' The precise question for decision in W.P. No, 8732 of 1990 and W.P. No, 8733 of 1990 is whether the Labour Court has jurisdiction in the matter or not, therefore, in both these petitions arguments were heard together and are being disposed of by this judgment.
2. The facts relevant for the decision of these petitions are that respondent No, 3 in each petition was serving as Line Superintendent Grade-I with petitioner No,
1. They were served with charge- sheets dated 4-8-1987 and 2-8-1987. Respectively together with the statements of allegations. The same are appended as Annexure 'A' with these petitions. The employees submitted their replies.
Thereafter, Inquiry Officer was appointed, who submitted his report and thereafter final show- cause notices were issued to respondent No, 3 in each case on 8-6-1988 and 6-6-1988 respectively. They submitted replies and thereafter proceeded to file grievance petitions under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 on 26-10-1988. The petitioners contested the grievance petitions before the Labour Court on facts and on legal plans it was argued that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction in the matter in view of the provisions of section 17(1-B) of the WAPDA Act. Respondent No, 2 after hearing the arguments concluded that as the employees of WAPDA have been declared civil servants for the purpose of Federal Service Tribunal, therefore, the petition is not competent, and relying on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported as WAPDA and another v. Muhammad Arshad Qureshi and 17 others 1986 SCMR 18 dismissed the petitions vide order dated 28-6-1990 which were assailed through appeals before respondent No, 1, who reversed the finding on the point of jurisdiction, accepted the appeals and remanded the cases to respondent No, 2 for decision on merits. Hence the present writ petitions, which were admitted to hearing and notices were issued to respondents. Respondent No, 3 alone has appeared and contested the petitions.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners in support of the petitions argued that the employees of the WAPDA are to be treated civil servants for the purpose of Federal Service Tribunal, therefore, all the questions pertaining to terms and conditions of service are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal and jurisdiction of all other Courts is barred in view of Article 212 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter to be referred as Constitution of 1973).
The learned counsel in this behalf has referred to the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported as WAPDA v. Muhammad Arshad Qureshi (1986 SCMR 18) and WAPDA v. Javaid Ahmad (1989 SCMR 1068). It is added that service of show-cause notice was only a step towards finalisation of proceedings under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 1978. The order was not final, therefore, respondent No, 3 should have waited till some final orders were passed and then challenged the same. It is added that the Legislature in its own wisdom did not provide for appeal against the interim orders, therefore, the same purpose cannot be allowed to be frustrated by filing grievance petition. The learned counsel in this behalf has referred to the cases reported as Abdul Wahab Khan v. Government of Punjab (PLD 1989 SC 508).
4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the contesting respondents argued that since the appeal is not competent against issuance of final show-cause notice, therefore, the grievance petition was competent. The learned counsel in this behalf has referred to Muhammad Azhar v.
General Manager (Operation), Power, WAPDA (PLD 1990 Lah. 352), S.H.M. Rizvi and 5 others v.
Maqsood Ahmad and 6 others (PLD 1981 SC 612), Mujeebullah Aijaz v. Director, Telephone and Telegraph Department and 2 others (PLD 1980 Quetta 58), Khaliq-uz-Zaman Chaudhary, Civil Judge, 1st Class, Lahore and 72 others v. Government of Punjab (1993 PLC (CS.) 1322) and the Superintending Engineer (E) WAPDA, Faisalabad and another v. Raja Muhammad Fazil, Line Superintendent, WAPDA, Faisalabad and 2 others (1991 PLC 838). It is argued that the employees of WAPDA are to be deemed as civil servants for the limited purpose only, therefore, section 15(4) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 would apply to respondent No, 3 and the grievance petition was competent. This explains that the petitioner is not a body constituted under the authority of the Federal Government but is a body corporate having its own seal. In this behalf the learned counsel has referred to section 3(2) of the WAPDA Act and relied on the judgments in the cases reported as Punjab Small Industries Corporation v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal (1988 SCMR 1725), H.E.M. Union v. State of Bihar (AIR 1970 SC 82), Carisbad M.W. Mfg. Co. v. P.K. Sarkar (AIR 1952 Calcutta 6) and Abdul Rehman v. Mrs. E.
