The petitioner was employed in BECO Industries Ltd., Lahore, in 1953. According to him, he has been working as Security Officer in the said concern for the last about 14 years till he was allegedly removed by respondent No. 1 against law.
2. President's Order 1 of 1972 (Economic Reforms Order, 1972), came into force on 3-1-1972, whereby the administration of the big industries, categories of which are given in the Schedule thereof was taken over by the Government. It is admitted that the administration of the affairs of the BECO Industries Ltd., was also taken over by respondent No. 2, in compli--ance with the provisions of the said Order of the President. According to Article 3 of the Order it shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Provisional Constitution Order or any other law for the time being in force or in any agreement, contract, memorandum or articles. The Central Government can appoint a Managing Director under Article 4 of the said order, if it considers necessary in the public interest for the purposes of managing the affairs of such an establishment. After the appointment of a Managing Director the administration of the affairs of such establishment taken over under the said order shall vest in him and any person or authority exercising or having the right to exercise immediately before such appointment, any power or function in relation to the Management of the establishment shall cease to exercise or to have the right to exercise such power or function. The Managing Director under the said Article is to hold office during the pleasure of the Central Government and in the discharge of his functions is subject to such orders and directions as the Central Government may from time to time give in writing. In sub-Article (a) of Article 5 of the Order, it is provided that if any such establishment is owned or controlled by a company, then all the powers and functions of the Board of Directors will be exercised by the Managing Director ; the same will happen in the case of an estab--lishment owned or controlled by an individual or a firm.
Article 6 of the order provides as follows :----- "Unless in any particular case the Managing Director otherwise directs all persons employed in, by or for the purposes of the business of the establishment by whomsoever appointed or engaged, shall continue in their respective employments on the same remuneration and other conditions of service as were applicable to them immediately before the appointment of the Managing Director of that establish--ment."
Article 9 of the Order further provided that no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Central Government or the Managing Director or any other person for anything in good faith done under this Order or any rule or order made thereunder.
3. Respondent No. I who is Minister of Finance, Government of Pakistan, addressed a meeting of the workers on 6th of January 1972, at 4-30 p.m. Held at Sattar Road, Badami Bagh, near BECO Workshop under the auspices of the BECO People Labour Unit. According to the petitioner, Humayun Iqbal, who was inimical to him presented address of welcome to respondent No. 1. He also made a speech in which, accord--ing to the petitioner he made certain allegations against him and demanded his dismissal. According to the petitioner, respondent No. 1, while replying to the address of welcome, dismissed him from his service. In support of this version he has filed copies of some of the newspapers carrying the proceedings of the meeting. The fact that the said meeting was addressed by respondent No. 1 has not been denied in the written statement. It is also admitted therein that there were number of complaints against the petitioner already received by respondent No. 1, on the basis of which the petitioner had been removed from service before the meeting was held. According to respondent No. 1 it was only the decision with regard to dismissal of the petitioner which was announced in the public meeting. According to him the said decision had been taken by the Managing Director of the concern, already appointed by the Central Government.
4. Respondent No. 2 in his written statement has asserted that certain allegations against the petitioner received by respondent No. 1 had been conveyed by him through proper channel to the petitioner. It is further alleged therein that respondent No. 2 on the basis of the said complaints had conducted `objective' and `unbiased' inquiry and found the petitioner to be guilty whose services were thereafter terminated in accordance with law. It is interesting to note that nothing has been brought on record by the respondents in spite of the Courts' asking to show that some order of termination or dismissal against the petitioner was passed before 6th of January 1972, or any charge-sheet was handed over to him and any formal inquiry on that basis was conducted by respon--dent No. 2, against him.
5. According to the petitioner, after he had been dismissed verbally from his service in the public meeting, he was summoned by respon--dent No. 2 to his office and was directed not to enter the BECO premises in compliance with the order of respondent No. 1. According to him no charge- sheet was supplied nor any order in writing was given to him. However, on 10-1-1972, the petitioner received a registered acknowledgment due notice dated 7th of January 1972, vide Annex. `G', intimating that his services were no longer required by the BECO Management, therefore, he was relieved of his duties with immediate effect. He was further intimated that he would be paid all his dues including one month's pay in lieu of notice. The petitioner has now came up to the High Court and has chal--lenged the validity of the impugned order passed against-him.
