' Abdul Shafiq, respondent No, 1, while working as a Junior Accountant in the service of the petitioner, was accused of having committed misconduct and was subsequently removed from service on that charge on 5th of March, 1983. He challenged the termination of his services by filing an application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, before Labour Court No, 3, Lahore at Ferozewala. This application was resisted by the petitioners both on merits as well as by raising an objection that neither the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, nor of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, were applicable and as such, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction in the matter. This objection was repelled by the Labour Court on 2nd of March, 1985. On merit's, it was found that the dismissal of respondent No, 1 was not justified. The Labour Court, therefore, proceeded to direct that respondent No, 1 be reinstated in service with all the back benefits.
2. Against the above said order of the Labour Court, the petitioners preferred an appeal before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore, only on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of Labour Court but the findings on merits were not challenged. The Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal found no force in the jurisdictional objection of the petitioners and proceeded to dismiss the appeal on 20th of August, 1985. Hence, this petition.
3. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of this petition is that the Courts below have erred in law in holding that the provisions of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, were applicable in the present case. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel on proviso to section 1(c) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, to contend that as the petitioner was an establishment being carried on by or under the authority of the Provincial Government having its own statutory rules of service, the Ordinance has no application to its employees. The learned counsel elaborated that the petitioner has been established and set up by the Government under the Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975, and is subject to the control of the Government in terms of section 17 of the Ordinance, which appointed its Director General as well as members. It was argued that the petitioner was virtually an attached department of the Government itself.
4. In order to demonstrate that the petitioner has its own rules of service, reference was made by the learned counsel to the Lahore Development Authority (Appointment and Conditions of Service)
Regulations, 1978, which were notified on 16th of April, 1978, and were published in the Punjab Gazette of 6th of August, 1986. According to the learned counsel as these regulations have been framed in the exercise of statutory powers vesting in the Authority under section 44 of the Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975 the same have force of statutory rules. The learned counsel has relied upon Salah-udDin and 2 others v. Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd., Tokht Bhai and 10 others PLD 1975 SC 244, Karachi Development Authority v. Presiding Officer, Vth Sindh Labour Court, Karachi and 2 others PLD 1976 Kar. 514 and Dr. Naeemul Zaman v. Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and 3 others 1990 PLC (C.S.)
25. It was argued that the Punjab Labour Court has erred in holding that merely because by the relevant time, the regulations in question had not been published in the official Gazette, they do not have statutory effect. The judgment of this Court in Shah Muhammad Rahman Ansari and another v. West Pakistan Bar Council and others PLD 1967 Lahore 657 was cited in support of this argument.
5. Mr. Muhammad Asghar Malik, the learned counsel for respondent No, 1, has, however, vehemently argued that the petitioner-L.DA. Had been constituted under a statute and has the status of a body corporate functioning under an Act of the Legislature and not under the authority of the Government. It was also argued that the regulations framed by the Authority cannot be considered to be statutory rules of service.
6. By virtue of section 1 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, it applies to every industrial or commercial establishment wherein 20 or more workmen are employed and to certain other classes of industrial and commercial establishments which may be notified by the Government. The proviso to this section, however, takes out of the ambit of the Ordinance certain industrial and commercial establishments which are being carried on by or under the authority of the Federal or any Provincial Government. This proviso reads as under:- "Provided that nothing in this Ordinance shall apply to industrial and commercial establishments carried on by or under the authority of the Central or any Provincial Government, where statutory rules of service, conduct or discipline are applicable to the workmen employed therein."
7. As is obvious from the proviso itself, its application is restricted to cases where the industrial or commercial establishment is being carried on by or under the authority of the Federal or any Provincial Government and statutory rules of service exist with respect to conduct or discipline of its employees. The applicability of the proviso is thus dependent upon the existence of two conditions; firstly, that the establishment must be carried on by or under the authority of the Federal Government or any Provincial Government, and secondly, that there must be statutory rules of service applicable to its employees.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that as the Lahore Development Authority is an establishment set up by the Provincial Government, it is being carried on by or under the authority of the Government of the Punjab. It is, however, to be noticed that the wording of the proviso is that the establishment must be carried on by or under the authority of the Provincial Government and not that it should have been set up by the Government. Consequently, the fact that the Lahore Development Authority has been established by the. Provincial Government in the exercise of the powers conferred upon it by section 4 of the Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975 is of not much significance.