Paul (AIR 1983 Bombay 267). It is added that there are also no statutory rules, therefore, the grievance petition was competent. In this behalf the learned counsel has referred to National Shipping Corporation v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and 2 others 1975 PLC 1, Anwar Hussain v.
Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (PLD 1984 SC 194), Chairman, WAPDA and 2 others v.
Syed Jamil Ahmad (1993 SCMR 346), Karachi Development Authority and another v. Wali Ahmed Khan and another (1991 SCMR 2434), Lahore Development Authority and others v. Abdul Shafiq (1992 PLC 1214), Pakistan v. Abdul Hamid (PLD 1961 SC 105), Murtaza Syed Asadullah v. The General Manager, N.W. Railway, Lahore (PLD 1962 (W.P.) Karachi 505), I.C.P. Employees Front Karachi through its General Secretary v. Presiding Officer, Vth Sindh Labour Court, Karachi and another (PLD 1976 Kar. 1176) and Chairman, WAPDA and 2 others V. Syed Jamil Ahmed (supra). It is maintained that the list of persons excluded from the purview of the I.R.O. Is appended as Schedule to the I.R.O. And the respondent No, 3 is not excluded. It is added that the Authorities/Bodies responsible for provision of public utility, which have been defined under section 2(20), I.R.O. As amenable to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. It is added that the respondent has vested right to object to the charge-sheet, which was barred by limitation. In this behalf, reliance is placed on the judgment reported as Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd. v. M. Badar Zaman (1981 PLC 219).
5. It is argued that respondent No, 1 has not decided the appeal on merits and has only remanded the case, therefore, the writ petition is not competent against the remand order. Reliance in this behalf has been placed on the judgments reported as Divisional Superintendent Pakistan Railways, Rawalpindi v. Muhammad Aslam and 25 others (1986 SCMR 1607), Safdar Ali v. Noor Muhammad (NLR 1989 U.C. 777), Ramzan v. Rehabilitation Commissioner (Legal), Sargodha (PLD 1%3 (W.P.)
Lahore 461), Mst. Kaniz Fatima v. Member, Board of Revenue (PLD 1973 Lahore 495) and Syed Saeed Hussain Shah v. Province of the Punjab and 2 others (1981 PLC (C.S.) 190). It is argued that not only the charge-sheet-is barred by limitation but the charges are without basis because the amount which was allegedly misappropriated by respondent No, 3 has been deposited by the S.D.O.
Concerned. It is, therefore, argued that the issuance of writ would amount to exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction in aid of injustice. It is added that the proceedings before the petitioners are void, therefore, it is not a fit case for exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction. In this behalf the learned counsel has referred to the cases reported as Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd. v. M.
Babar Zaman (supra); Muhammad Azhar v. General Manager (Operation, Power), WAPDA (PLD 1990 Lahore 352), Muhammad Afzal Khan v. Karachi Development Authority (PLD 1984 Kar. 114), Mrs. M.N.
Arshad v. Miss Naeema Khan (PLD 1990 SC 612) and Abdul Rafiq v. Secretary Ministry of Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, Islamabad (1980 PLC (CS.) 1). The learned counsel while concluding the arguments submitted that the final order has been defined in V.M. Abdul Rahman and others v. D.K.
Cassim and Sons and another (AIR 1933 PC 58).
6. The learned counsel for the petitioners while summing up the arguments submitted that the matter pertained to terms and conditions of service, which include the disciplinary action, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal irrespective of the fact that the rules are statutory or non-statutory. It is added that interlocutory orders which are steps in the finalisation of ,the disciplinary proceedings, cannot be challenged in any forum.