6. It has been argued that, the relationship of master and servant exists between the `parties and as such the present petition is not main--tainable. The petitioner has adequate alternative remedy in the form of suit for damages, if he considers that he has been dismissed from service arbitrarily.
It has been argued that since the petitioner does not enjoy any statutory protection as granted to the Government employees, there--fore, he cannot seek the redress of his grievance in the form of mere declara--petition. No statute or statutory provision giving protection to the petitioner has been infringed. He is an employee of a private concern managed by a nominee of the Government. The mere taking over of Management of the concern has not changed its complexion. Lastly it has been argued on behalf of the respondents that no Court including the Supreme Court and High Court can entertain any petition questioning any provision, any rule or order made or anything done or any action taken or purport--ing to be made, done or taken under Economic Reforms Order of 1972, to be called hereafter as Order.
7. The first question which arises for consideration is as to what is the status of Managing Director, respondent No. 2, in context of the provision as contained in Article 4 of the Order. It has been argued on behalf of the respondents that the Managing Director of the concern does not perform his functions in connection with the affairs of federation, a province or local authority and as such the petition is not maintainable against him. The relevant provision of Article 4 of the Order has already been reproduced above. Clause 3 of Article 4 lays down that the Manag--ing Director shall hold his office during the pleasure of the Central Govern--ment, and shall, in the discharge of his functions be subject to such orders and directions as the Central Government may from time to time give in writing. It means that virtually he is to function under the direction and control of the Central Government. The affairs of the concern have to be managed and controlled by the Managing Director who is appointed by the Central Government. In the present case it is not denied that the Managing Director of the concern appointed under the Order took over A the charge before the alleged order of dismissal was passed against the petitioner. It is true that he has to administer the affairs of the private concern taken over by the Central Government but his status an position has to be examined in context of the control and discipline under which he -has to carry out his duties. His appointment has been made by the Central Government and he has to work in accordance with the! Directions and orders made by the Government. In other words the Central Government through him is entrusted with the proper administration of the concern under the appropriate law. This position existed till 11th of August 1972, when Development of Industries (Federal Control) Ordinance, 1972, was enforced. Before the enforcement of this Ordinance the.
Managing Director was working under the direct control of the Central Ministry concerned. There was some advisory body with which the Managing Director was also associated for the purpose of rendering assistance in the running of the federally controlled industries. This body was set up by the Central Government in the month of February 1972. Before that there does not appear to be or at least nothing has been brought on record to show that there was any agency or board in addition to the Managing Director for controlling the affairs of such concerns. He was directly answerable to the Central Government for the perform--ance of his functions at the time when the petitioner was removed from service. His association with the advisory committee did not bring any change in the nature of the control and supervision which obviously vested with the Central Government.
8. Board of Industrial Management was constituted under the Deve--lopment of Industries (Federal Control) Ordinance, 1972, for the purpose of managing the affairs of federally controlled industries efficiently and in accordance with sound business principles. Under section 6(a) of the -- Ordinance the Board is competent to exercise such of the powers of a Managing Director under the Orders, and issue such directions to him as it may consider necessary. The exercise by the Board of the powers of a Managing Director under subsection (1) of section 6 of the Ordinance slap have effect as if it were the exercise of these powers by the Managing Director himself under subsection
(2) of the said section of the Ordinance. The Managing Director is to comply with all directions issued to him by the Board under subsection (3) of section 6 of the Ordinance relating to the management of the establishment. Section 7 of the Ordinance, that the Federal Government may by notification in the official Gazette direct that all or any of its powers under the Order shall in such circumstances and subject to such conditions if any as may be specified in the notification be exercisable also by the Board. Subsection (2) of section 7 further provides that the Federal Government may from time to time issue such directions to and call for such information or report from the Board as it may deem necessary.
