1. ' MUHAMMAD APZAL ZULLAH, J.-This appeal through special leave of this Court is directed against judgment dated 30th January, 1983 of the Lahore High Court, whereby, tenant's Civil Revision Petition arising out of execution proceedings in an urban tenancy matter, was allowed and the case was remanded to the District Judge for fresh decision of the appeal.
2. ' The predecessor-in-interest of the appellants sought ejectment of the respondent from a property through an application filed in March, 1980. After protracted litigation the landlord succeeded in obtaining an ejectment Order on ground of personal requirement, in March, 1982 ; but by could not obtain the possession because of objections raised from the respondent side against the execution of the order of ejectment.
3. ' The property in dispute is a very small portion of a factory which was once transferred to the appellant side as a factory. Although both the learned counsel agree that the portion in dispute was not rented out to the respondent as a factory ; but, according to the learned counsel for the respondent, it will have to be treated as if as a factory ; firstly because, it formed part of a factory ; and secondly because, according to the appellants themselves the respondent was using it for purpose of storing his merchandise. On the contrary there is an admission from the respondents side in his written statement, in paragraph 3 whereof he had described the portion in dispute as a house. The other circumstances relatable to the objections raised by the tenant as summarised in the impugned judgment are that -during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings, Ch. Rafiq Dad, Deputy Settlement Commissioner/Deputy Administrator (R. P.), Sheikhupura, by order dated 14.12-1980 (page 131 of the Settlement file which I have perused in the. Court with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties) passed an order that-the Transfer Order No, 74268, dated 23- 7-178, was partly invalid, in that, only the `Malba' and machinery was evacuee and not the land underneath which belonged to the Provincial Government. Consequently, the P. T.
0. Was amended by order dated 23.9-1981 with the result that the transfer of the land underneath- the building was excluded from the Transfer Order issued in favour of Sardar Khan deceased. It is also, an admitted fact that mutation sanctioned in favour of Sardar Khan deceased in pursuance of the original Transfer Order was cancelled on 25-11-1979 against which Sardar Khan pled appeal which is still stated to be pending adjudication. These facts are proved on record which I have perused with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties. Subsequently, the respondents appellants herein filed execution proceedings on 2-5-1982. This application was resisted by the petitioner (respondent herein) by means of an objection petition under section 47, C. P. C. Dated 3- 5-1982 on various grounds including the ground that the property, in dispute, being the property of the Provincial Government, was outside the domain of the learned Rent Controller and, therefore, in pursuance of the ejectment order passed by the learned Rent Controller, the decree was unexecutable. The Executing Court, by order dated 13-7-1982, dismissed the objection petition, inter alia on the ground that the tenant after having once admitted by tenancy under the decree- holder, was estopped to challenge the title over the property, in dispute, in the light of, the principle enshrined in section 116 of the Evidence Act. The appeal filed by the petitioner (respondent herein) was also dismissed by the learned District Judge on 8-12-1982. He upheld the findings of the Executing Court that the petitioner (respondent herein) was estopped to deny the title of the landlord decree-holder after having admitted the tenancy. He further held that the petitioner (respondent herein) had no locus standi to file the objection petition, in that, the ownership of the suit property had been cancelled by the Provincial Government and, therefore, the petitioner (respondent herein) neither remained the tenant of the decree-holder nor that of the Provincial Government by operation of law".
4. ' A learned Judge of the High Court did not agree with the reasoning of the appellate Court and observed as follows :- "The reasoning advanced by the learned District Judge is factually incorrect, in that, the learned counsel for the parties have admitted before me that Sardar Khan died during the pendency of the appeal before the learned District Judge. This being so, the learned District Judge ought to have considered as to whether a decree obtained on ground of personal need was executable at the instance of his legal heirs. Failure to decide this question has resulted in grave prejudice to the petitioner (respondent herein). It is also difficult to hold that the petition under section 47, C. P. C.
5. Filed by the petitioner (respondent herein) was not maintainable simply because the ownership of the property had been allegedly cancelled by the Provincial Government. In the first instance, this finding of fact is based on no evidence on record. This perusal of the Settlement record however, reveals that the ownership of the entire suit property was never cancelled. In fact the P. T. D. Alone was amended by excluding the land transferred to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents (landlords herein).
6. ' In terms of unamended provisions of section 15(5) of the Ordinance and section 15(7) as added by the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance (IX of 1979), the order of the Rent Controller subject to the result of appeal, if. Any is final and cannot be called in question in any Court of law including the High Court by suit, appeal or otherwise. Reference may be made to Zahurul Hassan v. Mst. Ruqqia Begun and others PLD 1981 SC 112. This being so, the grievance of the petitioner (respondent herein) could have been competently determined by the Executing Court which has the power to entertain an objection petition as envisaged by section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code which is admittedly applicable to execution proceedings of an order of ejectment passed under the Ordinance. Reference may be made to Khurshid Begum etc. v. Mrs. Ghulam Kubra etc. 1982 SCMR 90. Learned District Judge has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vesting in him in not deciding the appeal with reference to the questions raised before him in the memorandum of appeal".
