' SYED JAMSHED ALI, J.---This judgment will dispose of F.A.O. No,112 of 2000 as well because the two appeals are directed against the order, dated 6-4-2000 of the learned Banking Court-II, Lahore passed in execution proceedings. E.F.A. No,149 of 2000 is by the auction-purchaser against resale of the property while F.A.O. No, 112 of 2000 is by the objector, whose objection petition against attachment has been dismissed. These two appeals arise out of the following circumstances.
2. Messrs Trust Leasing Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the decree holder) obtained a decree in the sum of Rs,89,48,123 passed on 15-1-1999 in Suit No,308 of 1998 against Mohib Fabrics and others while another decree was obtained by the said decree-holder against Mohib Exports and others for an amount of Rs,3,50,06,944 passed on 15-1-1999 in Suit No,373 of 1998. During the pendency of Suit No,373 of 1998 Property No,19, Main Gulberg, Lahore, belonging to the directors of the aforesaid company, was attached vide order, dated 26-6-1998 (the date noted by the learned Banking Court is 15-7-1998). The decree-holder filed Execution Petition bearing No,208-E of 1999 (in Suit No,373 of 1998) as a result of which the property aforesaid, which was already under attachment, was put to public sale on 20-11-1999. The appellant was the highest bidder for a sum of Rs,2,10,00,000. He paid 25% of the bid money on 20-11-1999 to the Court auctioneers through two cheques while the balance amount of Rs,1,57,50,000 was paid through a cheque deposited with the Nazir of the learned executing Court, on 4-12-1999. All these cheques were duly encashed.
3.Meanwhile, the Garden Estate Private Ltd., appellant in F.A.O. No,112 of 2000 had, on 22-11-1999, filed an objection petition. The case of the objector was that the property in dispute was mortgaged in favour of the Citibank, N.A. For the liabilities incurred by Mohib Textile Mills Ltd. Of which respondents Nos.4 to 6 (in F.A.O. No,112 of 2000) were the Directors and owners of the disputed property. It was purchased by the objector for a consideration of Rs,4,40,00,000 through an agreement to sell dated 29-10-1997 coupled with an irrevocable general power of attorney of even date executed by the respondents Directors in favour of Rauf Ahmad, in his capacity as Chief Executive of the objector Company. Pursuant thereto the objector deposited an amount of Rs,4,40,00,000 on 29-10-1997 in Account No,501119-008 maintained with Citibank, N.A. Shahar-e-Quaid-i-Azam, Lahore in the name of Asif Saigal, respondent No,4 in the appeal of the objector and respondent No,3 in the appeal of the auction-purchaser. The said amount was adjusted towards the liabilities of Messrs Mohib Textile Mills Ltd. And the aforesaid property was released by the Citibank. The original title documents, the memorandum of deposit of title deeds and general power of attorney executed in favour of the Citibank were returned on 30-10-1997. It was asserted that in pursuance of the aforesaid agreement exclusive and vacant possession of the said property, alongwith original title documents, was delivered to the objector and since then it was in possession of the property in dispute. It was further averred that the objector came to know of the attachment of the said property only on 27-10-1999 when proclamation for the sale thereof was pasted on the premises.
4. Against the sale, neither the decree-holder nor the judgment-debtors filed any objection. The proceedings of the sale and the objection petition were disposed of by the learned executing Court vide the impugned order, dated 6-4-2000. It declined to confirm the sale on the ground that payment, through cheques did not meet the requirements of rules 84 and 85 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. In reaching this conclusion, reliance was placed on "1999 MLD 3205".
5. As far as the objection petition of the appellant in F.A.O. No,112 of 2000 is concerned, it was dismissed on the grounds that the objector was not in possession of any registered sale-deed, and agreement to sell did not confer any right. Its plea based on section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act was also repelled. It was also held that the objection petition was barred by time.
6. The learned counsel for the auction-purchaser has contended that provisions of Rules 84 and 85 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure have been misconstrued. Payment of sale price through a cheque which is duly honoured on presentation is a valid payment without the scope of the aforesaid rules. It is further asserted that the proclamation of sale did not direct that the 1/4th of the sale price or the remaining 3/4th was required to be deposited in cash. He maintains that the learned Executing Court erroneously held that the cheque was deposited with the Nazir of the Court on 22-11-1999. He invited our attention to the report of the Court Auctioneers according to which the proceedings of auction had concluded at 1-45 p.m. And since the Banking hours were over it was not possible to receive the said amount through a draft or pay order. Therefore, the said amount was received through two cheques. He maintains that the cheque for the 1/4th amount was, in fact, deposited by the Court Auctioneers with the Nazir on 22-11-1999 and was encashed in favour of the Court on 23-11-1999 on its first presentation. Likewise the cheque for the remaining 3/4th amount was also cleared. This is borne out by the two certificates respectively of the Emirates Bank and Deutsche Bank, which have been placed on record in original.
7. In support of his submission that payments made through cheques was valid payment, reliance was placed on Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay South, Bombay v. Messrs Ogale Glass Works Ltd. Ogale Wadi (AIR 1954 SC 429) and K. Saras-Wathy Mills, K. Kalpana v. PSS Somasundaram Chettiar (AIR 1989 SC 1553). He contended that the learned Executing Court could even extend time for payment of 3/4th of the sale price. Reliance was placed on Chaudhri Abdur Rashid and others v.
