K. G. OLD, PRINCIPAL, CHRISTIAN TECHNICAL TRAINING CENTRE, GUJRANWALA

This judgment decides the following Writ Petitions

(i) W. P. No. 1210 of 1973, K. G. Old, Principal, Christian Technical Training Centre, Gujranwala v.

Khurshid Masih and 6 others.

(ii) W. P. No. 1283 of 1973, K. G. Old, Principal, Christian Technical Training Centre, Gujranwala v.

Khurshid Alam and 10 others.

(iii) W. P. No. 901 of 1969, The University of the Punjab v. Punjab University Printing Press Workers'

Union and another.

(iv) W. P. No. 62 of 1974, The University of the Punjab v. The Technical Staff Employees' Union and another.

(v) W. P. No. 1365 of 1974, The University of the Punjab v. Punjab University Press Labour Union and another.

(vi) W. P. No. 977 of 1974, Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education Sargodha v. Ala Sanvi Taleemi Board Employees' Union and 2 others.

2. In the first two petitions the Christian Technical Training Centre, Gujranwala, is the petitioner. It is a Technical Educational Institution which offers courses in woodwork, sheetmetal welding, electrician job machinist fitter/turner, draughtsman and automechanic. It was founded in 1900 and is administered by a Board of Directors and is situate along Mcculloch Road, G. T. Road, Gujranwala.

The fees are charged from the students whose number in the past few years has remained in the neighbourhood of 100. As a part of the educational institution it has two workshops where training is imparted to the students and work is also done for private parties on charges levied as in commercial and industrial establishments. The Institution decided to close two of its workshops rendering thereby surplus 8 workmen, 4 from each shop. They were served with notices of termination of their employment from 1-2-1975 and it was given effect to. Such termination of the services of 8 of the employees and closure of the two workshops led to two proceedings under the Labour laws. In the first place, there was resort by individual workers to the grievance procedure as in section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance wherein the Junior Labour Court held that they were employed in an educational institution. All the same the definition of industry as contained in Industrial Relations Ordinance clause (xiv) section 2 was held to include and fully cover the educational institutions as well and their re-instatement in service was ordered. Appeals were preferred by the institution against all these orders of re-instatement which were disposed of by a consolidated order by the Punjab Labour Court on 19-4-1973. It affirmed the finding of the Junior Labour Court that the amended definition of Industry brought within its orbit the educational institutions as well and held further that the workshops attached to such an Institution were certainly run on commercial basis. Hence the exemption claimed from the operation of the Industrial Relations Ordinance was not allowed. All the same the order of the Junior Labour Court directing re-instatement in service was set aside and the proceedings were remanded for examination on facts as to the number of employees engaged in the Institution with a view to ascertain whether the Standing Orders Ordinance applied to the establishment or not. This order of remand has been challenged by the Principal of the Institution on the ground that educational institution could not be held to be industry and if that be so then the entire proceedings initiated by the former employees against their retrenchment were misconceived and untenable. This order is the subject. Matter of Writ Petition No. 1210 of 1913.

3. Another, almost parallel; proceeding started in the case was again by the employees themselves on whose behalf the Ganeral Secretary of the Staff Union informed the Assistant Director, Labour Welfare, Gujranwala on 20-2-1973 that the Management of the Centre and workshop had illegally declared lock-out . In the works' hop and terminated the services of 8 workers without any reason on 1-2-1973. The Assistant Director, Labour Welfare forthwith proceeded to take action under West "Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (.Standing Orders) Ordinance. 1968. The enquiry held by the Assistant Director; Labour Welfare established that there were 50 to 60 workers permanent as well as daily-paid, in various shops attracting thereby provisions of section 11-A of the Standing Orders Ordinance. After holding the enquiry the Assistant Director held that the Management had illegally locked-out the workshops and had also refused to end the lock out and open the workshop. An application under section 46-A(1) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 was therefore filed by the Assistant Director before the Labour Court Northern Zone for taking such action as was required by law in the circumstances of the case. The Labour Court examined the matter after notice to the parties and held that though apparently a case of retrenchment and closure of workshops it was indeed a case of lock-out and as tae lock-out had taken place with a view to coerce the employees to give up their Trade Union activities it attracted the provisions of section 46-A and invoking the powers conferred thereunder the Labour Court directed the Management to forthwith end the lock-out and to take back the employees. This order came to be passed two months after the remand order referred to earlier. This order dated 14-6-1973 is the subject-matter of challenge in Writ Petition No. 1281 of 1973. While admitting the petition against the order of remand I had suspended that order as a mare important question of law i.e. Whether an educational institution was an industry as defined in Industrial Relations Ordinance was required to be examined in the Writ Petition and on the decision of such question alone the further consequential proceedings could take place. The other order directing the Principal to end the lock-out and re-instate the workers was also for the same reasons suspended while admitting the Writ Petition No.. 1283 of 1973 on 4-7-1973.

