' This Constitution petition by M/s. Chohan Flying Coach Service, Sahiwal, calls in question the decision of the Regional Transport Authority, Multan dated 18-2-1990 and issuance of licence thereunder by the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Multan, for establishing 'D-Class' Stand in favour of respondent No,2.
2. A few relevant facts are that M/s. Chohan Flying Coach Service, Sahiwal (Registered Partnership herein petitioner) and M/s. New Prince Flying Coach Service, Tufail Shaheed Road Sahiwal (Registered Partnership herein respondent No,2) are locked in a dispute with respect to sanctioning of `D-Class' Stand under the order noted above by the Regional Transport Authority, Multan (hereinafter referred to as the Authority). Respondent No,2 submitted an application straightaway to the Chief Minister, Punjab, for permitting applicant to establish 'D-Class' Stand under rule 253 of Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules, 1969. This application was forwarded to the Authority who was communicated a wish on the part of the Chief Minister, Punjab to allow the same in consonance with the request of the applicant. This communication was followed by another directive dated 29- 11-1989 whereby the Authority was commanded to relax the policy, if any. It was on 29-11-1989 when the Authority after considering the application, decided to allow the same subject to the condition that the applicant shall produce the proof of 8 vehicles registered in the name of applicant firm and file the rent agreement relating to premises on which the Stand was to be established, with owners of that land. Thereafter the Chairman, Municipal Committee, the District Magistrate, and the Superintendent of Police of District Sahiwal granted no-objection certificates with respect to the construction of 'stand' on the premises described in the application on 12-2-1990, 17-2-1990 and 18- 2-1990, respectively. As a result of these proceedings, the Secretary of the Authority issued the requisite lincence on 11-3-1990.
3. The arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner can be conveniently summarised as follows:-- ' Firstly: That the impugned lincence was granted by the Authority without application of independent mind under the dictative communication of the Chief Minister, Punjab. According to the learned counsel neither under the Punjab Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965 (XIX of 1965) nor under the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred as the Rules of 1969), the Chief Minister had the authority to issue directive to influence the mind of the Authority while granting lincences for establishing various calsses of stands. This being the legal position, the Authority had passed a stereotype order which was nullity in the eye of law. Reliance was placed on A.W. Malik v. The Authorised Officer, Dacca Improvement Trust and others (PLD 1970 Dacca 178), Muhammad Yousaf v. Province of Sindh and 2 others (PLD 1976 Karachi 1219), Riaz Ahmad v. Secretary, (Information, Culture and Toursim Department) Government of Punjab and 3 others (PLD 1977 Lahore 307) and Aziz Ahmad v. Secretary, R.TA. Quetta and 6 others (PLD 1984 Quetta 106).
' Secondly: That the Authority decided to grant licence to respondent No,2 without consulting the Municipal Committee, Sahiwal in consonance with sub-rule (2). Of Rule 253 of the Rules of 1969. On the strength of the argument, it was contended .That the decision of the Authority dated 11-3-1990 was illegal and without jurisdiction. Strength was sought from Muhammad Jafar Tarar v. District Magistrate; Gujranwala and another (1990 CLC 281).
4. On the other hand, the preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition was raised by the learned counsel for respondent No,2 by saying that the petitioner had an alternative remedy of filing appeal under the Rules of 1969. This remedy was expeditious as well as alternate and so petition could not be filed without first exhausting this remedy. Reliance was placed on The Tariq Transport Company, Lahore v. Sargodha-Bhera Bus Service, Sargodha (2) the R.TA., Lahore and (3) the Provincial Transport Authority, Lahore (PLD 1958 SC 437), Imtiaz Ahmad v. Ghulam Ali and 2 others (PLD 1963 SC 382) and Muhammad Naseem Khan v. Government of N.-W.F.P. Through Secretary, Cooperative Peshawar and others (1990 CLC 1693). In addition to it, it was urged that the petitioner had come to Court with inordinate delay of three months. According to the learned counsel, during this time, respondent No,2 had constructed the stand; had purchased the vehicles in accordance with the order of the Authority. According to the learned counsel, this has been done by spending a lot of money. According to him, in these circumstances, the petition merited to be dismissed on the principle of gross lathes. Help was sought from the rule laid down in Pakistan through Chairman, Railways v. The Punjab Labour Court No,2, Lahore and 2 others (1982 CLC 711), Masood Khan v. Settlement Commissioner, Multan, Bahawalpur and others (1986 CLC 515), Ameer and others v. Sikandar and others (1986 CLC 2046), Khalid Mahmud Khuhro and others v.