9. All this shows that even under Development of Industries (Federal Control) Ordinance, 1972, the Central Government is directly concerned with the management of the affairs of the industries already taken over by, it. The word 'Federal Control' as used in the Ordinance of 1972, also --shows that the industries covered by the same have been and are under the Control of the Central Government. It may be mentioned here that the Ordinance, 1972, was in addition to the Economic Reforms Order as' provided by section 4 of the Ordinance. The Managing Director prior to the enforcement of the Ordinance has been evidently working in connection with the affairs of the federation and even thereafter though the administration of the federally controlled industries mostly lies with the Board, the Managing Director is performing his functions in connection with the same affairs. After the enforcement of the Economic! Reforms Order, 1972, the subject of the industries, categories of which are given in the Schedule thereof has been with the Central Government and anybody administering the affairs of such industries would be deemed to be performing his functions in connection with the affairs of the federation. In the circumstances it cannot be said that the Managing Director does not perform his functions in connection with the affairs of the federation.
10. It has been argued that since the petitioner was an employee of a private concern, therefore, he has no locus standi to challenge any, order terminating his services under Article 98 of the late 1962 Constitution. It is correct that the petitioner was an employee of BECO Ltd. Before its Management was taken over under the Order of 1972. If the DECO Ltd. Had not been taken over under the said Order then the objection of the respondent may have prevailed. In that case the service rules or service Code framed by the Board of Directors of the private concern would have governed the service of the petitioner and in case of any infringement thereof, the same would not have been actionable under any provision of the Constitution. Here the position is somewhat different. The Board of Directors, the Managing Director or any other authority worth the name of the private concern has already been superseded by the Managing Director and then by the Board of Management in relation to all the affairs of DECO Ltd. This being the position it is to be seen whether the Order of 1972, under which respondent No. 2 has to administer the affairs of the concern gives any protection to the employees of the same in matters of their service or not: It has been provided in Article 6 of the order that unless in any particular case the ' Managing Director otherwise directs, all persons employed in, by or for the purpose of the business of the establishment by whomsoever appointed or engaged, shall continue in their respective employments on the same remuneration and other conditions service as were applicable to them immediately before the appointment the Managing Director of that establishment. It means that unless the Managing Director makes an order for the removal of a particular employee of the concern, he will continue as its employee enjoying all the benefits of service available to him under the previous Management. This protec-- petition with regard to service matter has been granted by the statute itself which controls the affairs of the private concerns taken over under the said statute. In the presence of such statutory provision, it cannot be said that the employees of the concerns taken over under the Order of 1972, do not enjoy any statutory protection against the actions done in violation of the statute.
11. The grievance of the petitioner throughout has been that the respondents have not proceeded in accordance with law namely Order of 1972, under which he enjoys protection with regard to service matters. The main question involved in the present case is as to whether any valid order removing the petitioner from service has been passed by any compe--tent authority or not. Respondent No. 1, in his written statement has stated that he did not make any verbal order in the meeting addressed by him, as mentioned above. He merely announced the order of dismissal of the petitioner already made. As mentioned above, nothing has been brought on record to show that any order was made by respondent No. 2 who was competent in this regard, removing the petitioner from service before 6th or 7th of January 1973, or even thereafter. The reports appear-- ing in the various newspapers as alleged in para. 7 of the petition have not been denied indicating that it was respondent No. I who dismissed the petitioner in the public meeting while addressing the same. There is no mention in the written statement of respondent No. 1 as to whether the said reports are correct or not. Respondent No. 2, however, has admitted in his written statement that such reports did appear in the newspapers, ,copies of which have been produced on record as Annexs. 'C' to 'F'. I am not here to enter into any controversy as to whether any such action was taken by respondent No 1, in the public meeting or not. What is to be seen is whether any action removing the petitioner from service was taken in accordance with the provisions of the Order or not, which give protection to the employees of the industrial concerns, taken over under the said Order.
12. Letter dated 7th of January 1972, in original addressed on behalf of the Manager; Badami Bagh Works (BECO Industries Ltd.) to the petitioner has been produced on record as Annex. 'G' intimating him that his services had been dispensed with immediate effect. This letter does not convey any order passed by the Managing Director who was competent to take action in this regard. I have not been able to find out any provision of the Order whereby the Manager or any other Officer except the Manag--ing Director was empowered to take such action against the employees of the concern at the relevant time. In this view of the matter the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the said order has no substance in the eye of the law appears to be correct. The said order is in contra--vention of the statutory provisions of the Order of 1972, having been passed by an incompetent person. The case thus clearly is one in which the petitioner is complaining of non-performance of a public duty, in accordance with law.
