1. ' IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, J.---In Constitutional Petitions Nos.191 and 192 of 1994 the Administrator, Quetta Municipal Corporation and Registrar, Trade Unions, Balochistan respectively have challenged the right of the employees of the Municipal Corporation to establish trade union under the provisions of industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance, 1969). As a common question of law requiring interpretation is involved, thefefore, we have proposed to dispose of both the petitions by this common judgment.
2. ' It is the case of petitioner in Constitutional Petition No,191/1994 that Quetta Municipal Corporation's Employees Union has been registered by the Registrar of the trade unions, respondent No,1, in contravention to the provisions of Ordinance of 1969 as the petitioners establishment do not fall within the definition of an establishment as well as industry as it has been defined under section 2, clauses (ix) and (xiv) respectively of the Ordinance of 1969. Whereas in Constitutional Petition No,192/1994 the Registrar, Trade Unions feeling aggrieved from the Order dated 24-5-1994 passed by Presiding Officer, Labour Court Quetta whereby on the appeal filed by unregistered Trade Union, i.e, Quetta Municipal Corporation Mehnat Kash Union has been allowed setting aside the order of Registrar contained in the letter dated 8-2-1994, rejecting the application for registration of the trade union and directions have been issued to him for fresh decision in accordance with law. In the former petition following prayer has been made:- "It is accordingly respectfully prayed:
(i) That registration certificate dated 4-7-1993 and C.BA. Certificate dated 29-4-1984 issued by respondent No,1 in favour of respondent No,2 be declared as illegal, void, without lawful authority and of no legal effect;
(ii) That respondent No,1 had no jurisdiction in law to register respondent No,2 union or draw proceedings for registration of respondent No,3;
(iii) That the order dated 24-5-1994 passed by Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Quetta being nullity in the eye of law is of no legal effect;
(iv) That respondent No,1 be directed to cancel the registration of respondent No,2 union and drop the proceedings for registration of respondent No,3;
(v) That respondents-Union, its office-bearers, members and other related persons may be permanently restrained from indulging in unlawfui and illegal trade union activities as well as from raising demands in any manner whatsoever. They may also be restrained from staging agitations, demonstrations, going on strikes and interfering in the administrative affairs of the Corporation.
(vi) Any other relief as may be deemed fit and appropriate in the circumstances of case may also be passed in favour of petitioner and against the respondents."
3. Whereas in the later petition relief has been claimed in the following terms:-- "It is respectfully prayed that:-
(i) That petitioner has no jurisdiction in law to register respondent No,1 union or draw proceedings for registration;
(ii) That the order dated 24-5-1994 passed by Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Quetta being nullity in the eye of law is of no legal effect;
(iii) Any other relief as may be deemed fit and appropriate in the circumstances of case may also be passed in favour of petitioner and against the respondents."
4. ' Mr. Shakil Ahmed and Mr. Tariq Mehmood learned Advocates appeared on behalf of the petitioners respectively, whereas M/s. SA. Zahoor and K.N. Kohli, Advocates represented the registered and unregistered Unions. Ch. Ejaz Yousaf, Additional Advocate-General and Raja Rab Nawaz learned Deputy Attorney-General appeared on Court notice.
5. Mr. Shakil Ahmed learned counsel for petitioner on having referred different provisions of the Ordinance of 1969 contended that Quetta Municipal Corporation in view of its functions as have been defined under Balochistan Local Government Ordinance, 1980 is not an industry or industrial establishment, therefore, it was obligatory upon the Registrar, Trade Unions to have determined its status to ascertain whether it falls within the definition of industry or otherwise. He was also of the opinion that by no stretch of imagination the Municipal Corporation can be assigned the status of industrial unit therefore, registration of the trade union formed by its employees was in sheer contravention to the provisions of Ordinance, 1969.
