1. ' This revision filed under section 115, C.P.C. arises out of an order passed on 31-12-1983 by the learned Additional District Judge, Quetta in Civil Appeal No.56 of 1983, whereby the appeal filed by Haji Abdul Wall Khan son of Muhammad Hussain the present petitioner against the order of the Controller dated 18-8-1983 was dismissed.
2. 2.The material facts relevant for the purpose of this revision are that the respondent herein namely Muhammad Hanif son of Mulla Rahimuddin had filed an eviction application in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge-cum-Rent Controller, Quetta against (1) Abdul Qadeer son of Muhammad Yaqoob, (2) Abdul Salam son of Saghzai and (3) Haji Mohammad Rasool and the allegations were that the house situated in Pashtoonabad consisting of four rooms the particulars and boundaries whereof were furnished in the eviction application was obtained on rent, in the month of July, 1977 by Abdul Qadeer and rent for one month was also paid. Thereafter on account of a quarrel between the brother of the applicant with Abdul Qadeer (respondent No.1 in the eviction application) he did not make any payment of rent and left the house and inducted Abdul Salam and Haji Muhammad Rasool as "Shikni Keraidars" and disappeared from Quetta. Since no rent after July, 1977 was paid and the occupation of Abdul Salam and Haji Muhammad Rasool was unauthorized they had rendered themselves liable to eviction. Haji Muhammad Rasool son of Muhammad Hassan (the respondent No.3 in the eviction application) only filed the reply to the eviction application and contended that his brother (the present petitioner) has purchased the said property on 10th day of May, 1978 from Abdul Salam son of Saghzai (respondent No.2 in the eviction application) and is living in the house alongwith him. It is interesting to note that in support of the above contention Muhammad Rasool filed a photostat copy of an agreement which showed that one Abdul Salam son of Akhtar Muhammad (not respondent No.2) had agreed to sell the supersturcture to the present petitioner. After filing this reply he too did not pursue his defence and absented from the proceedings with the result that ex parte proceedings were taken against all the three respondents. The applicant submitted an affidavit and affirmed the allegations contained it the eviction application to which there was no rebuttal on record. In spite thereof the learned Controller was of the view that there was a dispute of ownership and title over the property and unless the applicant (present respondent) establishes his ownership the eviction application could not be considered. The eviction application was therefore dismissed on 31-8-1980. An appeal was filed in the High Court by Muhammad Hanif and in spite of service none of the respondents appeared and did not contest the appeal. The appeal was allowed in terms of the prayer contained in the memoradum of appeal and the order of dismissal passed by the Controller was set aside.
3. 3.The respondent Muhammad Hanif thereafter filed an application for the execution of the order in the Court of the Controller where the present petitioner filed an objection against the execution and took the stand that he was the owner of the property and was in occupation thereof as of his own rights and the order of eviction could not be executed against him. This objection was considered by the learned Rent Controller but was dismissed on 18-8-1983 and it was observed in the order that the petitioner's claim is not correct and no arguable case was made before him. The execution application filed by Muhammad Hanif (present respondent) was observed to be carried out.
4. ' Against this order an appeal under Order XLI, rule 1, C.P.C. was filed in the Court of the District Judge, Quetta which was later referred to the Additional District Judge-I, Quetta who vide his order dated 31-12-1983 held that the appeal was not maintainable before him and as such dismissed the appeal. Against this order the present revision has been filed. The reason which weighed with the learned Additional District Judge, Quetta was that after the amendment in section 17 of the Baluchistan Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980 (See PLD 1981 Baluchistan Statutes page 25) the eviction order passed by the Controller (or the appellate authority as in the instant case) shall be executed by the Controller as if it was a decree of the civil Court. The order of the Controller in execution proceedings will be governed by the provisions of the Ordinance and not by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has contended that:--
(a) the Controller while executing the order was bound to consider the objection and no summary disposal was warranted as such the order of the Controller whereby the objection application filed by the present petitioner was dismissed is illegal;
(b) the interpretation of the learned Additional District Judge of section 17 of the Ordinance VI of 1959 is erroneous as the Controller in execution of the order of eviction converts himself into a civil Court and any order thus passed during the execution proceedings becomes appealable or revisable under the provisions of Civil Procedure Code.