13. Further there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner was ever afforded an opportunity of being heard by respondent No. 2 before any action was taken against him. It is true that respondent No. 2 ' has been given power under Article 6 of the order to dispense with the services of any employee but that does not mean that any order in this regard can be passed in contravention of the principle of natural justice. The application of the said principle has not been excluded by express words in the statute of Economic Reforms Order. . Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held in Abdul Saboor Khan v. Karachi University and another (PLD 1966 SC 536), that the maxim audi alteram parteam ("no one can be condemned unheard") embodies one of the settled principles of law, and such a principle will be read into the relevant law, unless its application is excluded by express words. The Supreme Court as well as the High Court in various cases have repeatedly adverted to this cardinal principle of natural justice that no man should be condemned unheard. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the petitioner was ever given any charge-sheet in respect of certain alleged complaints against him or any explanation was called for from him or he was otherwise heard before he was removed from service.
14. Thus the petitioner has succeeded in establishing that 'the order of his removal from service was made in contravention of the mandatory provision of Article 6 of Economic Reforms Order, 1972 (President's Order I of 1972).
15. The next contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Article 8 of the Order reproduced above has no substance, in circum--stances of the case. The petitioner admittedly has not challenged any provision of the Order nor any action taken under the said Order. His, grievance has been that he has not been dealt with in accordance with law, as provided by the Order. Nothing has been brought on record to show that any order was passed by respondent No. 2, the Managing Director against the petitioner, in accordance with the provision as contained in Article 6 of the Order. A letter dated 7th of January 1972, conveying the petitioner his removal from service, does not state that the same was, based on any order passed by respondent No. 2. Rather the said letter appears to have been written by some person' for the Manager of BECO Industries Ltd. Who is certainly riot competent to make such order under the law. Moreover any order or action in respect of which immunity may be claimed under any special enactment must be an order or action made in accordance with the relevant provisions of the said enactment. If any order or decision made by an authority having exclusive jurisdiction in the matter suffers from excess of jurisdiction or refusal to exercise jurisdiction then the same is not immune from scrutiny under Article 98 of the late 1962 Constitution. Reliance in this respect can be placed upon Now Haji Khair Muhammad Khan v. State (PLD 1966 SC 804), Mst. Hajiani and 2 others v. West Pakistan Land Commission and 4 others (PLD 1966 SC 114), Jaman Das and 5 others v. The Chief Land Commissioner, West Pakistan (PLD 1966 SC 229) and Ahmadi Begum v. Muhammad Mushtaq A.I Khan (PLD 1970 Lah. 341).
16. The next question which needs consideration is whether the petitioner is entitled to challenge the order of his removal from service under Article 98 of the Constitution when he is not enjoying any constitutional guarantees with regard to service matters . As provided by Article 177 of the Constitution to civil servants. The petitioner admittedly cannot claim to be a civil servant as he was an employee of a private industrial concern, later on taken over under the Economic Reforms Order. His claim is that since he enjoys protection under Article 6 of the Order in his service matters, therefore, any violation of the said mandatory provi--sion can be challenged by him in the present proceedings. If the said protection granted by the statute had not been available to him then his case would have been governed by the principle of master and servant. It is true that the law on the subject in Pakistan has followed in all essential respects the practice of the English Courts. The superior Courts in England have not found it possible to extend the scope of mandamus to restoration to office in private corporations. It was held by the Supreme Court in Lahore Central Co- operative Bank Ltd. v. Saif Ullah Shah (PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 210), that it was doubtful whether a Commercial Manager of a Co-operative Bank could claim the application to himself of the Civil Service Rules when the said Rules were made applicable to the employees by a resolution of the Managing Committee. It was further observed that the resolution of 3rd of February 1945, which made the Civil Service Rules applicable was not passed in the form of Rule and as such it was doubtful whether it could be thought that thereby compliance was made with By-Law No. 23(19) of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in that case accepted the appeal filed by the Bank on the ground that the respondent was not holding any statutory office and secondly the service was not governed by any statutory Rule and as such he was not enjoying any statutory protection ~against his illegal removal from service.
