1. MAZHARUL HAQ (CHAIRMAN).-Muhammad Afzal, Steno--grapher has filed this petition under Standing Order 18 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders)
2. Ordinance, 1968 read with section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 against the Principal, Pakistan Administrative Staff College, Lahore, for his re-instatement. The facts as enumerated in the petition are that the petitioner was employed in the District Council, Lahore as a Stenographer and his services were transferred to the Administrative Staff College on 25-11-1964 and since then he has been in the service of the respondent till 22-9-1970 when the respondent ordered the reversion of the petitioner to his parent Department which according to the petitioner amounted to the termination of his services because on his transfer from the District Council, his lien in that Office had been terminated. The petitioner further alleged that the termination of his services by the respondent was due to his Trade Union activities.
3. Mr. Afzal Mufti, the learned counsel for the respondent, contesting the petition, argued that the Administrative Staff College, being an educational institution, would be excluded from the purview of both the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 and Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and as such the petition was not maintainable. He referred to section 2, sub-clauses (b) and (f) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 wherein Commercial Establishment and Industrial Establishment have been defined and section 2 (ix) and
(xiv) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, of 1969, wherein an establishment and Industry has been defined. The learned counsel for the respondent also relied on AIR 1963 SC 1873, the case decided under the industrial Disputes Act, 1947, wherein it was held that the work of education carried out by the institution like the Delhi University was not industrial within the meaning of sections 2 (i) and 2
(g) of the said Act. It may be mentioned at this stage that the definition of Industry in the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 and the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, is almost similar. The learned counsel for the petitioner replied that the words calling, service, employment or occupation used in the definition of Industry in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, are wide enough to include an educational institution. He however also attempted to argue that the Administrative Staff College is not an educational institution with which I do not agree for the simple reason that the main object of this institution is to train senior public and business executives for their role in a dynamic and developmental society and to focus attention on the need and methods of making public and business administration efficient and economical and also to award grants, scholarships or travel fellowships for research in public administration and allied subjects. The College holds two regular sessions every year and a special course for the R. C. D. is also held. Apart from the participants from the R. C. D. countries, the College also admits trainees from other Afro-Asian countries.
4. International experts also visit the College occasionally to assist in the running of various courses; and the admission to the College Courses is controlled by the Governing Body and is strictly limited to such cases as have been fully recommended by the respective Govern--ments and Corporations. The learned counsel for the petitioner also argued that the College publishes various books which are sold and as such this would amount to "business". I cannot agree with this argument also for the simple reason that occasional Publications such as books either treatise public administration or collections of essays and articles on the same subject and the college journal intend to impart knowledge on public administra--tion and its allied subjects. This activity, to my mind, would again be in consequence with its main function i.e. imparting education. The learned counsel for the respondent had argued than the publications are sold so that the College should recover its expenditure and no profit was involved. Keeping this fact in view, I conclude that it cannot be said that the publication of aforementioned books and journals would amount to a trade or a business.
5. No doubt, the words, calling, service, employment or occupation which are embodied in the definition of industry under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, are very wide terms, but they will have to be read and interpreted keeping in view the intention of this special enactment. It would be unreasonable to regard the work of imparting education as an industry only because its minor subsidiary and incidental work amounts to partake of the character of the service which may fall within the definition of industry. The aim of education cannot be compared or assimilated with what may be described as an industrial process.
6. On behalf of the petitioner, reliance was also placed on a case from the Courts of Chancery, Kemp v. Sober ((1851) 20 L J 602) wherein it was observed that in the conveyance of a house at Kemp Town, Brighton, a covenant was contained that the purchaser should not carry on any trade, business, or calling in the said house, or permit the same to be used to the annoyance, nuisance, or injury of any of the houses in Kep Town-Held, that keeping a girls' school was a breach of the covenant and that the Court would interfere by injunction, notwithstanding other schools had been permitted to be carried on upon the same property in houses which were subject to a similar covenant. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that in the cited authority, it was observed that keeping a school as carrying on a calling. In my opinion, this citation would not be relevant for interpreting the word 'calling" used in the definition of industry because in the cited case, the word "calling" has been implied in the-conveyance of a house.
7. For the foregoing reasons, I uphold the objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent that an educational institution cannot be called an industry. This petition as such is not maintainable and is dismissed.
8. Before parting with this case, I may however also mention that in the definition of Commercial Establishment and Industrial Establishment, as contained in the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standings Orders) Ordinance, 1968, the words "calling", service, employment or occupation", have not been used which would obviously mean that the scope is still further restricted for the purposes of this statute.