4. The admitted facts which emerge in these petitions are that Christian Technical Training Centre, Gujranwala, is primarily an educational institution. As it is imparting technical education in vocational subjects, it has two workshops of its own. There are 52 persons in all on its staff, one Principal, one Vice-Principal, one Head of Department at the appex, two Chaukidars, two Malis and a Sweeper at the bottom, with Mechanics, Machinist Engineers for instruction and maintenance, in- between. The total number also includes office staff of one Accountant, one Cashier, one Head Clerk, one Clerk and a Peon, apart from for Storekeepers. The number of students during the year remained in the neighbourhood of hundred.

5. In. Order to earn recognition fo: itself in the commercial and the industrial world and to ensure job opportunities for its trainees, the institution has been advertising its products, assuring customers, about their dependability, quality and competitive price. It leas been servicing and repairing cars for outsiders,

6. Every effort is made by the institution to facilitate the obtaining of the jobs for its trainees and it has also been keeping a record of those who left on completion of the training and were very well provided for in Industry and Commercial Establishments.

7. So far as the question of law arising in these petitions is concerned, viz., whether an educational institution, falls within the definition of Industry, it is useful to reproduce hereunder the reasoning of the Labour Court. It observed "The definition of industry given in section 2(xiv) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance is very simple and reads as under :- "," 'Industry' means any business, trade, manufacture, calling, service, employment or occupation."

Apparently the definition of 'industry' given in the Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969 is very wide and it would be against the rule of interpretation of statutes, to restrict it by giving such an interpretation which does not follow from the words. I am aware of the fact that my learned brothers have held in 1971 PLC 343 and 1967 PLC 590 that educational institutions are not industries but obviously they have formed their opinion on the basis of the Indian authorities which are based upon the definition of `industry' which is somewhat different from the one given in the Industrial Relations Ordinance.

But in the definition given in section 2(xiv) of the I. R. O. The original character of calling, service, employment or occupation has not been retained and they have been directly called as industries, the result being that they would be taken as an industry without seeing that there is any element of business, trade or manufacture in them. According to the definition, therefore, not only that only a business, trade or manufacture can be called as an industry in the special term in which the industry has been defined but calling, service, employment or occupation would also be industries."

8. In Writ Petition No. 901 of 1969 the Punjab University Printing Press Workers' Union filed a petition under section 5(5) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1969 against the Punjab University on failure of conciliation proceedings. A preliminary objection was raised with regard to the competence of the petition on the ground that the Punjab University Printing Press was a part of the Punjab University which was an educational institution and not an industry. The Industrial Court by its order dated 27-8-1968 relying on the decisions of the Indian Courts in cases of Assam Rashtra Basha Prachar Samiti (1966 PLC 28and University of Delhi and another v. Ram Nath and another (AIR 1963 SC 1873held that the industrial law was not applicable to the situation. An appeal was taken against this decision to the Industrial Appellate Tribunal and it was held on 4-4- 1969 as a fact that the printing press in run by the University of the Punjab for facility of the students and its own convenience. However, on the ground that there was no bar under any law to restrain the University of the Punjab from running an industry or business and as printing press independently was an industry and a business, therefore, it could not loose its character simply because it was being run by the University or its objects were different. The two Indian cases were distinguished on the ground that in both the main point urged was that the educational institutions were an industry and the point before the learned Judges of the Indian Court was not as to whether a printing press which is run by an educational institution can be said to be an industry or not. The Punjab University invoked the Provisional Constitution Order with a view to have the order of the Industrial Appellate Tribunal dated 4-4-1969 quashed. This petition was admitted for hearing on 23rd June 1969 and further proceedings in that matter were stayed the same day.

9. In Writ Petition No. 62 of 1974 the technical staff employed by the University of the Punjab Lahore (New Campus) formed itself into a Trade Union and got itself registered on the 30-3-1973, with the Registrar Trade Unions, Lahore Region. It was, when they filed a list of demands and the Assistant Director, Labour Welfare (Conciliation) Lahore Region summoned the petitioner in respect of the demands set forth by the Union, that it came to the notice of the petitioner that such a Union had been registered. The conciliation proceedings took place. The petitioner raised the objection that University was not an industry and the conciliation failed. Thereafter, the petitioner received a notice from the Punjab Labour Court in proceedings under section 32 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. On this the University of the Punjab invoked Article 201 of the Interim Constitution for declaring the registration of the respondent-Union on 30-3-1973 as without 'lawful authority and of no legal effect. The petition was admitted on 17-1-1974 and an interim order was passed on 20th February 1974 directing -the Labour Court not to finalize the proceedings pending under section 32 ,of the Industrial Relations Ordinance.