9. The argument of the learned counsel that the petitioner is an establishment carried on by or under the authority of the Provincial Government is without any force. By virtue of section 4(2) of the Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975, the petitioner has the status of a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal. Consequently, merely because the Government is authorised to issue directions to the Authority under section 17 of the Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975, cannot make the petitioner to be an establishment being carried on by or under the authority of the Provincial Government. On a perusal of the provisions of the Lahore Development Authority Act, it becomes obvious that the petitioner is functioning under the statutory authority conferred upon it and is not being carried on by or under the authority of the Government. Some of the relevant provisions in this behalf are section 6 which enumerates the powers and functions of the Authority; section 7 which relates to the meetings of the Authority; section 11 which authorises the petitioner to appoint officers and its employees; section 12 in which the petitioner is authorised to constitute various committees. Chapter V relates to the preparation and execution of schemes; section 26 by which the petitioner has been conferred the status of an official development agency. Section 27 is also of relevance which, inter alia, provides the setting up of a fund known as "Lahore Development Authority Fund". According to subsection (2) of section 27, grants made by the Provincial Government, Federal Government or any international agency are to be credited to the said fund in addition to the other resources generated by the petitioner under sub-clauses (c), (d), (e) and (f).
10. In this view of the matter, it cannot be contended with any success that the petitioner is an establishment being carried on by or under the authority of the Provincial Government.
11. This question was examined in detail by a Division Bench of the Sindh High Court in National Shipping Corporation v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and 2 others 1975 PLC (Karachi) 1, where the dispute was as to whether the National Shipping Corporation of Pakistan set up under the National Shipping Corporation Ordinance, 1963, was an establishment being carried on by or under the authority of the Federal Government. The anwer to this question was rendered in the negative.
The learned Judges held that though notwithstanding certain powers were reserved for the Federal Government in relation to the functioning of the Corporation, the Corporation was functioning under its own authority and not under the authority of the Government.
12. The judgment in the aforesaid case was approved by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Punjab Small Industries Corporation v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and others (1988 SCMR 1725). In the context of the controversy before it, the Supreme Court was pleased to take notice of the provisions of Article 18 of the Constitution and observed that the proviso to section 1 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, applies only to those establishments which are being carried on by or under the authority of the Federal Government and not to Corporations set up under a statute. It was specifically held that the Punjab Small Industries Corporation which has been set up under the Punjab Small Industries Corporation Act, 1972, was not an establishment being carried on by or under the authority of the Provincial Government. It is of importance to point out that the relevant provisions of the Punjab Small Industries Corporation Act are in para materia with the provisions of the Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975, inasmuch as the said Corporation was established under section 3 and is a body Corporate. Its management vests in a Board which was to be guided by such directions as the Government may give. Under section 5 of the Punjab Small Industries Corporation Act, the Government had the authority to alter the membership of the Board. The power to appoint the Managing Director was also vested in the Government who could be removed by the Government.
Similarly, under section 29, the Corporation Fund to be set up was to comprise of the investment or the grant made by the Government.
13. Reference may also be made to the judgment of Sindh High Court in I.C.P. Employees' Front, Karachi through its General Secretary v. Presiding Officer, Vth Sindh Labour Court, Karachi and another (PLD 1976 Karachi 1176), in which the Investment Corporation of Pakistan constituted under the Investment Corporation of Pakistan Ordinance (IV of 1966) was held not to be an establishemt falling within the proviso to section 1(4)(c) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968.