6. ' Mr. Tariq Mehmood learned counsel for petitioner contended that the Presiding Officer Labour Court, in fact, had misdirected himself in passing the impugned order whereby case has been remanded to the petitioner for fresh consideration. He contended that honourable Supreme Court in C.P. No,66-0/1992, 67-Q/1992 and 74-0/1992 had upheld the judgment of this Court announced in the Constitutional Petition Nos. 279/1992, 39/1992 and 92/1992 as it had resolved the issues fmally and in view of the observations made by honourable Supreme Court the Registrar had no option but to refuse registration of the respondent No,1 Union. Both the learned counsel relied on PLD 1974 SC 368, PLD 1976 Lahore 1097, PLD 1985 SC 429 and unreported judgment of Honourable Supreme Court in C.P. Nos. 66-Q/92, 67-Q/92 and 74-Q/92 decided on 17-10-1992. They also referred to PLD 1968 Lah. 395, 1974 PLC 98 (Labour), 1981 PLC 403, 1980 PLC 426, 1992 PLC 1214, 1989 PLC 760, 1993 PLC 475 and 543.
7. ' SA. Zahoor learned counsel argued that according to its functions the Quetta Municipal Corporation is providing service to general public and it being an incorporate body under the Ordinance of 1980 is not engaged in the affairs of State administration, as such its workers has a right to form a trade union. According to him the expression Industry does not mean whether an establishment is earning profit or otherwise but once it is established that the members of such organisation are undertaking a service they cannot be denied the right of performing the trade union. Particularly those employees of the Corporation who are not performing regal functions cannot be denied the right to form trade unions or associations under the Industrial Relations Ordinance. He placed reliance on PLD 1968 Lahore 395, PLD 1977 Karachi 843, 1980 PLC 213, 1983 PLC 854, 1988 SCMR 765 and 1988 SCMR 1725. Learned counsel also argued that the petition filed by Quetta Municipal Corporation suffers from laches as action of Registrar, Trade Unions registering the union has been challenged after eleven years, therefore, petition is bad on this score. Reliance in this behalf was placed by him on 1986 SCMR 1454, 1987 SCMR 692, 1988 SCMR 765 and 1680.
8. ' The learned counsel also contended that alternate remedy was available to the petitioner for the cancellation of the registration of Trade Union by approaching the Registrar and if he had refused to de-register the Union, then appeal before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court was competent.
9. Thus for this reason as well the petition is not maintainable.
10. ' Mr. K.N. Kohli learned counsel appearing for Quetta Municipal Corporation Mehnat Kash Union unregistered followed the arguments addressed by SA. Zahoor, Advocate and added that according to legislative history of the laws relating to the industrial relations etc. The members of any Organisation who undertake a service for the General Public falls under the definition of establishment, as such are entitled to form a Union. He referred to the definition of the word 'workman' under the Ordinance, 1969 in order to show that whosoever is a workman is entitled to form a Trade Union. In this behalf he also referred to section 3 of the Ordinance, 1969. Mr. K. N. Kohli pointed out various provisions from the Balochistan Local Government Ordinance, 1990 in order to show that the Municipal Corporation is engaged in providing the service of public utility, as such its employees are engaged to carry on the industry as has been defined under section 2, clause (ix) read with clause (xiv). The learned counsel besides -relying on the judgments which have already been cited by S.A. Zahoor, Advocate stated that the Municipal Corporation being involved in economic activity for providing utility service does not go out of the definition of the word 'Industry'.
11. He also relied on 1984 PLC 686 and 1992 PLC 1214.
12. ' Ch. Ejaz Yousaf learned Additional Advocate-General contended that organisation of Quetta Municipal Corporation is not engaged in any industrial establishment therefore, its employees have got no entitlement for the registration of the Trade Union. According to him on the basis of material so placed before the Registrar it was his duty to satisfy himself as to whether respondent-union is carrying on any industry and thereafter would have considered their request for registration under the Ordinance, 1969.