10. In Writ Petition No. 1365 of 1974 the employees of the Printing Press Punjab University formed themselves into a Trade Union and got -themselves registered from the Registrar of Trade Unions, Lahore on the 22nd day of November 1973. Thereafter a demand notice was served on the .Registrar of the University by the Union. The registration of the Union has been challenged by a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution on the ground that the printing press being an integral part of the Punjab University -which is concerned exclusively with education is not an industry and the Industrial Relations Ordinance is not at all applicable. The petition was :admitted on 13th July 1974 and as an interim measure it was ordered that proceedings, if any, on the basis of the registration of the Union, which ,was impugned in the petition shall remain in abeyance.

11. In Writ Petition 977/1974 the employees of the Secondary 'Education Board, Sargodha formed themselves into a Trade Union and applied for registration. The Registrar on 10-4-1974 refused the registration . Of the Union by reference to a decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal -in an Appeal No. Lahore-127/1972 dated 7-9-1972. An appeal was preferred under section 8(3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance by the Union on which the Punjab Labour Court on 24-5-1974 held that the Union was -entitled to be registered and accepting the appeal gave a direction to that =effect. The judgment relied upon by the Registrar for refusing registration was distinguished on the ground that it related to the applicability of the :industrial and Commercial Employment Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 .And not to the Industrial Relations Ordinance. The petitioner Board wanted to pursue an appeal and did file one before the Appellate Tribunal against this direction of the Labour Court, but it was dismissed in limine on the ground that such an order was not appealable. In consequence the Trade Union comprising the employees of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Sargodha was formally registered and certificate issued on the 27th May 1974. The Board has invoked Article 199 of the constitution for challenging the decision of the Labour Court dated 24th May 1974, directing registration of the Trade Union of the employees of the Board.

The only ground taken up is that the Board is under a statutory .Duty to organize, regulate,. Develop and control Intermediate and Secondary :Education and these duties do not make it an industry or a commercial establishment for the purposes of Industrial Relations Ordinance. There was, therefore, no power in the Registrar to register a Trade Union of its employees and the Labour Court in giving the direction acted without lawful authority.

12. The question of law common to all these petitions and requiring determination is whether education is an industry or in other words whether .Educational institutions are governed by industrial Relations Ordinance. The decision of this question requires the interpretation of the definition of "industry" as provided in the Ordinance in the context of Labour and industrial laws of the country.

13. By Ordinance No. XIX of 1970 the definition of industry has come to be as follows:- "'Industry' means any business, trade, manufacture, calling, service, employment or occupation."

14. Immediately before such a simplified definition of industry' was provided it was defined as follows (Ordinance No. XXIII of 1969 as enacted): "2(xiv) "industry" means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture of calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, occupation or avocation of workmen and includes-

(a) mines, quarries and other works for the extraction of minerals from. The earth;

(b) industries in which articles are manufactured, altered, cleaned, repaired, ornamented, finished, adapted for sale, broken up or demoli--shed, or in which materials are transformed. Including shipbuilding and the generation, transformation, and transmission or electricity or motive power of any kind;

(c) constructions, reconstruction, maintenance, repair, alteration or demolition of any building, railway, tramway, harbour, dock, pier, canal, inland waterway, road, tunnel, bridge, sewer, drain, well, telegraphic or telephonic installations, electrical undertakings, gas work, waterwork or other work of construction as well as the preparation for. The laying the foundations of any such work or structure;

(d) transport of passengers or goods by road, rail, sea or inland waterway including the handling of goods at docks, quays, wharves or warehouses. But excluding export by land."

15. The following definition of industry (section 2(j)) contained in Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was reproduced in identical words (section 2(h)) In Industrial Disputes Ordinance of 1959 and in Industrial Disputes Ordinance of 1968. "industry means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen."

16. Even before 1947 the definition remained the same except for a minor addition It was contained (section 2(e)) in Trade Unions Act, 1926. It was as follows: 'industry' means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling: of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial or agricultural occupation or avocation of workmen."

17. It is, therefore, clear that at least from 1947 to 1969 the statutory definition of industry remained just the same. On the sub-continent in the--past the concept of industrial dispute and the meaning of industry, wherein doubts, were sought to be resolved mainly by reference to Australian Cases,. In particular the observations of Isaacs and Rich, JJ. In Federated Municipal and Shire Council Employees of Australia v. Melbourne Corporation (26 CLR 50S which. Were as follows: "The concept may be thus formulated. Industrial disputes occur when,,. In relation to operations in which capital and labour are contributed in co-operation for the satisfaction of human wants or desires, those enagaged in co-operation dispute as to the basis to be observed, by the parties, respecting either a share of the product or any other terms and conditions of their co-operation.

