1. DORAB PATELJ.-The petitioner was employed as a Zilladar in the Irrigation Department of the Provincial Public Works Department.. On 18-3-1959, he received a notice from the Executive Engineer (Irrigation), Kasur calling upon him to show cause why his services should not be terminated on account of inefficiency, and to indicate whether he desired to be heard by the District Screening Committee. The petitioner showed cause and appeared before the District Screening Committee. However, his representations were not successful and the Chairman of the Screening Committee recommended his retirement. He was, therefore, informed that he could file an appeal before the second appellant, but as his appeal was dismissed, he was compulsorily retired from service on the 30th of June 1959. Then for nearly 12 years he went on making representations as appeals and mercy petitions to different authorities including the President, the Governor and the Martial Law authorities for setting aside the order of his compulsory retirement.
2. As all these representations were unsuccessful on 25-10-1971, he filed a writ petition in the Lahore High Court against the appellants to challenge the order of 30th June 195) by which he was compulsorily retired. It is not surprising that this writ petition was dismissed by a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court on the ground of gross laches. This was by a judgment dated 8-11-1971 and the petitioner challenged this judgment in a Letters Patent Appeal in the Lahore High Court. In was conceded on behalf of the appellants before the Letters Patent Bench that the order for the petitioner's compulsory retirement was bad in law, but the issue of the writ was opposed on the ground of gross ]aches. However, it would appear that the Letters Patent Bench was of the view, on the basis of this Court's judgment in Abdul Qadir v. Govern--ment of Pakistan (PLD 1967 SC 506) that the principle of laches was not applicable to the petitioner's claim, therefore, the Letters Patent Bench set aside the order of compulsory retirement passed against the petitioner.
3. The appellants challenged the judgment of the Letters Patent Bench in a petition for leave in this Court and leave was granted in order to consider, inter alia, the question whether the learned Judges of the Letters Patent Bench bad rightly interfered with the exercise of discretion by the learned Single Judge whereby he had refused relief to the petitioner on the ground of laches. The appeal was heard and. Allowed more than two years ago. The petitioner claims to have opposed it inter alia on the ground that the appeal itself was time-barred and on the ground that the learned Single Judge of the High Court had erred in dismissing his writ petition on the ground of laches, because the order for his compulsory retirement was a void order and not a void able order. Gul, J., who read the judgment of the Court dismissing the appeal did not examine tile question whether the appeal was within time or not. He however examined at great length (I say so with respect) the petitioner's plea that the order for his compulsory retirement was void and rejected this plea. Then, after examining the case-law, he held that the delay of 12 years in filing the writ petition could not under any circumstances be condoned. Accordingly, he allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Letters Patent Bench and dismissed the writ petition filed by the petitioner by his judgment dated 20-2-1976. Therefore, the petitioner has filed this review petition for the review of this judgment.
4. The petitioner's first submission was that the petition for leave which was admitted by this Court was time-barred, and as he assumed that a review can lie on the ground that this Court had allowed a time-barred appeal, I would point out here that in Sajjad Nabi Dar & Co. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax Rawalpindi Zone, Rawalpindi (PLD 1977 SC 437) this Court approved of a passage by Mulla in his commentary on the Civil Procedure Code (12th Edition, page 1259) that a review will lie "where an error on a point of law was apparent on the face of the judgment, e.g., failure to apply the law of limitation to the facts found by the Court but the point of law must be in disputable," I would reaffirm 'the view taken by us in this judgment and as the facts relevant to the petitioner's submission are not in dispute his plea requires examination.
5. The parties concluded arguments before the Letters Patent Bench on 11-7-1973 and the learned Judges had reserved judgment, which was pronounced on 7-2-1974. As the period of limitation for filing a petition for leave was sixty days, the appellants had to file their petition for leave within sixty days from 7-2-1974 plus the time required by them for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment of the Letters Patent Bench. They filed the petition for leave on 2nd May and as this was eighty-four days after the pronouncement of the judgment the learned Assistant Advocate-General submitted that the explanation of the delay of twenty-four days was that this period was necessary for obtaining the certified copy of the judgment of the Letters Patent Bench. Mr. Hashmi, however, challenged this explanation. He submitted that the appellants had applied for a certified copy of the judgment on.14-3-1974, and as they had obtained it on 27-3-1974, they were entitled to add only this period of thirteen days between 14-3-1974 and 27-3-1974 to the statutory period of limitation of sixty days, therefore, they should have filed the petition for leave within seventy --three days of the pronouncement of the judgment, but as it was admittedly filed eleven days later, Mr. Hashmi submitted that the petition for leave was time-barred.