Federation of Pakistan and others (1986 CLC 2320), Mir Sultan v. The Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and 4 others (1989 CLC 1495) and M/s. Murree Brewery Company Ltd. v. Director-General, Excise and Taxation and 3 others (1991 MLD 267).
5. It was next contended that the petitioner was not aggrieved person within the meaning of Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, as such he had no locus standi to file this petition.
6. Last but not least, it was urged that the Chief Minister, Punjab was the Chief Executive of the Province under the Constitution and had the power under Article 129 of the Constitution to direct the Authority to issue lincences. On the basis of this argument, it was canvassed that the State was not bound by the Statute unless it was so provided by express terms or by necessary implications.
Reliance was placed on Director of Rationing and Distribution v. The Corporation of Calcutta (AIR 1960 SC 1355).
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in reply to preliminary objection, submitted that the impugned order was coram non judice and was passed under the dictative influence of the office of Chief Minister of the Punjab as such the appeal under the rules was illusory and futile exercise. According to the learned, counsel the remedy under Article 199 of the Constitution is proper remedy under such circumstances. Reliance was placed on The District Magistrate and another v. Faqir Sayed Fayyaz-ud-Din and another (PLD 1965 SC 371), Syed Ali Abbas v. Vishan Singh and others (PLD 1967 SC 294) and Abdul Qadir v.Government of West Pakistan (PLD 1967 SC 506).
8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at a considerable length and perused the comments furnished by the Authority, the written statement filed by respondent No, 2 and the arguments placed on record by the parties. The questions emerging for consideration are:--
(i) Whether the decision of Authority dated 29-11-1989 and issuance of licence by the Secretary of the Authority dated 11-3-1990 are without jurisdiction and without lawful authority? If so, what is its effect?
(ii) Whether the petition merits to be dismissed on the ground of laches and availability of the relief- of appeal under the Rules of 1969?
(iii) Whether the petitioner has no locus standi to file this Constitution petition?
9. Having penned down the facts of the case, the arguments advanced by the parties and the points calling for determination, I proceed to deal with first point. Under the Ordinance of 1965, the Authority is vested with the power to sanction stands. Under rule 253, the Authority is empowered in consultation with the Local Authority of the area concerned, to make an order in prescribed form permitting any place to be used as a stand. It is further laid down in this rule that no place which is privately owned shall be notified as a stand without the written consent of the owner. It is thus clear that the Authority has the exclusive power to permit or refuse the application for the use of any place for stands. It is settled principle that whenever an Authority is given power to pass some order it shall exercise its authority independently by taking into consideration all the relevant circumstances. Reference be made to statement of law in Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, page 33. The relevant portion is as follows:- "Acting under dictation---A body entrusted with a statutory discretion must address itself independently to the matter for consideration. It cannot lawfully accept instructions from, or mechanically adopt the view of, another body as to the manner of exercising its discretion in a particular case, unless that other body has been expressly empowered to issue such directions or unless deciding body or officer is a subordinate element in an administrative hierachy within which instructions from above may properly be given on the question at issue."
' This question came up for consideration before Division Bench of Dacca High Court, A.W. Malik v.