14. Reverting now to the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is to be seen that the authority of the Supreme Court in Salahuddin and 2 others v. Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd., Tokht Bhai and 10 others (PLD 1975 SC 244), has no application as that case concerns itself with the definition of the expression "persons performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation or a Province" within the meaning of Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. It was in that context held that the persons holding offices as Directors of a limited Company are persons holding public offices. This question, however, does not fall for determination in the present case. Same is the position with regard to the judgment of this Court in Dr. Naeem-uz-Zaman v. Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and 3 others 1990 PLC (C.S.) 25 and the judgment of Sindh High Court in Karachi Development Authority v. Presiding Officer, Vth Sindh Labour Court, Karachi and 2 others (PLD 1976 Karachi 514). Proviso to section 1 never came up for discussion in the aforesaid cases. The case of Superintending Engineer (Headquarters) Irrigation Lahore Zone, Old Anarkali, Lahore and another v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and another 1987 PLC 180 has again no relevancy as it relates to a dispute between the Government and its employees.
15. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Authority is virtually for all intents and purposes an attached department of the Government runs counter to the provisions of section 4(2) of the Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975, which confers status of a corporation upon the Lahore Development Authority and not that of a department of the Government. The contention overlooks the well-settled principle that the corporation is a separate and distinct entity. Law in this respect is so well-established that it does not need any authority but the following observations in the case of Tamlin v. Hannaford ((1950) 1 KB 19) may be quoted with advantage:- "These are great powers but still we cannot regard the Corporation as being his agent, any more than a company is the agent of the shareholders or even of a sole shareholder. In the eye of the law, the Corporation is its own master and is answerable as fully as any other person or Corporation. It is not the Crown and has none of the immunities or privileges of the property. It is as much bound by Acts of Parliament as any other subject of the King. It is, of course, a public authority and its purposes, no doubt are public purposes, but it is not a Government Department nor do its powers fall within the province of Government."
16. It may be noticed that the same view, as above, has been taken by the Indian Supreme Court in Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar and others (AIR 1970 SC 82), wherein the following observations appear at page 85:- "The words "under the authority or mean pursuant to the authority, such as where an agent or a servant acts under or pursuant to the authority of his principal or master. Can the respondent- company, therefore, be said to be carrying on its business pursuant to the authority of the Central Government? That obviously cannot be said of a company incorporated under the Companies Act whose Constitution, powers and functions are provided for and regulated by its memorandum of association and the articles of association. An incorporated company as is well-known, has a separate existence and the law recognises it as a juristic person separate and distinct from its members. This new personality emerges from the moment of its incorporation and from that date the person subscribing to its memorandum of association and others joining it as members are regarded as a body incorporate or a corporation aggregate and the new person begins to function as an entity."
' Two other cases from the Indian jurisdiction, namely, Carisbad Mineral Water Manufacturing Company Limited v. P.K. Sarkar and others (AIR 1952 Calcutta 6) and Abdul Rehman Abdul Ghaffur and another v. Mrs. E. Paul and others (AIR 1963 Bombay 267) may also be referred to.
17. The other condition for applicability of the proviso to section 1(4)(c) of the Ordinance is also lacking. As noted earlier in addition to the fact that the establishment is being carried on by or under the authority of the Federal Government or any Provincial Government, in order to attract the proviso it must also be shown that there are statutory rules of service, governing the employees of the establishment. In order to show that there are statutory rules of service applicable to the employees of the Lahore Development Authority, the learned counsel has referred to the Lahore Development Authority (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Regulations, 1978. However, this contention of the learned counsel cannot be accepted as it overlooks that the Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975, itself distinguishes between rules and regulations. Under section 44 of the Act, the Government has been empowered to frame rules for the purposes of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act, while by section 45, the Lahore Development Authority is empowered to make regulations. The regulations referred to by the learned counsel have been framed in exercise of this power of the Authority and not by the Government. The distinction between the rules and regulations becomes obvious by the fact that the rules have to be framed by the Government, while regulations can be made by the Authority itself and that too without any approval by the Government. That being so, obviously, the regulations cannot be given the same status as the statutory rules, which emanate from a different authority altogether.
18. Although according to section 2(55) of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956, rule includes a regulation but the further condition is that the regulation must have been made as a rule under the enactment, meaning thereby it should have been made by the authority, which is competent authority under the enactment to frame the rules.