This formula excludes the two extreme contentions of the claimant and the respondents respectively. It excludes, for once, the legal and medical professions, because they are not carried out in intelligible sense by the cooperation of capital and labour and do not come within the sphere of industrialism. It includes, where the necessary co-operation exists, disputes between employers and employers. It implies that "industry", to lead to an industrial dispute, is not, as the claimant contends, merely industry in the abstract sense, as if it alone affected the result, but it must be acting and be considered in association with its co---operator "capital" in some form so that the result is, in a sense, the outcome of their combined efforts. It also implies that "an industry", -in relevant sense, is not confined to a single enterprise, but means a class of operations in which all persons, employers and employers, are engaged on the same field of industry-not necessarily of commerce-- provided by the society in which they exist."

Finally as regards profits, it was observed: "The question of profit-making may be important from an income-tax point of view, as in many municipal cases in England; but, from an industrial dispute point of view, it cannot matter whether the expenditure is met by fares from passengers or from rate."

18. Another Australian case quite often noted for resolving the doubt is that of Federated State School Teachers Association of Australia v. The State of Victoria and others (44 CLR 569 Isaacs, J.

Who was the solitary in dissent posed the question thus- "The basic question raised by this case strange as it may seem, is whether the occupation of employees engaged in education itself universally recognized as the key industry to all skilled occupations, is "industrial" within the meaning of the constitution."

19. He answered it by holding that education so provided constitutes in itself an independent industrial operation as a service rendered to the community and "even if education, cultural and vocational had no other claim industrially than as a mere adjunct of indubitable industrial enterprise, it would, for the reason last stated, come within the constitutional provision."

20. The majority (of for) against this view held: "Can it be said that the educational activities of the states constitute an industry. So far as the matter is one of fact, we would say that they cannot. They bear no resemblance whatever to an ordinary trade, business or industry. They are not connected directly with, or attendant upon, the production or distribution of wealth and there is no cooperation of capital and labour, in any relevant sense, for a great public scheme of education is forced upon the communities by the States by law."

21. The objection to this reasoning if education were in private hands was noted and met by the following observations: "It was said that if the activities were carried on by private person, such as a school master, then the operation would be described as a business, a trade or an industry. Sharply, that argument is met by the fact that a private person could no more carry on this system of public education than he could carry on His Majesty's Treasury or any of the other executive departments of Government and if he were authorized to do so, which is almost inconceivable, then he would no more carry on an industry than the State does now."

22. The Australian decisions bad their basis in an altogether different situation, viz., the resolution of conflict between the constitutional provision providing for federal jurisdiction and the State autonomy,. The constitution provided that "the parliament shall, subject to this constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the commonwealth with respect to . . . .(XXXV) conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State." Municipal functions were categorized into (a)

Governance or those partaking of administration of state (b) Trading (c) non-trading. The Governance part was held not capable of giving rise to industrial disputes but the Trading activity was held to be one which could give rise to industrial dispute-, and hence felt within jurisdiction of commonwealth Court. The question whether a particular activity was a trading activity or not, whether it could and did give rise to an industrial dispute or not was actually examined time and again. This side reference to the Australian cases has become necessary in these proceedings for two reasons. Firstly, to take note of the definition of industry as provided in the sub-constitutional legislation of Australia which came to be examined in juxtaposition with the undefined expression "industrial dispute" in the constitution. Secondly, to demonstrate what decisive role these Australian decisions have played in the past in understanding the definition in our own laws.

23. Section 4 of the Common weath Conciliation and Arbitration Act defined industry to include: "any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of employers on land and waters in which persons are employed for pay, hire, advantage or reward excepting only persons engaged in agricultural, viticultural, horticultural or dairying pursuits."

24. The guidance obtained from these Australian decisions has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court of India in the Madras Gymkhana's case (AIR 1968 SC 554 in the following words: "Decisions rendered on these definitions (and some others very similar) have naturally influenced opinion making in this Court. The Australian cases in particular have been sub-rose all the time."

25. From 1926 to 1968 the definition" of industry had remained almost the same. There was a significant change in it b;- Ordinance No. XXIII of 1969 enforced on 3-I1-69 when it was enlarged, not so much in its meaning and content, as in the specifications of the industries brought within it-, fold by the inclusive clause. Not even a year had elapsed when this definition was by an amendment (Ordinance XIX of 1970) under examination shorn of all its inclusive clauses and reduced to a size smaller than it ever had, retaining all the key-words that existed in it since long past but omitting a few important ones. Going by the rule of interpretation there are certain assumptions that can safely be made. The first is that in, ,the ordinary circumstances the Legislature must be taken to have intended a change in law, for otherwise its effort would be one of futility. An amending Act to this extent partakes of the characteristics of a curative act.