The Authorised Officer, Dacca Improvement Trust and others (PLD 1970 Dacca 178). In this case, the petitioner owned a piece of land in an area. It was governed by Town Improvement Act. The petitioner applied to the relevant Authority for the purpose of construction of a Cinema house on his land. No objection certificate was granted by the Police Authorities as well as Film Development Corporation. The application was refused by the Chairman, Dacca Improvement Trust. However, on appeal, an application was allowed by Board of. Trustees. Later on, the Government refused to give the approval for the construction of cinema. Taking into account the afore-noted circumstances, it was held:-- "What, then is the duty of the Authorised Officer? When statutory duty is cast upon an authority, it is for that authority, and that authority alone, to discharge such duty and no other authority, howhighsoever, is permitted to interfere with or to influence, the exercise of the said statutory function. Conversely, it is the duty of the abovementioned statutory authority to repel and dispel any attempt to influence his decision, even when such an attempt proceeds from a superior authority. Having regard to the limited nature of his function, under the Building Construction Act, 1952, the Authorised Officer must confine himself solely to matters which are entrusted to him under the Act. He is required to examine the building plan from the point of view of construction and to investigate whether there are defects in the plan purely from a constructional point of view.
He is not allowed to embark upon an investigation as to the desirability of such a building from the point of view of public policy. Public policy is something which is completely outside the province of the Authorized Officer. It is the demand of law that he must disabuse his mind from any such consideration."
' The same view was reiterated with greater emphasis in Riaz Ahmad v. Secretary, Information, Culture and Tourism Department, Government of Punjab and 3 others (PLD 1977 Lah. 307). It is worth to quote paragraph No,12 of the judgment in extenso, which is as follows:-- "The Act and the Rules, as seen above, have made provisions in regard to the licensing authority i,e, the person who can issue licences. They also vest that authority with the jurisdiction to choose from among applicants the persons to whom lincences can be granted. It has to see whether the rules have been complied with and then pass an order of issuance of licence. In regard to the touring cinemas sub-rule (2) of rule 6 gives the additional power to the Commissioner to extend the period fixed in that rule for the licence issuable by the District Magistrate. Sub-rule (3) of rule 6 which still holds the field further provides for review of any order of the District Magistrate and confers finality on the order of the Commissioner. The Act, therefore, does not only provide for the authority to act as a licensing authority but also provides for a review by a higher authority and gives finality to the order of that authority i,e, the Commissioner. In these circumstances no power can be claimed by the Government in the garb of control which is not conferred by the Rules. It may also be seen by the letter dated 23rd June, 1974, to which reference has already been made that the Government has been alive to the situation that while fixing the period of extension to be given by the Commissioner and the Government, it was not exercising any statutory function but an administrative function; but I am afraid, the Government is bound by the law of the land. It cannot exercise any administrative function which in the case of licensing of cinematograph is not provided by the law or the rules. No doubt it is open to the Government to make amendments in the rules but for so long as these amendments are not made by publication in the official Gazette, the Government does not have any jurisdiction to pass any order of the type passed in favour of the petitioner or respondent No,3. If any amendment is made in the rules by publication, no doubt, that amendment will make the rules a part of the statute but for so long as this is not done the Government as a statutory functionary has no power or authority to pass any order either of extension or of selecting a particular person as fit for *a lincence. This power has been granted by the conferment of review jurisdiction upon the Commissioner and his order has been given a finality. The word control cannot take away the finality given by the rules to the order of the Commissioner to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Deputy Commissioner."
' The rule laid down in aforementioned precedents was followed in Muhammad Yousaf v. Province of Sindh and 2 others (PLD 1976 Kar. 1219), Miss Adeeba Zakiyah v. Deputy Director of Personal Service, Naval Headquarters, Islamabad and 4 others (1984 CLC 1331), and Mast Khan v.
Muhammad Nawaz Khan Niazi, Superintendent of Police, Kasur and 3 others (1987 P.Cr.LJ 391). I am in respectuful agreement with the view taken in the aforesaid authorities. Applying these principles to the facts and circumstances of this case, I have no difficulty in concluding that the Authority made the impugned decision and issued the licence under the extraneous influence noted above, as such the impugned orders are found to have been passed without jurisdiction.