6. The appellants on the other hand submitted that they had applied for certified copy of the judgment on 16-7-1973, and I may point out that this was long before the pronouncement of the judgment. But I have no hesitation in accepting Mr. Ijaz Ali's statement that this is a common practice at the Bar in cases in which judgment are reserved. Next, according to Mr. Ijaz Ali, the office of the Advocate-General had applied again for a certified copy of the judgment in March 1974, as no copy had been supplied on their earlier application. They had received the certified copy of the judgment on 27th March and as they had filed the petition for leave on 2-5-1974, which was well within statutory period of limitation, the contention of the appellants is that their petition for leave was not time-barred.
7. As Mr. Hashmi vehemently denied that the appellants had filed two applications for certified copies of the judgment, we sent for the register of the copying branch of the Lahore High Court and examined it ourselves. We found that an application for a certified copy of the judgment, bearing No. P-40, was filed on 16-7-1973, and the Court's office numbered this application as 3542/A. G. The letters A. G. Indicate that the application was filed by the office of the A. G., therefore, this entry supports Mr. Ijaz Ali's submission from the Bar. Further, there is another entry about the second application for a certified copy bearing No. P. 343. We have verified the position about this entry from the register and we find that an application bear--ing No. P-343 has been duly entered in the register on 14-3-1974. The Serial No. Given by the Court's office for this application is 1461/A. G., and as this entry has been cancelled with the noting "that P-40 has supplied," it supports Mr. Ijaz Ali's submission from the Bar that his office had filed a second application for a certified copy ex abundant cautla and that this application had become infructuous because a copy of the judgment bad been supplied on the application filed on 16-7-1973. As this application had been filed long before the Letters Patent Bench had pronounced its judgment, it is clear that limitation began running against the appellants only when they obtained the certified copy of the judg-- ment. This was on the 27th March 1974, and as the appeal was filed on 2nd May, it was within time, and there is no merit whatever in the petitioner's plea.
8. Mr. Hashmi then stated that the Court bad allowed the appeal against him on. The ground that the order of 30th June 1959, was void able and not void. But as he had not been heard on the plea that the order challenged by him was void the submission was that the judgment contained an error apparent on the record. Even on the assumption that the petitioner had not been heard as alleged by him, this would not bring his case under rule 26 of this Court's rules. Secondly, the submission that the petitioner had not been heard is' not correct. Gul, J , who pronounced the judgment of the Court, pointed out that the petitioner had addressed "spirited arguments" in support of the judgment under appeal and then observed "Lastly, the respondent urged equally forcefully that it being conceded that the order of his compulsory retirement was without jurisdiction it was void ab initio and therefore, an absolute nullity which had no existence in the eye of law, and which the Courts are bound to ignore any passage of time, notwithstanding. A fortiori, on the principle of de die in them there can be no question of any laches, the impugned order being in the nature of a continuing wrong."
9. Gul, J., then examined the petitioner's plea and rejected it, therefore, I would very briefly recapitulate the grounds on which this plea was rejected.
10. As the second appellant was the petitioner's Appointing Authority, Gul, J., held that the second appellant was competent to retire the petitioner. Gul, J., further held that in retiring the petitioner the second appellant had purported to act under the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance, 1959 read with the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Rules, 1959. But the petitioner had been com--pulsorily retired on the ground of in efficiency under clause (c) of-rule 2, but as this clause had been omitted with effect from 28-2-1957, the appellants had very properly conceded before the Letters Patent Bench in the High Court that the order directing the petitioner's retirement on 10th June 1959, on the ground of ineffciency was bad in law. And it was presumably on this ground that the petitioner had challenged this order as void. But Gul; J., held that it was void able and not void, because it had been made- "by the authority otherwise competent to make it ...Appellant 2 could have proceeded under the Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline)Rules (the impugned order) was therefore merely voidable which could have been avoided by the (petitioner) by appropriate proceedings.
11. The petitioner is aggrieved by these observations. According to him, the impugned order was void because it was ultra vires of the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Rules, 1959. But he did not deny that the second appellant, who had passed the impugned order, was the authority competent to retire him under the rules, And Gul, J., was of the view that an order, howsoever illegal, was not void if it was passed by a Tribunal which had the power to entertain the type of claim which it had decided. Now the expressions "void order" and "orders without jurisdiction" are over-Worked expressions and have _~ been subject to divergent judicial interpretations. This has hardly furthered the development of the law, and in Conforce Ltd. v. Syed All etc. (PLD 1977 SC 599) this Court approved of an observation by Lord Reid in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission and others ((1969)
12. 2 A C 147) that it would be better to use these expressions "in the narrow and original sense of the Tribunal being entitled to enter on the inquiry in question" and on the whole the construction placed upon the expression void order by Gul, J., is in consonance with the view taken in Conforce's case.