5. 5.The fact patent on record was that the objector was in possession of the premises on account of the judgment-debtors i.e. Abdul Waal and Haji Muhammad Rasool who were bound by the decree/order of the eviction passed against them and were precluded for all times from agitating a question which they could have raised before the Controller. The objector (Haji Abdul Wali) lived in the said house under one roof. The objection petition was in substance an objection filed by the judgment-debtors and on their behalf. Such a claim was not competent under law. Besides it was mala fide, and should have been rejected forthwith. The objector had admittedly got access to the premises through the judgment-debtors. Mr. Aslam Chishti, the learned counsel for the present respondent decree-holder has placed reliance on Khurshid Begum v. Ghulam Kubra etc. 1982 SCMR 90 and has contended that even if the objection could be held to be maintainable yet the objection was male fide. I feel bound by the law enunicated by the Supreme Court. The stand taken by the objector before the Controller was that he had purchased the property (the superstructure) from one Abdul Salem son of Saghzai (this personis no other than the person against whom the eviction application was filed) and this stand has been repeated before me by the learned counsel for the petitioner and an affidavit to that effect is also sworn by the petitioner but when I drew his attention to the agreement which was being pressed for the contention and pointed out that this document contradicts the stand as the person mentioned therein is one Abdul Salem son of Akhtar Muhammad, the counsel had no answer. Thus the very superstructure on which the contention/stand is built falls to the ground. I have therefore, no hesitation in holding that the objection filed by the petitioner before the Controller had no legs to stand upon. I am of the view that the Controller while executing the eviction order is competent, to determine, how to what extent and in what manner it is to be executed and in deciding the objection he could make use of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and all matters pertaining to the execution or otherwise of the same have to be decided by the Controller a special forum created under the Rent Restriction Ordinance itself as provided in section 17 thereof as amended by Ordinance III of 1980 (Baluchistan Urban Rent Restriction Amendment) Ordinance, 1980. The objection of the petitioner has been rightly adjudicated upon and no error of law is found in the order of the Controller rejecting the objection.
6. 6.There remains to be considered the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Controller while executing an order of eviction converts itself into a Civil Court and any order passed in the execution proceedings is appealable to the District Judge and thereafter a revision is competent under section 115, C.P.C. The contention is misconceived. Through the amending Ordinance (Baluchistan Ordinance III of 1980) two distinct departures from the Baluchistan Rent Retriction Ordinance (Ordinance VI of 1959) as it originally was have been made (i) that only one right of appeal from the order passed by the Controller has been allowed to the person affected thereby and that too before the High Court unlike Punjab where the appeal now lies to the District Judge. (ii) The eviction order passed by the Controller is to be executed by the Controller himself as a forum created under the Ordinance III of 1980 and Not as a Civil Court. Previously the order passed by the Controller or the appellate authority was to be executed by a Civil Court having jurisdiction in the area as if it were a decree of that Court. By the promulagation of the Baluchistan Ordinance III of 1980 the Rent Restriction law is now made self-contained, for the obvious reasons that Civil Courts of the nature of the Court of Civil Judge and District Judge are the creation of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962. Although the Ordinance is extended to the whole province of West Pakistan when it was promulgated but it has not been enforced in the whole of Divisions of Kalat by virtue of subsection (3) of section 1 thereof because due to the existence of peculiar practices and procedure the Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani Kalat stays in the field and the policy of the Government is to continue the present Courts of Kazi constituted under the said Dastur in Kalat. Thus no uniform procedural law in the whole of the Province of Baluchistan could be established and the appointment of District Judge in those Areas of Kalat could not be made. The law-makers being conscious of this peculiar situation prevalent in Baluchistan have therefore provided an appeal to be filed in the High Court instead of District Judge as was done in other provinces like Punjab and N-W.F.P. and this has been done purposely. Thus to allow an appeal to be filed before the District Judge in execution proceedings would be creating two sets of procedures, one for the trial of the eviction application and appeal thereafter to the High Court and the other for execution by the Controller as a special forum created under the Ordinance and permitting the appeal thereafter to the District Judge and thus to bring back the forum which stands expressly and deliberately excluded rendering the provisions of section 17 as substituted by Ordinance III of 1980 Nugatory. In this view of the matter I am of the considered view that the appeal filed by the petitioner under Order XLI, rule 1, C.P.C. being misconceived was not maintainable.
7. 'After the amendment in 1980 as referred above the Controller has to execute the order as if it is a decree of Civil Court only means that the principles contained in the Civil Procedure Court relating to the execution of the decree can be made use of by the Controller but for no conceivable reasons the forum of appeal against the order of the Controller different from the one provided in section 15 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance can be allowed. In this connection the provision of section 15(5) of the Ordinance may be referred to. The said provision reads : - "Section 15(5).--The order of the Controller subject to the result of the appeal if any shall be final and shall not be called in any question in any Court of law."
8. ' This provision and the provision contained in section 15(7) of the Ordinance as subtituted for Punjab through Ordinance IX of 1979 are in pari materia.
9. 'In this view of the matter the order of the learned District Judge, Quetta is not open to any exception and the appeal filed by the petitioner was correctly held to be not maintainable. The Supreme Court of Pakistan in Zahoorul Hussain's case PLD 1981 SC 112 has observed at page 117 of the report that "this Court has already expressed its opinion that a revision under section 115, C.P.C. is not applicable under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance as it stood before the amending Ordinance IX of 1979. In view of the language contained in subsection (7) of the newly- constituted section 15 any doubt which could be entertained on this question stands resolved."
10. ' The upshot of the above discussion is that the revision fails and is accordingly dismissed.
11. ' At the close of the arguments on 19-11-1984 I had passed a short order dismissing this petition with no orders as to costs for the reasons which are now furnished.