' MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, C.J.---This leave to appeal petition is directed; against the dismissal by the High Court, of petitioner's Constitutional Petition which had arisen out of a dispute over the assessm ent/determination of the annual rental value of property, under the Cantonments Act, 1924.
' The brief facts stated by the learned counsel are that the Cantonment Board (the respondents' side) had raised the annual rental value of the building in question from Rs, 24,000 to Rs, 5,04,000 mainly because of the reconstruction and renovation done by the petitioner. An appeal having been filed before the District Judge under section 84 of the Cantonments Act, it was allowed and the annual rental value was reduced to Rs, 1,70,000. This decision was not accepted by the respondent Board. Accordingly, a revision petition having been filed, it was allowed by the Director Military Lands and Cantonments (respondent No, 1) and the annual rental value was increased to Rs, 2,20,000. The petitioner then moved the High Court in its Writ jurisdiction but having failed has sought leave to appeal.
' The question agitated before the High Court and reiterated before this Court is one of competence and jurisdiction---Whether a revision under section 277 of the Cantonments Act was at all competent and if it was not competent the impugned order passed by respondent No, 1 is without jurisdiction. The relevant provisions of the. Cantonments Act which came under discussion during the arguments are as follows:-- "S. 84. Appeals against assessm ent--(1) An appeal against the assessme nt or levy of, or against the refusal to refund, any tax under this Act shall lie to the District Magistrate or to such other officer as may be empowered by, the Central Government in this behalf: "Provided that, where the person to whom the appeal would ordinarily lie is, or was when the tax was imposed, a member of the Board, the appeal shall lie to the Commissioner of the Division, or, in a Province where there are no Commissioners, to the District Judge.
(2) If, on the hearing of an appeal under this section, any question as to the liability to, or the principle of assessm ent of, a tax arises on which the officer hearing the appeal entertains reasonable doubt, he may, either of his own motion or on the application of the appellant, draw up a statement of the facts of the case and the point on which doubt is entertained, and refer the statement with his own opinion on the point for the decision of the High Court.
(3) On a reference being made under subsection (2), the subsequent proceedings in the case shall be, as nearly as may be, in conformity with the rules relating to references to the High Court contained in Order XLVI of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."
"S. 88 Finality of appellate orders. --The order of an appellate authority confirming, setting aside or modifying any order in respect of any valuation or assessment or liability to assessment or taxation shall be final: ' Provided that it shall be lawful for the appellate authority, upon application or on its own motion, to review any order passed by it in appeal if application in this behalf is made within three months from date of the original order."
"S.
274. Appeals from executive orders. --(1) Any person aggrieved by any order described in the second column of Schedule V may appeal to the authority specified in that behalf in the third column thereof.
(2) No such appeal shall be admitted if it is made after the expiry of the period specified in that behalf in the fourth column of the said Schedule.
(3) The period specified as aforesaid shall be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908, with respect to the computation of period of limitation thereunder."
"S.
277. Revision.
(1) Where an appeal from an order made by the Board has been disposed of by the District Magistrate either party to the proceedings may, within thirty days from the date thereof, apply, through the Officer Commanding-in-Chief, the Command, to the Central Government, or to such authority as the Central Government may appoint in this behalf, for a revision of the decision.
(2) The provisions of this Chapter with respect to appeals shall apply, as far as may be, to application for revision made under this section."
' Learned counsel has contended that section 277 falls in Chapter XV which deals with "the powers, procedure, penalties and appeals". It has no nexus with the assessment of annual rental value which subject has been dealt with under Chapter V relating to "Taxation". Therefore, the revisional jurisdiction conferred under section 277 does not relate to the subject-matter of taxation and rental value. Secondly, he has contended that Chapter V itself contained the provisions relating to appeals including section 84 and a provision (section 88) making the appellate order as final and leaving only a scope for review thereafter. Hence, for this reason also, as argued, the revisional jurisdiction was not available under section 277. Lastly, it was argued that the appeals mentioned in subsection (1) of section 274 the decisions wherein are subject to revision relate only to those original and appellate orders as are described in second and third columns of Schedule V. And as the orders involved in this case do not fall in either of the said two columns, therefore, section 277 read with Schedule V is not at all attracted.