Crawford has expressed this in the following words: "They may be defined as those statutes which make an addition to or operate to change the original law so as to effect an improvement therein or to more effectively carry out the purposes for which the original was passed." -Secondly, an amending provision is not ordinarily interpreted so as to alter completely the character of the Principal law, unless clear language is found indicating such an intention. In other words, in the absence of a contrary intention, an amendatory statute will not have a wider scope than the statute which has been amended, and should be construed to have the same sphere of operation. Thirdly, and this is important for these cases, the previous judicial construction becomes a part of the amended statute, where the terms construed are retained in a subsequent amendment. With these assumptions 'as starting points an attempt will be made to ascertain what was the state of law before the alteration was made, what was the mischief intended to be remedied and what was the nature of the remedy provided.

26. There are three reported decisions (to my knowledge) of the Courts of this country concerned with the definition of industry which stands today. The first is a Labour Tribunal's decision in F. I. M. C.

Employees' Union v. Registrar, Trade Unions (PLJ 1973 Tr. C. (Lah.) 113 in which after taking note of the amendment in the definition and its effect it was concluded that "The result is that according to the present definition of industry without seeing whether a calling, service, employment or occupation is being run on business point of view or not, it would be industry."

27. The next is a well considered Division Bench judgment of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court in Ferguson & Co. v. The Sind Labour Court (1974 PLC 98), wherein the whole range of Labour legislation in this country in the recent fast was cavered and the following conclusions drawn 'I have, referred to these statutes to show that the Ordinance was one in the series of statutes which manifest the concern of the Legislature for the welfare of the workmen. In the legislative back.-round, it is clear that the legislature has altered the definition of industry deliberately,,) and it would be defeating its intention if we were to construe and restrict the meaning of new definition by reference to the old definition and the decisions on it."

28. The third case is of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, in Aisha Bawany Academy v. Madad Bakhsh (1975 PLC 354 in which educational institution was held to be not an industry following the University of Delhi's case (AIR 1963 SC 1873 The change in the definition of industry was not noted in this case.

29. In passing I might as well point out that the latest definition of ;industry in the Ordinance is not so radically different from the oldest of which record is available. In New Zealand Act No. 14 of 1894 entitled "An Act. To encourage the Formation of Industrial Unions and Associations, and to~ facilitate the Settlement of Industrial Disputes by Conciliation and Arbitra--tion." Industry was defined to mean `any business, trade, manufacture, undertaking. Calling or employment of an industrial character'. In South Australian Conciliation Act, 1894 which came into force on 1st January 1895 industry was defined to mean "arty avocation, business, trade, undertaking;. Calling or employment." Western Australian Act on the subject was enforced: in 1900 and it defined industry as "Any business, trade, manufacture, undertaking, calling or employment in which workers are employed"

30. The object of reproducing these definitions is to demonstrate that in the context of Industrial and Labour Laws the words Business, trade, manufacture, undertaking, avocation, employment (or service) have been used and they have presented some problem in interpretation.

31. One such problem has been whether these words should be given their plain dictionary meaning or their popular and conventional meaning, whether they should have the fullest sway or must be contained by the nature and object of the statute in which they are used. The very first word, Business always finding a place in the definition has the following dictionary (all references to dictionary are to the Oxford English Dictionary) meaning "state or quality of being busy. In general sense action which occupies, time, demands attention and labour; especially serious occupation;. Work as opposed to pleasure or recreation."

32. Similarly the expression, Trade has the following dictionary, meaning "Anything practised for a livelihood; The practice of some occupation,. Business or profession habitually carried on especially when practised as a means of livelihood or gain."

33. It is, therefore, clear that given their plain ordinary dictionary meaning words used to define Industry, words which have been always, and are even now, a part of the definition, viz., Business.

Trade, Manufacture, Calling, -Service, occupation are of the widest amplitude a include in their sweep every conceivable human activity which is not casual, recreational or past time. Literal construction certainly leads to that tend and to no other. However, one accepted principal of interpretation already reproduced used is that use in a statute , amending or otherwise, of a term which was received ajudicial construction gives rise to the presumption that the term is used in that sense. The Privy Council adopted with approval this rule in Webb v. Outnim (1907 AC81). It is expressed in the following words "When a particular form of legislative enactment which has received authoritative interpretation whether by judicial decision or by long course of practice is adopted in the framing of a later statute, it is a sound rule of construction to hold that the words so adopted were intended by the Legislature to bear the meaning which had been so put on them."

34. Maxwell (Twelfth edition, page 87) sets out another principle of interpretation relevant to the issue in the following words "However wide in the abstract, general words, and phrases are more or less elastic, and admit of restriction or extentions to suit the legislation in question. The object or policy of the legislation often affords the answer to problems arising from ambiguities which it contains, for it is a canon of interpretation that all words, if they be general and not precise, are to be restricted to the fitness of the matter that is to be construed as particular if the intention be particular."

35. In the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha's case (1), the meaning was sought to be given to these expressions in the following manner: "Business" is a wider term not synonymous with trade and means practically "anything which is an occupation as distinguished from pleasure." The word calling again is very wide, it means "one's usual occupation, vocation, business or trade, so is `service' very wide in its import. Prima facie, if the definition has deliberately used words of such wide import, it would be necessary to read these words in their, wide denotation, and so read, Hospital cannot be excluded from the definition."

