1. NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.-This petition is directed against the order dated 16-I1-1980 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court dismissing the civil revision in 1lmine.
2. The respondents had filed an ejectment petition against the petitioner on the ground, inter alia, of personal need and reconstruction/renovation. The petition was accepted by the learned Rent Controller vide his order dated 20-11-1979 and the tenant was ordered to vacate and hand over the possession of the property in dispute to the landlord. The petitioner, therefore, filed an appeal before the District Judge, Multan, who dismissed it by his order dated 22-10-1980. A Civil Revision Petition (C. R. P. No. 1856/80) wag then filed before the Lahore High Court which was dismissed, vide order dated 16-11-1980, on merits as no justification for interference in the concurrent findings of the two Courts below was found to exist. Hence this petition for Special Leave to Appeal.
3. The question that struck us at the very outset was the competency of the Civil Revision in the High Court in view of the recent amendment in the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 by the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance, 1979 whereby the power of the second appeal has been taken away. Before this amendment section 15 which deals with appeals to the extent relevant was thus couched :- "15. Appeal.-(1) Any party aggrieved by an order made by the Controller under section 4, section 10, section 12 or section 13, may, within thirty days of the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the District Judge having jurisdiction over the area where the building or rented land, in relation to which the order is passed, is situated.
4. (1-A) On such appeal being preferred, the District Judge may himself hear it or refer it fur disposal to an Additional District Judge having jurisdiction over the area where the building or rented land, in relation to which the order is passed, is situated.
5. (1-B) The District Judge may recall an appeal made over by him to an Additional District Judge and either hear it himself or refer it for disposal to another Additional District Judge having jurisdiction as provided in subsection (1-A)
6. Provided, that the District Judge shall not so recall or make over an appeal which is part-heard).
7. (2)--------------------- (3)---------------------
(4) Any party aggrieved by an order passed on appeal by the Appellate Authority appointed by the Government under clause (a) of subsection (1), and if an Appellate Authority has not been appointed in respect of any area or class of cases, any party aggrieved by an order of the Controller may within 30 days from the date of the order of Appellate Authority or, as the case may be, of the Controller, prefer an appeal in writing to the High Court and the decision thereof shall be final.
8. Explanation.-An appeal under this subsection shall be heard and determined as an appeal from an original decree under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, if it is from an order of Controller and as an appeal from the appellate order under section 103 of the Code if it is from an order of the Appellate Authority and the provisions of Part VI and of the First Schedule to the said Code relating to appeals shall, with such modification as the context may require, to such proceedings.
(5) No order passed by the Controller, the Appellate Authority or the High Court under the provisions of this Ordinance shall be called in question in any Court of law by suit or otherwise, except as provided under this Ordinance."
9. Section 15 has been substituted, to the extent relevant, as follows by Ordinance IX of 1979 :- "15. Appeal.-(1) Any party aggrieved by an order of the Controller finally disposing of an application made under this Ordinance may, within thirty days of the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the District Judge having jurisdiction over the area where the building or rented land in relation to which the order is passed, is situated.
10. Provided that no appeal shall lie against an order made by a Controller under subsection (6) of section 13 determining approximately the amount of rent due or the rate of rent and directing the tenant to deposit all the rent due Provided further that no appeal shall lie from an interlocutory order passed by the Controller.
(2) On such appeal being preferred, the District Judge may hear it himself or refer it for disposal to an Additional District Judge having jurisdiction over the area where the building or rented land in relation to which the order is passed, is situated.
(3) The District Judge may recall an appeal made over by him to an Additional District Judge and either hear it himself or refer it for disposal to another Additional District Judge having jurisdiction as provided in subsection (2): (4)---------------.
11. (5)---------------..
(6) . . ---------.
(7) The order of the Controller, subject to the result of appeal, if any, shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court of law, including the High Court, by suit, appeal or otherwise."
