Unnecessary details apart respondent No.1, while serving as Senior Clerk, in DLD-IV Lahore Development Authority (LDA), was dismissed from service vide order, dated 26.10.2015, passed by the Director Administration LDA against which he preferred an appeal which was rejected by the Additional Director General (Hqrs.) LDA through order, dated 13.02.2016. After dismissal of his appeal respondent No.1 filed a Grievance Petition under section 33 of the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010 before Punjab Labour Court No.2, Lahore (the Labour Court). After service of notice the petitioners entered appearance and filed reply to the Grievance Petition. In addition thereto, they also filed an application under Order VII rule 11 CPC for rejection of the Grievance Petition which was dismissed by the Labour Court through order, dated 24.01.2018, against which they filed an appeal but without any success as the same was dismissed by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore (PLAT) through judgment, dated 10.04.2018; hence this petition.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that as respondent No.1 was proceeded against under the provisions of the Punjab Employees Efficiency , Discipline and Accountability (PEE DA), Act 2006 he could not file proceedings before the Labour Court; that as respondent No.1 availed remedy of appeal against his dismissal, provided under section 16 of PEEDA Act, 2006 he could not approach the Labour Court; that according to section 23 of PEEDA Act, 2006 order passed by the departmental as well as appellate authority cannot be challenged before any forum; that according to section 20 of PEEDA Act, 2006 provisions of said Act enjoys overriding effect on the general law; that the Apex Court of the country in the case of Haroon-ur -Rashid v. Lahore Development Authority and others (2016 SCMR 931) has already held that the employees who have been proceeded against under any statutory enactment cannot approach the Labour Court rather they are supposed to knock the doors of this Court against any penultimate order; that according to section 2(h) of PEEDA Act, 2006 there is no difference between the officers and officials working in a statutory body and that even otherwise Grievance Petition filed by respondent No.1 before the Labour Court was barred by law , thus, the same was not proceed-able.
3. Conversely , learned counsel representing respondent No.1, while defending the impugned decisions of the fora below , submits that as respondent No.1 filed Grievance Petition after dismissal of his departmental appeal the same was competent before the Labour Court; that the points urged by learned counsel for the petitioners before this Court, being not part of the applicatio n filed under Order VII rule 11 CPC, cannot be given any weight; that the case-law referred by learned counsel for the petitioners, being quite distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the instant case, is not applicable inasmuch as in the said case controversy revolved around an officer whereas respondent No.1 being Senior Clerk falls within the category of workman, thus, the Grievance Petition filed by him was maintainable and that when departmental appeal of respondent No.1 was not dismissed on the point of limitation subsequent proceedings cannot be held barred by law of limitation. Relies on Mir Ajab Khan and another v. Deputy Post Master -General, SRP, Dera Ismail Khan and others (2013 SCMR 1053 ), Lahore Development Authority through D.G., Lahore and another v. Abdul Shafique and others (PLD 2000 SC 207), Muhammad Hanif v. Executive Director (O.P.S.) House Building Finance Corporation, Islamabad and others (2008 PLC 1 ) and Lahore Development Authority and others v . Abdul Shafiq and others (1992 PLC 1214 ).
4. While exercising his right of rebuttal, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the case of Lahore Development Authority through D.G., Lahore and another v. Abdul Shafique and others (PLD 2000 SC 207) referred by learned counsel for respondent No.1 having been decided prior to promulgation of PEEDA Act, 2006 is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have also gone through the documents, annexed with this petition, as well as the case-law cited at the bar .
6. Admittedly, respondent No.1 was proceeded against under the provisions of PEEDA Act, 2006 and on conclusion of proceedings he was dismissed from service. He challenged his dismissal order through an appeal under section 16 of PEEDA Act, 2006 and after rejection thereof he knocked the door of the Labour Court. Section 1 of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (the Ordinance, 1968) deals with the application of the said ordinance which for convenience of reference is reproduced herein below:- "1. Short title, extent and commencement .-
(1) This Ordinance may be called the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968.
(2) It extends to the whole of Pakistan.
(3) It shall come into force at once.
(4) It applies to-
(a) every industrial establishment or commercial establishment wherein twenty or more workmen are employed, directly or through any other person whether on behalf of himself or any other person, or were so employed on any day during the preceding twelve months.
(b)........................................
(c) Such classes of the industrial and commercial establishments as Government may, from time to time by notification in the official Gazette, specify in this behalf: Provided that nothing in the Ordinance shall apply to industrial and commercial establishments carried on by or under the authority of the Federal or any Provincial Government, where statutory rules of service, conduct or discipline are applicable to the workmen employed therein: (emphasis provided)
Provided further that the provisions of Standing Orders 10-B and 11, clauses (6) and (8) of Standing Order 12 and Standing Order 15 shall not apply in the first instance, to any industrial establishment wherein not more than forty- nine persons were employed on any day during the preceding twelve months but Government may by notification in the official Gazette, extend all or any of the said provisions to any such industrial establishment or any class of such establishments.
