SHAHID ANWAR BAJWA, J.--- Facts giving rise to this petition are that petitioner was taken in employment of respondent No,2 vide letter of employment dated 18-8-2002. The letter was issued by Civil Aviation Club. Vide letter, dated February, 1st 2002, his employment was terminated.
Termination letter in its entirety reads as under:--- "Termination of service
(1) It is to inform you that the management has decided to terminate your appointment being no more required.
(2) Please consider this letter as one month notice for which you will be paid one month salary."
2. Petitioner sent grievance notice on March, 18th 2002 and thereafter filed grievance petition in Sindh Labour Court No,IV. Evidence was recorded and vide order, dated 20-12-2008 grievance petition was dismissed on sole ground that the respondent is a Club, which provides services to its member officers of Civil Aviation Authority and therefore, is not an industry and the Industrial Relations Ordinance and the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance were not applicable to the respondent Club. This order was passed by the learned Court on 20-12- 2008. Certified copy was delivered on 6-1-2009 and this writ petition was filed on 4-2-2009.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner made the following submissions:--- ' Although appeal is provided under section 54 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, no Labour Appellate Tribunal has been constituted in the Province of Sindh and therefore, he has no remedy available to him under the law against the impugned order.
(II) The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 and Industrial Relations Act, 2008 are applicable to the Club
(III) Even if any of the above three are not applicable to the respondent establishment being a club, Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 is applicable to it.
(IV) Employment of the petitioner has been terminated without assigning any reason and is therefore, in violation of Standing Order 12(3) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent made the following submissions:---
(I) That grievance notice was served on March 18th 2002 whereas termination of employment had taken place on February 1, 2002, therefore, the grievance notice was barred by time and grievance petition before Labour Court was not maintainable.
(II) That Club is not an industry or commercial establishment and, therefore, provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 and the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 are not applicable to the Club. Therefore, in any case the grievance petition was not maintainable. Learned counsel relied upon Aftab A. Chaudhry, Chairman, Managing Committee, The Punjab Club, Lahore v. The Registrar of Trade Unions, Lahore Region, Lahore and another 1996 PLC 8'7, Rawalpindi Club, Rawalpindi v. Registrar of the Trade Unions and 2 others 1989 PLC 760 and Lahore Development Authority and others v. Abdul Shafiq and others 1992 PLC 1214.
5. I have heard learned counsel for parties and have gone through the record as well as case-law cited by the learned counsel.
6. There is no doubt that appeal is provided under section 54 of Industrial Relations Act, 2008 before Labour Appellate Tribunal. However, the parties are at one on the point that no Labour Appellate Tribunal has been constituted in the Province of Sindh. This is a very sad aspect and is clear indication of bureaucratic negligence. Be that as it may, obviously in the absence of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in the Province of Sindh the petitioner had no remedy available to him under the law. Therefore, in such a situation the petitioner shall have right to invoke constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Petition is, therefore, held to be maintainable.
7. It was contended by learned counsel for respondent that grievance notice was time-barred. As quoted above, letter of termination is dated February 1st, 2002 and grievance notice was served on March 18th, 2002. I think grievance notice was within time and I have two reasons for it. Firstly, in the letter of termination it is not stated that service is being terminated with immediate effect. All that is stated is that please consider that letter as one month notice. Therefore, in the presence of such ambiguous statement I think petitioner should be justified in presuming that the letter took effect on March 1st, 2002. Second reason is much more simple. On February 1st, 2002 the workman was governed by the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and under section 25-A(1) of the Ordinance of 1969, period for service of grievance notice was three months, unlike section 46(1) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002, where period prescribed for service of grievance notice was one month.
Therefore, the grievance notice was governed by section 25-A(1) and is therefore, within time.