13. ' Ch. Ejaz Yousaf learned Additional Advocate-General also contended that according to the principle relating to the interpretation of statutes each word has to be defined and explained with reference to the object for which the statute has been promulgated. To elaborate his contention he invited our attention towards the definition of the word 'movable and immovable' properties from the Registration Act as well as the Pakistan Penal Code. Learned counsel in this context stated that the expression industry for the purposes of Ordinance, 1969 has been used for limited object as it has been defined by Lahore High Court in the case of 1976 PLD Lahore 1017. Learned counsel referred to 1981 PLC 474, 1992 PLC 121.
14. ' Raja Rab Nawaz learned Deputy Attorney-General appeared on 29-9-1994 and stated that the right of trade union cannot be denied to the employees of Quetta Municipal Corporation and the registration of the Union which has already been made be kept intact.
15. ' We have considered the respective arguments put forth by the learned counsel appearing for the parties as well as the Additional Advocate-General and Deputy Attorney-General who were asked to assist the Court. According to section 3 of the Ordinance, 1969 a right has been conferred upon the workers to establish a Trade Union subject to filing an application under section 6 of the Ordinance, 1969. However, with reference to the proposition under discussion every application for registration of a trade union shall be accompanied by the name of the establishment or group of establishments or the industry as the case may be alongwith names and addresses of the registered Trade Union in the establishment, group of establishments or industry as the case may be to which the Union relates. On the receipt of complete application the Registrar shall proceed to examine the request. He however, may refuse the registration of the union if it is not satisfactorily proved before him that under subsection 2 of section 7 all the persons who are the members of the union are workmen actually engaged or employed in the industry with which the Trade Union is connected. Thus on perusal of these provisions one can visualise that it is mandatory for the applicants to disclose the name of the establishment or the industry and also to prove that the members of the union being workmen are actually engaged or employed in the industry. Therefore, this brings us to examine the definition of the expressions `establishment' and 'Industry' as has been defined under section 2 clauses (ix) and (xiv) respectively of the Ordinance, 1969. The former word means any office, firm, industrial unit, undertaking, shop or premises in which workmen are employed for the purpose of carrying on an industry whereas according to the latter 'Industry' means any business, trade, manufacture, calling service, employment or occupation. It may be observed that in original text of the Ordinance, 1969 an undertaking was also termed to be an "Industry" but later on its definition was substituted by the Industrial Relations Ordinance XIX of 1970, according to which the word 'undertaking' was deleted therefrom. A close perusal of both these expressions reveals that the word 'Industry' is most important to understand that if the workers are not actually engaged in the industry whether their trade union could be registered. According to the Black's law dictionary the word 'Industry' is defined as follows:- "INDUSTRY: Any Department or Branch of Art, occupation, or business conducted as a means of livelihood or for profit: especially, one which employees much labour and capital and is a distinct branch of trade".
16. ' Honourabele Supreme Court defined this word in 1974 PLD SC 368 in the following words:- "INDUSTRY" BASIC CONCEPT:-- The basic concept of "industry" or its derivative "industrial undertaking" is that there must be joint economic endeavour of the employer and the employees, to produce wealth or render services. In other words, what comes out of an "industry" must be the result of combined effort of both the capital and the workmen and must be distinguished from what is commonly known as business or trade. In the case of industry, the relationship of employer and employee is not that of a mere master and servant."
17. ' In the above-noted report, however, the word "industry" has not been interpreted with reference to its definition under the Ordinance, 1969. In this context the Lahore High Court in the case of KG. Old v. Presiding Officer Punjab Labour. Court and others PLD 1976 Lahore 1097 dealt with the word `industry' exhaustively. Relevant para. Therefrom is re-produced hereinbelow:- "The upshot of the entire discussion is that the use of the expressions "Business, Trade, Manufacture, Calling, Service, Employment or Occupation" in the definition of Industrial Relations Ordinance is not in its ordinary dictionary meaning but in its popular and conventional meaning. In the context of industrial and labour laws, these expressions apply to any enterprise which is organized and is systematic depending substantially, if not entirely, on the cooperation between labour and capital, and having as its object production, distribution and consumption of wealth, or the production or provision of material services. The enterprise as a whole has to be looked at to find out its raison d'etre, and any part of it which is incidental, ancillary or an adjunct cannot determine the character of the whole."
