This judgment shall dispose of Writ Petitions Nos. 9207 of 1995, 9208 of 1995, 10428 of 1996, 10430 of 1996 and 11712 of 1996 as they involve common questions of law and facts.
2. Through the Notification dated 7-10-1980 issued by the Government of the Punjab, Labour Department, the provisions of West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965, were applied to the petitioners for making contribution in respect of their employees for the purpose of the said Ordinance. It appears that the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 remained silent for quite a considerable period for actual enforcement of the said notifications and the petitioners also failed to pay their contribution as required by them under the law. It was on 8-5-1995 that the Punjab Employees' Social Security Institution issued a notice to the petitioners demanding the amount of social security contribution. The petitioners, therefore, filed these Constitutional petitions to call in question the validity of the notification issued by the Government of the Punjab, Labour Department, under the provisions of section I of subsection (3) of the aforesaid Ordinance and the impugned notice dated 8-5--1995 for the payment of the social security contribution.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the petitioners were the educational institutions and the provisions of the aforesaid Ordinance could not be applied by the issuance of a notification as the petitioners were neither an industrial establishment, undertaking or an.
Organization within the meaning of the said Ordinance. He further submitted that the employees of the petitioners comprised teaching and non-teaching staff who did not qualify the definition of an employee as given in clause (xviii) of section 2 of the Ordinance ibid. He further submitted that the employees of the petitioners were paid their salaries which concept was distinct from the wages as defined by the said Ordinance. He referred to the Black's Law Dictionary whereby the term "salary" has been defined as a reward or recompense. The learned counsel also relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of K.G. Old, Principal, Christian Technical Training Centre, Gujranwala v.
Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court, Northern Zone and 6 others PLD 1976 Lahore 1097. A learned Single Judge on the facts of that case took the view that the Christian Technical Training Centre was not an industry within the meaning of section 2(xiv) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
He further referred to the case of, Messrs Standard Printing Press v. Sind Employees' Social Security Institution 1988 SCMR 91 wherein it was held that the vires of an enacted law and the notifications thereunder could not be agitated under section 57 before the Social Security. Institution or in appeal under section 59 before the Social Security Court or in further appeal under section 64 before the High Court. He, therefore, argued that the present Constitutional petitions could be directly filed by the petitioners without availing the remedies of appeal before the Department as well as before the Social Security Court and the High Court as provided for by the -provisions of the Ordinance.
4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents have submitted that in view of the law laid down in the cases of Holy Family Hospital and another v. Government of Sind and another (1985 SCMR 593), St. Jude's Secondary School and others v. Employees' Old-Age Benefits Institution and another (PLD 1988 Karachi 473) and Don Bosco High School v. The Assistant Director, E.O.B.I.
And others (PLD 1988 SC 128), no exception could be taken to the notification issued by the Government of the Punjab whereby the provisions of the West Pakistan Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965, were made applicable to the establishments of the petitioners and their employees.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length. The West Pakistan employees'
Social Security Ordinance, `1965, is the beneficial or remedial legislation conceived as a means of ameliorating the lot of the working class. As such, it would be in keeping with the accepted principles of interpretation, that it should be so construed as to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief, as it would frustrate the legislative intent. It could appear, therefore, that, in keeping with the object of the legislation, as wide an interpretation should be placed to the terms 'employee' and ' establishment' as permissible within the language employed in the statute.
Similarly, the term 'wages' as defined in the said Ordinance has to be construed for. The advancement of its purpose and the promotion of social justice as guaranteed in Article 2A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. In taking this view I find support from the judgments in the cases of Kohinoor Chemical Co. Ltd. And another v. Sind Employees' Social Security Institution and another (PLD 1977 SC 197), Messrs Macdonald Layton Costain Limited, West Wharf, Karachi v.
Punjab Employees Social .Security Institution, Lahore and 2 others (PLD 1991 SC 1055), National Embroidery Mills Ltd. And others v. Punjab Employees' Social Security Institution (1993 SCMR 1201), Sind Employees' Social Security Institution v. Messrs Cowardree and Sons (1993 SCMR 1433), Shaheen Airport Services v. Sind Employees' Social Security Institution (1994 SCMR 881) and Anoor Textile Mills Ltd. And another v. The Federation of Pakistan and another (PLD 1994 SC 568).
6. The question as to whether the petitioners' establishments are or not covered by the term 'establishment' has already been answered in affirmative in the cases of Don Bosco High School (supra), St. Jude's Secondary School and others (supra) and Saint Peter High School, Gujranwala v.
Assistant Director (Field Operation) E.O.B.I., Gujranwala (1990 PLC 244) (Lahore) wherein the educational institution was held to be covered by the definition of an 'establishment' within the meaning of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976. There is no reason for making a departure of the view already taken by the highest Court of the country to the term 'establishment' which seems to have been borrowed from the provisions of the West Pakistan Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965. It is now well-settled rule of construction that in the case of statutes which are pari-materia the definitions as provided in one statute and interpreted by the superior Court can be applied for the-purpose of another statute Reliance can be placed on the case of Amanullah v.
The State (1993 SCMR 1806). I, therefore, hold that the petitioners are fully covered by the definition of 'establishment' as defined by the Ordinance of 1965 and no exception could be taken to the issue of a notification of the Government whereby the provisions of the said statute were applied to the petitioners and their employees. Similarly, I see no reason as to why a technical view of the term 'wages' should be taken to the remuneration being paid by the petitioners to their employees. In the presence of the term 'wages' as defined in section 2(30) of the said Ordinance, there is no need to have recourse to the ordinary dictionary meaning. The Supreme Court of India in the cases of Muhammadali and others v. Union of India and another (AIR 1964 SC 980) and Gestetner Duplicators (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal (AIR 1979 SC 607) held that conceptually there was no difference between salary and wages both being recompense for the work done or services rendered. A similar view was taken in the case of Mir Laiq Ali and others v.
Syed Muhammad Jafari (PLD 1959 (W.P.) Karachi 704). There is, therefore, no reason as to why the meaning of the word 'wages' should not be followed as I assigned to it by the Legislature unless the context otherwise required. It has been held by a Division Bench of the Sind High Court in the case of Sind Employees' Social Security Institution v. Prestige Fabrics Limited (PLD 1987 Kar.. 124) that the definition of 'wages' given in section 2(30) of the Ordinance to 6e followed in letter and spirit with beneficial construction thereon. I have, therefore, no doubt in holding that the emoluments or remuneration or salary being paid by the petitioners to their employees are fully covered by the definition of 'wages' as given in the said Ordinance.
7. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned notification and the notices issued by the respondents do not suffer from any legal infirmity. These writ petitions fail and are dismissed with no order as to costs.