17. In the present case, as discussed above, Article 6 of the Order lays down that the previous employees of the industrial concerns would continue in service unless removed by the Managing Director in accord--ance with law. The statute itself as such has granted protection to the petitioner being the employee of the concern at the time when the order was enforced. As mentioned above, his case is that he has not been removed from service by the Managing Director and the order if any in this regard has been passed by an incompetent person which is in contraven--petition of the statutory provision.
18. The Supreme Court while accepting the appeal in Sheikh Maqbool Elahi and others v Khan Abdul Rehman Khan and others (PLD 1960 SC 266), held that although no statutory duty was involved there it was undeniable that a duly qualified Director had a legal right to sit on the Board of Directors and that this was a right which was of the greatest importance to the public interest, in the field of the operation of public joint stock companies under Company Law. It was further held that the shareholders, had a legal right vested in them to elect persons to be members of the Board of Directors which shall conduct the affairs of the Company. The Supreme Court by this decision upheld the admission of a duly qualified Director to the Board of Directors of the West Pakistan Steel Corporation Ltd., a public company formed under the Companies Act, although no statutory duty was involved there. In another case namely The Managing Committee Co-operative Model Town Society v. Kh. Muhammad Iqbal (PLD 1963 SC 179), relief claimed by the respondent and granted to him by the High Court was main--tained on the ground that he was holding a statutory office under the law and any violation of the relevant provision of the said law was actionable in writ jurisdiction of the High Court. In The Chairman, East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Dacca and another v. Rustam A.I and another (PLD 1966 SC 848), their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the safeguards provided for public servants under the Constitu--petition could not be availed of as of legal right by an employee of a statutory Corporation like the East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation. In that case, service of the respondent was of a contractual nature and the terms and conditions of his service were embodied in his letter of appoint--ment. One of the conditions was that after successful compliance of probation, his services would be terminated on one month's notice on either side. As is clear from the above, the present case is quite distinguishable from the one cited above. In the above. Case the service of the respondent before the Supreme Court was based on a contract and he enjoyed no protection under the statute in his service matters while in the present case it has been clearly laid down in Article 6 of the Economic Reforms Order, that he would continue in service unless otherwise decided by the Managing Director. Similar circumstances existed in the case, Faiz Ahmad v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, West Pakistan and others (PLD 1962 SC 315). In that case the appellant before the Supreme Court was employed as a clerk in the Pakistan Central Co- operative Bank Ltd. Established under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912. He applied to the High Court of West Pakistan for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of dismissal from service and for mandamus for his restoration to the office. It was held by the High Court while relying on Pakistan and others v. Nasim Ahmad (PLD 1961 SC 445), that his prayer for the issuance of writ was wholly misconceived for the reason the office held by him was not public office restoration to which could have been ordered by mean of a writ of mandamus. In that case, Faiz Ahmad was not enjoying any guarantee or protection as envisaged by a statute or the constitution itself, violation of which is actionable in law. In Zainul Abidin v. Multan Central Co--operative Bank Ltd., Multan (PLD 1966 SC 445), the appeal was dismissed by their Lord--ships of the Supreme Court mainly on the ground that the appellant as accountant of a Co-operative Bank, was not holding an office of public nature and in the case of his dismissal from service, writ of mandamus could not be issued and further the Bank in question had made the Punjab Civil Service Rules applicable to its employees not by virtue of any statutory provision but purely by the adaptation thereof under the by-laws of the Co-operative Bank and such rules are no more than the rules laid down for the guidance of the Bank itself. It was further observed that the said rules in such circumstances did not create any right in an employee to hold his office in accordance with them nor such rules extended the protection given to a Government servant under the constitutional provi--sions. In Pakistan Refugee and Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, Lahore v. Syed Karamat Hussain (PLD 1966 Lah. 442), the relief claimed by the respondent against his alleged wrongful dismissal from service was refused to be granted in a suit for mere declaration to the effect that the notice dated 30-6-1954 