These two Constitutional petitions raise same question of law and facts. The relevant facts are that the petitioners in both these petitions were employed as Loaders in P.I.A. And both of them were posted at Multan Air Port in the year, 1980. Some passengers got criminal case of theft of the baggage registered against the petitioners. The respondents Nos. 3 to 5 learnt about involvement of the petitioners in the criminal case only when they were found absent from duty and news of their arrest by the police leaked out. The petitioners were accordingly served with charge-sheet dated 8th October, 1980 which is placed on record. The petitioners submitted their respective replies to the charge-sheet, which was followed by enquiry. Enquiry Officer reported that the charges levelled against the petitioners stand proved, therefore, the petitioners were served with second show-cause notice and ultimately dismissed them from service vide order, dated 2nd of November, 1981.
2. The petitioners in both the writ petitions proceeded to serve grievance notice and thereafter submitted petitions under section 25 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 before respondent No.2. The application was resisted by the respondents on legal as well as factual planes. The jurisdiction of the Labour Court was challenged. It was pleaded that since the action has been taken under Martial Law Regulation No.52, therefore, the only remedy available to the petitioners was by way of review application and the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was specifically barred.
3. This objection was upheld by the respondent No.2 vide judgment, dated 4th April, 1984. The same was impugned in the appeal before respondent No.l which was also dismissed on 23rd of August, 1984. Therefore, the petitioner Mir Sultan filed Writ Petition No.945 of 1985 on 14th October, 1985. It was followed by writ petition by Muhammad Saeed which was filed on 3rd January, 1987. The writ petitions were admitted to regular hearing and notices issued to the respondents. Respondents Nos.l and 2 in spite of service did not appear, therefore, they were proceeded ex parte. The other respondents have contested the writ petitions.
4. The learned counsel for respondents Nos.2 to 5 has raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the petitions are likely to be dismissed on account of laches. It is explained, as already noted, the appeals of the petitioners were dismissed by respondent No.l vide judgment dated 23rd of August, 1984, while the first writ petition by Mir Sultan was filed on 14th October, 1985 and the other petitioners delayed the institution of the writ petition till 3rd of January, 1987. The learned counsel for the contesting respondents in support of the preliminary objection has referred to the cases reported as PLD 1985 Lah. 420, PLD 1976 SC 410,1986 CLC 515. n the other hand the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the delay occurred on account of the financial difficulties. The petitioners could not raise the necessary funds, therefore, the delay in availing the Constitutional remedy may be ignored.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments of both sides and gone through the precedents. The first writ was filed after 14 months of the last order. This constituted laches and disentitled the petitioners to an discretionary relief in service matter. Now I refer to cases relied by the learned E counsel for the respondents. The first in series comes case of Settlement Authorities v.
Akhtar Sultana. The writ petition challenging the auction was filed after six months of the auction and the same was dismissed on ground of laches. The relevant para of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan reads as under:- "And even after the auction she kept silent for about six months. In these circumstances her writ petition should have been dismissed on the ground of laches. I am supported in this by the following observations of this Court in the case of Din Muhammad v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, reported in 1968 SCMR 1274."
7. Now I refer to the case of Financial Adviser v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal PLD 1985 Lah. 420 arising in the similar circumstances. The Constitutional petition filed after nine months of the order of Labour Appellate Tribunal was held to be suffering from laches. The relevant portion reads as under:-- "The last impugned order was passed on 29-4-1984. Constitutional petition was filed on 5th January, 1985. In such like cases delay ofnine months is rather inordinate. Therefore, the petition suffers from laches as well.
8. The learned counsel for the respondents lastly referred to the case of Masood Khan v. Settlement Commissioner and others 1986 CLC 515. It was again a writ petition in Settlement matter having been (1) filed after six months, was dismissed on account of delay. The relevant para No.8 as under:- "Last but not the least was the objection that the writ petition having been filed on 16-12-1973 beyond six months of the impugned order dated 23-5-1973, was hit by laches. Settlement Authorities etc. v. Mst. Akhtar Sultana PLD 1976 SC 410 was relied upon. This plea itself suffices torefuse the relief through the extraordinary remedy."
9. It is clear from the precedent cases that the Constitutional remedy is to be invoked within reasonable time. In service matter reasonable time cannot be streched beyond three months and delay thereafter shall have to be accounted for by the petitioners. The employer, who fails to challenge the order for more than three months makes the employee to believe that the same has been accepted and job is available for him. Similarly the employee shall also hurry up because delay will lead to be a belief on part of the employer that the order has been accepted by the employee. It is so because no employer can afford to keep a post vacant for indefinite period in exceptation of some challenge by the employee. This is not all. Now if the employee is reinstated with back benefits then it will amount to paying him premium for his own lapses. This situation can be avoided if petitions are filed within shortest possible span of time.
10. It is now settled law that even if the order is legally infirm still this Court has discretion to refuse the relief to the petitioners on account of his conduct, which includes delay in seeking the redress of his grievance through extraordinary remedy. In this behalf reference can be made to the following portion of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.Sharif Ahmad Hashmi v. Chairman, Screening Committee, Lahore 1978 SCMR 367.
"This passage does not mean that a void order is always to be struck down regardless of the consequences of such decision, but that a void order must be struck down provided there is no statute or principle of law which would make it unjust or inequitable to strike down the void order.
This qualification is very important, and that is why, for example, a writ may be refused against a void order if this would enable the petitioner to circumvent the provisions of a statute of limitation.
(See this Court's judgment in Civil Appeals 150 and 166 of 1970 Jaw-ud-Din and others v. Mst Noor Sain and others and Jalal-ud-Din and others v. Shamas-ud-Din and others respectively). Similarly in Ghulam Mohi-ud--Din v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others PLD 1964 SC 829; a writ petition had been filed against an order which this Court held was old. Nonetheless the writ petition was dismissed on the ground that it was barred by acquiescence on the part of the petitioner.
There is also ample authority for the proposition that a writ against a void order may be dismissed if the petitioner is estopped by his conduct from challenging it or if he has been guilty of laches this test is applied then the petitioners in the present petitions are clearly disentitled to any relief.
11. The result is since there is inordinate and unexplained delay in invoking the constitutional jurisdiction, therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to discretionary relief. The petitions are hereby dismissed. No order as to the costs.