AJMAL MIAN, C.J.--This petition is directed against an order dated 19th August, 1989, passed by the learned Sessions Judge (Central) at Karachi, in Criminal Revision No. 2 of 1988, declining the petitioner's revision against an order dated 24th April, 1987, passed by the learned Assistant Commissioner and S.D.M., Nazimabad, Karachi, ordering of the ejectment of the petitioner under section 16(3) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders)
Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the Standing Orders).
2. The brief facts leading to the filing of the above petition are that the petitioner was an employee working in respondent No. 2's Ice Factory. While working, he was allotted a residential flat (hereinafter referred to as the Flat). His services were terminated on 30th October, 1979. After that, he was called upon to vacate the flat which he failed to do so and, therefore, an application under section 16(3) of the Standing Orders was filed before the learned Assistant Commissioner and S.D.M., Nazimabad, Karachi, who by the aforesaid order dated 24th April, 1987, allowed the above application. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the above order, filed the aforesaid criminal revision application, which was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge, by his aforesaid impugned order dated 19th August, 1989, on the ground that the revision was not competent. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the above order has filed the present petition,
3. In support of the above petition, Mr. Haji Ameer Ahmed Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that since the learned S.D.M. passed the order as a Criminal Court under section 16(3) of the Standing Orders, a criminal revision application under section 439-A was competent.
4. On the other hand, Mr. Abdul Waheed Siddiqui, Advocate, appearing for respondent No. 2, has made the following submissions:--
(i) That the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands and, therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed.
(ii) That the petitioner has already availed of alternate remedy by way of filing a suit and an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C.
(iii) That the Magistrate in fact exercises power under section 16(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance as a Civil Court and, therefore, revision, if any, would lie under section 115, C.P.C., before a Civil Court and not before a Sessions Judge.
(iv) That even otherwise, the Magistrate acts as a persona designata under section 16(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance and, therefore, no revision would be competent under section 439-A, Cr.P.C. before the learned Sessions Judge.
5. It may be appropriate to take up the first three submissions of Mr. Abdul Waheed Siddiqui before touching upon the main controversy which is in issue.
6. As regards the first submission of Mr. Abdul Wahceed Siddiqui that the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands, it may be observed that he has referred to the averments contained in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the petition in which it has been inter alia alleged that Haji Noor Muhammad Butt father of Mr. Manzoor Iqbal Butt, the respondent No. 2, had gifted the flat in question to the petitioner for his good services. He has also invited our attention to paragraph 2 of the petitioner's application dated 18-5-1987, under the Payment of Wages Act filed by him before the Authority under the aforesaid Act for the recovery of Rs.89,000 as his dues and in which the petitioner has averred that, "the applicant has also been provided accommodation and the applicant is residing with his family members in the said accommodation since 1952.
In Munir Ahmed v. The State 1985 SCMR 257, the facts were that the factory did not issue attendance tickets to certain workers who were employed by the contractor. In that case the admitted position was that an employer is required to issue such tickets only to the persons employed by him as workers. In these circumstances the proceedings were quashed.
In Farid Ahmed v. Pakistan Burmah Shell Ltd. 1987 SCMR 1463 the facts that according to the terms of contract entered into between the respondent and the contractor who is running Saifee Filling Station and employees number of his own pump attendants and personnel to provide the required services. According to the contract the workers employed by the contractor are to be his employees. In this case, definition of workman as contained in section 2(xxviii) of I.R.O., came up for interpretation.
In a case reported in PLD 1976 Lahore 1097, it has been held that word `industry' is of widest aptitude and includes in its sweep every conceivable human activity.
It is well-recognised principle that any exposition of law in a judgment has to be read in the context of issues raised therein and the facts of the case from which such issues arise. I would, therefore, leave the matter at that only and would not like to say anything further since the question whether the employer shall in respect of every employee, whether employed by him directly or through any other person pay to the institution a contribution at such times, at such rate and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, is a matter which arises for decision in the above appeals.
I am inclined to hold that the dictum of their lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the above case of Social Security Institution v. Consolidated Sugar Mills Ltd. that the owner of the industry is liable for employees engaged for his industry even through the contractors binds this Court and I do not think therefore the cases cited by the learned counsel for the respondents can be of material assistance either to the learned counsel for the respondents or to me.
I respectfully follow the dictum as it would tersely apply to the facts of this case. I hope that the employers of the respondent establishments are liable to pay contributions on the wages of persons engaged by them directly or through contractors at such rate and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed.
I would accordingly accept these appeals and set aside judgments dated 31-8-1986 and 9-3-1988 of the Social Security Courts and restore those of the institutions under section 57 of the Social Security Ordinance, 1%5. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs of these appeals.