S. IBNE ALI, J: --The petition is addressed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 to invoke jurisdiction of this Court, to annul order of Registrar, Co-operative Societies, N: W.F.P., respondent No.2, dated 23-3-1989, which has the origin in the facts, next to be narrated.
The petitioners alongwith thirteen others figured as elected Directors and they constituted Board of Directors of Frontier Provincial Co-operative Directors presently. They are listed in the impugned order, out of whom, four including petitioner No.2 have ceased to be the members of Central Board of Directors due to the expiry of their maximum tenure of six years as provided under section 6 (i.e) of the N.-W.F.P. Co-operative Societies (Reform) Ordinance, 1982. Further, petitioner No.2 has incurred disqualification under bye-law No.21 (i) (c) to hold the office of the Directorship also, because his two relatives, namely, Nadeem Zardad Clerk and Zahoor Ahmad Clerk are regular employees of the Frontier Provincial Co-operative Bank. He is being served with show-cause notice separately for knowingly concealing this fact in violation of the bye-law just referred to. Besides, after creation of the new Districts of Swabi and Charsadda, a contention was'raised that Directors Banaras Khan and Mian Gul from Mardan District and likewise Mohammad Zaman and Hafeezullah from Peshawar District who were returned as Directors on foot of joint electorates as a sequel to elections held under bye-law No.18 of the Bank should seek fresh mandate from their respective districts of domicile. The matter was referred to Legal Advisor of the Bank and he remitted an opinion that these four Directors stood disqualified and were no longer members of the Central Board of Directors of Frontier Provincial Co-operative Bank. Ex consequent, their seats were declared vacant and are required to be filled in accordance with the bye-laws of the Bank. Apart from the above, about 1/4th of the members of the Central Board were due to retipe in year 1989 under bye-law No.18. In the manner stated above, eleven Directors, in all, have ceased to be the members of the Central Board of Directors, representing more than 1/3 of the total elected members of the Board. 1n the above posture of facts, the whole Central Board of Directors stood superseded under the N.-W.F.P. Co-operative Societies (Reforms) Ordinance, 1982, read with bye- law No.18 alluded to. Consequent upon the supersession of the Board of Directors, respondent No.2, appointed Mr. Mian Kifayatullah as Administrator to manage the affairs of the Bank and exercise all powers and functions of the Central Board of Directors until assumption of office by new Board as a result of election and also directed General Manager to chalk out a schedule for the General Election. So far as facts go, that is how, sketched in brief outlines, they stand.
2.The validity of the aforesaid order of respondent No.2 is called in question inter alia, on the main grounds, firstly it is mala fide, secondly; before its issuance, shown-cause notice was issued to Managing Committee nor was Federal Bank of Co-operative, Islamabad consulted nor was any approval from Provincial Government obtained, thirdly the impugned order has not so far been published in the official Gazette, fourthly; neither the period of supersession nor its extension has been disclosed and lastly, there is no provision in the entire Co---operative Law for removal of Managing Committee of the Bank. These grounds, one and all, are controverted by respondents 2 and 3 in their respective replies, in which however, preliminary objections to the effect that petition suffers from laches and that the impugned order, being revisable, has not been challenged under section 64-A of the Co-operative-Societies Act, 1925 and consequently in the presence of alternative remedy, though not availed, the writ petition is not maintainable, were taken up.
3.Both the contesting parties have been called upon to address arguments on the point of maintainability and competency of writ petition. It is admitted on all hands that Article 199 of the Constitution confers jurisdiction on this Court to act on the application of any aggrieved party and provide adequate remedy, provided it was satisfied that no other adequate remedy under the law was available to such an aggrieved party. The words `adequate remedy' connote an efficacious, convenient, beneficial, effective and speedy remedy. The test of aforesaid meaning of `adequate remedy' primarily rests on the proposition of fact and law raised in each case. It is noticed that the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, which ostensibly created a right in the petitioners, equally provided a remedy as contemplated under section 64-A of the Act, the taxt of which for the sake of ready reference is being reproduced herein below in extenso:- "64-A. Power of Provincial Government and the Registrar to call for proceedings of Subordinate Officers and to pass orders thereon.---The Provincial Government and the Registrar may call for and examine the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any officer subordinate to them for the purpose of satisfying themselves as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such officer. If in any case, it shall appear to the Provincial Government or the Registrar that any decision or order or proceedings so-called for should be modified, annulled or reversed the Provincial Government or the Registrar, as the case may be, may pass such order thereon as to it or he may seem fit."