10. There is yet another aspect of the case. From the detailed narration given above, it is quite clear that the Authority decided to allow the application of respondent No,2 on 29-11-1989 without consulting the Chairman/Local Authority. As a matter of fact 'no-objection certificate' from Chairman-Municipal Committee, District Magistrate, the Superintendent of Police, Sahiwal District, were obtained on 12-2-1990, 17-2-1990 and 18-2-1990, respectively. From the examination of these facts it becomes crystal clear that the provisions of Rule 253 which prescribes that the sanction for establishment of stand had to be granted in consultation with the Local Authority of the area concernded, was violated.
' From the aforenoted examination it is thus clear that the impugned decision of Authority and issuance of licence by the Secretary, R.TA., were wholly without jurisdiction, void ab initio and were ultra vires.
11. Coming to the second question it is to be noticed that this objection of the respondents proceeds upon the principle of exhaustion embodied in Article 199 of the Constitution. This principle is that no one is entitled to invoke Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court unless and until he has exhausted the remedies provided to him under the relevant law. The principle has been applied by the superior judiciary in accordance with the facts and circrumstances of the each case.
12. Afzal Hussain Syed v. Punjab Government etc. (PLD 1980 Lah. 697), Mumtaz Hussain alias Bhutta v. Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Punjab, Lahore and another (1976 SCMR 450), Manzoor Ahmad v.
XXIV Civil Judge, Karachi and others (1985 SCMR 959), William Lawrence v. Government of Pakistan and others (1986 SCMR 1077), Allah Bakhsh and another v. Muhammad Ismail and others (1987 SCMR 810), Abdul Rehman Hayat and another v. Wealth Tax Officer and others (1988 SCMR 1722), Muhammad Aslam v. Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another (1988 SCMR 1803), Pakistan Burmah Shell Ltd. v. MRs, Nasreen Irshad and others (1989 SCMR 1892) and State Bank of Pakistan v. The Director, Military Lands and Cantonments, Rawalpindi and others (PLD 1990 SC 827), are cases in which the petitions under Article 199 were rejected on the ground that the petitioners had alternate remedy available to them under the relevant law and had come to Court without availing such remedy.
13. Lieutenant-Col. Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan v. The Controller of Estate Duty etc. (PLD 1961 SC 119), Muahmmad Ali v. Muhammad Bashir and others (PLD 1962 (WP) Lah. 230), Premier Cloth Mills Ltd., Lyallpur v. Sales Tax Officer, Investigation Circle H, Lahore and another (1972 SCMR 257), Muhammad Nazir Khan v. Dr. Mubashir Hassan and another (PLD 1974 Lah. 49), Dr. MRs, Naseem Qureshi v. Deputy Administrator, Evacuee Trust Property, Karachi and another (PLD 1987 Kar. 459), M/s. Shahid Agency v. Collector of Customs (Appraisement) and others (PLD 1989 Kar. 594), The Murree Brewery Co. Ltd. v. Pakistan through the Secretary to Government of Pakistan, Works Division and 2 others (PLD 1972 SC 279), Syed Ali Abbas and others v. Vishan Singh and others (PLD 1967 SC 294), Abdul Hai v. The Administrator, Hyderabad Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad and another (PLD 1985 Kar. 319) and Hafiz Muhammad Arif Dar v. Income Tax Officer (PLD 1989 SC 109), are the cases where the interference in constitutional jurisdcition was made notwithstanding the fact that the applicants had come to Court without availing the alternate remedy prescribed under the relevant law.
14. As already noted above, the question of doctrine of exhaustion is not free from difficulty. At this stage, I feel it appropriate to examine few leading cases noted above for and against proposition in order to arrive at a correct conclusion. In Hafiz Muhammad Arif Dar v. Income Tax Officer, supra, it was held: "One of the conditions for grant of relief in writ jurisdiction of the High Court is that the petitioner before it should not have any alternative adequate remedy. In this case, a remedy by way of appeal, as mentioned in the impugned order was such remedy. Therefore, it is correct that no relief could be granted to the petitioner under Article 199 of the Constitution.
