' RAJA MUHAMMAD KHURSHIO KHAN, C. J.-This appeal, by leave, has been moved to discredit the judgment passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court in chamber on 22-1-1983. By this order the learned Judge felt advised to dismiss the revision petition, moved by the petitioner, in limine.
' The main consideration which weighed with the learned Judge is that the revision petition against the order passed by the District Judge while exercising the appellate jurisdiction under section 15 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1980, is not competent.
2. The dispute arose in the following way .The respondent, Mallick Muhammad Wan, herein, who is admittedly the owner of the house in dispute, sought ejectment of the appellant from the house under the provision of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1980. The Rent Controller/A. D. M., Muzaffarabad, after holding necessary inquiry, vide order dated 27-12-1981, found that the ejectment proceedings are bona fide as the house in fact needs renovation and repairs. The petition thus was accepted by him and the respondent was ordered to vaeate the house and hand over its possession to the landlord before 12-2-1982.
3. An appeal taken to the appellate authority, i,e,, District Judge, Muzaffarabad also failed with cost on 17-2-1982.
4. To assail the findings recorded by the District Judge (appellate authority) the appellant invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, but his revision thereat also was dismissed in limine, on 22-1-1983, solely on the ground that the order passed by the appellate authority (District Judge) is not amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.
5. We have heard lengthy arguments of the learned counsel for the parties advanced at the bar.
After giving or dispassionate thought to the arguments advanced and after looking into the judgment, the record and the relevant law, we believe that this appeal merits no consideration for the reasons to follow.
6. Mr. Gillani, the learned Advocate for the appellant, contended that under section 115 of the C. P. C.
The order passed by the District Judge, as an appellate authority, is amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court and the learned Judge in the High Court has misdirected himself to hold otherwise. We regret we cannot agree with the learned counsel. It is a matter of common knowledge that a Court or authority incompetent to exercise revisional powers unless these powers have been expressly conferred by an authority to whom it owes its existence. There is no provision under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974 or the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1980, conferring power of revision to the High Court to look into the validity of an order by the District Judge as an appellate authority in rent matters. The relevant section 18(7) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1980, which corresponds to the provisions of Pakistan Rent Restriction Act, 1978 may with advantage be reproduced. It reads:- "The order of the Controller, subject to the result of appeal, if any, shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court of law, including High Court, by suit, appeal or otherwise."
7. It would appear that under subsection (7) of section 18, the order of the Controller subject to the result of an appeal, if any, is final and cannot be assailed in any Court of Law including the High Court by was of a suit, appeal or otherwise. Subsection (7) thus creates a total bar for appeals, revisions, etc. To the High Court. The word "otherwise", we may say, is comprehensive enough to include the bar to challenge the order of the District Judge by way of a revision even. It appears that to hay speedy remedy the Legislature aims that the order passed by the District Judge though as Presiding Officer of principal Court in the District should attain finality and such order should not be called in question either in second appeal in the High Court or by any other manner including petition under section 115, C. P. C. There seems to be a lot of wisdom behind it. The Legislature very rightly intended to save the landlords and tenants from all possible harassment which they have to face for the lengthy and protracted litigation to get their grievance redressed within a reasonable time. Our considered view is that the question now without any ambiguity is to be answered that a revision petition to assail the order of District Judge is incompetent. So was held in "Zahurud Hasan v. Mst. Raqqia Begum and 4 others" . In that case it has been observed that the order of Rent Controller subject to the result of appeal, if any, is final and not questionable in any Court of law, including the High Court, by suit, appeal or revision.
8. The next question on which we would like to express ourselves is as to whether under section 3 of the C. P. C. The District Judge while acting as an appellate Court in rent matters can be said to be a Judge of a subordinate Court to the High Court ? Section 3 of the C. P. C. Reads :- "Subordination of Courts.-For the purposes of this Code, the District Court is subordinate to the High Court, and every civil Court of grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court."
