' AJMAL MIAN, J.---By this common judgment, we intend to dispose of above three civil appeals as they are directed against common judgment dated 4th May, 1994 of a learned Single Judge of the Sindh High Court passed in First Appeals Nos.740 of 1988, 356 of 1993 and 357 of 1993.
2. First Rent Appeal No,740 of 1988 was filed by the appellant in above Civil Appeal No,647 of 1994 against order of Rent Controller dated 3rd August, 1988 dismissing the appellant's Rent Case No,257 of 1987 whereas First Rent Appeals Nos.356 of 1993 and 357 of 1993 were filed by the respondents/tenants in Civil Appeals Nos.648 and 649 of 1994 against the orders of the Rent Controller dated 12th July, 1993 in Rent Case No,1508 of 1986 and the Rent Controller order of even date in Rent Case No,258 of 1987 granting ejectment in favour of the appellants in the above two appeals on both the grounds. By the judgment under appeal, the learned Judge in Chambers allowed the above First Rent Appeals Nos.356 and 357 of 1993 by setting aside the ejectment order but dismissed the appellant's above Rent Appeal No,740 of 1988. The operative portion of the above judgment reads as follows:-- "In view of the above, the proper course for the appellant in F.R.A. No,740 of 1988 and the respondents in F.R.A. No,356 of 1993 and F.R.A. No,357 of 1993 will be to first obtain Permanent Transfer Deed of the property in question after making the full payment of the price, have the share of each transferee determined and have the property partitioned according to the share of individuals and then if the property is needed for their bona fide use or default in payment of rent is committed by any of the statutory tenants, action can be initiated against the concerned statutory tenants only.
' For the foregoing reasons I set aside the orders of the Rent Controller impugned in F.R.A. No,356 of 1993 and F.R.A. No,357 of 1993, allow these appeals and dismiss the ejectment applications filed by the respondents in the two appeals while F.R.A. No,740 of 1988 is dismissed."
3. The brief facts are that plot of land bearing No,L.R.9/24-P, IC-C141/142, measuring 11401 sq.Yds., with the construction thereon which consisted of several buildings comprising about 285 small apartments and a factory, was put to auction as a big mansion, which was purchased by one Nawab Din and fifty-eight others for a sum of Rs,5,71,000 (Rupees five lac seventy-one thousand).
The payment of the above price was made by the above purchasers through various Compensation Books which had verified claims for different amounts. A P.T.O. In respect thereof was issued on 17th December, 1959 in favour of the above fifty-nine persons. It seems that the present three appellants in the above three appeals are the sons of Naney Khan son of Qasim Bakhsh, who is mentioned at Serial No,4 of the P.T.O. (at page 60 of the paper book Part I of Civil Appeal No,647 of 1994).
4. It is an admitted position that till today, no PTD has been issued. It is also an admitted position that the above big mansion has not been partitioned among the transferees. So legally all the fifty- nine transferees or their successors have joint ownership of the above big mansion. It seems that Naney Khan expired leaving behind inter alia three sons namely the three appellants in the above three appeals. They filed above three ejectment cases against the respondents on the grounds of default in payment of rent and personal requirement. The above cases were resisted by the respondents inasmuch as, it was denied that the appellants were co-owners of the suit premises or that they were landlords. It was also pleaded that the appellants failed to establish their ownership in respect of the premises in possession of the respondents. It appears that at a later stage, it was also pleaded that the respondents had become joint owners of the big mansion by virtue of entering into agreements to purchase the interest of the three joint transferees in respect of which registered power of attorneys were executed. It may be pertinent to mention that the case of the respondent in Civil Appeal No,647 of 1994 was that he purchased the share of Salamullah (mentioned at Serial No,6 of the PTO at page 60 of the Paper Book Part I of Civil Appeal No,647 of 1994). Whereas the case of the respondent in Civil Appeal No,648 of 1994 was that he had purchased the share of Mst. Ulfat wife of H. A. Haleem Khan through her legal heirs and the plea of respondents in Civil Appeal No,649 of 1994 was that they had purchased the share of the transferee Shahzad mentioned at Serial No,33 of the PTO at page 60 of the Paper Book, Part I of Civil Appeal No,647 of 1994). It appear that the legal heirs of the transferees applied to become parties in the above first rent case. Their application was declined by the High Court by order dated 28th September, 1993 whereas in the above remaining two Rent Cases, they were impleaded by the Rent Controller. It is not necessary to refer to the litigation which ensued on account of the filing of the above application for being impleaded as parties. It will suffice to observe that they supported the case of the respondents/occupants of the suit tenements by admitting that agreements to sell have been executed. They have received the amount of consideration and that they executed registered power of attorneys.
