country. They were persuaded by irrelevant consideration while non-suiting the appellant. As already observed, on the admitted facts the appellant is entitled to have the shop vacated for his own use.
' In view of what has been said above, this appeal is allowed, the impugned orders are set aside and the order of eviction of respondent from the shop in dispute is passed in favour of the appellant and against the respondent with no order as to costs. The respondent is allowed four months' time to vacate the shop from today.