It would be noticed that section 3 of the Code does not declare a special Court as a Court subordinate to the High Court. There is also no provision in the Ordinance to the effect that a special Court shall be deemed to be Court subordinate to the High Court for the purposes of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
9. On the aforesaid view of the matter, we feel safe to hold that the District Judge (appellate authority in rent matters) is not subordinate to the High Court. So the applicability of section 115 in relation to the order passed by the Special Court hardly arises. This view prevailed in "Wajahat All1 Hasnie v. Mst. Ghazala" . On the point the learned Judge (Nasim Hasan Shah, J. While in the High Court) observed :- "I respectfully agree and may add that the words "subordinate Court" in section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure ought to be understood in the sense given to them in section 3, otherwise the words 'for the purposes of this Code' would be rendered useless. Since section 3 is enacted for the purpose of the Code and deals with all the civil Courts and their subordination to one another the inference appears to be irresistible that no Court other than that mentioned in it can be said to be subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure."
' In that report earlier it was observed :- " I cannot accept the broad and unqualified proposition that once it is held that an officer, authority, or functionary is exercising the functions of a Court in relation to rights that may be called "civil" that officer, authority or functionary must be held to be subordinate to the High Court.
The result of any such finding would be that all Courts which adjudicate upon the civil rights of subjects whether in cases between the subjects themselves or between the State and the' subject will be subordinate to the High Court and this will bring within the sphere of subordination not only the revenue Courts which admittedly decide civil disputes between the parties but also the income-tax authorities which determine the subject's liability to the state."
' It was further observed it. .a Court which is inferior in rank to the High Court is treated as subordinate to it for purposes of exercise of revisional jurisdiction only if it has been declared subordinate to it by a statutory provision."
' In the result it was held that the orders of the Family Court are not amenable to revision before the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and admits of no departure in the present case.
10. Let us now examine the point from another angle. Assuming that the Special Court can be treated as a Court subordinate to the High Court, it would hardly advance the case of the appellant. The ordinance is a special law. Section 4 of the C. P. C. Provides that in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or by special jurisdiction or power conferred on any special forum. A Special Court is a Court of special jurisdiction and sections 11 and 12 of the Ordinance preclude the High Court from exercising its revisional jurisdiction qua the orders of the Special Court.
11. For the above-stated reasons, it is legitimate for us to hold that in view of the provisions of sections 11 and 12 of the said Ordinance read with section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the orders of the Special Court cannot be assailed before the High Court in revision by resorting to the provisions of section 115, C. P. C. This aspect of the case received attention in the above-mentioned case of the Lahore High Court, i. e. (PLD 1970 Lah. 641). The relevant observation is as follows :- "The object of this Act is to provide a speedy method of settling family disputes and if orders of interlocutory character are to be brought to the High Court, this object would be defeated. Under the provisions of the Act the Family Court is subordinate to the High Court if it is presided over by a person who is or has been District Judge or an Additional District Judge and to the District Court in any other case, vide section 14 of the Family Courts Act. But merely because of this subordination to the High Court it does not automatically follow that the orders passed by such a Court become revisable by the High Court. The revisional power is contained in section 115 of the C. P. C. However, by virtue of section 17 of the Act, the application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure does not as provided in section 4 override any special or local law. The provisions of section 17 of the Family Courts Act must, therefore, be given their full effect with the result that even if the Family Court is regarded as a Court subordinate to the High Court, the effect of section 17 of the Act is to exclude the orders of the Family Court from the operation of section 115, C. P. C. And the said2 provision of law is not available for obtaining revision of orders passed by the Family Courts. In somewhat similar circumstances, in the case of `Hafeez Ahmed v. Barkat Ali PLD 1955 Lah. 629 Mr. Justice B. Z. Kaikaus also took a similar view."
12. Respectfully agreeing with the law enunciated in the above-mentioned case, or conclusion is that the provisions of section 115, C. P.C. Cannot be availed of in-rent matters.
13. We have a direct authority on the point. In Muhammad Ayub Butt v. Allied Bank Ltd., Peshawar and others it has been observed that sections 11 and 12 of the Ordinance put effective bar to appeals etc. Against the orders of the Special Court functioning as appellate Court in rent matters and such a Court even a District Judge, cannot be deemed to be a Court subordinate to the High Court for the purposes of section 115, C. P. C. And, therefore, a special Judge appointed under an Ordinance cannot be said to be subordinate to the High Court for the purposes of section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.