5. It may be again stated that the Rent Case No,257 of 1987 was dismissed whereas the other two rent cases were allowed. The matters were brought before the High Court by filing above First Rent Appeals. It appears that while above. First Rent Appeal No,740 of 1988 was pending, a learned Single Judge of the High Court on 3rd December, 1992 adjourned the appeal sine die and directed the appellant to approach the competent authorities for obtaining a PTD of the property and to get the same demarcated so that there should not remain any confusion about the fact as to which of these 285 houses was transferred to which of the fifty-nine claimants. Against the above order, a petition for leave to appeal was filed which was granted and Civil Appeal No,53-K of 1992 arising from the above petition was allowed by this Court through judgment dated 10th March, 1992 and the High Court was directed to hear the above appeal.
6. After that, the above F.R.A. No,740 of 1988 was heard alongwith above Rent Appeals Nos.356 and 357 of 1993 which were disposed of by the judgment under appeals in the above terms, whereupon the appellants filed petitions for leave to appeal which were granted to consider the contentions noticed in para. 8 of the leave granting order dated 4th July, 1994 which read as follows:-- "Contentions raised before us on behalf of the landlords are that firstly, there was sufficient evidence available in the rent proceedings that the landlords were entitled to receive rent and were covered by the definition of landlord as contemplated in section 2(f) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. Secondly, if tenant disputes relationship and claims title to the property, then it is for him to have I B question settled by the Civil Court. Thirdly, plea of the tenant that disputed premises were purchased by him is not reflected in the pleadings and, therefore, no issue was framed with regard to it in the rent proceedings, which could be concluded as permitted in the relevant law. Fourthly, directions in the impugned judgment given to the landlords/petitioners before us to obtain PTD and to have property demarcated are outside the scope of rent proceedings as defined in the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. Fifthly, whether PTO is not sufficient to entitle landlord to claim rent as contemplated under the provisions of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979."
7. In support of the above appeals, Mr. Zahoor-ul-Haq, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing for the appellant in Civil Appeal No,647 of 1994 has vehemently contended that the learned Judge in Chambers was not justified in non-suiting the appellant on the grounds found favour with him.
The thrust of his arguments was that the appellants as one of the co-owners of the suit premises was entitled to file ejectment proceedings on the grounds of default as well as personal requirement and that non-issuance of a PTD or non-partitioning of the above big mansion amongst the transferees was not fatal to the above rent cases.
8. Mr. Abdul Majeed, learned Advocate Supreme Court who has appeared for the appellants in the remaining two civil appeals has reiterated the above submissions of Mr. Zahoorul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court.
9. Mr. Ali Akbar, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing for the respondents in the above three appeals has vehemently urged that the appellants, in fact, are attempting to commit fraud by getting the respondents ejected through the above rent cases. His submission was that since the respondents have purchased the shares/interest of the above three co-transferees, they had become joint co-owners and hence they cannot be ejected by a joint co-onwer particularly keeping in view that the above big mansion has not been partitioned and none of the above fifty- nine persons can claim ownership in respect of a specified portion of the above property. His further submission was that since no PTD has been issued, the appellants have no right to file ejectment application.
10. Mr. Zahoorul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court has invited our attention to para. (iii) of the Provisional Transfer Order dated 17th December, 1959 which reads as follows:-- "(iii) Fending the permanent transfer of the said property the transferee shall not alienate it in any manner except that the transferee may lease it or mortgage it subject to such conditions as may be laid down by the Chief Settlement Commissioner."