12. Mr. Dilawar Mahmood, learned counsel for the petitioner, urged before us that the change in law did not affect the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain revision petitions against the orders passed in appeal by District Judge or an Additional District Judge as they were Courts subordinate to the High Court and, therefore, a petition under section 115, C. P. C. Against their orders was competent. He cited some authorities in support of his submission. Attention was first drawn by him to a Division Bench judgment of the Lahore High Court in Kishan Chand & Co. v. Nur Muhammad (P L D 1949 Lah. 30wherein it was held that the Controller under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (VI of 1947), who exercises all the powers of the civil Court must be regarded as such and therefore is a Court subordinate to the High Court and subject to its revision under section 115, C. P. C.
13. However, this judgment was overruled by a Full Bench decision of the same Court in The Corporation of the City of Lahore v. Mst. Fahmida Begum (PLD 1952 Lah. 258), Nonetheless, it was then argued that despite the last mentioned decision a revision was still competent because the position under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 was different as compared to the position obtaining under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947. The District Judge under section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959 as originally enacted as persona designate and not as the Presiding Officer o:' the principal Court in the District as held by the Supreme Court in the well-known case of Khadim Mohy-ud-Din and another v. Ch. Rehmat All Nagra (PLD 1965 SC 459). In this judgment it was also observed that the Rent Controller acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and not as a Court. However, after this judgment was pronounced, the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 was amended by Ordi- -nance XXII of 1966. The effect of which was that the District Judge exercising the appellate power under section 15(1) began to act not as a persona designate but in his ordinary judicial capacity as Presiding Officer of the Principal Court in the District as explained in the judgment of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court consisting of Waheeduddin Ahmad, C. J. And Muhammad Akram, J., in Abdul Haq v. Saif-ur-Rehman arid others (PLD 1968 Lah. 418), and later reiterated in Abdul Aziz v.
14. Syed Arif A.I and 6 others (PLD 1978 Lah. 441). It 'was, therefore, argued that a revision under section 115, C. P. C. Against the order of a District Judge or an Additional District Judge was still available. Reliance for this submission was sought from a Single Bench judgment of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court in Motabar and others v. Messrs S. M. Rehman & Co. And another (PLD 1971 Quetta 47), wherein it was held that a revision lies to the High Court under section 115, C. P. C.
15. Against an order of the District Court under Payment of Wages Act, 1936.
16. However, the amendment West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordi--nance carried out by Ordinance 1X of 1979 directly came up for consideration by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court in Abdul Fazal Khan v. Muhammad Amjad Khan (PLD 1980 Lah. 706). Before the said learned Judge reliance was also placed on Abdul Haq v. Satfur Rehman and others (PLD 1968 Lah.
17. 478and Allah Rakha v. Col. Abdul Ghafoor (P L. D 1978 Lah. 1364). It was also argued that the decision of the AdditionalDistrict Judge or the District Judge will be a decision by a "Court" and will, therefore, be amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115, C. P. C. It was observed that although the proposition of law that the District Judge while hearing an appeal under section 15 of the Ordinance acts as a Court is undisputable the question remained whether the decision made by him in appeal is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115, C. P. C. In answering this question in the negative he referred to subsection (5) of section 15 of the Ordinance in its unamended form that "no order passed by the Controller, the Appellate Authority or the High Court under the provisions of this Ordinance shall be called in question in any Court of law by suit or otherwise exempt as provided under this Ordinance".
18. According to him the provision of subsection (5) of section 15 which was not noticed in any of the earlier decision took away the jurisdiction of Courts of law from calling in question any decision made by the Controller, the appellate Authority or the High Court by way of suit or otherwise except in the manner as provided under the Ordinance. However, by the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance, 1979 (IX of 1979) which came into force on 12-9-1979 this provision was substituted by a still stronger provision, namely, subsection (7) of the newly constituted section 15 under which the order of the Controller, subject to the result of appeal, if any, is to be final and cannot be called in question in any Court of law, including the High Court, by suit, appeal or otherwise. It was observed that the word "otherwise" is wide enough to include the remedy of revision under section 115, C. P. C. And by the amending Ordinance, the Legislature had taken away the jurisdiction of the High Court regarding second appeal against the order of the District Judge.