termi--nating his services was illegal and void. The matter came up in second appeal before the High Court and it was held that since the respondent was an employee of the Corporation and did not claim the status of a civil servant, therefore, the relationship between him and the Corporation was to be regulated by the law of master and servant. In that case, the respon--dent before the High Court had not alleged any violation of the statutory provision or rules granting him protection in case of removal or dismissal from service and mainly for that reason the principle as laid down in Messrs Malik & Haq v. Muhammad Shamsul Islam Choudhry (PLD 1961 SC 531), was followed. Similarly circumstances existed in Province of East Pakistan v. Moulvi Momtazuddin Ahmad and 2 others (PLD 1971 Dacca 235). In that case the plaintiff's terms of appointment were governed by his own appointment letter. It was observed that where there is an employee of a statutory body both the statutory body and the employee are governed by the statute itself which has brought into existence that statutory body and the rules and regulations framed thereunder. But in the absence of such a rule govern--ing the relationship of employer and employee in the case of statutory body or body corporate, ordinary principle of master and servant will apply. In Saddique Ahmad Chaudhry and others v. Chairman, West Pakistan Agricultural Development Corporation and others (PLD 1968 Lah. 695), the contention raised by the petitioners that employees of Thal Development Authority under the Thal Development Act (XXV of 1949), were entitled to protection under Article 177 of the late Constitution of 1962, was not accepted by the High Court but the order of suspension and termination in question was held not to be according to law, governing the service matter of the petitioners. The petitions were accepted accordingly. In A George v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PLD 1971 Lah. 748), it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that the employees of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation cannot be treated as employees of the State. They are not entitled to any guarantees and safeguards under the Constitution or any statute or the rules having the force of law. The relationship between the Corporation and its employees is purely that of a master and servant under the general law. A. George who was appellant before the High Court in second appeal had challenged the order of dismissal passed by the local Manager P I A against him. The plea of the Corporation in that case was that appellant was not governed by any statutory rules but by the rules and regulations framed by the Board of Directors of the Corpora-- petition itself and as such he was not enjoying any protection against his dismissal or removal from service. The rules of Pakistan International Airlines though a statutory body were not statutory in nature and for that reason it was held that relationship between the appellant and the Corpo-- ration was governed by the law of master and servant. In another case, namely Syed Fayyaz Hussain Qadri, Advocate v. The Administrator, Lahore Municipal Corporation, Lahore and 4 others (PLD 1972 Lah. 316), it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that a ' n employee of Municipal Corporation removed from service in violation of statutory rule could invoke jurisdiction of High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution. It was further held thatif an employee of such a corporate body can show that an order dismissing or removing him from service or any other order adversely affecting his rights has been passed in violation of a statute or the rules having the force oflaw, he can doubtless invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 98. In the case cited above, the Administrator of the Corporation of the City of Lahore by his letter dated 10th of May 1970, informed the petitioner in the following terms :- "As directed by the Government under their Memorandum No. SOIV-LMC-3(26)/69 dated 9th of February 1970, your services will stand terminated on the expiry of period of notice of 90 days from the date of issue of this notice in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of the West Pakistan Municipal Committees Legal Advisers Rules, 1964.--- This order was challenged under Article 98 of the Constitution by the Legal Advisers adversely affected by the same in the case cited above. It was contended that it was only the Municipal Committee under sub-clause (b) of clause (4) of Article 45 of the Basic Democracies Order -which can suspend, remove, dismiss or otherwise punish the Legal Advisers who were appointed under clause (2). It was held by the High Court that the order of removal had not been passed by the Administrator nor could it be deemed to be his order. He had only implemented the instructions given by the Government. The Government could not by giving the instructions limit the authority or discretion conferred on the Municipal Committee and after its supersession on the Administrator to remove a person which was within their exclusive competence after the repeal of the West Pakistan (Appointment and Removal of Legal Advisers) Ordinance, 1965. It was further observed that after supersession