13. The petitioner however referred us to several judgments, which, according to him, supported his plea that the impugned order in the instant case was void and not voidable. It is not necessary to examine these judgments, because even if we assume for the sake of argument that they support the petitioner's contention, it only means that the Court could have taken the view that the impugned order in the instant case was void. But a judgment cannot be) reviewed merely because a different view could have been taken. And further, even if we also assume that the petitioner's submission is correct, the contention that the impugned order was void and not voidable cannot be established without elaborate arguments. But as pointed out by us in Sajjad Nabi's case a review can lie only when the alleged error in the judgment is an evident error which can be established without elaborate arguments.
14. The petitioner then submitted that the impugned order was in violation of Constitution and was, therefore, void and could be challenged at any time. He relied, in support of this submission on a judgment of the Lahore High Court reported in Hussain Bakhsh and others v. Settlement Com-- missioner and another (PLD 1969 Lah. 1039) and on a passage in the Third Edition of De Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action at page 378. The view taken in the Lahore case was that limitation is not a bar to a void order. As this view had reference to an appeal under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, this judgment has no relevance to this review petition, because Mr. Hashmi's claim was dismissed not on the ground of limitation but on the ground that the writ petition is barred by gross laches. Next as to the passage in De Smith's Judicial Review it is not relevant because the learned Author was not examining the question of the effect of laches on a writ petition.
15. Additionally I have to observe here that the petitioner assumed in his arguments before us that a Court always struck down a void order regardless of the consequences of its decision. The assumption is a total fallacy, because a void order is only a type of an illegal order. This is described as void, because it is so illegal that it does not exist in the eye of the law, but this does not alter the fact that it was passed and by describing it as void Courts cannot alter the fact that the order was passed. And an order, which has been passed can create consequences, therefore, there cannot be a hard and fast rule that void order must always be struck down. The true position has been clarified by Munir, C. J., with usual lucidity (I say so with respect) in Yousaf Ali v.
16. Muhammad Aslam Zia (PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 1104), where Munir, C. J., observed at page 117: "And if on the basis of a void order subsequent orders have been passed either by the same authority or by other authorities, the whole series of such orders, together with the superstructure of rights and obliga--tions built upon them, must, unless some statute or principle of law recognising as legal the changed position, of the parties is in operation, fall to the ground because such orders have as little foundation as the void order on which they are founded."
17. This passage does not mean that a void order is always to be struck down regardless of the consequences of such a decision, but that a void order must bet struck down provided there is no statute or principle of law which would make it unjust or inequitable to strike down the void order.
18. This qualification is very important, and that is why, for example, a writ may be refused against a void order if this would enable the petitioner to circumvent the provision of a statute of limitation.
19. (See this Court's judgment in Civil Appeals 150 and 166 of 1970 (Jalal-ud-Din and others v. Mst. Noor Sain and others) and Jalalud-Din and others v. Shames-ud-Din and others respectively. Similarly in Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others (PLD 1964 SC 829) a writ petition had been filed against an order which this Court held was void. Nonetheless the writ petition was dismissed on the ground that it was barred by acquiescence on the part of the petitioner. There is also ample authority for the proposition that a writ against a void order may be dismissed if the petitioner is estopped by his conduct from challenging it or if he has bee guilty of laches.
20. It is true that a writ was issued in Yousaf Ali's case, and the void order was set aside "together with the superstructure of rights and obligations" built upon it. But there were no equities in that case against the appellant, because the void order related to a dispute about property and was one of a series of orders in the continuous litigation between the parties, therefore, no equities had accrued either in favour of the respondent or in favour of third parties. But, in the instant case, even on the footing that the impugned order is void the petitioner failed to challenge it for more than a decade, therefore, it must have led to consequences, such as the promotion of other people to the appointment held by the petitioner. Additionally to allow the writ after much gross laches would be to throw on the tax-payer the consequences of the peti--tioner's gross negligence in pursuing his remedies but as the petitioner relied upon the judgment in his favour by the Letters Patent Bench, I would recall here that the Letters Patent Bench had relied on the Court's judgment in Abdul Qadir's case, but the delay in filing the writ petition in this case was three years, and there can be no comparison between a delay of three years and a delay of twelve years. I may, however, point out that this Court had condoned a delay of about eight years in Pakistan v. Sheikh Abdul Hamid (PLD 1961 SC 105). But this was an/ extreme case. In any event, the law has to draw a line somewhere between'. G delay which can be condoned and delay which cannot be condoned, and, as the delay in the instant case was too gross to be condoned, the writ petition of the petitioner had to be dismissed on this ground irrespective of the question whether the impugned order was void or voidable.
21. Before parting with this order, I may point out that the petitioner also advanced submissions on the merits of the case and relied on the points raised by him in his review petition in this respect. It is however not necessary to go into these questions, because I respectfully agree with the view of Gut, J., that the writ petition was not fit to be entertained on the ground of laches. This review petition is, therefore, dismissed.
22. ANWARUL HAQ, C. J.-I agree.
23. WAHEEDUDIN AHMAD, J.-I agree.
24. MUHAMMAD AKRAM, J.-I agree. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.
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