19. The question as to whether the regulations framed by an authority can have the force of statutory rules was considered by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Karachi Development Authority and another v. Wali Ahmad Khan and others 1991 SCMR 2434, wherein it was observed: "The rule-making power for the purposes of giving effect to the provisions of the K.D.A. Order has been given to the Government under Article 14 thereof, whereas under Article 15 of the said Order, power has been vested in the K.D.A. To frame regulations, inter alia, in the matter of terms and conditions of service. This power is unbridled and unfettered by the statutory intervention of any outside authority. It is common ground that no rules have been framed by the Government under Article 14. Therefore, in accordance with the dictum laid down in the case of Anwar Hussain PLD 1984 SC 194, as there is no clog on the freedom of the parties in the matter of terms of contract of service, ordinarily the rights of the employee will be governed by the law of master and servant."
' The cases of Hamid Mukhtar Piracha v. Faisalabad Development Authority, Faisalabad (1984 PSC 42) and Anwar Hussain v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan and others (PLD 1984 SC 194) may also be referred to with advantage. This Court in Muhammad Saeed Ahmad Khan v. Secretary to Government of Punjab, Housing and Physical Planning Department, Lahore and 3 others (PLD 1983 Lah. 206) took the view that the regulations framed by a statutory body like WASA and Lahore Development Authority do not have the force of statutory rules.
20. It flows from the above, discussion that the Lahore Development Authority is neither an establishment being run by or under the authority of the Provincial Government nor there are any statutory rules of service applicable to its employees and, therefore, the proviso to section 1 has no application with the result that the provisions of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, apply to the employees of the petitioner.
21. The other aspect of the matter may now be adverted to, which is as to whether the provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, are applicable so far as the petitioner is concerned. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the contention that the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, was not applicable and, therefore, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction in the matter, has argued that as the petitioner is not an "industry" as defined by section 2(ix) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, is not applicable. It is however, to be noted that even if the provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, are held to be inapplicable, still, as the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, applies to the workmen in employment of the petitioner, they could invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, under Standing Order 12(3) in case of termination, removal, discharge of services which provides an independent remedy and makes the provisions of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, applicable.
22. Even otherwise, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the petitioner is an "industry" within the meaning of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and is, therefore, covered by the aforesaid Ordinance.
23. The expression "industry" has been defined in section 2(xiv) as under:- "Industry" means any business, trade, manufacture, calling, service, employment or occupation;"
' The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the context of the above definition was that as the Lahore Development Authority is a statutory corporation having not been formed with the object of making any profit or carrying on any business, it is an "industry'. The learned counsel has referred to the preamble to the Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975, to show that it has been established in the public interest with a view to set up a comprehensive system of metropolitan planning and development in order to improve the quality of life within the metropolitan area of Lahore. Reliance has been placed upon Employees' Union Jamia Karachi and another v. Registrar of Trade Unions, Sindh and 2 others 1981 PLC 403, Gulzar Ahmad v.
Superintendent of Police, Headquarters, Lahore 1983 PLC (C.S.) 905, M/s. MSCO Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and others AIR 1985 SC 76 and The Managing Committee, Attock Industrial School v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 2, Lahore and another 1985 PLC 936.
24. On the contrary, it has been contended by the learned counsel for respondent No, 1 that the definition of "industry' as given in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, is of wide connotation and it not only includes business or trade but also service and fully covers the petitioner- Organisation. The learned counsel emphasised that the petitioner not only provides services like water, sewerage etc. But is also engaged in construction of roads, of flats, houses besides carrying on development of land and its subsequent sale in form of plots. Leading judgment to the true scope and meaning of "industry" as defined in section 2(xiv) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, is the judgment of this Court in K.G. Old, Principal Christian Technical Training Centre, Gujranwala v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court, Northern Zone and others PLD 1976 Lahore 1097, where Shafi-ur-Rehman, J. (as his Lordship then was) elaborating the definition of "industry" appearing in various enactments as well as taking into consideration various developments which had taken place in the sphere of labour legislation and surveying the entire case-law observed as under:- "The upshot of the entire discussion is that the use of the expressions "Business, Trade, Manuracture, Calling, Service, Employment or Occupation" in the defintion of Industrial Relations Ordinance is not in its ordinary dictionary meaning but in its propular and conventional meaning. In the context of industrial and labour laws, these expressions apply to any enterprise which is organised and is systematic depending substantially, if not entirely on the cooperation between labour and capital, and having as its object production, distribution and consumption of wealth, or the production or provision of material services. The enterprise as a whole has to be looked at to find out its raison d'etre, and any part of it which is incidental ancillary or an adjunct cannot determine the character of the whole."