of the Municipal Committee the Administrator alone was competent to order the removal of the petitioner under section 29 of the Ordinance read with Article 45Qv) 6f the Order. When statute confers a certain duty on an officer, then it is that officer who has to make up his mind and pass the order in accordance with law and exercise his discretion uninfluenced by any opinion of his superior Officers. The writ petition was accepted accordingly. In Dr. Abdul Hafeez v. Chairman, Municipal Corporation, Lahore and others (PLD 1967 Lah. 1251), the petition filed by Dr. Abdul Hafeez under Article 98 of the late Constitution was accepted on the ground that the Municipal Corporation was a local authority, the petitioner being Assistant Medical Officer of Health was holding a statutory office under the city of Lahore Corporation and the impugned order for his compulsory retirement on 29th of July 1964, was not passed in accordance with the rules. The necessary declaration as prayed for that the order of compulsory retirement of the petitioner was against law and ineffective was granted by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution. In Abdul Razzaq Malik v. The Water and Power Development Authority (PLD 1973 Lah. 188), the learned Single Judge of this Court after discussing all the relevant case- law on the subject held as follows :- "The mere fact, therefore, that a person is not a civil servant of the State and is not entitled to Constitutional guarantees does not always lead to the result that he is governed by the ordinary and general law of master and servant. Wherever there are statutes or statutory rules governing the relationship between an employer and an employee, and there are restrictions placed in such provisions which are contrary to the concept of the ordinary law of master and servant it is those statutory provisions and rules, which shall apply and not the so-called general law of master and servant.1 In such cases the employer would have the power to terminate the employment only in the circumstances in which the statute or the rules clothe it with authority to do so."
19. In the present case there is a specific statute which governs the relationship between the petitioner and respondent No. 2 placing certain restrictions on the exercise of his power in relation to matters of service. The mandatory provision of Article 6 of the Economic Reforms Order having been contravened, the petitioner has a locus standi to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution to grant him the proper relief. The last case on the subject under discussion is Gul Muhammad v. Chairman, Road Transport Corporation, Lahore (PLD 1973 Lah. 240). In that case the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Traffic Manager, on temporary basis in 1956, by the Chairman, Punjab Transport Board. Subsequently he was confirmed in that post. In 1966, his services were terminated by the Chairman with immediate effect under rule 23.4 of the West Pakistan Road Transport Board Service Rules, 1959, on one month's pay in lieu of notice. This order was challenged by the petitioner inter alia mainly on the ground that the Chairman has no authority to terminate his services. It was held as follows by the learned Single Judge :- "As a result of the above discussion, my conclusion is that the conten--petition raised on behalf of the petitioner that the overriding power to terminate the services of an employee has been retained by the Road Transport Corporation itself has substance and the plea that it has not been considered appropriate to confer such a vast power on the Chairman is correct. Hence the Chairman also would not be competent to pass an order of termination of service of any employee. The intention underlying this appears to be that the Chairman would be the competent authority for terminating the services of any employee, if he is established to be 'undesirable' and may also 'remove' or 'dismissed him, if he is proved to be guilty of some misconduct. But in all the above eventualities he can get rid of employee only after taking proper proceedings against him. If he is an 'undersirable' employee the procedure laid down in Ordinance VIII of 1965, will have to be observed. If he wishes to 'dismiss' or 'remove' him, he must cause an enquiry to be held and give him a reasonable opportunity to show cause why he should not be 'dismissed' or 'removed'. But where the services of the employee are to be terminated summarily, without assigning cause or allowing him any opportunity to represent against his severance from service, the only protection that appears to have been conceived is that such an order should be passed by the master himself namely the Road Transport Corporation, and not any subordinate authority. I, therefore, uphold the first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner."
20. In view of the above discussion, the irresistible conclusion would be that irrespective of the fact whether an aggrieved person under Article 98 of the Constitution is an employee of the Corporate body or not, if he proves that he has been granted some protection with regard to his service matters by some statute or statutory rules then he can invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under the Article.