14. The irresistible conclusion, therefore, is that the order passed by the District Judge in such matters even as Presiding Officer of the principal Court in the District cannot be called in question either in second appeal in the High Court or by any other manner including the remedy under section 115, C. P. C., though it is conceded that the exclusion of the jurisdiction, as contended by Mr. Manzoor-ul-Hassan Gillani, shall not be inferred but in the present case the Law has expressly taken away the jurisdiction of the High Court by way of appeal or otherwise from calling in question the order passed by the District Judge as appellate authority in rent cases.
15. We are also not in agreement with Mr. Gillani, Advocate, that the Rent Restriction Controller acts as a Court. Though under section 18(6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1980, the Controller has been given powers of summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of evidence, he is not bound in every case to follow the procedure stipulated in the Code of Civil Procedure. He has been given powers to make orders after holding such inquiry as he thinks fit. It would be thus observed that the question to decide the nature and extent of inquiry is purely his discretion and the parties have no right to insist upon for production of such evidence as they desire to adduce in support of their case. The inquiry in such like cases is akin to an inquiry conducted by an executive officer. We, however, concede that some of the functions of the Controller are judicial in character yet he is not required to act judicially in discharging many of his functions.
16. In the result we hold that the Controller while performing his functions under Rent Ordinance does not act as a Court. At the most it may be said that he acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.
17. Another question posed is as to whether the District Judge while hearing the appeal acts as 'persona designata' or as District Judge in his judicial capacity ? Subsection (1) of section 15 of the Ordinance gives power to the Government to appoint such District Judges as it thinks fit as appellate authority. The question is : Is the District Judge, as contemplated in this section, the District Judge in his judicial capacity as the Presiding Officer of the principal Court in the District or persona designata ? The answer is in negative. If the Legislature intended that the District Judge should bear the appeal as the Presiding Officer of the principal Court in the' District it would have expressly said so. The very fact that the Government is given power to select for this purpose such District Judges as it thinks fit indicates that the intention was not to confer appellate power on him as the Presiding Officer of the principal Court in the District. There is even no indication in the Ordinance itself that the District Judge is to exercise his authority as the Presiding Officer of the principal Court in the District. On the other hand from the nature of his appointment, the character of his power and procedure and the total ouster of jurisdiction of Court of law to question his order save as provided in the Ordinance, it is clear that he while acting as appellate authority is not acting in his ordinary judicial capacity as the Presiding Officer of his Court. We find support in Khadim Mohy-ud-Din v. Rehmat Ali . At page 463 of the report it has been observed :-3 4 "From the provisions of the Ordinance it appears that though under section 16 the 'Controller' has been given powers "of summoning and enforcing the attendance of the witness and compelling the production of evidence" he is not bound in every case to follow the procedure as laid in the Code of Civil Procedure. He has been given powers under sections 4, 10 (3) and 12 to make orders after holding such enquiry as he thinks fit. In such cases the question of nature of enquiry is left to him. That means that in such enquiries the parties have no right to insist on production of such evidence which they desire to adduce in support of their case. Therefore, no machinery is prescribed for summoning witnesses or compelling production of documents in such enquiries. In short these enquiries may be such as are conducted by an Executive Officer. Furthermore, the Controller has been given power to regulate the use by a landlord of his own property, inasmuch as within the Urban Area the landlord may not convert a residential building into a nonresidential building. The power thus conferred on the Controller would appear to be a purely executive. When subsection (3) of section 13 says that before putting the landlord in possession of the tenanted premises the Controller should be "satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide." But there is no express mention of any enquiry by the Controller. If the word 'satisfied' imports the necessity of an enquiry, even then it cannot be said that in holding such enquiry he will be bound by any particular procedure.
' We, therefore, conclude from the foregoing examination of the relevant provisions of the Ordinance that though some of the functions of the Controller are judicial in character, but yet he is not required to act judicially in discharging many of his functions. In these circumstances it will be difficult to hold that the Controller while performing his functions under this Ordinance acts as Court. At the most it may be said that he acts in a quasi-judicial capacity."
In the light of the discussion made above, we are of the considered view that the revision petition before the High Court was not competes and the High Court was very right to dismiss the same in limine. The appeal, therefore, fails. No order as to costs of this Court. PLD 1981 SC 112 PLD 1970 Lah, 641 PLD 1981 SC 359 PLD 1965 SC