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the relevant provisions of the Constitution of 1973, Statutes, Rules as well as the precedent cases. The basic question for decision is whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction in the matter as held by the Labour Appellate Tribunal or the matter is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal as held by the Labour Court. I am of the firm view that this controversy was set at rest with the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Arshad Qureshi (supra) where the question of law for decision was whether the Federal Service Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal of an employee of WAPDA whose services are terminated in accordance with the provisions of subsection (1-A) of section 17 despite the provisions of subsection (1-C) of the said section which purports to oust its jurisdiction. The above question was replied as under:-- "Our conclusion, therefore, is that in view of subsection (1-B) the Service Tribunal alone had the jurisdiction to adjudicate with regard to the terms and conditions of WAPDA employees as from 30- 9-1975 and that jurisdiction of all other Courts, Tribunals, Commissions was affected by section (1- C) but not that of the Service Tribunal itself. **"
' Thereafter, in the case of Javaid Ahmad (supra) who moved the Labour Court, which allowed his petition and directed his reinstatement with back benefits, the Labour Appellate Court dismissed the appeal of WAPDA. This order was assailed through a Constitutional petition which was also dismissed by this Court. However, the appeal was accepted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and it was held as under:-- "**** Since the respondent Javaid Ahmad was to be deemed as civil servant for the purposes of seeking relief against termination of his service, only the Service Tribunal had jurisdiction under section 17(1B) of the aforesaid Act. Consequently the orders passed by the Punjab Labour Court No, 1 and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal were without jurisdiction and the High Court was in error in refusing to interfere with the same in judicial review by not considering that section 17(1-B) of the aforesaid Act was applicable to the present case."
' Therefore, respectfully following the decision in the case of Javaid Ahmad (supra) these petitions merit acceptance.
8. Now coming to the point that respondent No, 1 had only remanded the case to the Labour Court for decision on merits, therefore, no writ petition is competent against remand order. The argument is clearly misconceived as the question of jurisdiction has been finally decided by respondent No, 1.
In the case of Muhammad Aslam and 25 others (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that since adequate remedy was available in the lower Court, therefore, the writ issued by this Court was re- called. The case is not relevant because in that case the matter was remanded with the direction that the Authority should decide the case afresh after affording the parties another chance of producing evidence of their choice, while in the present case the question of jurisdiction has been decided finally by respondent No,
1. Therefore, the same principle is not attracted here. Similarly, in the case of Safdar Ali (supra), if was observed by this Court that as the jurisdiction is yet to be determined by a 'competent Authority', therefore, no interference in writ is called for. The lower Court has held in the earlier part of the judgment that it is not the competent forum. The same is the position in the cases of Ramzan (supra) and Kaniz Fatima (supra) where proceedings were remanded to the Court of competent jurisdiction. The same are clearly distinguishable.
9. This brings us to the question whether a writ petition is competent? Strange argument is coming from respondent No,
3. The same runs counter to the argument dealt in the preceding paragraph that no writ is competent. The learned counsel perhaps meant that since the writ is competent, therefore, the grievance petition before the Labour Court was also competent. Now if looked from this angle, the argument is clearly misconceived and misdirected because the Labour Court is a special forum, therefore, a Court of limited jurisdiction. It cannot be deemed to be a Court of general jurisdiction as this Court while exercising Constitutional jurisdiction and Civil Courts.
Therefore, the reference to the case of Muhammad Azhar (supra) decided by this Court is not relevant.
10. This brings us to the last question that this Court should not issue any writ in aid of injustice. It is explained that concerned S.D.O. Has paid the amount which allegedly was misappropriated by respondent No,
3. The learned counsel in this behalf has referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in CPSLA No, 423/L of 1994 titled 'Medical Superintendent, Mayo Hospital, Lahore etc. v. Razia Bibi wife of Safdar Masih' on 5-12-1994. The precedent case is not relevant to the present controversy because in the cases in hand the decision on merits is yet to be rendered.
11. The upshot of the above discussion is that these petitions are allowed and the order of respondent No, 1 is set aside. The result is that the order of respondent No, 2 is restored and the grievance petitions of the respondent No,3 are dismissed.