21. The last contention raised in this case which needs examination is that since there is an adequate alternative remedy in the form of suit for damages open to the petitioner, therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction to grant him relief under Article 98. It has been argued that recourse to the application under Article 98 is available where the law has established no specific remedy and where "in justice and good Gov--ernment, there ought to be one". According to law the other remedy to be adequate remedy must be efficacious convenient beneficial and effective. The relief afforded by ordinary law must not be less efficacious, more expensive and cumbersome to achieve as compared to that provided under this Article. This depends on the circumstances of each case. It would be appropriate to rely in this regard upon the case Anjuman-e-Ahmdiya, Sargodha v. The Deputy Commissioner, Sargodha and another (PLD 1966 SC 639). The law laid down in this authority by their Lordships of the Supreme Court has also been followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Dr. Abdul Hafeez v. Chairman. Municipal Corporation, Lahore and others (PLD 1967 Lah. 1251). The Supreme Court has held as follows :- "Once it is established that the remedy sought is for the performance of some public duty then relief by way of an extraordinary remedy of this nature is not to be denied merely because some other remedy under the general law is available, unless such alternative remedy can be considered to be equally inexpensive, expeditious, beneficial and efficacious. The policy underlying the introduction of this form of extraordinary remedy is, 'to prevent disorder from a failure of justice and defect of policy' in an inexpensive, expedi--tious and effective manner 'where the law has established Do specific remedy and where in justice and good Government there ought to be one".
In a case where this remedy is in other respects, warranted, it is rarely that the Courts in England have considered an action in law to be such an adequate alternative remedy as to refuse the writ unless complicated questions of fact have to be deter--mined, or a question of title to land is involved or the remedy sought is, in effect, for the recovery of damage."
The Supreme Court has further added : "When the relief sought for is by its nature one which lends itself to be effectively remedied by orders of the naturecontemplated in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of sub-Article (2) of Article 98, then intention of the Constitution appears to be that the remedy granted by the Constitution would be made available to the citizen unless the Court is satisfied that the other adequate remedy is provided by law. The other adequate remedies provided by law would, in the ordinary circumstances, have reference to the remedies provided by the particular statute itself which has created the right or obligation and not a general remedy at law, as for example by a suit. On the other hand if the remedy sought for is in substance a remedy which is available under the ordinary law then a suit and not the extra--ordinary remedy under Article 98 should be the appropriate remedy for, the remedy provided by this Article is not intended to be a. Substitute for the ordinary forms of legal action. But where this is not the case the remedy by way of a suit can hardly be considered to bean adequate alternative remedy. A suit is by no means as inexpensive or speedy or beneficial a remedy as the remedy provided by this Article."
The facts of the case cited above are that Anjuman-e-Ahmadiya, Sargodha, got possession of the land in question in pursuance to a grant made by the Government which was afterwards cancelled. The Anjuman challenged the cancellation order in the High Court by means of a petition under" Article 98. This petition was dismissed in limine - on the ground that adequate alternative remedy by way of a civil suit was available but their Lordships of the Supreme Court accepted the appeal filed by the Anjuman on the ground that what the appellant really wanted was the performance of public duty namely that the authorities seeking the cancellation of the grant should proceed in accordance with law, the provisions of the Colo--nization of Government Lands Act, 1912, under which the grant was made. In the opinion of the Supreme Court the remedy provided by the civil suit if brought by the Anjuman for the purpose would not be adequate-- for all that the appellant asked was the performance of public duty by the respondent, in accordance with law.
22. What the petitioner is asking for in the present case is that the Economic Reforms Order, 1972, should have acted in accordance with law by which he was bound in the discharge of his public duties. In the case of violation of any of the provisions of the said Order, nothing has been provided therein for any alternative remedy. In the circumstances it has to be seen if a suit for the specific relief, would be available to him. , How ever, even if the alternative remedy by way of a civil suit is available to the petitioner, I am sure it would by no means be adequate, equally efficacious, less expensive and convenient in the light of the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in the case cited above. It is, therefore, held that the present petition under Article 98 of the Constitu--petition is competent.
23. As a result of the above discussion, the petition is accepted and the impugned order of dismissal as conveyed to the petitioner (vide Annex. 'G'), letter dated 7th of January 1972, issued on behalf of the Manager, BECO Industries Ltd. And any order made in this regard by respondent No. 1, is hereby set aside being illegal, without jurisdiction and of no legal, effect. There will be no order as to costs.