' After hearing the learned counsel at length and carefully examining the amendments made from time to time we have not been able to agree with him. The view taken by the High Court on these questions is unexceptionable. Reliance was properly placed in the revisional judgment of respondent No, 1, on the following principle taken from Maxwell:-- "Division of a statute into parts or chapters is a mere matter of convenience. The object of such division is not that each part or chapter should be read independently of each other or as a complete code by itself. It is a fundamental principle of interpretation that a statute must be read and construed as a whole, notwithstanding that every section in a statute is a substantive enactment in itself."
' It is true that some times the division of Sections and Chapters are helpful in discovering the intention and giving extended meanings to the provisions of a statute but there is no general rule that such division itself would be a determining factor for interpretation of a provision. In the present case there are other compelling reasons to ignore the fact that section 277 falls in Chapter XV and section 84 falls in Chapter V of the Cantonments Act.
' Regarding the second argument of the learned counsel it is correct that section 84 which deals with the appeals against assessm ent is to be read with section 88 which provides that the order of the appellate authority confirming, setting aside or modifying an order in respect of any valuation or assessm ent or liability to assessment or taxation, shall be final but shall be open to review.
However, it does not exclude the said finality being subject to the revisional jurisdiction in case the power to revise has been conferred by the same statute in any other provision. In this case section 88 would have to be read subject to the said provision if any. This argument of the learned counsel, therefore, by itself is of not much help in resolving the controversy.
' The real question for determination is: Whether, Section 277 itself is so worded as to make a clear provision for exercise of revisional jurisdiction against the appellate orders passed under section
84. Had it been the intention of the legislature to provide the revisional power under section 277 only to be exercised in respect of the appellate orders passed under section 274, it would have been easier to say so in the said provision than to provide elaborate revisional mechanism. It is specifically stated in subsection (1) of section 277 that where an appeal has been disposed of by a District Magistrate from an order made by the Board, a revision would lie to the Central Government or its appointee-- respondent No, 1, it is not denied, is an appointee of the Central Government. The appellate order passed by the District Magistrate in this case which was brought under revision was admittedly passed by the Board. These two conditions of section 277 thus in a positive manner stand satisfied. Not only this subsection (2) of section 277 specifically provides that the provisions of Chapter XV with respect to appeals shall apply, as far as may be, to application for revision made under this section. This also indicates that in a given case Chapter XV might seem irrelevant for the subject-matter of the revision. Accordingly its provisions were specifically made applicable by reference.
' Further, it appears that before 1936 by amending Statute XXIV of 1936 (by virtue of its section 69) the words "Cantonment Authority" were substituted by the word "Board" in subsection (1) of section
277. A similar change was made generally by section 69; namely, that wherever the Cantonment Authority, Cantonment Authorities and Cantonment Authority's were used in the Cantonments Act the word Board, Boards and Board's respectively were substituted. In Schedule V also a change was made in column No,
2. Wherever the word Cantonment Authority was mentioned it was substituted by the word Board. It was in 1979 by Ordinance XLIV that the word competent authority was substituted in Column No, 3 for Officer Commanding-in-Chief, the Command, as an appellate authority. These changes when read together show that in 1936 a major change was made in section 277 which had the effect of creating revisional jurisdiction against the orders passed by the District Magistrate under section 84. There is no doubt about it. As to whether inadvertently or intentionally the revisional power regarding the other appellate orders passed under the Act was taken away, is not before us. Therefore, that subject for the time being is left out for a proper case.
' In the light of the foregoing discussion we are satisfied that respondent No, 1 had the revisional jurisdiction and the impugned order having been passed with competence no justification has been made out for interference on the basis of the arguments raised. No other point having been pressed, leave to appeal is refused.