4. A bare perusal of this statutory provision reveals that the Registrar as well as the Provincial Government has the requisite power to examine and interfere in an appropriate case covering legality and propriety of any decisions or orders and regularity of any proceedings or inquiry before subordinate officers. The factual and legal position is stated in parawise comments of respondent No.2, which in nutshell is that last General Meeting was held on 30-9-1987 and election made therein, next election/general meeting was required to be held upto 30-9--1988 but no such meeting was convened or held till the passing of impugned order. So, in accordance with section 8
(2) of N.W.F.P.Co-operative Societies (Reforms) Ordinance, 1982 there was no legal existence of Central Board of Directors. And that indeed, in the absence of Central Board of Directors, it presents a case .Of making interim arrangement till elections are held in the near future. This interim arrangement as a sequel to non-existence of Board of Directors, or supersession thereof is in the nature of proceedings taken in the matter and is amenable to interference by the Provincial Government. Nevertheless, while relying upon PLD 1966, (West Pakistan), Karachi 177 the learned counsel for petitioners cannot invoke the provision of section 64-A of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925. The facts of that precedent case are totally different from those of the case in hand. Here, a definite order is passed on 23-3-1989 by respondent No.2 and it is subject of challenge in this writ petition on the grounds set forth therein. It is petitioner's own case that situation to which exception is taken, is still persisting on account of the proceedings taken in the matter. As defined in the case of Mst. Karim Bibi and others v. Hussain Bakhsh and another (PLD 1984 SC 344) "the term `proceedings' is a very comprehensive term, and generally speaking, means a prescribed course of action 1: for enforcing a legal right and hence it necessarily embraces the requisite steps by which judicial action is invoked". The proceedings are still pending or lying before the Registrar so long as impugned order is holding the field. The jurisdiction conferred under section 64-A is both revisional as well as supervisory and superintending in its nature qua any proceedings or inquiry. Restricted construction cannot be put on the plain phraseology employed in the section itself. The petitioners could therefore impeach the action taken by the Registrar by making a revision petition to the Provincial Government to which he is subordinate. It is an effective and efficacious remedy, especially when no specific mala fides is urged against the Provincial Government.
5. Under section 64 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 an appeal against an order under section 10, 16, 45, 49, 50, 50-A, or 54 or subsection (3) of a section 54-A may be made by any party aggrieved or affected by the order or decision to the Provincial Government within two months of the date of the communication of the order, while, in all other cases, revision may be filed against order of Registrar to the Provincial Government under section 64-A which is indeed revisional in character and that any order passed in appeal under section 64 or in revision under section 64-A by the Provincial Government shall be final and conclusive and shall not be liable to be called in question in any civil or revenue Court, therefore, keeping these provisions in mind, it is clear enough that effective remedy by way of revision is prescribed by section 64-A of the Act in a matter like the one under consideration. And to say that remedy by way of revision on the basis of two precedent cases, relied upon by the petitioner such as: PLD 1967 Lah. 991 and 1983 CLC 187, though proceeding on their peculiar sets of facts, is not provided or it is not enforcible adequately is to fly at tangent with the express provision contained in section 64-A of the Act itself. The view that we are taking is in consonance with 1988 CLC 2177, Sultan Mahmood & Co. v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, which lays down that if `alternative remedy provided by Act itself is not availed by an aggrieved person, the Writ Petition does not lie. In fact, alternative remedy though barred by time Was forced upon the petitioner in that case.
6. Consistently with above view point, the learned counsel for contesting respondent has contended that the jurisdiction under the Constitution can only be exercised if no other adequate remedy is available to the person seeking relied thereunder. Where any enactment or statute, according to him, as in the instant case, creates a right, provides a special forum and a set procedure for enforcement of that right, it is not only obligatory upon such person to approach the special forum and follow the procedure prescribed, therefor, hilt normally the High Court will also be reluctant to interfere until the special remedy available has been invoked and exhausted; for it is not the object of a writ petition like this to defeat the existing jurisdiction. However, the jurisdiction of the Court could he invoked provided the remedy envisaged by law could not be availed for want of forum or failure of the Government of exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it or exercise of such jurisdiction in derogation to well-established principles of law and unless either of these conditions was not shown proved, it was not permissible to grant the relief asked for. Thus, availability of alternative remedy as provided by section 64-A of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, should upon these and general principles disincline a Court to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction. The same view and rule of law is declared in Sadarud Din Ansari's case reported as PLD 1967 SC 569.
7.In consequence of the discussion given above, the petitioners, though their term of office has expired and one of them has soiled his hands with a disqualification, are eligible, if at all, to seek redress of their grievance in the light of provision of section 64-A alluded to. In presence of the adequate remedy, F special jurisdiction of this Court could not be invoked at this stage nor does I his Court consider expedient to settle the disputed questions of fact involved in controversy before us. In addition, impugned order was passed on 71--1-1989 while writ petition was filed on 10-10-1989, beyond six months and obviously, in the absence of any explanation, it suffers from infirmity of laches and merits to he thrown out on this score too.
8.For the reasons stated above, the petition, is therefore, dismissed limine alongwith C.M. With no order as to costs.