' Reference may also be made to another judgment of this Court which has been reported as The Management of Municipal Committee, Mianwali v. The General Secretary, Municipal Muharrirs'
Union and the 1st Industrial Court (PLD 1968 Lahore 395), in which it was observed that definition of industry is very wide but does not include the regal and sovereign functions of the Government.
The definition of the industry also came up for consideration before the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Employees' Old-Age Benefit Institution v. National Industrial Relations Commission and others (1988 SCMR 765), wherein it was held that in view of the services being provided by it the Employees' Old-Age Benefit Institution falls within the definition of an industry.
25. So far as the petitioner is concerned, it cannot be doubted that the petitioner is rendering various types of services, some of its functions are enumerated in section 6 of the Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975, which reads as under:- "6. Powers and Functions of the Authority.--(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and any rule framed thereunder, the Authority may exercise such power and take such measures as may be necessary for carrying out the purposes of this Act.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing subsection, the authority may--
(i) prepare, implement and enforce the Lahore Metropolitan Development Plan;
(ii) prepare, implement and enforce the Annual Development Programmes for the area;
(iii) prepare, implement and enforce schemes for environmental improvements, housing, urban renewal including slums, clearance and redevelopment, water supply, sewerage, drainage, solid waste disposal, transportation and traffic health and education facilities and preservation of objects or places of historical, archaeological, scientific, cultural and recreational importance;
(iv) take any steps or adopt any measures for the face lifting and beautification of the Area;
(v) acquire property, both movable and immovable;
(vi) sell, lease, exchange or otherwise dispose of any property vested in it;
(vii) undertake any works and incur any expenditure; (viii)procure machinery, instruments or any other material required by it;
(ix) enter into contracts;
(x) cause study, surveys, experiments, technical researches or to contribute towards the cost of any such studies, surveys, experiments or technical researches, made by any other Agency;
(xi) issue interim development orders for areas for which a scheme is under preparation and restrict or regulate by general or special order, any change in the use of land and alteration in building structures and installations;
(xii) cause removal of any works obstructing the execution of its schemes;
(xiii) seek and obtain advice and assistance for the preparation of any scheme, or for the execution of any schemes from any Government Agency or person, and such agency or person shall give the advice and assistance sought by the Authority to the best of its ability, knowledge and judgment and the additional expenditure, if any, involved in giving such advice or assistance shall be borne by the Authority."
From the above, it would appear that the Authority is not only empowered to prepare, implement and enforce the Metropolitan Development Plan and Annual Development Programmes but also prepare, implement and enforce schemes for environmental improvements, housing, water supply, sewerage, drainage, solid waste disposal, transportation and traffic health facilities as also sell, lease, exchange and dispose of any property, undertake any work, incur any expenditure. There is no denial that in addition to rendering various services, like sewerage, water supply, drainage, solid waste disposal, the petitioner is also engaged in construction of roads, flats and houses. For the purposes of implementing its schemes, land acquired by the authority is developed by it and a part thereof is sold in form of plots to the general public through auction or negotiations as the case may be. It is thus difficult to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is not rendering any service and is, therefore, not an industry within the meaning of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
26. So far as the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner arc concerned, it may, at the very outset, be noticed that the cases relate to educational institutes which do render any material services and have been held not to be an industry. In the case of Employees' Union Jamia Karachi and another v. Registrar of Trade Unions, Sindh and 2 others 1981 PLC 403, the Sindh High Court observed that the words "industry" and "service" are capable of various interpretations which may differ according to one's approach, notions, socio-economic considerations and ideology and that only those services which are material in nature and are outcome of an organised economic activity in continuity with cooperation of workers and management will be treated as industry. After noticing the provisions of the University of Karachi Act, 1972, it was held that as the services being provided by the University are not material services, therefore, cannot be said to be falling within the definition of industry. Apart from being clearly distinguishable, it may be observed that the ratio laid down therein supports the case of respondent No, 1 instead of the petitioner as the services being rendered by the Lahore Development Authority are material in nature.
