1. ' MAMOON KAZI, J.---The petitioner is aggrieved by the decision given by the learned Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal dated 10-3-1988, reversing the order passed by the Vlth Labour Court, Hyderabad, whereby it was held that the Sindh Small Industries Corporation was not governed by the provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 as the same does not come within the definition of "industry". Consequently, it was held that the union formed by the employees of the said Corporation was not entitled to seek registration under the provisions of the said Ordinance.
2. ' It may be pointed out that an application had already been filed before the Sindh Labour Court by the Registrar, Trade Unions, Hyderabad (respondent No,4) seeking cancellation of registration of Small Industries Corporation Employees Union (respondent No,3). During the pendency of the proceedings before the learned Labour Court, the petitioners were also impleaded as party to the said proceedings. The learned Labour Court, after hearing the parties concerned, passed the impugned order dated 25-8-1985, reference to which has already been made in this judgment. It was held by the learned Labour Court as follows:- 9 I would now advert to the submission of Mr. Aftab. As pointed out above, this corporation was established in 1972 and its main functions have been elaborately mentioned not only in the preamble but also various sections of the Act 26 of 1972. The entire control is of the Government and its funds are also be provided only by the Government. The Board is to run this corporation to be constituted by the Government with absolute control of the Government over the Board. Besides other duties and functions of the corporation as per section 25 ibid the corporation also is responsible for preparing and submitting schemes to Government for the development of Handicrafts, Cottage, Small and other Industries, small industries to be set up in the private or public sector, to establish model projects of small and cottage industries, taking over and running schemes, projects and training institutions, organising cooperative societies etc. Etc. It is also to train persons in different skills and for this purpose to establish technical education and which, I am told by Mr. Aftab are registered and recognised by the Board of Education. Accordingly necessary testimonials are to be issued to the successful trainees. In view of these activities of the corporation it would not be covered by the definition of 'industry' in the light of the dictum laid down in PLD 1976 Lah. 1097 and which has been approved by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No, K-25 of 1974. The conclusion thereto is that the corporation is not governed by the IRO 1969 as it does not come within the definition of 'industry'. Accordingly, no union can be registered by the Registrar in respect of the employees of the corporation."
3. ' The respondent No, 3, who was aggrieved by the said order filed Appeal before the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal, which allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the Labour Court and directed respondent No, 4 to restore the registration of respondent No, 3 and issue a certificate of Collective Bargaining Agent to it.
4. ' We have heard Mr. Qazi Munawar Ali, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. M.L. Shahani, learned counsel for respondent No,3 and Mr. S. Sarfraz Ahmed, learned Additional Advocate-General, for respondents Nos, 1 and 2.
5. ' Mr. Qazi Munawar Ali has first argued that the appeal filed by respondent No, 3 before the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal was time-barred and his second contention has been that the petitioner was a person employed in the administration of State and, therefore, excluded from the perview of the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. Mr. Qazi Munawar Ali's next argument in the alternative was that the persons employed by the petitioner were also the persons employed in the administration of the State and, therefore, the provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance were not applicable.
6. ' So far as the first contention of the learned counsel is concerned, the same appears to be completely devoid of force as admittedly the relevant provisions providing for appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal against an order passed by the Labour Court under subsections (1) and
(2) of section 10 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance are embodied in section 11 of the said Ordinance. Admittedly no period of limitation has been provided for therein. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also conceded that no such provision can be found in the rules framed under the said Ordinance. Since there is no provision of law providing for a period of limitation within which an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal may be filed, the contention that the appeal filed by respondent No, 3 was time-barred is not tenable. The first contention of Mr. Qazi Munawar Ali is, therefore, repelled.
7. Turning to the second contention, section 1(3)(b) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance provides:- (1)
8. (2)
(3) It shalt not apply to any person employed--
(b) in the administration of the State other than those employed as workmen by the Railways, Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Departments.
9. ' It may be pointed out in this regard that Mr. Qazi Munawar Ali has referred to various provisions of the Sindh Small Industries and Handicrafts Development Corporation Act, 1972, to support his contention that the petitioner corporation came into existence by virtue of a statute and it functions under the control of the Government of Sindh. The question as to the status of employees working under the Director of National Savings, Multan Region, Multan which is also a Government controlled Corporation came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Faqir Muhammad v. The Director of National Savings, Multan Region, Multan 1992 PLC 163 and it was held by the Supreme Court by its majority decision that the expression 'in the administration of the State' has been used in section 1(3)(b) in a narrow and limited sense and except for those employees who are performing duties of administrative nature, the rest of the employees are not excluded from the perview of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Similar view was taken in the case of Employees Old-Age Benefit Institution v. National Industrial Relations Commission and others.
10. Reference in this regard may also be made to the case of Sindh Road Transport Corporation v.
11. Staff Union and 2 others 1975 PLC 361 wherein a similar view was also taken by the Division B'ench of this Court.
12. It is, therefore, clear that notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner-Corporation came into existence by a statute and its functions are completely controlled by the Government, it cannot be said that its employees are persons employed in the administration of the State. The argument of Mr. Munawar Ali Qazi that the corporation is itself employed in the administration of the State, however, is also completely misconceived, because the provisions of section 1(3)(b) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance do not relate to the employer but the same only relate to persons who are employees in an establishment. This is clear from the language used in clause (b) which not only excludes the persons employed in the administration of the State but also such persons who are employed as workman by the Railways, Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Departments, It is, therefore, clear that clause (b) is not intended to apply to the "employer" but only to "workmen" or "persons employed". Since no other argument has been advanced and we are unable to agree with the contentions of Mr. Qazi Munawar Ali, we find no force in this petition.
13. ' In the result, the petition is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.