' According to him, in terms of the above-quoted para. Of the PTO, a transferee is not entitled to alienate but has been given the right to lease or to mortgage a soot transferred property subject to such conditions as may be laid down by the Chief Settlement Commissioner.
' He has also referred to section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation)
Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and submitted that by virtue of the above provision of the Act, relationship of landlord and tenant came into existence upon the issuance of PTO between the transferees and the occupants of the above big mansion.
' Mr. Ali Akbar, learned counsel for the respondents has referred to the case of Attaul Haque and 2 others v. H. Malik Electric Co. Reported in PLD 1971 Lahore 1007 (decided by a Division Bench) in support of his submission that no ejectment case can be maintained by the transferees of a big mansion unless and until a PTD is issued. In the above report, the transferees of the big mansion involved were issued a letter of transfer and not a PTO or a PTD. In that context, the observations relied upon by Mr. Ali Akbar, Advocate Supreme Court were made by the learned Judges of the Lahore High Court. However, in the case in hand, a PTO was issued as far back as 1959. The full price has been paid. There is no doubt that certain amounts as rent and other charges are to be paid before a PTD can be obtained but this does not detract the right of the transferee to let out big mansion or to file ejectment case in respect of the same or a portion thereof.
We are inclined to agree with Mr. Zahoorul Haq, learned counsel for the appellant in the above Civil Appeal No,647 of 1994 that by virtue of the above-quoted para. (iii) of the. PTO, the transferees of the big mansion in question were entitled to let out above transferred property. The relationship of landlord and tenant came into existence between the transferees and the occupants by virtue of section 30 of the Act.
10. Mr. Zahoorul Haq, learned counsel for the appellant has cited the following cases in support of his contentions that one of the co-owner/co-sharer can file ejectment proceedings without impleading the other co-owners/cosharers: --
(i) AIR 1932 Sindh 220--Pitamberdas and others v. Bhawanilal and others.
(ii) PLD 1971 Lah. 104--Mazhar Ali Azhar v. Dr. Inzarul Islam Qureshi.
(iii) PLD 1973 Note 138 at p.209 (Karachi) Sh. Syed Rashid Hussain and 2 others v. Hussain Haji Ahmed.
(iv) PLD 1973 Supreme Court 214--Khalique Ahmed v. Abdul Ghani and another.
(v) 1981 SCMR 193--Ghulam Rasul and another v. Hajan Bakhtawar and another.
(vi) 1983 SCMR 302--Bashir Ahmad v. Abdul Hamid and another.
(vii) PLD 1983 Karachi 419--Mst. Safia Bai v. Abdul Sattar.
(viii) PLD 1985 Karachi 47--Shahryar Ali Patudi and 3 others v. Messrs Decora Furnishers.
(ix) 1986 CLC 354 (Karachi)--Mrs. Zeinab Mehmood and another v. Hamida Khatoon and another.
(x) 1991 SCMR 432--Ghulam Mustafa and others v. Mst. Muhammadi Begum and others.
(xi) 1996 MLD 391 (Lahore)--Pakistan Burmah Shell v. District Judge and others.
' It is not necessary to deal with all the above cases in detail. It will suffice to refer to the two cases, namely, the case mentioned at Serial No,(ii) in which a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court has held that an associate of a purchaser of a big mansion can take ejectment proceedings in respect of premises transferred to him under deed of association. It was further held that under para. 10 read with para. 19(b) (Part VIII) of terms and conditions of auction of big mansions under Settlement Scheme No,3, Settlement Authorities are competent to issue PTO in respect of transfer of big mansion. Whereas in the fourth case mentioned above which is the leading judgment of this Court on the controversy in issue, Muhammad Yaqub Ali, J. Sitting with Anwarul Haq, J., held as under:-- "That there were three other co-owners of the leased premises had, in law, no effect on the competence of the application for ejectment. A suit for possession can be brought by all the co- owners jointly. It is open, however, to one of them also to sue for possession, but he must join the other co-owners as defendants and the decree will be for joint possession and not in favour of the plaintiff only. Unlike, that a suit for ejectment can be filed by one of the co-owners without joining the others as defendants. This is the difference between an action for possession and an action for ejectment. If this clear distinction was kept in view, certificate of fitness under clause 10 of the Letters Patent would not have been granted, nor the appeal admitted to hearing by the Division Bench."