19. By another amending Ordinance called the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment)
20. Ordinance, 1980 (VIII of 1980), all appeals which were filed in the High Court from the orders of the District Judge or the Additional District Judge passed after the commencement of amending Ordinance (IX of 1979) abated on 19-6-1980, the date on which Ordinance VIII of 1980 came into force. The conclusion was, reached that the law-maker intended that the order passed by the District Judge, even though as Presiding Officer of principal Court in the District, should not be called in question either in second appeal in the High Court or by any other manner including petition under section 115, C. P. C. W consider that this view is correctly taken.
21. Muzaffar A.I v. Muhammad Shaft (C. A. No. 14 of 1973) decided on 30-9-1980 in which one of us (Nasim Hasan Shah, J.), was a party while discussing the power of the High Court to review its own orders in appeals decided under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance before its amendment by Ordinance IX of 1979 has observed as under :- "A perusal of the Explanation attached to subsection (4) of section 15 of the Ordinance as above reproduced will show that it applies only to the provisions of Part VI-(which it has been held in Mauls Bakhsh v. Abdul Hamid and 4 others PLD 1971 Lah. 511 and in Roshan Din v. S. M. Budruddin PLD 1969 Kar. 546 really means Part VII-) of the Code to appeals in the High Court. Part V1I is headed as 'Appeals' and consists of sections 96 to 112. Section 114 of the Civil Procedure Code is headed as 'Review' and lays down that- Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved--
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred ;
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, and the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.
22. This section exists, in Part VIII of the Code which is headed as 'Reference, Review and Revision, and comprises of sections 113 to 115. This part and these sections have not been applied to the High Court because by making mention only of the provisions of Part VII, the provisions of Part VIII stand expressly and deliberately excluded. In these circumstances, to bring back section 114 so as to say that this section also applies to the High Court while hearing appeals under Chapter VII, in our opinion, is not justified. Same is the position of section 117 of the Civil Procedure Code which occurs in Part 1X which on the same reasoning also stands excluded. It will be appreciated that it is, inter alia, for this reason that section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code which deals with 'Revision' and which too occurs in Part VIII is not applicable to the High Court, with the result that the High Court does not possess any power of revision in cases under the Rent Restriction Ordinance."
23. Thus, this Court has already expressed its opinion that a revision under sec-1 115 of the C. P. C. Is not applicable under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance as it stood before the amending Ordinance IX oil 1979, In view of the language contained in subsection (7) of the newly constituted section 15 any doubt which could be entertained on this question no w' stands resolved.
24. Mr: Dilawar Mahmood attempted to argue that the provision of the Punjab Amendment Ordinance (Ordinance IX of 1979) could not prevail against the unamended provisions of section 15 of the Ordinance as the same were contained in the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance which could not be amended by any Ordinance promulgated by the Governor of the Punjab. There is no force in this submission. The West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959 is an "existing law" within the meaning of Sub-Article 7 of Article 268. According to Sub-Article (1) of Article 268 all the existing laws, subject to the Constitution are to continue in force so far as applicable and with the necessary adaptations until altered or repealed by the appropriate Legislature. There can be no doubt that the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 was an "existing law" which was continuing in force subject to any amendment mad by the appropriate Legislature. In the Constitution of 1973, two lists have been enumerated, namely, the Federal Legislative List and Concurrent List. The subjects which are not mentioned in either of the said two lists are exclusively within the domain of the Province to legislate. The subject dealt within the Rent Restriction Ordinance not having been mentioned in either would fall within the residuary, list, unlike civil procedure which has been mentioned at Item No. 3 in the Concurrent Legislative List where both the Federal and the Provincial Authorities have power to Legislate on the subjects. The Governor of the Punjab was, therefore, competent to promulgate the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance IX of 1979 which has validly amended the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959.
25. The revision petition filed by the petitioner against the order of the District Judge before the High Court under section I15, C. P. C. Was not maintainable and liable to dismissal on this score alone. In the result the order of the High Court dismissing the revision petition was correct though we have come to the same conclusion for a reason different from that which found favour with the learned Judge in the High Court. His order is, therefore, not liable to be interfered with.
26. This petition must fail and is dismissed hereby.
27. Since the premises in question is a shop and the petitioner would require time to make alternative arrangements, he is granted four months' time to vacate the premises, provided he continues to pay the monthly rent in accordance with law.