7. Leave to appeal was granted by this Court to examine amongst others, the question "whether , instead of deciding the questions (which are the subject-matter of the remand order), the High Court could and should not have decided them in its revisional jurisdiction so as to save time for the litigants in the matter which on principle required summary this postal". The questions which were required to be resolved were :- "(1) Whether the death of the landlord during the execution proceedings will deprive his successors-in-interest and or heirs of the fruit/benefit of the eviction order passed against the tenant on ground of personal requirement of the landlord ;
(2) Whether the fact that the building in dispute was a part of the premises of a factory, if established, will make any difference so far as the power of Rent Controller to evict the tenant under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance is concerned ;
(3) Whether the alleged change of ownership of the land under the building from which the tenant was ordered to be evicted, before the execution of the order of ejectment, will make any difference in so far as the eviction from the building is concerned."
8. The matter came for hearing more than once. Learned counsel were told that the legal questions which required to be resolved in this case could be examined with reference to available precedent law and that they should discover and cite the same. For example on the very first question with regard to the rights of the successors-in-interest of a landlord who obtain an ejectment order on the basis of personal requirement, useful guidance could be sought from "Abdul Salam Akhtar v. Dr. Najam Parvez . Some of the other cases cited in this behalf are :- Muhammad Ashraf v. Mst. Azizan and 4 others PLD 1981 Lah. 201 ; Abdul Rehman v. Fazal Karim (represented by Legal Heirs) 1982 CLC 2641 ; Muhammad Ismail v. Muhammad Ibrahim (through his Legal Heirs) 1983 CLC 961 and Messrs Ally Brothers & Company v. The Additional' District Judge (Mehr Muhammad Nawaz Khan), Rawalpindi etc. 1983 CLC 1897.
9. ' The case of Abdul Rehman v. Fazal Karim and another , was also cited but it was contended by all the sides that the question in that case was not resolved. Two more cases namely, "Jamila Latif v.
10. Ghulam Yazdani Khan and others and Muhammad Azim and others v. Sh. Muhammad Nawaz and others , were also considered as relevant for resolving the controversy regarding the rights of the successors-in-interest of a party in the proceedings before a Rent Controller. Similarly learned counsel could not satisfy us that on the basis of admissions made by the parties in their own pleadings the question regarding the character of the 'portion' in dispute (namely, whether it was a "factory" or not) could not be resolved on the basis of the existing precedent law. Same would apply to the third question.
11. ' Accordingly the learned counsel were asked as to why this appeal should not be decided on the basis of the last question posed in the leave granting order namely "whether or not the High Court could or should not have decided" the three questions arising in this case and noted in the leave granting order.
12. ' None of them excepting the learned counsel for the respondent raised an objection to this course of action. According to him firstly a question of fact was involved whether or not the portion in dispute is a factory and secondly that the High Court had intact remanded the case for resolution of questions other than the afore-noted three controversies.
13. We do not agree with him. As already indicated no factual controversy could now be permitted to.
14. Be raised. The material on record is enough so a C to determine the legal character of the `portion in dispute' which was describe by the respondent himself in his written statement as a house though it originally formed part of factory transferred to the predecessor-in-interest of the1 2 3 4 appellants. It is also stated that the question regarding the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller viz-a- viz the character of the property-factory or otherwise-was raised before the Rent Controller himself ; and it was decided against the respondent. All this material is sufficient for the High Court to deal with and decide this question raised from the respondent side in the objection petition in any manner it deems fit by overruling the objections as having already been finally decided by the Rent Controller's hierarchy as distinguished from the hierarchy of the executing Court or, on the basis of the merits of the objection in accordance with law.
15. The other plea of the respondent's counsel that the objection petition contained several other questions to be resolved, is not tenable. As observed in the leave granting order the cases coming under the law of Rent Restriction, "on principle required summary disposal". The questions specifically noted in' the impugned judgment of the High Court are in reality the only questions which could be raised in the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court the others are mere embroidery.
16. ' The only question now to be examined is whether after giving some findings in the impugned judgment the questions of law posed in the leave granting order of this Court should also not have been finally determined by the High Court itself instead of remanding the case, as observed in the leave granting order ; "so as to save time of the litigants in this matter which on principle required summary disposal". The answer, in the foregoing discussion is obvious. Looked at from whatever angle, we are of the view that the High Court instead of remanding the case to the District Judge, should have finally decided the same.
17. Although there are some cases where, instead of remanding the case to the High Court, this Court decided the same itself. But, in order to see that a precedent is not established for the parties to approach the Supreme Court in these cases arising from Rent Restriction Law which, there is no doubt, should end within the shortest possible time and at the most at the High Court level ; we are constrained to set the practice right and remand the case to the High Court for deciding finally, the three questions noted earlier-the others urged by the learned counsel for the respondent do not arise for the High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction. And we . There shall be no order as to costs. 1976 SCM R 52 1980 SCM R 758 1981 SCM R 637 P 1, D 1966 $ C 182