' Same view was taken by this Court in the case of Ghulam Rasul and others v. Hajan Bakhtawar and another (supra) mentioned at serial No,(v) and the case of Bashir Ahmad v. Abdul Hamid and another (supra) mentioned at Serial No,(vi). In the above remaining Reports, more lesss same views have been taken. It seems to be a well-settled proposition of law that a co-owner can file ejectment proceedings against a tenant without impleading his other co- owners under the Rent Laws whereas a suit for possession cannot be filed without impleading all the co-owners.
11. However, the contention of Mr. Ali Akbar, Advocate Supreme Court was that since the respondents had purchased the shares of 3 transferees referred to hereinabove in the big mansion involved, the appellants and the respondents have become co-owners/co-sharers and hence in the absence of any partition of the above big mansion, a co-owner/co-sharer cannot file an ejecment application. In support of above submissions, he has referred the cases of Allah Rakha v.
Mukhtar Ahmad Baig reported in 1996 SCMR 1501, Ali Gohar Khan v. Sher Ayaz and others reported in 1989 SCMR 130, Muhammad Nawaz and 2 others v. Sh. Abdul Latif and another reported in 1971 SCMR 198, Abdul Rafiq v. Saadat Ali reported in NLR 1980 Civil Lah.199 and Muhammad Nadar Khan and 2 others v. Jam Khair Muhammad reported in 1989 CLC 1310.
' In the first case, the facts were that one Mukhtar Ahmad Baig (who was represented through his legal heirs before the Supreme Court) was issued a PTO by the Settlement Department on 30th January, 1962 in respect of a house. On 12th February, 1962, said Mukhtar Ahmad executed two documents viz. a mortgage deed and an agreement of sale. By the latter agreement, he agreed to sell the said house to the appellant but as a sale-deed could not be executed until a PTD had been issued in order to give effect to the bargain, a mortgage deed was also executed on the same day.
In both the above documents, consideration stated was Rs,8,000 (rupees eight thousand). It appears that said Mukhtar Ahmad subsequently filed a suit for possession by redemption of the said mortgage on payment of Rs,8,000. The same was contested. The learned Civil Judge granted a preliminary decree in favour of Mukhtar Ahmad Baig, holding that the transaction was a mortgage. The appellant feeling aggrieved by the said judgment filed an appeal before the District Judge which was accepted by a learned Additional District Judge and it was held that the transaction was a sale but the property could not be sold until PTD had been issued. Upon filing of a civil revision, the learned Chief Justice of the Peshawar High Court has held that there was transaction of sale between the parties but he further went on to observe that in absence of PTD, the sale was not complete and under such circumstances, there was no need for execution of an agreement of sale. Leave was granted by this Court against the above judgment of the High Court to examine the propriety of the said judgment. Eventually, this Court maintained the judgment of the High Court and dismissed the appeal, holding that the sale was in fact complete, since full consideration had been paid to the respondents by the appellant and the possession of the property had also been obtained by the latter. It may be pointed out that in the above case, the question as to whether under the terms of the PTO, a sale agreement could be entered into was not discussed as it was not in issue. To some extent, the above case supports the plea of Mr. Ali Akbar, Advocate Supreme Court. In the second case, this Court held that in case of joint immovable property, each co-sharer deemed to be interested in every inch of subject-matter irrespective of quantity of his interest and that one co-sharer cannot be allowed to act in a manner which constitutes an invasion on the right of other co-owner. It was also held that a co-sharer in possession of a portion of joint property cannot change nature of property in his possession unless partition takes place by metes and bounds. In the third case, this Court held that co-sharer in possession of joint property cannot be evicted without filing suit for partition. In the fourth case, a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court held that original occupants of evacuee property does not ipso facto become a tenant, under section 30 of the Act when persons are themselves joint owners and that eviction application against such person is not competent. In the fifth case also, same view was taken by the learned Single Judge of the said High Court while sitting at Bahawalpur Bench that a co-owner cannot eject another co-owner unless partition of joint property is effected.