' But that does not mean that in case the petitioner has not been allowed any relief by the Departmental authorities (despite the observations by the Supreme Court), the petitioner would have no immediate remedy at all against the highhandedness of the department.
' Among others he can file a complaint and grievance application before the Federal Ombudsman who can provide effective redress, in a case like the present one. That forum has several attributes of a Court in many aspects of its power. It can also move in a matter promptly whenever so needed. At the same time it does not suffer from some of the handicaps, due to the technicalities of procedural nature, which operate as impediments or thwart such like action by the Courts. For example the limitation on non-availability of an alternate remedy in this case for the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, is not, applicable to the said forum. Besides, the same being quasi-judicial, it is also added by a Judge of the Supreme Court with similar powrs to punish for contempt. In this context, therefore, it can be safely concluded that it can provide the alternate effective and adequate remedy to the petitioner also."
15. The Supreme Court in the Murree Brewery Co. Ltd. v. Pakistan through the Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, Works Division and 2 others, supra, observed as under:-- "It is thus evident that the appellant challenged the very jurisdiction of the Capital Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the C.D.A.) to make the impugned acquisition under the Ordinance. If it had succeeded in establishing that the impugned acquisition was ultra vires the Ordinance, its appeal under section 36 would have been an exercise in futility. It was held by the Supreme Court in Lt.-Col. Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan v. Controller of Estae Duty and others (PLD 1961 SC 199) that the rule that the High Court will not entertain a writ petition when other appropriate remedy is yet available is not a rule of law barring jurisdiction but a rule by which the Court regulates its jurisdiction. It was further observed that one of the well recognized exceptions to the general rule is a case where an order is attacked on the ground that it was wholly without authority."
' The same principle was followed in Syed Ali Abbas and others v. Bishan Singh and others, ibid wherein it was held that:-- "There had been in the relevant respect, an excess of jurisdiction, and the affected parties 'could not be penalised for not throwing themselves again on the mercy of the authorities who were responsible for such excess. The proper and indeed the only authority which possessed power to correct the legal wrong thus done was the High Court acting in its jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution in order to provide that their right was allowed to the appellants, the proper order of the High Court to have made was to have directed that the Custodian himself should entertain and hear the appeal that had been presented to him."
' The observations in Abdul Hai v. The Administrator, Hyderabad and another, supra, are worth repetition which are as under:-- ' For more than one reason, we are not inclined to sustain the above objection as to the maintainability of the above petition. Firstly, the petition was filed at the time when there was no right of an election petition available to the petitioner, and, therefore, the petitioner had no alternate adequate remedy and, hence, the petition was competently filed. It may be pointed out that in the above-cited Supreme Court case of Sadruddin Ansari (PLD 1967 SC 569) the right of an election petition was available to the petitioner under rule 7 of the relevant rules but its scope was limited and during the pendency of the petition scope of the above rule 7 was extended by substituting above rule 7 which amendment was considered by the Supreme Court procedural so as to make it applicable to the pending cases. But the instant case is on a higher pedestal as a right to file an election petition, which is a substantive law and not procedural, has been conferred during the pendency of the petition as hereinabove pointed out. Secondly, no disputed question of fact is involved. The controversy centres around the construction of the rejected ballot paper.
Thirdly, there seems to be unanimity of view among the Superior Courts on the point in issue."
' From the survey of case-law noted above, it is clear that the principle of alternative remedy under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 is not absolute bar to the adjudication of the petition. If the Court comes to the conclusion that the impugned order/impugned action by E the functionary of the State is in excess of authority, or is totally destitute of authority, it had the powers to come to the relief of affected party and strike down the order in order to keep the functionary of the State within the sphere of his authority.