36. Apart from this fact others noted in that cast were (i) the use of the -word 'undertaking' in the definition which suggested that profit was no consideration and (ii) the inclusive character of the definition of industry prompting the Court to reject the application of rule of construction noscuntur a socus. But the exact scope of the meaning remained undetermined if one were to keep in view the conclusion reached by the Court and expressed in the following words "It is clear, however, that though section 2(d) uses words of very wide denotation, a line would have to be drawn in a fair and just manner so as to exclude some callings, services or undertakings. If all the words used are given their widest meaning, all services and all callings would come within the purview of the definition; even service rendered by a servant purely in a personal or domestic matter or even in a casual way would fall within the definition. It is not and cannot be suggested that in its wide sweep the word service is intended to include service howsoever rendered in whatever capacity and whatever reason. We must therefore, consider where the line should be drawn and what limitations can and should be reasonably implied in interpreting the wide words used in section 2(d) and that no doubt is a somewhat difficult problem to decide."

37. The history of judicial decisions thereafter shows how more and more tests were added to contain the generality of the definition as in Ahmadabad Textile Industry Research Association ( AIR 1961 SC 484 in M. R. Mehr's case (AIR 1962 SC 1080 and in University of Delhi case. Then comes the Madras Gymkhana's case (AIR 1968 SC 534 where it was held that "It is, therefore, clear that before the work engaged in can be described as an industry, it must bear the definite character of trade or business or manufacture or calling or must be capable of being described as an undertaking in material goods or material services."

38. Next case of this category was Cricket Club of India ((1969) 1 L L J 775), where a Cric--ket Club employing 397 persons owning and managing immovable property of the value of 67 lakhs, running canteen and refreshment rooms, arranging big;, parties. Charging fee for admission to matches in stadiums owned by it was held to be not falling in the definition of industry for the following reasons "It is, in fact, an activity in the course of promotion of the game of' Cricket and it is incidental that the club is able to make an income on these few occasions which income is later utilized for the purposes of fulfilling its other objects as incorporated in the memorandum of association. The holding of matches is primarily organized by the Club for the purpose of promoting the game of Cricket. This activity by the Club cannot, by itself, in our opinion, lead to the inference that the Club is carrying on an industry."

19. Finally, in the case of Safdar Jang Hospital ((1970) 11 L L J 266 decided in April' 1970 more specific decision was given on certain controversial expressions. These are summarized as follows

(f) "The word 'trade' includes persons in a line of business in which persons are employed as workmen."

(ii) "'Business' too is a word of wide import. In one sense it includes, all occupations and professions.

But in the collocation of the terms and their definition these terms have x definite economic content of a particular type and on the authorities of this Court have been uniformly accepted as excluding professions and are only concerned' with the production, distribution and consumption of wealth and the production and availability of material services."

(iii) "Industry has thus been accepted to mean only trade and business, manufacture or undertaking analogous to trade or business for the production production of material goods or wealth and material services."

(iv) "Material services involve an activity carried on through cooperation: between employers and employees to provide the community with the use of something . . . . . . . Organized as an industry and commer--cially valuable."

(v) "If a hospital, nursing home or dispensary is run as a business in a. Commercial way there may be found elements of an industry there. Then the hospital is more than a place where persons get treated for their ailment."

40. The amendment, which has come up for consideration in these cases, was made by Ordinance XIX of 1970 introduced on 14th October, 1970. Its following characteristics have to be noted for ascertaining the intention of the Legislature

(i) 1t retains most of the key-words used in the definition viz., Business,. Trade, Manufacture, calling, service, employment or occupation.

(ii) It omits from the definition a few key-words, most important being undertaking.

(iii) The extended inclusive definition is given up.

(iv) Simultaneous amendment was made in the definition of establishment.

41. A review of the Australian and Indian cases makes it clear that in. The sphere of Industrial and Labour law the terms Business. Trade and manufacture were without exception given not their plain dictionary meaning; but their popular and conventional meaning. Their retention in the definition would clearly suggest that it was not intended by the Legislature to either enlarge their meaning or to further limit it. The expressions, calling, service. Employment or occupation have also never been understood or interpreted" in their plain dictionary meaning. Instead they have been held to be con--trolled by and taking their colour from opening words, Business, Trade and Manufacture.

