' This judgment shall dispose of two Civil Revision Petitions viz. Civil Revision No, 27/D of 1982 and Civil Revision No, 1707 of 1982, as parties in both the Civil Revisions are the same and property involved in both the cases is also the same.
2. Ch. Muhammad Tufail, respondent in both the cases, is admittedly owner of Property No, 112-R-16, Peco Road, Badami Bagh, Lahore, He filed an ejectment application against one Siraj-ul-Haq seeking his eviction from the aforesaid property, shop, and the learned Rent Controller passed an order of eviction in favour of Ch. Muhammad Tufail, against the said Siraj-ul-Haq on 4th December, 1978. The said Siraj-ul-Haq contested the ejectment order by way of an appeal before the Appellate Authority but without success. The landlord viz. Ch. Muhammad Tufail, thereafter filed execution proceedings before the learned Rent Controller against Siraj-ul-Haq.
3. During the execution proceedings, the petitioner herein, filed an objection petition before the learned Rent Controller contending that in fact Muhammad Tufail had rented out the aforesaid shop to the petitioner on 5th October, 1980 through a registered lease deed and put the petitioner into the possession of the shop in question which was earlier vacated by Siraj-ul-Haq. He thus pleaded that he was in possession of the shop in question of his own right and not on behalf of Siraj-ul-Haq afore-said. Objection application was contested by Muhammad Tufail and the learned Rent Controller (Executing Court) after hearing the parties, dismissed the objection application on 29th June, 1981 and found that the lease-deed, dated 5th October, 1980 on which the petitioner based his objection application was in fact a forged document.
4. The petitioner, thereafter went in appeal before the learned Appellate Authority and a learned Additional District Judge, Lahore (Appellate Authority) vide his order, dated 13th October, 1982 dismissed the appeal as well.
5. The aforesaid orders of the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority have been called in question through Civil Revision No, 1707 of 1982.
6. The petitioner, simultaneously filed an independent civil suit before a learned Civil Judge, Lahore seeking a declaration to the effect that he was in possession of the shop in question independently as tenant under Ch. Muhammad Tufail on the basis of registered lease deed, dated 5th October, 1980 and that ejectment order passed in favour of Ch. Muhammad Tufail against Siraj-ul-Haq could not be executed against him.
7. Ch. Muhammad Tufail instead of filing a written statement, submitted an application seeking rejection of the petitioner's plaint on the ground that civil suit was not legally competent under Order XXI, rule 103, C. P. C.
8. The learned Civil Judge after hearing the parties, rejected the plaint on 1st December, 1981. An appeal filed against that order by the petitioner was also dismissed on 22nd December, 1981.
9. The aforesaid orders, dated 1st December, 1981 and 22nd December, 1981 passed respectively by the learned Civil Judge, Lahore, and the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore, have been called in question through Civil Revision No, 21/D of 1982.
10. So far as the orders, dated 29th June, 1981 and 13th October, 1982 passed by the learned Rent Controller and the learned Appellate Authority dismissing the objection petition of the petitioner which have been impugned through Civil Revision No, 1707 of 1982 are concerned, it may be observed that no Civil Revision is legally competent under the provisions of the Rent Restriction Ordinance against an order passed by a Rent Controller or the one passed by an Appellate Authority. It has rather been specifically provided in subsection (7) of section 15 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, that the order of the Controller, subject to the result of the appeal, if any, shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court of law including the High Court by suit, appeal, or otherwise. In Zahoor-ul-Hassan v. Mst. Ruqia Begum and 4 others (1), it has been observed :- "This Court has already expressed its opinion that a Revision under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code is not applicable under West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, as it stood before the Amending Ordinance IX of 1979. In view of the language contained in subsection (7) of the newly constituted section 15, any doubt which could be entertained on this question now stands resolved."
11. For the foregoing reasons, Civil Revision No, 1707 of 1982 is not legally competent and is accordingly dismissed in limine, as it has not yet been admitted to regular hearing.