' The crux question is whether a Club is industry for the purpose of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 or Industrial Relations Act, 2008 and whether the Club is a commercial establishment as defined in the section 2(b) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders)
Ordinance, 1968. I do not think that in this case question whether Club is industry or not under Industrial Relations Ordinance should detain me anymore. That can be left for determination in an appropriate case. For the purpose of present case I would leave this question unanswered because as has been held by various Courts that even where Industrial Relations Ordinance is not applicable but the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 is applicable the workman can maintain his grievance against termination of employment before the Labour Court. Thus the workman can do in terms of provisions contained in Standing Order 12(3) of the Industrial and. Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. Therefore, when such a terminated, dismissed, retrenched, discharged or otherwise removed workman comes to a Labour Court, he does not come by virtue of section 25-A(1) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 or section 46 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 or section 41 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 but comes by virtue of Standing Order 12(3) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. If authority is needed, one may refer to Security Papers Limited v. Sindh Labour Court No,IV and another 1981 PLC 898, Trustees pf the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem and another 1987 PLC 46, National Bank of Pakistan v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi and another 1994 PLC 301 and Mustehkum Cement Limited through Managing Director v. Abdul Rasheed and others 1998 PLC 172.
8. Section 2(b) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 is in the following words:---- "2. Definitions.- In this Ordinance, unless there is anything repugnant to this subject or context- 2(b) 'Commercial Establishment" means an establishment in which the business of advertising, commission or forwarding is conducted, or which is a commercial agency, and includes a clerical department of a factory or of any industrial or commercial undertaking, the office establishment of a person who for the purpose of fulfilling a contract with the owner of any commercial establishment or industrial establishment, employees workmen, a unit of a joint stock company, an insurance company, a banking company or a bank, a broker's office or stock exchange, a club, a hotel, a restaurant or an eating house, a cinema or theatre, and such other establishments or class thereof, as Government may by notification in the official Gazette, declare to be a commercial establishment for the purposes of this Ordinance."
9. The bare reading of above provision clearly indicates that the word "commercial establishment" has been defined to mean, inter alia, "A Club". It is settled principle of interpretation of statutes that where definition clause says that something mean so and so, one is not to have reference to dictionary or the common meanings or the commonly understood parlance in respect of that word but is to include that word or that concept in the term which the Legislature has chosen to define.
' Therefore, whatever Club may be, it may or may not be industry under the Industrial Relations Act, 2008, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 or Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, since the Ordinance of 1968 says that commercial establishment shall, inter alia, mean a Club, even Club is included in the definition of commercial establishment. Therefore, Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance by virtue inclusion of Club in the definition of commercial establishment is applicable to the respondent establishment. Case-law relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent is quite distinguishable. In Aftab A. Chaudhry's case (supra), which case related to Punjab Club, it was a question relating to registration of Trade Union and the question was whether Club falls within the meaning of word Industry used in the Industrial Relations ordinance, 1969. In Rawalpindi Club's case (supra), it again pertained to registration of union and to the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. These two cases are quite distinguishable. Third case relied upon by learned counsel is the case of Lahore Development Authority and others. In this case a single Judge of the Lahore High Court has held firstly Lahore Development Authority falls within definition of Industry as given in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and consequently since Lahore Development Authority is not being run under the authority of the Federal or a Provincial Government or local authority but is run under the authority of a Statute conferred upon it, therefore, the Ordinance of 1968 is applicable to it. Therefore, this case-law cited by the learned counsel for respondent does not help him.
10. There is no again saying that letter of termination does not state any reason for termination of employment of the employee. It only says that your employment is terminated being no more required. It has been held by this Court in Farooque Ahmed v. Delta Shipping Pvt. Limited 2006 PLC 102 and Ghulam Rasool Tahir v. IV-Sindh Labour Court, Karachi and another 2007 PLC 83, that statements that services are no more required is not a statement meeting mandatory requirements under Standing Order 12(3).
11. In view of the above discussion, I set aside impugned order passed by the Labour Court on December 22nd, 2008. I also set aside the letter of termination dated February 1st, 2002 issued by the respondent No,2 to the petitioner and order that petitioner be reinstated in service with all back-benefit within a period of seven days. Parties are left to bear their own costs.