42. It is an interesting study to examine the difficulty presented by the word `undertaking' in the company of 'Business, trade arid manufacture, in the earlier definition A comprehensive resume is found in the case of Madras Gymkhana Club and the reason for its omission is readily ascer-- tainable. In the case of D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukkerji (AIR 1953 SC 58 the suggestion that the word undertaking takes its colour from the words business, trade, manufacture was not accepted on the ground that this interpretation renders the word undertaking superfluous and the latter part of the definition unnecessary. In State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (AIR 1960 SC 610 the expression. Undertaking was allowed to take its colour from the other expressions. On the earlier reasoning such a view made the word undertaking superfluous and the latter portion of the definition unecessary. In the Madras Gymkhana case following observations were made with regard to the expression under--taking "'Of these categories' undertaking is the most elastic . . . . . . It is this category which has figured in the cases of this Court . . . . . . The word: undertaking must be defined as "any business or any work or project' which are engaged in or attempts as an enterprise analogous to business or trade."

43. The omission of the word undertaking was, apparently, with the set purpose of giving full effect to the control of the opening words business, trade and manufacture. It had taken the Indian Supreme Court a period of over ten years, and a number of cases to submit finally the word under- -taking to the effective control of the opening expression business, trade and manufacture.

44. I have already referred to the case of D. N. Banerji (AIR 1953 SC 58 where ones reason for not placing the word undertaking under the control of the governing expressions was that it would make the word undertaking. Superfluous and the latter part of the definition unnecessary. When finally the expression undertaking was brought within the same fold (Madras Gymkhana) the inclusive character of the definition was abandoned and it was taken to be a definition having one part only, Me opening words, governing the rest of the definition. The definition was by such a pruning shorn of its superfluity and vagueness. It became more precise. There was-- no question now of extending its meaning and scope by reference to expres--sions like undertaking or its inclusive character.

45. I consider that most positive manifestation of legislative intent has --taken place in the simultaneous amendment of the definition of establishment, in Industrial Relations Ordinance.

Immediately before the amendment it was defined to mean `Establishment' means any office, firm, industrial unit, undertaking, shop or premises in which workmen are employed for the purpose of carrying on any manufacturing process, business, trade or service."

46. While amending the definition of industry in terms already reprodu--ced, there was a simultaneous amendment in the definition of establishment -which after such amendment stood as follows "Establishment means any office, firm, industrial unit, undertaking, shop or premises in which workmen are employed for the purpose of carrying on any industry."

47. An argument was advanced in the case of Fergusan & Co. That the expression "in which workmen are employed for the purpose of carrying on any industry" qualified not merely the preceding word "premises" but all the preceding words in the definition of establishment. The Division Bench rejected it on the ground that it will make the expression industrial unit redundant and further the word industry used herein could not be given a different meaning than the one contained in the definition. With greatest respect I find it difficult to agree to this view. It is a recognized rule of construction that where several words are followed by a general expression which is as much applicable to the first and other words as to the last, that .Expression is not limited to the last but applies to all. It is this rule of .Construction which was sought to be pressed into service. Further the use of the word unit with Industrial is very significant. Unit has the following dictionary meaning "A single individual or thing, regarded as a member of a group or member of things or individuals, or discriminated from these as having separate existence, one of the separate parts or members of which a complex whole or aggregate is composed or into which it may be analysed."

48. The moment the expression "industrial unit" comes up for interpret--tation we are reminded of the aggregate or the group or the genre of which it is a part. It is not sufficient that there should be an industrial unit. What is required in addition is that it should exist for industry and not for any .Other non-industrial purpose. Thus a scheme for rehabilitation of destitute women, or disabled and infirm men, or the blind may have as its integral part, workshops, or industrial units but as its existence would not be for industry it would not fall within the definition of industry. There is a whole range of case-law on this. The sale of milk and manure was held to be not industry (Madras Plnjara Pole v. Labour Court (1961PLC414) where the main object and purpose of the undertaking was to afford shelter, food and medical treatment to unserviceable cows, including dry cows till the end of their lives. Such sales being incidental to the main object, notwithstanding having a business tinge about them.

49. In the case of Assam- Rashtra Bhasha Prachar Samutt v. Workmen Union maintenance of a printing press was held to be subsidiary to the main cultural activities of the organization keeping it out of the definition of Industry.

50. In Brahmo Samaj Educational Society y. West Bengal College Employees' Associations the colleges were found running canteens, selling refreshments to students, maintaining workshop' for laboratory equipment. All the same, these being incidental and ancillary to the main purpose of the establishment, viz education were held to be not industry.

51. It is, therefore, not sufficient that there be an industrial unit. What. Is required is that such industrial unit, office, firm, shop must be for industry and for no other purpose. Here the word industry will have the same: meaning as in the definition. Such a construction imputes no redundancy or surplusage to the Legislature. On the contrary it explains the fullest significance of the expression industrial unit and industry.

52. The upshot of the entire discussion is that the use of the expressions, "Business, Trade, Manufacture, Calling, Service. Employment or Occupation" in the definition of Industrial Relations Ordinance is not in its ordinary dictionary meaning but in its popular and conventional meaning. In the context of industrial and labour laws, these expressions apply to any enterprise! f which is organized and is systematic depending substantially, if not entirely, on the cooperation between labour and capital, and having as its object production, distribution and consumption of wealth, or the production or provision of material services. The enterprise as a whole has to be looked at to find its raison d---etre , and any part of it which is incidental ancillary or an adjunct cannot determine the character of the whole.