12. As regards Civil Revision No, 271D of 1982, section 17 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, has been amended by Punjab Ordinance No, XI of 1979. Section 17 (ibid) so amended reads :- "17. Every order made under section 10, section 13, section 13 B and every order passed in appeal under section 15, shall be executed by the Controller as if it were decrees of a Civil Court."
' Prior to this amendment, section 17 was in the following terms :- "17. Every order made under section 10 or section 13, and every order passed on appeal under section 15 shall be executed by a Civil Court having jurisdiction in the area if it were a decree of that Court."
13. It, thus, transpires that prior to amendment of section 17 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, an ejectment order could be executed by a Civil Court having jurisdiction in the area as a decree of the Civil Court. After the amendment, an ejectment order has to be executed by the Controller himself as a decree of a Civil Court. It is thus further
(1) PLD 1981 SC 112 ' manifest that the Controller while executing the ejectment order as a decree of a Civil Court would act in accordance with the provisions of C. P. C. Relating to execution of decrees as contained in rules 1 to 103 or Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. During the execution of an ejectment order by a Controller as a decree of a Civil Court, objection application contemplated by rules 97, 98, 99, 100 and 101 of Order XXI (ibid) can be filed before the Controller and he may pass an appropriate order thereon. Similarly, provisions of rule 103 of Order XXI, C. P. C. Would also apply whereby a separate suit is barred in relation to questions arising as to title, right or interest in, or possession of, immovable property between an application under rule 97 and the opposite party or between an applicant under rule 100 and the opposite party and all these questions$ shall be adjudicated upon and determined by the Executing Court viz. The Controller while executing an ejectment order as a decree of a Civil Court.
14. In Mehr Jabal Din and 9 others v. Abdul Majid (1) it has been held by this Court that all matters to which rule 103 relates are to be adjudicated upon by the Executing Court only and that if a suit in respect of any of c those matters is filed, it would be hit by rule 103 regardless of the fact' that an application for execution of decree has or has not been filed by the time of the institution of the suit.
15. Similarly, in Shahzad Ahmad v. Muhammad Hayat and 3 others (2) it was held:- "The petitioners could file an application if not dispossessed but was apprehensive of his dispossession and the Court can deal with his application. In Khurshid Begum v. Mst. Ghulam Kubra etc. 1982 SCMR 90 it was held that the Civil Procedure Code is applicable to execution proceedings of an order of ejectment passed under the Ordinance and the Executing Court has power to entertain and adjudicate upon an objection petition filed by a person not claiming through judgment-debtor even before his physical dispossession from the property. Respectfully following the ratio laid down in Khurshid Begum's case. I hold that the plaint was rightly rejected under rclause (d) of rule 11 of Order VII of the Civil Procedure Code."
16. Needless to say that the plaint was rejected on the ground that independent suit was barred by virtue of rule 103 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure.
17. Reliance on behalf of the petitioner has been placed on Ismail Brothers v. Keval Ram (3). As a matter of fact, in this judgment principles underlying section 116 of the Evidence Act, and principles governing the grant of temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2, C. P. C. Have been discussed. This authority has, therefore, no bearing on the question as to whether an independent suit in regard to an immovable property is barred under rule 103 of Order XXI, C. P. C. Or not when the execution proceedings in regard to that property pursuant to an order of ejectment passed by a Rent Controller are pending before the Controller under section 17 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959.
(1) 1981 CLC 288 (2) PLD 1983 Lah. 234
(3) PLD 1981 SC 545
18. In the light of the above discussion, it is concluded that the learned Rent Controller under section 17 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, could competently execute an order of ejectment as decree of the Civil Court. While doing so, an objection petition under rules 97 to 101 could be competently adjudicated upon by the Rent Controller and, therefore, by virtue of rule 103 of Order XXI (ibid), an independent suit to establish a right to retain possession of the property in question independent of the judgment debtor is legally barred. No exception can, therefore, be taken to the impugned orders whereby plaint of the petitioner has been rejected under Order VII, rule 11, C. P. C., as the suit being legally incompetent.
19. For the foregoing conclusions, this Revision Petition (No, 27/D of 1982) also fails and is dismissed with costs.