18. ' Later on before the Division Bench of Karachi High Court the case of A.F. Furguson and Company v.
19. The 5th Sindh Labour Court, Karachi and another(1974 PLC 1998) the word Industry, Calling, Service, Employment,Occupation as has been used under section 2, clause (xiv) of the Ordinance, 1969 came for consideration. The honourable Bench after tracing the history opined that the A.F.
20. Farguson & Company firm did not constitute an Industry within the meaning of the Ordinance but refused to grant the relief as was prayed for and referred the matter to Labour Court for settling down issue relating to factual controversy. The petitioner-Firm approached Honourable Supreme Court wherein the interpretation made by the Lahore High Court in the case of K.G. OLD was approved. Relevant observations from the Supreme Court judgment reported in PLD 1985 SC 429 as re-produced below:- ' We observe that after the above judgment was delivered, the Lahore High Court as well as a Bench of the Sindh High Court has dissented from the view taken by the learned Judges that the dictionary meaning was to be given to the words mentioned in clause (xiv) of section 2 of the Ordinance and that its amplitude could not be curtailed by reference to the old definition of the word "industry". In K.G. Old v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court and others (1), Mr. Justice Shafiur Rahman (now a Judge of this Court) in an exhaustive and detailed judgment, after noticing all the relevant case-law including the judgment in the present case, took the view that the "use of the expressions "Business. Trade, Manufacture, Calling, Service, Employment of Occupation" in the definition of industry in Industrial Relations Ordinance is not in its ordinary dictionary meaning but in its popular and conventional meaning". He went on to add that "in the context of Industrial and Labour Laws, these expressions apply to any enterprise which is organized and is systematic depending substantially, if not entirely, on the co-operation, distribution, and consumption of wealth, or the production or provision of material service". In his view the words calling, service, employment or occupation were not to be understood or interpreted in their plain dictionary meaning but took their colour from the opening words, namely, Business, Trade and Manufacture and the meaning of these words in the definition and the objects of the statute. This view was followed by one of us (Nasim Hasan Shah, J) while sitting in Lahore High Court in Pakistan Central Cotton Committee, Karachi v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No,3, Lyallpur etc. (Writ Petition No, 74 of 1976). And before us, it was further submitted that the distinction between learned professions on the one hand and business/trade/manufacture, on the other was so fundamental and the concept of the two so utterly inconsistent that the same could not be abolished merely by the use of general words like calling, service, employment or occupation.
21. ' Again, a Bench of the Sindh High Court consisting of Mr. Justice Zaffar Hussain Mirza (now a Judge of this Court) and Mr. Justice Salim Akhtar in the case of employees' Union, Jamia Karachi v.
22. Registrar of Trade Unions, Sindh and others (2), also appears to have followed the view taken by the Lahore High Court in K.G. Old's case rather than that expressed in the present case so far as the definition of "industry" is concerned.
23. ' We also observe that of the three points raised in this case before the learned Judges of the High Court, namely:- "(i) that the appellant-firm was not an industry within the meaning of the Ordinance; ' that the respondent No,2 had no locus standi to raise and maintain an industrial dispute as required under the Ordinance; and that respondent No,2 was not qualified as a Collective Bargaining Agent; ' The High Court only decided the first point definitely holding that the appellant-firm did not constitute an industry within the meaning of the Ordinance. However, as regards the second point, though it was held that respondent No,2 had a locus standi to raise the dispute because the appellant-firm had failed to establish before the High Court that the second respondent's registration as a profession was illegal in view of section 7(2) of the Ordinance but the appellant- firm was allowed to raise this objection before the Labour Court in the light of further evidence, if so advised. However, it entirely refused to entertain and decide the third question namely, that respondent No,2 was not qualified as Collective Bargaining Agent on the ground that this question could not be decided in Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court."