53. Applying these tests to the individual cases we find that Christian. Technical Training Centre is an educational and training establishment. If it is maintaining an industrial unit (a workshop) rendering services on payment; advertising its product, it is as an incidence of vocational education and of training programme designed to ensure job opportunities to the trainees, Therefore, what is incidental to the main purpose cannot detract in any, manner, from its being an educational institution.

54. At the relevant time the West Pakistan (University of the Punjab) Ordinance, 1961 determined the character of the Punjab University and the sphere of its activities. The preamble sets out the purpose of the Ordinance in the following words "Whereas it is expedient to reconstitute and reorganize the University of the Punjab for the purposes of improving teaching and research provided thereby and the administration thereof."

Section 5 of the Ordinance specifies the powers of the University which actually determine and circumscribe the sphere of its operational field. There are 14 specific items all dealing with teaching, instructions, research, conduct of examination, conferment of degrees etc, and control and supervision over such matters. There is no power possessed by the University to embark on any enterprise or to establish any industry alien to these purposes of the Ordinance. The residuary clause (xv) of section 5 empowers the University to do such other acts and things whether incidental to the powers aforesaid or not as may be requisite in order to further the objects of the University as an examining, teaching and research body specially regarding dessemination and advancement of knowledge and cultivate and promote art, science and other branches of learning. The assumption of the industrial Court that the University has opted to have the printing press as an industrial enterprise i'h a situation where it was free to embark on any other industrial enterprise is open to serious question in view of statutory provisions.

55. University of the Punjab Act, 1973 while specifying the powers of the University in section 4 by its clause (v) authorizes it to "receive and manage property transferred and grants bequest, trusts, gifts, donations, endowments and other contributions made to the University and to invest any fund representing such property, grants, bequests, trusts, gifts, donations and endowments or contributions in such manner as it may deem fit." Even where such a power in general terms has been conferred on the University to invest its funds it does not follow that the University is free to set up an industry not connected with purposes for which it has been established as a part of the investment of its funds.

56. An effort, has been made by the employees of the University Printing Press to demonstrate that books are being printed at the Press and they are sold to the public at prices which are their normal market prices and this gives the entire printing press a commercial and industrial complexion irrespective of the educational purpose for which the University exists. In support --f this claim a list of books published by the printing press showing also their prices was filed during the course of the hearing of the writ petition. A perusal of the list could convince any one that by setting up a printing press which is printing such books the University is in no manner eroding its own character as an educational institution. The list of books contains the following heads of subject on which the books have been printed t

(i) Text Books.

(ii) Miscellaneous Books.

(iii) Urdu Encyclopedia of Islam.

(iv) Oriental Publications.

(v) Shahanshah of Iran ; Grant Publication.

(vi) Books published on the centenary of Ghalib.

57. A further examination of the books listed under each head shows that these are not the ordinary commercial publications. Wits an eye on the market, but these are publications directed try promote the advancement of learning and research by preserving and ensuring the availability of rare books and manuscripts to students and researchers.

58. The balance-sheet of the University Printing Press was submitted with a view to establish that its activities are more businesslike and commercial than educational. The balance-sheet shows that its liabilities to University were to the tune of Rs. 2,16,086.65 in 1971-72 and Rs. 2,8!,176.89 in 1972- 73 and the printing charges realized during 1971-72 from all sources were Rs. 1,78,249.97 and Rs.

1.04,270.59 in 1972-73. The loss in 1971-72 is shown to be Rs. 26,198.12 and in 1972-73 it is Rs.

1,62,067_66. The balance-sheet does not bear out the contention of the workers.

59. A solitary marriage invitation card without any print line was put in to prove that private printing work is also undertaken by this press. It is said to have been printed on 3-11-1975. Even if it were true it does not alter the character of the Printing Press which is an industrial unit designed for and owing its existence m that set up to a larger and bigger purpose, viz. The educational process. It remain incidental and ancillary to that purpose.

60. A similar reference to and study of the Ordinance setting up the Sargodha Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education (Ordinance VII of 1968) would show that its power and sphere of activity has been deliated in section 11 stud none of them concerns any matter which is alien or is not incidental to education, its standardization, control, supervision or advance--ment.

The same result will therefore follow.

61. All these petitions are, therefore, allowed, the orders impugned therein, in so far as they treat the petitioner not to be a part of the educa--tion al process, or education to be an industry for the purposes of Industrial Relations Ordinance and all the consequential orders are declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. This adjudication does not to any manner, affect or deal with their status, legal rights and obligations under laws other than Industrial Relations Ordinance.

62. In view of the nature of controversy no order is made as to costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.