According to the first proviso, quoted above, the provisions of the Ordinance, 1968 are not applicable to industrial and commercial establishments carried on by or under the authority of the Federal or any Provincial government wherein the terms & conditions of service of the employees are governed under statutory rules of service or statutory law/rules are applicable in respect of their conduct and discipline. Insofar as the case in hand is concerned admittedly respondent No.1 was proceeded against under PEEDA Act, 2006 which being statutory dispensation jurisdiction of the Labour Court to take care of the order either passed by the competent authority or the appellate authority was not attracted. Reliance in this regard is placed on the case reported as National Bank of Pakistan v. Punjab Labour Court No.5, Faisalabad and 2 others (1993 SCMR 672). Further , the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, while clinching the issue relating to remedy for employees of statutory bodies, who are proceeded under the provisions of PEEDA Act, 2006, in the case of Haroon-ur -Rashid (Supra), has inter-alia observed as under: -
13. Thus, it could be seen that anomaly as to availability of forum for the aggrieved or affected employees of statutory corporation/ authority/body against whom disciplinary proceedings are initiated and or any penalty is inflicted under statutory dispensation has been removed. In the case wher e the employees of statutory corporation/authority/ body are proceeded under the statutory rules or any statutory dispensation like RSO, 2000 or PEEDA, 2006 etc. action of the competent authority could be challenged under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
14.......
15. In view of the foregoing discussion, the judgment rendered in the case of Muhammad Masood v. Market Committee (2014 PLC (C.S.) 1080), does not lay down the correct law and so also impugned judgment is not sustainable. It is abundantly clear that the respondent is an employee of Lahore Development Authority, a statutory authority created under section 4 of Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975, proceeded under PEEDA, 2006, which is a statutory intervention in disciplinary matter, therefore,irrespective of the fact that the rules framed under section 45 of the Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975 are non statutory yet the respondents were not proceeded under the Rules, 1978 but under the PEEDA, 2006 which is a statutory enactment and even a level up of the statutory rules. Therefore, High Court has jurisdiction to examine the proprietary of the impugned action taken against the respondents under the PEEDA, 2006."
If the fate of the Grievance Petition filed by respondent No.1 before the Labour Court is adjudged on the touchstone of the afore-referred judgment there leaves no ambiguity that the same is not sustainable.
7. Though, learned counsel representing respondent No.1 has tried to draw a line of distinction between the officers and workmen working in statutory bodies but has failed to give any plausible explanation with regarding to section 2(h) of PEEDA Act, 2006 according to which an employee means: - "(i) in the employment of a corporation, corporate body, autonomous body, authority, statutory body or any other organization or institution set up, established, owned, managed or controlled by the Government, by or under any law for the time being in force or a body or organization in which the Government has a controlling share or interest and includes the chairman and the chief executive, and the holder of any other office therein; and
(ii) in Government service or who is a member of a civil service of the province or who holds a civil post in connection with the affairs of the province or any employee serving in any court or tribunal set up or established by the Government but does not include-
(aa) a Judge of the Lahore High Court or any court subordinate to that Court or an employee of such courts; and
(bb) an employee of Police. "
The definition of an employee with specific reference to PEEDA Act, 2006 has also been exhaustively dealt with by the Apex Court of the country in the case of Haroon-ur -Rashid (Supra), relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners has inter-alia observed as under: -
5. Heard the arguments and perused the record. There is no cavil to the factual matrix of the case that the LDA created under the LDA Act, 1975, is a statutory authority and disciplinary matters and proceedings against its employees, admittedly were governed under the LDA Regulations, 1978 framed under section 45 of the LDA Act, 1975. However, pursuant to the promulgation of Punjab Removal from Service (Special Powers)
Ordinance, 2000 (RSO 2000), enacted on 18.09.2000, the employees both in the service of Government of Punjab and or in service of statutory corporation/authority/ body for the purpose of disciplinary matters and proceedings were brought within the regime of RSO, 2000 which was succeeded by Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline Act, 2006 (PEEDA, 2006), promulgated on 17th October, 2006. Section 2(h) of PEEDA, 2006 recognizes two sets of employees; one in the government service or those who are members of a civil service of the Province or who hold civil post in connection with affairs of the Province and another set of persons in the employment of corporation, corporate body, autonomous body, authority, statutory body or any other organization or institution set up, established, owned, managed or controlled by the Government by or under any law for the time being in force or a body or organization in which the Government of Punjab has a controlling share or interest and also includes the Chairman and the Chief Executive and the holder of any other office therein. Thus it could be seen that irrespective whether a person is in the Government service or a member of a civil service (per section 2(h)(ii) of PEEDA) or is in employment of corporation or corporate or statutory body (per section 2(h)(i) of PEEDA) could be proceeded departmentally in disciplinary matter under the uniform statutory disciplinary dispensation. Any proceedings taken, penalty imposed in terms of PEEDA, 2006 could be agitated before the departmental hierarchy by way of appeal, review and or revision before the competent authority detailed therein. (emphasis provided)
8. Now coming to the case-law , referred by learned counsel representing respondent No.1, I am of the view that the same is not applicable to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case inasmuch as in none of the referred cases it has been held that even if an employee of a statutory body has been proceeded against under the statutory enactments viz. the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 or PEEDA Act, 2006 still he can approach the Labour Court. Moreover, in none of the cases referred by learned counsel for respondent No.1, the employee was proceeded under any statutory enactment. Further , when in the case of Haroon-ur -Rashid (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has clinched the issue under discussion, the said judgment being later-in-time enjoys precedence over the earlier judgments on the subject.
9. For what has been discussed above, instant petition is accepted and the impugned orders passed by the Labour Court as well as PLAT are set-aside . As a result, the application filed by the petitioners, under Order VII rule 11 CPC, before the Labour Court would stand accepted and proceedings filed by respondent No.1 before the said forum would stand quashed . No order as to costs.