27. The case of M/s. MSCO Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and others (AIR 1985 SC 76) is of no relevance as the question involved therein was whether hospital or nursing home falls within the definition of industry as used in the 1st Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The Supreme Court itself observed that though nursing home and hospital might have come within the definition of industry as given in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, but the same could not be considered to be industry for the purposes of the taxation statute or a notification issued thereunder.
28. The dispute in case of The Managing Committee, Attock Industrial School v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 2, Lahore and another (1985 PLC 936) again was as to whether the services being rendered by the Attock Industrial School can be considered to fall within the definition of industry. It was observed that the petitioner institution decidedly was an educational school being run on a small scale for imparting technical education and could not be considered to be an industry. This case has, therefore, no application here.
29. It may also be noted that the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that in order to determine as to whether the organisation would come within the meaning of the industry or not, it is main function for which an organisation is set up which should be taken into consideration and not the incidental or ancillary function. There is no cavil with this proposition which found support from the K.G. Old's case (PLD 1976 Lahore 1097). However, this argument does not advance the case of the petitioner inasmuch as the material services which the petitioner is rendering cannot be considered to be ancillary or adjunct to the main purpose. In fact, the petitioner-Authority has been established with the, main object of providing material services within the Metropolitan Area of Lahore. In the Management of Municipal Committee, Mianwali's case (PLD 1968 Lahore 395), the Division Bench of this Court, while considering the definition of industry as given in section 2(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1959, held that the definition despite being very wide would not include regal and sovereign functions of the Government and that in so far as Municipal Committees performing functions, regular or Governmental, namely, levying and collecting the taxes, it cannot be said to carry on any industry but in other respects it may be an industry. It was observed: "There are other activities of the Municipal Committee such as making and preparing roads, sanitation and conservancy, running the hospitals and the schools. They do not exclusively pertain to the regal or sovereign functions of the Government and can be undertaken by the private concerns of individuals as well. They are, therefore, an undertaking and can be classed as industry within the meaning of clause (g) of section 2 of the Act. The persons employed in such activities will be the workmen within the meaning of the Ordinance and any dispute which may arise between them and the Committee will be an industrial dispute."
30. Same view was taken by this Court in Municipal Corporation, Faisalabad v. Mst. Nawab Bibi and others (1992 PLC 398) and it was observed that Municipal Committee if it is performing the functions in the nature of regal or sovereign does not fall within the purview of "construction industry" but while performing certain other works, it can be considered to be an industrial establishment.
31. In Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A Rajappa and others (AIR 1978 SC 548), it was observed that the definition of "industry" in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was very wide and a hospital would also come within this definition. It was further held that the absence of profit- making motive was not relevant for determining whether or not an undertaking or an organisation was an industry. The same view was taken in Des Raj etc. v. State of Punjab and others (AIR 1988 SC 1182).
32. The tests for determining as to whether or not a particular establishment is an industry culled out from the cases cited above, especially K.G. Old's case (PLD 1976 Lahore 1097) supra, arc:
(i) that the enterprise in question must be organised and systematic;
(ii) that it should depend substantially if not entirely on cooperation between labour and capital;
(iii) that its object should be production, distribution and consumption of wealth and production of material services;
(iv) that the main object for formation of enterprise or any part thereof should be considered and incidental, ancillary or adjunct purposes are not relevant; and
(v) that profit making may not be the object for running the enterprise.
33. From the discussion now there cannot be any doubt that the petitioner falls within the definition of an industry as given in section 2 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
34. So far as merits are concerned, suffice it to say that before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, the order of the Labour Court was challenged not on merits but only on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as has been noted by this Court in its order dated 21st of July, 1986, while dismissing the application for stay. Therefore, the merits of the case cannot be gone into.
' In view of what has been stated above, this petition is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.