24. ' The Honourable Supreme Court in the above judgment had also approved the case of Employee's Union Jamia Karachi v. Registrar of Trade Unions Sindh and 2 others 1981 PLC 403, which has been cited at Bar by Mr. Tariq Mehmood, Advocate.
25. ' In the case of Government of Balochistan LivestQck Department v. Livestock Employees' Union, Balochistan and two others 1993 PLC 13 a Constitutional Petition was filed by the petitioner Government. Seeking cancellation of the Registration Certificate of the respondent-union on the ground that they being Government servant do not fall within the definition of workmen. The petition was allowed alongwith another petition bearing No,90/1992 filed by the Government through Agriculture Dapartment involving the same question. The Union approached Honourable Supreme Court by filing C.P. Nos.66-Q/1992, 67-0/1992 and C.P.No,74-Q/92 by the Forest Employees and Workers Union. The Honourable Supreme Court refused to grant the relief vide order dated 17- 10-1992. However, in respect to the definition of Industry it has been observed as follows:- ' In the instant case, the primary object of the departments is to explore all avenues for the advancement of a particular field and to cater the needs of public-at-large. The cost is to be borne from public funds. They do not run any industry. The function of the Forests Department is to protect the forests from destruction which is necessary for the healthy environment. For the performance of their duties, they make research in their special field. From the nature of their work it cannot be deduced by any stretch of imagination that the respondents are running any industry.
26. Whatever little business is done that is ancillary to the main object. The departments are performing multifarious duties in this behalf but their main function is not changed. The petitioners are not employed to run any industry. The Government is not consuming any wealth from these establishments. The ingredients of an industry are lacking in the present case, therefore, the learned High Court has taken a correct view of the matter."
27. ' Now adverting to the case of the respondent-Union both registered and unregistered it is to be observed that learned counsel had placed heavy reliance on the case of the Management of Municipal Committee, Mianwali v. The General Secretary, Municipal Muharrirs Union and annother PLD 1968 Lahore 395. In this case the Union of Municipal Muharrirs served a strike notice to the Committee raising number of damands including the one that the Octroi Muharrir should not be made to work for more than eight hours a day. In addition to another demand that the childern of the employees should be given free education up to the High Classes. On failure of negotiations matter went before the Industrial Court where the Municipal Committee questioned the jurisdiction of the Court precisely contending that the Committee was not an industry within the meaning of clause (G) of section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959. However, the Court allowed both the demands, as such an appeal was filed before the Lahore High Court where amongst other questions definition of the word 'industry' came for interpretation. Thus after attending the different aspects of the case it was held that staff of the Municipal Committee engaged for regal/serving functions like collection of taxes will not be workmen and also bear no relationship with the term `industry'. SA. Zahoor learned counsel on the strength of this authority contended that excluding the employees as has been notified in the reported judgment all other persons being employees in Municipal Committee who are performing non-regal functions shall be deemed to have relationship with the terms industry. As such they would acquire a right to form a Union under Ordinance, 1969. With utmost respect we are not inclined to agree with the learned counsel because after the above judgment the same High Court while interpreting the word 'industry' in the case of K.G. Old had declared that the use of the expression, Business, Trade, Manufacture, Calling, Service, Employment or Occupation in the definition of 'industry' in the Industrial Relations Ordinance is not in its ordinary dictionary meanings but in its popular and conventional meaning.
28. In addition to this it has also been held that in the context of Industrial and Labour laws those expressions apply to an enterprise which is organised and is systemic depending substantially if not entirely on the cooperation between labour and capital and having as its object production, distribution and consumption or the production or provision of material service. This view has also been approved by Honourable Supreme Court in the case of A.F. Farguson and Company.
