' Muhammad Amjad Khan respondent filed an ejectment petition against the petitioner Abdul Fazal Khan under section 13 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, from Kothi No, 14, Race Course Road, Lahore, on the grounds mentioned therein. An order of ejectment was passed by the learned Rent Controller on 16-1-78, against the petitioner, and the order, on appeal by the petitioner, was affirmed by learned Additional District Judge, Lahore, by his order dated 18-5-80. Both the orders of the learned Courts below are being challenged by this revision petition under section 115, C. P. C.
2. The short point involved in this revision petition is whether a civil revision under section 115, C. P. C., in competent in rent restriction cases. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that under section 15 of the Ordinance, District Judge acts in the Judicial capacity as Presiding Officer of the principal Court in the District and he does not act as a persona designata in hearing the appeal under section 15. It is contended that the decision of Additional District Judge, therefore, under section 15 of the Ordinance, will be a decision by a Court and will be amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115, C. P. C. In this respect, he relies on Abdul Haq v.
Saifur Rehman and others (1) and Allah Rakha v. Col. Abdul Ghafoor (2),
3. The argument of the learned counsel is entirely misconceived. The proposition of law that the District Judge while hearing appeal under section 15 of the Ordinance acts as a Court is not disputed but the question is whether the decision made by him under that section while hearing an appeal is amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115, C. P. C, Subsection
(5) of section 15 of the Ordinance, in an unamended form, was that "no order passed by the Controller, the Appellate Authority or the High Court under the provisions of this Ordinance shall be called in question in any Court of law by suit or otherwise, except as provided under this Ordinance." In none of the authorities cited above by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the provision of subsection (5) of section 15 was taken note of or discussed, which in fact took away the jurisdiction of Courts of law from calling in question any decision made by Controller, Appellate Authority or High Court, by way of suit or otherwise. The only mode for challenging these decisions was as provided under the Ordinance. Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance, 1979 (IX of 1979), came into force on 12-9-79. By
(1) PLD 1968 Lab. 478 (2) PLD 1978 Lah. 1364 section 5 of the amending Ordinance, 1979, section 15 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959, was substituted. The relevant provision in the amended section 15 is subsection (7) thereof which reads- "(7) The order of the Controller, subject to the result of appeal, if any, shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court of law, including the High Court, by suit, appeal or otherwise."
' Earlier, the bar created under section (5) of section 15 (as unamended) was not so clear but by the amendment made by Ordinance IX of 1979, a specific bar has been created under which the order of the Controller and that of the District Judge passed in appeal cannot be called in question in any Court of law including the High Court, by suit, appeal or otherwise. The word "otherwise" is wide enough to include remedy of revision under section 115, C. P. C. The intention of the Legislature is obviously clear. By the amending Ordinance, the Legislature has taken away the jurisdiction of the High Court regarding second appeal against the order of the District Judge. By another amending Ordinance called the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980 (VIII of 1980), all appeals which were filed in the High Court from the orders of the District Judge or the Additional District Judge passed after the commencemet of amending Ordinance (IX of 1979), (i,e,, 12-9-79, have abated on 19-6-80, the date when Ordinance VIII of 1980, came into force. From the above provisions, the irresistible conclusion is that the order passed by the District Judge, even though as Presiding Officer of principal Court in the district, cannot b called in question either in second appeal in the High Court or by an other manner including section 115, C. P. C.; though it is conceded that the exclusion of jurisdiction shall not be easily inferred but' in the present case the law has expressly taken away the jurisdiction of the High Court by way of appeal or otherwise from calling in question the order passed b the District Judge on appeal in rent cases.
4. In view of the above discussion, the result is that this revision petition is not competent, and, therefore, is dismissed as such in limine.