1. NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.-This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment and order dated 3rd April 1978, passed by a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court, whereby he accepted the Second Appeal (S. A. O. No. 37 of 1977), set aside the order of the learned Addl. District Judge and restored that of the Rent Controller, whereby the petitioner herein was directed to vacate the shop in dispute.
2. The facts which form the background are that the petitioner is in posses--sion of Shop No. F/1136, Mohallah Sarin, Azam Cloth Market, Lahore, as a tenant and the respondents Ghulam Rasul and Ghulam Nabi sons of Rahim Bakhsh are the a landlords Ghulam Rasul respondent was occupying a shop belonging to one Mohammad Tufail P. W. As tenant. The said Mohammad Tufail wanted the said shop for his own use and, accordingly, called upon Ghulam Rasul to vacate it. The respondents, thereupon, in order to get their own shop vacated with a view to handing over the shop taken on rent by Ghulam Rasul respondent to Mohammad Tufail, initiated ejectment proceedings against tire petitioner herein. The main contest in these proceedings was with regard to the issue whether Ghulam Rasul (respondent herein) required the disputed property in good faith for his personal use? In so far as the respondent was occupying a shop, even as a tenant, the question whether he required the shop in dispute for his personal use was dependent on the fact whether Mohammad Tufail had really called upon him to vacate his shop and whether he did require it for his personal use.
3. Before the Rent Controller, Muhammad Tufail appeared as a witness (P. W. 7) and made a statement to the effect that he did require his shop for his personal use, and for that reason had asked the respondent to vacate it. Relying upon the said statement the Rent Controller found that Ghulam Rasul required his shop for his personal use. He also repelled the suggestion that he (Ghulam Rasul) and his brother Ghulam Nabi had brought the ejectment petition with a view to letting out the shop on higher rent. He, accordingly, accepted the ejectment petition and ordered the ejectment of the petitioner herein.
4. On appeal, the Addl. District Judge observed that Mohammad Tufail had stated that he had asked Ghulam Rasul to vacate the shop, but also added that he never issued him a notice to that effect.
5. He also observed that Mohammad Tufail P. W. Had not stated that he wanted the shop for his personal use. He, consequently, came to the conclusion that Muhammad Tufail did not want the shop for himself and bad only appeared as a witness in support of the claim of Ghuam Rasul. He further held that the mere fact that Ghulam Rasul wanted to shift his business to his own shop did not prove his bona fide requirements of personal use. He was of the view that the petition had been filed to enhance the rent and not for bona fide require--ments of personal need. Consequently, the appeal was accepted and the order of the Rent Controller set aside.
6. Dissatisfied with the above decision the respondents herein filed a second appeal (S. A. O. No. 37 of 1977) before the Lahore High Court. Before the High Court, it was submitted that the learned Add].
7. District Judge had misread the evidence of Mohammad Tufail. It was also submitted that in the light of the dicta of this Court in Abdul Aziz v. Muhammad Ibrahim (PLD 1977 SC 442) and Abdul Salam Akhtar v. Dr. Najam Parvez (1976 SCMR 52) where one of the appellants was in possession of a rented shop, this circumstance could not be considered against their claim of bona fide requirements in so far as the shop owned by them was concerned.
8. The learned Judge in the High Court carefully perused the statement of Mohammad Tufail P. W.
9. And came to the conclusion that it had, in fact, been misread by the learned Add District Judge. He pointed out that Muhammad Tufail in his examination-in-chief had stated that he had told Ghulam Rasul to vacate the shop in answer to which he was told that the shop in dispute was not vacant and that as soon as it was vacated by the petitioner herein, Mohammad Tufail's shop would be handed over to him. Mohammad Tufail also explained that he bad not served the notice to the occupant of the shop because some persons had intervened and it was promised before them that the shop would be vacated. It was also pointed out that the examination-in-chief was correctly understood by the cross--examiner as having contained the averment that Mohammad Tufail wanted the shop for his personal use. Thai is why, in answer to a suggestion in cross- examination in this behalf the witness replied that "it is incorrect that I do not require the shop for myself." The conclusion reached was that not only that Muhammad Tufail asked Ghulam Rasul to vacate the shop, but also insisted upon it.. It was held that the first Appellate-Court bad misread the evidence of Mohammed Tufail and overlooked some other relevant circumstances, which corroborated the statement of Ghulam Rasul in material particulars. The learned Judge, therefore, agreed with the Rent Controller that the respondents had succeeded in discharging the burden of issue relating to their personal requirement. He also observed that the rule laid down in the two judgments of this Court relied upon by the counsel for the respondents also supported their case to a considerable extent. The appeal was, accordingly, allowed and the order of the Add]. District Judge set aside, with the result that the order of the Rent Controller was restored. Hence, this petition for leave to appeal.
10. Before us, Mr. S. A. Mannan submitted that the statement of Muhammad Tufail had not been misread by the learned Addl. District Judge and that the learned Judge in the High Court had, therefore, erred in setting aside his finding on the issue of personal requirement, which was essentially a question of fact.
11. We have ourselves perused the statement of Mohammad Tufail P. W. a copy of which was available in the brief of the learned counsel, and are of the view that the learned Judge in the High Court bad read it out correctly and that the learned Addl. District Judge bad indeed misread it. Any finding based on misreading of evidence cannot be regarded as sacrosanct. Conse--quently, the learned Judge in the High Court was justified to set aside the finding of the learned Addl. District Judge, which was based on the misreading of evidence. We are satisfied that no ground for interference has been made out. This petition must, accordingly, fail and is hereby dismissed.