29. ' SA. Zahoor, Advocate also referred to the case of Liaquat National Hospital v. Government of Sindh, Karachi and another PLD 1977 Karachi 843. The facts of this case in our opinion have no application on the facts of the instant case because it deals with section 3 subsection (1) read with section 2(b) and (c) of the Workers, Childern Education Ordinance, 1972 wherein with reference to the said law the word 'establishment' was interpreted.
30. ' SA. Zahoor learned counsel also made reference to 1975 PLC 361. This judgment deals in respect of the expression administration of state as has been provided under section 1(b) of the Ordinance, 1969. Since in the instant case it is an admitted position that the employees of Quetta Municipal Corporation are not engaged in administration of State, therefore, this judgment is not relevant for our purposes. Similarly another judgment relied upon by the learned counsel reported in 1988 SCMR 1725 is also not relevant for the disposal of the instant case.
31. ' Reference was also made by him to the case of Employees Old Benefit Institution v. National Industrial Relations Commission and others 1988 SCMR 765. In this report section 2(xiv) of the Ordinance, 1969 was interpreted and it was held that since employees of Old-Age Benefit Institution are rendering a service to Industrial and Commercial Sector, therefore, its functions are not outside the purview of word 'industry'. In the judgment the case of K.G. Old, and A.F. Farguson also were referred but the Honourable Supreme Court without discussing the word 'industry' concluded that the "statute which has created the appellant i.e, Employees Old-Age Benefit Institution has institutionalised these functions which really belong to the employer by setting up a body for preforming them for him. The appellant institution is thus rendering a service to the Industrial and Commercial sectors. It cannot, therefore, say that its functions fall outside the purview of clause (xiv). In view of these observations it can safely be held that since the Institution of Employees Old- Age Benefit is providing service to Old-Age workers of various organisations, therefore, in that context it was held that they are engaged to carry on an industry but with utmost respect, in our opinion, this judgment also is not attracted in view of the facts of the instant case.
32. At this juncture before drawing the final conclusion in view of the substantive law as well as the judgments referred to hereinabove whether the Quetta Municipal Corporation has nexus with the expression industry it would be important to note the functions of the Municipal Corporation as have been notified under section 50 read with 5th Schedule of Balochistan Local Government Ordinance, 1980. According to which the Municipal Corporation may and if the Government so directs shall perform the functions relating to public health, water supply, public safety, town planning, building control. Streets, arboriculture etc. Each had further define different type of functions which are not relatable to the functioning of an industry. SA. Zahoor learned counsel stated that under section 3(2) of the Ordinance, 1980 while defining the word 'budget' the law- givers have explained that it means a final statement of income and expenditure of local council for financial year. As such according to the learned counsel since Quetta Municipal Corporation is making income by performing various functions, thus it must fall within the definition of industry.
33. It is to be observed that under section 56 of the Ordinance, 1980 the composition of local and special funds has been prescribed which includes the balance available with the council on the date of the enforcement of the Ordinance, the proceeds of all taxes, fees etc. Rents and profits payable or accruing to a local council, all sums received by it in the performance of its functions, all sums contributed by individuals, all loans raised and all profits or interests accruing from investment including funds under the Ordinance, fines awarded to local council under any law and such proceeds from such source of income as the Government may direct to be placed at the disposal of the local council. Section 59 deals regarding application of local fund which will be spent in the order of preference, firstly in the payment of salaries and allowances to the servants of Local Councils, secondly in the re-payment of loans, contribution of Local Council towards the conduct of elections, the maintenance of Balochistan Local Services and the auditing of accounts, in the fulfilment of any obligation and in the discharge of any duty imposed on the Council, fifthly in meeting the expenditure charged in the local fund under the Ordinance, sixthly in meeting the expenditures declared by the Government tot be an appropriate charge on the local funds, seventhly any sum required t satisfy decree or award.
