On the Multan Road, Lahore, there is a mosque known as Al-Minar Mosque. A part of the building containing the mosque, and owned by the mosque, is occupied by the petitioner, Muhammad Saeed, as tenant. Respon--dent No. 1, Anjuman Jamia Hanfia, Multan Road, Lahore, hereinafter referred to as the respondent is administering the mosque and the property vesting in the mosque.
The respondent made an application for eviction of the petitioner alleging that the premises with him were needed by the mosque for setting up a religious library . This plea did not find favour with a Rent Controller of Lahore who heard the application. It was, therefore, dismissed by him. His order was challenged by the respondent by taking an appeal before the District Judge, Lahore. The learned District Judge accepted the appeal, set aside the order of the learned Rent Controller and directed the petitioner to vacate the premises. He has, therefore, invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court to assail the order of the learned appellate authority.
2. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that under subsection (3) of section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordi--nance, 1959, a tenant can be ejected if the premises occupied by him are needed by the landlord for his own use or for the use of his children but since the respondent required the premises for establishing a library for the benefit of the public, its requirement did not constitute a ground for eviction. In this connection he placed reliance on Suba v. Siraj Din PLD 1977 Lab: 1263
3. In the cited case, certain premises owned by a private individual were required by him for setting up a free dispensary for public welfare. It was held that since the landlord did not need the premises for his occupation the tenant could not be ejected. Relevant observations made in that case read as follows :- "12. Lastly the question is whether requirement of the premises for being used for charitable purposes is recognised by the Ordinance as a ground for ejectment from a residential building.
Section 13 (3) as stated above, allows a landlord to claim ejectment of a tenant of a residential building only if he requires it in good faith for his own occupation or for the occupation of any of his children. It was held in Mumtaz Humayun v. Habib-ur-Rehman PLD 1969 Lab. 886 that the emphasis in this provision is more on the words `own occupation' rather than on the word `requires'.
It was further held that `need' not always be personal in the sense of constituting his strictly individual and personal need, but it may be a need for one's children and no other relation. In Adam Ali Hussan All v. Rabab Bhai (PLD 1965 Kar. 408), the scope of the needs of the landlord was discussed. It was held that the needs of the landlord cannot be discriminated so as to separate the inner needs and outer needs of his body because both of them are projected on his environments.
His hunger may be projected in the form of a need for servants ; nor can `his needs' be restricted to physical needs in contra--distinction to social, economic, intellectual, emotional and spiritual needs, which may be projected in the form of a need for a sitting room, for an office, for a wife, for children, for a room reserved for prayers or for :" room reserved for maintaining a library. The needs would differ from landlord to landlord and some of those which may be genuine in one case, may not be so in another case ; nor is it open to the landlord to declare his needs as his own subjective decisions, firstly because his needs reflect the ideas of the society and secondly because his rights are controlled by the society. The character of the social order to which he belongs places the general limits on his needs and his own characteristics place special limits on them. Abdus Salam Akhtar v. Dr. Najam Parvaiz 1976 SCMR 52 it was held that personal need of the landlord includes need of those dependent on him including needs of family members.
13. Applying the principles of those authorities it will be clear that `own occupation' by the landlord may include the occupation for need of his dependents and that need might also have arisen due to tile circum--stances of his life; his social status or position, his social, moral or legal obligations etc. He may even need a sitting room, a room for an office, room for wife and children, room for prayer, room for his own library ; but his requirement must be of personal. Occupation for the purpose of residence. The opening of a mere dispensary is neither such an occupation nor involves personal occupation of the property, since admittedly the respondent does not belong to the medical profes--sion. Opening of Free Dispensary is really a charitable object which involves the use of the premises for the benefit of the public and not for the visible benefit of the landlord though the ultimate object of the charity may be his spiritual aggrandisement. However laudable the object with which the respondent has submitted the application for ejectment, it does not fall within the scope of section 13 of the Ordinance."
4. The property involved in the present case does not vest in a private individual nor the respondent, which is a registered society, is its owner. This property belongs to the mosque and therefore, the mosque is landlord in the instant case. As observed in the case of Adam Ali Hasan Ali, referred to in the cited case of Suba, the need of the landlord includes his spiritual need which may be projected in the form of a room reserved for prayers or a room reserved for maintaining a library. Religious library is spiritual need of a mosque. It is a matter of common knowledge that, as of necessity, religious books, including copies of the Holy Quran, are kept in every mosque. The number of these books vary, from mosque to mosque, depending on the resources of each mosque and the number and type of persons for whom they are meant. It is difficult to think of a mosque having no religious books at all.
5. It is the primary function of a mosque to provide place of worship for Muslims, particularly those who reside or work in its vicinity, and to educate them in religious affairs, inter alia, by making available to them adequate literature on religion. If a mosque wants to have extra accommo-- dation for the offering of prayers and seeks ejectment of a tenant to secure it, can the ejectment order be withheld on the ground that the mosque does not need accommodation for its own use because prayers would be offered by mem--bers of the Muslim community who are part and parcel of the public at large. Similarly, if a mosque needs accommodation for setting up a library, contain--ing books on the religion of Islam, can it be said that it does not require accommodation for its own use because the library would be utilised by the believers in Islam. My answer to both the questions would, for obvious reasons, be in the negative.
6. In Suba's case, relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, dispensary was intended to be established by an individual for public welfare. He did not belong to medical profession. He did not need the dispensary for his personal use either. It also looks strange, if not unreasonable, that a person should have a dispensary of his own. But if in given case, the dispen--sary is proposed to be set up by a local body such as Municipal Committee, District Council or Municipal Corporation, on the premises owned by the local body, by ejecting a tenant therefrom, it would not be possible to refuse ejectment on the plea that the dispensary would be for the benefit of the public. In. Such a case the need for a dispensary would be the need of the local body. What distinguishes the case of an individual from that of a local body, in the matter of establishing a dispensary, is that whereas it is one of the functions of the local body to establish dispensaries it is not the function of an individual to do so. Similarly, as explained above, it is one of the functions of a mosque to arrange religious literature for those for whom the mosque is meant and, therefore, if the mosque, managed by the respondent, needs the disputed premises for setting up a library, comprising books on Islam, it would mean that the mosque needs the premises for its own use. In this view of the matter, Suba's case, being distinguishable on facts, is of no avail to the petitioner.
7. Another point canvassed by learned counsel for the petitioner was that alternative accommodation was available for setting up the library and, therefore, it was not necessary to disturb the petitioner, This plea was also raised before the learned District Judge but was repelled with the following remarks :- "In this context it was tried to show from record that some alternative accommodation upstairs was available to the governing body to establish reading room there. Probably any such plea cannot be heard because it is the choice of the landlord and not the tenant, to choose any portion of his property for his personal need. Besides, there was ample evidence to reveal that the said alternative accommo--dation was being used by the children as also womenfolk in offering 'Jumma' prayers etc., and it may not be practically safer to deny them C the user of the said space.
That also appears to be a need for the and any interruption in the same was bound to cause confusion."
8. This reasoning of the learned District Judge appears to be cogent. N misreading of evidence on his part has been alleged nor anything else has been pointed out to enable me to interfere with his finding. I am, therefore, not inclined to disturb his finding.
9. There is no merit in this writ petition. It is dismissed in limine.