16. Applying this principle to the facts and circumstances of this case, it is quite clear to me that the Authority did pass the order under the extraneous influence from the office of the Chief Minister, Punjab. In this background, I have no doubt in my mind that the petitioner cannot be non-suited on the principle of non-availability of the relief available to him under the rules of 1%9, the appeals would be mere futile exercise . The preliminary objection of the learned counsel is found to be untenable and is accordingly repelled.
17. As regards the question of laches, it needs to be stated that this principle has to be applied according to the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rules can be laid down for this principle. The doctrine of laches came into examination in Pakistan Post Office v. Settlement Commissioner and others (1987 SCMR 1119). It was held as under:- "It is necessary to mention here a peculiar feature of Goverment litigation. No doubt, it observed in Province of East Pakistan v. Abdul Hamid Darji (1970 SCMR 558), that in matter of condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act the Government will not be shown extra indulgence than an ordinary litigant and if so desired only an amendment of law was the way out. The further experience of nearly two decades after that judgment shows that the inability on the part of the Government to get such an amendment made, has been treated as an accepted and inviolable rule to refuse condonation of delay whenever the plea is raised of departmental delays; which are inherent in the procedure even if culpable negligence is not involved. A just and proper approach which has not been prohibited by the rule in Abdul Hamid Darji's case, is to treat the request of condonation on its own merits like that of any other litigant; and not to shut out the law on simple formula that it is mere departmental delay negligence; because the decision itself, does not lay down such an inflexible rule. The facts of that case and the condition that each case is to be seen on its own circumstances, cannot at all be ignored. It is well-known that indiscriminate application of this decision has caused immense loss to the public exchequer wherein an innocent third party, namely, the taxpayer in ultimate analysis, suffers the loss. This is besides those cases where delays are collusive so as to avoid dictates of justice and law.
' Hence a departmental delay whenever put forward as a ground for condonation of delay requires consideration in its merits and rejected or accepted accordingly, as the case may be.
' In the case of laches, however, the principles of condonation would be totally different. It being in the field of equity, it will not be denied where either the negligence is not culpable vis-a-vis the merits of the case; or, when there is no equity in favour of the party who would be the gainer in case the condonation is denied.
' It is also for the very same reason that bar of laches in equitable jurisdiction has rightly been equated with principle of estoppel and not the statutory bar of limitation. See Mst. Noor Jehan Begum v. Abdul Majid Shaida and another (Law Notes 1967 (N.U.C.) SC 15 Civil Review Petition No,K-3 of 1967 in Civil Appeal No,K-39 of 1965, decided on 14.-4-1967). In the present case no question of estoppel arises. The change of position by the transferee was pendente lite. He cannot take any advantage of this principle either. And the writ petition could not be dismissed except on grounds of merits.
' The next aspect relates to the nature of the order impugned before the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. We agree that the mere fact that the order is void would not necessarily displace the bar of laches in equitable jurisdiction. The rule is that if it is a just and proper order then notwithstanding it being otherwise void, it need not be set aside in writ jurisdiction, if the same was filed after inordinate delay. See S. Sharif Ahmad Hashmi v. Chairman, Screening Committee, Lahore and another (1978 SCMR 367). On the other hand, if it is a void order and is also unjust and improper besides being illegal, the High Court will have no hesitation in setting it aside despite the objection regarding laches. It is so because the High Court would then be acting on a still higher principle than that of laches that: injustice is not perpetuated with the blessings of the Court in its discretionary jurisdiction, as the discretion to dismiss a writ petition cannot be exercised in aid of injustice.
' In this case, if the High Court would have examined the foregoing features in the subject-matter of the writ petition the results would have been different. As a necessary corollary, therefore, it has to be laid down that a writ petition cannot be dismissed on ground of laches, without examining the dictates of justice in the claim of each party. This, of course, is in addition to examination of law and jurisdictional point involved in the case."