34. ' Thus from the application of the funds it is manifest that the income and expenditure of a Local Council is an ancillary matter and merely due to this reason Quetta Municipal Corporation cannot be declared having a nexus to industry as it has been held by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Livestock Union and others referred to hereinabove.
35. ' Mr. K.N. Kohli with vehemence argued that the employees of the Quetta Municipal Corporation are responsible to provide a service to the general public, therefore, under the definition of the word 'establishment' they can be termed involved in an industrial activity.
36. We may observe that the word service used in the definition of the industry has to be read alongwith the word establishment under clause (ix) which would mean that any such activity should be for the purpose of carrying on any industry.
37. ' No doubt service is being provided by the employees of Quetta Municipal Corporation according to their functions assigned to it under the law but that is not for the purpose of carrying on an industry. Therefore, we are inclined to follow the definition of the word industry as has been interpreted in the cases of KG. Old, A.S.F. Farguson and Livestock Employees' Union and on the basis thereof it is concluded that the Quetta Municipal Corporation is not an industry nor it is an establishment where workmen are engaged for the purpose of carrying on any industry.
38. ' We have also examined the objection of learned counsel for the registered Trade Union SA.
39. Zahoor, Advocate relating to non-maintainability of the petition due to laches. In support of his contention he relied on Muhammad Shafique and others v. Settlement Commissiner and others 1986 SCMR 1456. In this judgment for want of explanation on record for the long delay a writ was dismissed by the Lahore High Court. The Honourable Supreme Court refused to grant leave holding that the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity. He also made reference to 1987 SCMR 692 (1). In this case as well a Constitutional Petition suffering from laches was dismissed and the Honourable Supreme Court refused to grant relief against the dismissal order. Similarly reference was made to 1988 SCMR 1680. In this report as well writ petition was dismissed in limine by the Lahore High Court as no explanation was offered for inordinate delay in invoking constitutional jurisdiction of High Court and while refusing leave to appeal against such order petition was dismissed both on laches as well as on merits.
40. As far as the principle enunciated in the cited judgment are concerned we are in respectful agreement with them. In this behalf it is suffice to observe that action/order which apparently appears to have been passed in contravention to any provision of the law then instead of perpetuating such action/order on the pretext that proceedings suffer from lathes in the interest of justice it is not advisable to dispose of the matter on technical point and it should be heard and decided on merits. In forming this view we are fortified with 1987 SCMR 1119 and 1993 PLC 13. As we have held hereinabove that Quetta Municipal Corporation is not an organisation which has any relationship with the term industry or establishment, therefore, the registration of its Employees Union was made by the Registrar in contravention to the provisions of section 7, subsection (2) of the Ordinance of 1969 by exercising jurisdiction which was not vested in him. Thus such action being nullity in the eye of law cannot be allowed to be protected on the ground that Petition No, 191/1994 suffers from latches.
41. As far as alternate remedy is concerned that too was not available under section 10 of Ordinance 1969 to Quetta Municipal Corporation because the cancellation of registration can only be sought for by the Registrar on F making a complaint in writing to Labour Court seeking direction that the Certificate of the Union be cancelled.
42. As far as the right of appeal against the cancellation of the Certificate of Registration of the Union is concerned that too is only available under section 11 of the Ordinance, 1969, to the Trade Union but not to the employer.
43. As a result of above we are persuaded to hold that the Registrar Trade Unions, Balochistan registered the Quetta Municipal Corporation Employees Union in contravention to the relevant provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 discussed hereinabove. Consequently Constitutional Petition No,191/1994 is allowed in the terms of its prayer.
44. ' Similarly Constitutional Petition No, 192/1994 is also granted and the order of Presiding Officer, Labour Court dated 24-5-1994 having been passed without lawful authority is set aside ' Parties are left to bear their own costs.