' In the sixth case, a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court held that a co-owner cannot eject another co-owner unless partition of the joint property is effected. It was also observed that the right course for the respondent was to apply for partition of Khata in dispute. After having held as above, the learned Judge in Chamber set aside the decree of the learned District Judge granting ejectment against the co-owner and restored the judgment/decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit.
12. In the instant case as pointed out hereinabove, 3 out of 59 original transferees or their legal heirs, have entered into agreements of sale of their share/interest in the above jointly owned big mansion with the respondents. They have also admitted in their affidavits which were filed in support of their application for becoming parties to the above rent cases that they have received the consideration of their shares. They have also executed registered power of attorneys in favour of the respondents. On the other hand, Mr. Zahoorul Haq has relied upon para. (iii) of the Provisional Transfer Order dated 17-12-1959 reproduced hereinabove in para. 10, which provides that the transferees shall not alienate the transferred property in any manner except that they may lease it or mortgage it subject to such conditions as may be laid down by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. According to Mr. Zahoorul Haq, in view of the above clause in PTO the aforesaid 3 out of 59 transferees could not have created any interest in the property in favour of the respondents through the above sale agreements. To this the reply of Mr. Ali Akbar was that there was no prohibition to enter into an agreement to sell and, therefore, the respondents are entitled to invoke section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act in order to protect their possession. Reliance was placed by him on the cases (1) Naib Subedar Taj Muhammad v. Yar Muhammad Khan and 6 others (1992 SCMR 1265), (2) Mst. Azeemun Nisa Begum v. Ali Muhammad (PLD 1990 Supreme Court 382) and (3) Kalimuddin Ansari v. Director, Excise and Taxation, Karachi and another (PLD 1971 Supreme Court 114).
In the first case, this Court held that in order to apply section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the following ingredients are necessary:--
(i) There is a-contract in writing signed by the transferor in respect of an immovable property;
(ii) from the writing, transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty;
(iii) in part performance of the contract, the transferee has taken possession of the property or any part thereof or if he was in possession, he continues to be in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract; and
(iv) the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract;
(v) if all these conditions are satisfied, then even if the contract is not registered, the transferor or any person claiming under him cannot enforce any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken possession except such right, which a transferor is entitled to enforce by virtue of the contract.
' In the second case, this Court set aside the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Sindh in which it was held that the appellant who was tenant and who had entered into an agreement of purchase of the tenement and paid part of the consideration was entitled to invoke section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. The appeal of the landlord was allowed as under:-- "For the foregoing reasons I am unable to subscribe to the conclusions arrived at by the learned Single Judge and hold that the respondent was not entitled to protect his possession and resist ejectment, under the provisions of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and the relationship of landlord and tenant continued to exist between the parties even after the execution of the agreement of sale. As admittedly the respondent had failed to tender rent to the appellant the eviction order passed against him by the Rent Controller was fully justified. I would, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court and restore the order passed by the Rent Controller."
' In the third case, two representative suits, were filed in the High Court by the allottees of plots of land in P.E.C.H.S. Society, Karachi challenging the right of the Excise and Taxation Department and of the then Karachi Municipal Corporation to levy taxes on the bungalows/shops etc. On the ground that in terms of the sub-licence the land remained vested in the Federal Government and therefore, they were not the owners of the property in terms of the sub-licence. The above contention was repelled by the High Court as well as by this Court. This Court while dismissing the appeal filed by the allottees of the plots observed that "in any proceeding for ejectment section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act would afford a valid defence against the ejectment". It was further observed that "the agreements clearly show that the Government has intended to divest itself and to vest the laws in the sub-licensees".
13. Since the above big mansion has not been partitioned, none of the transferees out of above 59 transferees can claim that he owns any specific part of the big mansion as all the joint transferees/joint owners have interest in each inch of the property. In this view of the matter, none of the transferees could transfer a particular part or portion of the big mansion in favour of a third person. In our view, a joint transferee of an unpartitioned property, at the most, can assign his interest in such property according to law if permissible.
Without expressing final opinion, our tentative view is that it is a debatable point, as to, whether section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act can be invoked in the case in hand keeping in view the peculiar circumstances of the case. We may clarify that the above observation will not prejudice either of the parties in any competent civil proceedings which may be now pending or which may be initiated in future. The Court will decide the above issue if it arises without being influenced by the above observation.
We are, therefore, inclined to hold that though the appellants as the joint tranferees/joint owners of the above big mansion can file the above ejectment cases on the ground of default, the ejectment order would be for the benefit of all the joint transferees/joint owners and not for the benefit of the appellants alone, particularly keeping in view that the 3 original transferees or their successors out of the aforesaid 59 transferees have contested the appellants' right to eject the respondents.
14. Adverting to the ground of personal requirement, it may be observed that Mr. Zahoorul Haq has relied upon the following cases:--
(1) Allah Wasaya v. Sultan Ahmed and another (PLD 1976 Lah. 62).
(2) Nek Muhammad v. Muhammad Shafi and others (1983 SCMR 180).
(3) Mst. Syeda Hyderi Khatoon v. Aftab Ahmed and 8 others (1986 CLC 1534).
(4) Mst. Wahabun Nisa v. Haji Abdul Sattar (1989 CLC 517).
(5) Qadri Brothers Foundry & Workshop etc. v. Mst. Safia (1988 CLC 2063).
(6) Muhammad Ali v. Mst. Hameeda Begum (1988 SCMR 705).
(7) Syed Muhammad Haider Zaidi and others v. Abdul Hafeez and others (1991 SCMR 1699).
(8) Pakistan Burmah Shell v. District Judge and others (1996 MLD 391).
(9) Akbar Ali v. Mansoorul Haq and others (1995 SCMR 494).
' In the first case, Muhammad Afzal Zullah, J. (as his Lordship then was) while sitting as Single Bench in the Lahore High Court held that the word 'landlord' includes singular and plural and that the personal requirement may be that of one of the landlords.
' In the second case, this Court while declining petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court and while interpreting section 2(c) read with section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance read with West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956 observed that' bona fide personal need for the purpose of section 13 need not be of entire body of landlords taken together and that a landlord may apply to Rent Controller for an order directing tenant to put landlord in possession.
' In the third case, one of us (Ajmal Mian, J.) while sitting as Single Bench in the High Court of Sindh and while interpreting section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 held that widow being co-owner.Of property was entitled to press into service the above provision provided other coowners/legal heirs supported her application, or portion of the building for which she had applied for ejectment had fallen to her share upon partition of the property.
' In the fourth case, a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Sindh while construing section 14(1)
(iv) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance held that the same does not contemplate sole owner but a co-owner of rented premises would be competent to file application under the above provisions.
' In the fifth case, another learned Single Judge of the High Court of Sindh while interpreting section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance held that a widow would be entitled to the benefit of the above provision even if she was not sole owner/landlady of the rented premises: ' In the sixth case, a Full Bench of this Court comprising of Muhammad Haleem, C.J., Shafiur Rahman, Zaffar Hussain Mirza, Saad Saood Jan and Ali Hussain Qazilbash, JJ., while construing section 14-A of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance held as under:-- "It is difficult to agree with the contention raised on behalf of the appellant. Quite obviously the object of section 14(1) ibid, is to lessen the hardship which a widow not infrequently faces on the death of her husband and to assist her in settling down again. Therefore, it will not be proper to construe this provision in a manner which would defeat the very purpose for which it has been enacted. The relevant words in the subsection are: 'the landlord of a building who is a widow'. There is no reason at all why these words should be taken to refer only to a widow who was the owner of the building before the death of her husband or who is sole heir of the original landlord. Such a narrow construction would leave out from the benefit of the provision in question a widow with minor children who has to leave the residence which was formerly given to her husband by his employer or one who purchases a house for personal use from the funds made available to her on the death of her husband; there is no compelling reason for placing such a narrow construction on the provision. There is also no merit in the contention that an application made by a widow under section 14(1) would be in derogation of the rights of the other heirs in the property. The proceedings before the Rent Controller here are intended merely to determine the liability of a tenant to ejectment under a special provision and it is difficult to see how an order made in these proceedings will have any bearing on the rights of the other heirs in the property. It may also be mentioned that the expression 'landlord' has been used in the Ordinance in a wider sense for it includes a person who need not be the owner of the premises at all; all that is required is that he should be authorised or entitled to receive rent in respect of the rented premises. In this case all the other heirs of Pir Muhammad Nawaz had authorised the respondent not only to collect the rent of the house in dispute but also to deal with it in all respects including to get the same vacated and use it for her own occupation."
' In the seventh case, this Court held that section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance can be invoked only by owner of the premises and not by persons who had been included in the extended definition of the term "landlord" in provisions of section 2(f) of the said Ordinance, and that the application can be maintained by the person specified therein or on their behalf, who should have interest either as sole owner or as one of the co-owner.
' In the eighth case, a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court while interpreting section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, held that one co-owner is entitled to file application for ejectment against a tenant inter alia on the ground of personal requirement.
' In the ninth case, this Court while declining leave to appeal, observed that the landlord being co- owner of the property was entitled to apply for ejectment of the tenant on the ground of his personal requirement as he had retired from the Government service on medical ground.
15. There seems to be consensus of view among the superior Courts that one of the co-landlords or one of the co-owners can seek ejectment on the ground of his personal requirement. There also seems to be unanimity of view that under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance a widow can avail of the above special provision for seeking summary ejectment even though she is one of the co-owners. However, one of us (Ajmal Mian, J.) in the case of Mst.
' Syeda Hyderi Khatoon v. Aftab Ahmed and 8 others (supra) mentioned at S.No,3, held that a widow being co-owner is entitled to invoke section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, provided the other co-owners/legal heirs support her application. But this Court in the case of Muhammad Ali v. Mst. Hameeda Begum (supra) mentioned hereinabove at S.No,6, took a somewhat contrary view to the above view by observing in the above-quoted para. 4 of the judgment that "there is no reason at all why these words should be taken to refer only to a widow who was the owner of the building before the death of her husband or who is sole heir of the original landlord". In other words, the view holding the ground is that a widow, though she may not be the sole owner of a tenement and may be a co-owner, can seek ejectment under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance.
The question which requires consideration is, as to whether the above principle of law can be invoked in aid in the case in hand. Admitted position as repeatedly observed, is that the property in question is a big mansion which comprises plot of land measuring 11401 sq. Yds., several buildings thereon consisting of about 285 small apartments and some other constructions. The above property was transferred to 59 persons who had contributed different amounts towards the price of the above property through the compensation books. It is also evident that three of the above original transferees, or their legal heirs, have entered into agreements of sale with the respondents agreeing to transfer their interest. They have opposed the appellants' above rent cases on the above two grounds. The appellants, as pointed out hereinabove, are the sons of one of the above 59 transferees. Their father contributed Rs,9,900 towards the above price of Rs,5,71,000. As the property has remained unpartitioned, the appellants cannot claim that they owned particular portion of the big mansion in question. In our view, since some of the original transferees, or their legal heirs, are opposing the appellants in the above rent cases, they cannot apply for ejectment on the ground of personal requirement, till that time the property is partitioned and they get particular portion of the property as their share. If we accede to the appellants' contention, it would lead to an illogical/unreasonable situation, namely, a joint transferee having one paisa share out of rupee will get the possession of the entire property for his personal requirement in spite of opposition of some of the other co-owners.
The upshot of the above discussion is that we hold that the appellants' application for personal requirement is not competent till the properties are partitioned because of the above peculiar circumstances of the case. However, their rent cases for ejectment on the grounds of default are competent, but the ejectectment order, if any, would be for the benefit of all the transferees and not for the exclusive benefit of the appellants.
We are inclined to remand the case to the High Court to decide the above appeals afresh only on the ground of default, and in case the High Court finds that the default is committed by the respondents and it passes ejectment order, it may be clarified that the same will be for the benefit of all the transferees and not for the exclusive benefit of the appellants.
' The appeals stand disposed of in the above terms with no order as to costs.