18. Guided by the rule in the case of Pakistan Post Office v. Settlement Commissioner and others, supra, it is quite clear to me that the petitioner has come to Court without any inordinate delay, that the impugned order/action of the Authority is wholly without jurisdiction and that no equity exists in favour of respondent No,2 as he had obtained the impugned order and licence by over- riding the provisions of law. I have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner cannot be non-suited on the principle of laches.
19. Before I proceed to deal with the question of 'locus stand? Of the petitioner it seems necessary to reiterate that for invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, the petitioner must be an aggrieved person. He had to demonstrate direct or indirect injury to himself and substantial interest in the subject-matter of the proceedings. The meaning of aggrieved party had in number of cases received liberal orientation. In Mian Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore and another (PLD 1969 SC 223), it was held:-- "Learned counsel for the appellant, however, contends that the fact that he had been induced to purchase Plot No,86.E/1 by the special attraction of the market proposed to be built opposite to his plot did give him a sufficient right for this purpose as this was not merely an illusory or an imaginary right.
' In support of this contention learned counsel has also placed strong reliance upon the observations contained in judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan in the case of Montgomery Flour and General Mills Ltd. v. Director, Food Purchase (PLD 1957 Lah. 914) by Kaikaus, J. (As he then was):-- 'It is true', observed the learned Judge, 'that a petitioner must have some right if he applies to the Court for a direction or order under Article 170 (now Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan) but he need not have a right in that strict sense of the terms which is mentioned above. Whenever an enactment empowers a public officer to pass orders that benefit or harm a citizen, the citizen gets a right that in a matter in which he is concerned an order be passed in accordance with law. This too is a right that can be enforced by the Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 170 of the Constituion of Pakistan. If the officer concerned passes an order that is not in accordance with law, any person whose interests are affected by the order can maintain a petition for a writ direction under Article 170. All orders of executive officers are subject to challenge by those affected by the orders, and a person would be 'affected' even if he loses some benefit or advantage which he would have gained if the order was in accordance with law. A public officer passing an order on an application submitted to him does not grant the applicant a favour.
' He is only granting the applicant his right in the sense that he has a right to have the matter determined in accordance with law and justice. It will be observed that even a fundamental right may not be a `right' in the strict sense of the term. A right to acquire or hold property, a right to carry on a profession, a right to move about freely, etc., are not rights in the strict sense because they do not cast,. Any corresponding duties on any person. They are what writers on jurisprudence call 'liberties'. In a wider sense these too are recognised as rights by jurisprudence and they can form the basis of a writ petition.'
' This decision was approved by this Court in the case of Ikram Bus Service v. Board of Reveneu (PLD 1963 SC 564) where this Court stated that: `Even an administrative body such as an R.TA. Is under a legal obligation to deal with all applicants before it fairly, justly and equitably and an applicant has a legal right to demand that the administrative body should determine the matter with whose decision it is charged, in accordance with the law.'
' It is clear from the above that the right considered sufficient for maintaining a proceeding of this nature is not necessarily a right in the strict juristic sense but it is enough if the applicant discloses that he had a personal interest in the performance of the legal duty which if not performed or performed in a manner not permitted by law would result in the loss of some personal benefit or advantage or the curtailment of a privilege or liberty or franchise."
' This view was followed. In Nasar Trading Co. And 6 others v. Provincial Transport Authority, Baluchistan, Quetta and another (PLD 1979 Quetta 45) and again in All Muhammad v. Hussain Bukhsh and others (PLD 1976 SC 37). Judged from this perspective, it is quite clear that the petitioner is a registered partnership, running a D-Class Wagon-Stand under a licence from Regional Transport Authority. As such he had a substantial interest in the matter of establishment of another Stand in the vicinity of his "Stand".
' In the light of foregoing discussion, this Constitution petition is accepted, alongwith requested relief. The decision of the Regional Transport Authority, Multan dated 18-2-1990 and the licence issued by the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority thereunder, are declared to have been passed and issued without lawful authority. The case is remitted to the Regional Transport Authority, Multan, who shall decide the applicaion of respondent No,2 in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs.