1. ANWARUL HAQ, C. J. -This petition seeks leave to appeal against an order made by a learned Judge of the Lahore-High Court on the 18th of June, 1978, whereby the second appeal filed by the petitioner Nek Muhammad against an order of ejectment made by a learned Rent Controller on the 6th of July, 1977, was dismissed.
2. The relevant facts are that under a lease deed executed on the 13th of March, 1973, the petitioner had taken on rent a property described as a shop and situate in Chiniot Bazar, Faisalabad. On the 8th of April, 1975 the respondents/landlords moved an application before the Rent Controller for the ejectment of the petitioner on the ground that one of them needed this shop for his bona fide personal need. This app by the learned Rent Controller by his order dated the 6th of July, 1977.
3. Petitioner's appeal against this order was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge by his order dated the 28th of February, 1978, and his second appeal, as already stated, has been dismissed by the High Court on the 18th of June, 1978.
4. Leave to appeal is sought on the following grounds:
(i) That the learned Judge in the High Court has failed to appreciate the fact that under the definition contained in clause (d) of section 2 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, the building could not be regarded as a shop, as it also contains a Chaubara on the first floor, which is being used by the petitioner for residential purposes, with the result that this was not a building used solely for the purpose of business or trade;
(ii) That all the three landlords should have required the building for their personal bona fide need in view of the definition of the term `landlord' as contained in clause (c) of section 2 aforesaid, read with section 12(2) of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act; and
(iii) That all the Courts have misread the evidence in coming to the conclusion that the property was, indeed, required by one of the landlords for his bona fide personal need.
5. After hearing the learned counsel far the petitioner at some length, we have come to the conclusion that there is no merit in any of these submissions.
6. It is true that clause (d) of section 2 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, defines a `non- residential building' as meaning a building being used solely for the purpose of business or trade, but this definition is of no avail to the petitioner in the present case. We have perused the rent deed dated the 13th of March, 1973, and find that it clearly recites that the, petitioner was taking on lease a shop, which would indicate that the entire property was a non-residential building at the time the petitioner took it on rent from the respondents. If subsequently he has also started residing' in the Chaubara comprised in the building, it does not mean that it has been converted into a residential building. As the entire property had been taken by the petitioner under a single lease deed as one unit, the Courts below were justified in treating the property as being a shop in according with its description and use at the time it was leased out to the petitioner, On this view of the matter the personal bona fide requirement of one of the landlords had to be judged in the light of his business needs.
7. As regards the second contention urged by Mr. Aziz Ahmad, the learned counsel for the petitioner, we find that the term landlord is defined in clause (c) of section 2 of the Ordinance as meaning any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land, whether on his own account or on behalf or for the benefit of any other person. In accordance with clause
(2) of section 12 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, the term landlord would also cover a case where several persons are jointly owners or landlords within the meaning of this definition.
8. However, it does not mean that for the purpose a section 13 of the Ordinance, the bona fide personal need must be of the entire body of landlords taken together. According to clause (ii) subsection (3)(a) of section 13 of the Ordinance, a landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession if he requires a non-residential building in good faith for his own use or for the use of any of his male children. It would be seen, therefore, that " this clause covers the need of any one of the landlords as well as the collective, need of the entire body of landlords. The clause cannot be interpreted to mean that the need of one of the landlords will fall outside its purview, In the present case the application was moved jointly by all the three land lords, although the heed urged before the Rent Controller was of one of them, We see no illegality in such a prayer, which is fully covered by the relevant clause of section 13 of the Ordinance.
9. The contention - that all the three Courts below have misread the evidence on the record as regards the bona fide personal requirement of the landlord, has no merit, as it was a simple question of fact which has been concurrently decided in favour of the landlords by all the Courts below. The learned counsel was not in a position to point out any misreading of the relevant evidence.
10. For the foregoing reasons the petition fails and is hereby dismissed.