The New Bank of India Ltd. And others (PLD 1959 Lahore 224). He next contended that the cheques for the entire amount were duly accepted by the Court inasmuch that these were presented for encashment and had duly been realized. Therefore, the auction-purchaser could not be allowed to suffer for the act of the Court. Reliance was placed on Rashid Ehsan and others v. Bashir Ahmad and another (PLD 1989 SC 146).
8.He, however, further contended that since the value of immovable property has risen to millions of rupees and in this case the 1/4th amount was R.52,50,000, it was neither practicable nor desirable that the auction-purchaser should have carried the said amount in cash with him because of the security reasons. Also that the auction-purchaser could not be said to be certain of his success in the auction so as to carry with him the aforesaid huge amount.
9. As far as the objection petition is concerned he relied on the reasoning of the learned trial Court and contended that agreement to sell was fake document. Delivery of possession of the sold property was disputed. It was contended that a person holding an agreement to sell has no right or interest in the property. And, even if a decree for specific performance was passed in his favour, the proprietary title continues to remain vested in the vendor/owner. Reliance was placed on Muhammad Ishaq v. Muhammad Siddique (PLD 1975 Lahore 909), M. Ghulam Muhammad v.
Custodian of Evacuee Property, Lahore and others (PLD 1966 (W.P.) Lahore 953) and Khawaja Ammar Hussain v. Muhammad Shabbiruddin Khan (PLD 1986 Karachi 74). His other contention was that the objection petition filed by the objector was beyond one year of attachment made on 26- 6-1998 and was clearly beyond time. Reliance was placed on Nan Fung v. H. Pir Muhammad Shamsdin (PLD 1995 Karachi 421). He accordingly, concluded that since the objection petition was not filed by any person having any right or interest in the property, the sale was liable to be confirmed under rule 92 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. Reliance was placed on Hudaybia Textile Mills Ltd. And others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. And others (PLD 1987 SC 512).
10. On the other hand the learned counsel for the Objector contends that the objection petition could not be summarily dismissed without providing an opportunity to the objector to produce evidence as required by rule 59 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. Rule 60 was also referred to. He also referred to rule 62 of Order XXI to contend that all questions relating to the right, title, or interest of the claimant or objector are required to be adjudicated by the executing Court and no separate suit lies to establish such title, right or interest. He also contended that under agreement to sell dated 29-10-1997. Possession of the disputed property was delivered to the objector and even by virtue of the provisions of rule 103 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, the objector was entitled to remain in possession and thus, the property in dispute was not liable to attachment. His further contention is that objector's possession was protected by virtue of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act which was in the nature of an exception to sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act. He further contends that after having received R.4,40,00,000 before the date of attachment, the respondents, Directors judgment-debtors, were bound to inform the learned executing Court but they deliberately failed in order to receive an undue advantage. He contended that in fact the transaction in favour of the objector was a completed sale for valuable consideration coupled with the general irrevocable power of attorney in favour of the Chief Executive of the objector company. The learned counsel placed before us the photocopies of the Wealth Tax Returns filed by the respondents Directors for the year ending 30-6-1997 and the year ending 30-6-1998. While in their returns for the year ending 30-6-1997, they had claimed ownership of the property in dispute, it was deleted by them in their returns filed for the year ending 30-6- 1998. He contends that, in fact, the judgment-debtors had accepted the factum of sale of the disputed property by them. In support of his submissions reliance was placed on Fazla v. Mehr Din and 2 others (1997 SCMR 837), Muhammad Yousaf v. Munawar Hussain and 5 others (2000 SCMR 204), Abdul Ghani v. Abrar Hussain (1999 SCMR 348), Mst. Surayya Begum v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. And 4 others (PLD 1990 Lahore 4), Akbar Ali and others v. Lal and others (PLD 1997 Lahore 709), Abdul Ghani Khan v. Dino Bandhu Adhikari and another (PLD 1963 Dacca 777), Mst. Razia Ghafoor v. Messrs Eastern General and others (1987 CLC 777). In support of the submission that it was in fact a completed sale, reliance was placed on Mst. Sharifan v. District Judge and others (1985 CLC 2481). He also maintained that the power of attorney was not required to be registered.
Reliance was placed on Muhammad Yousaf v. Asif Siddique and another (PLD 1987 Lahore 659).
11. As to the finding that the objection petition was barred by time his contention was that the limitation of one year prescribed by rule 58 of Order XXI was not applicable, since the property was not attached in execution of the decree. He questioned the sale in favour of the auction-purchaser on the ground of inadequacy of sale consideration. He maintained that according to the Valuation Table notified under section 27-A of the Stamp Act in force on the date of sale the value of the property at the Main Boulevard Gulberg, Lahore was Rs,8,00,000 per Marla and the value of the property in dispute which comprises an area measuring 5 Kanals, 3 Marlas and 178 sq. Ft. Was more than Rs,8,00,00,000, while it was sold for Rs,2,10,00,000. He further contended that even according to the Valuation Table now in force, the value of the property was Rs,5,76,00,000 and thus, there was an elemenat of fraud in conducting the sale.
12. The learned counsel for the decree-holder resisted the appeal of the objector on the ground that the agreement to sell or the irrevocable general power of attorney, which was not otherwise registered, did not create any right, title, or interest in favour of the objector. In the property in dispute. He also attacked the agreement as being fake and bogus. He also contended that the property continued to vest in title in the judgment-debtors, it was liable to attachment under section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure and was rightly attached. It was further contended that the objection petition was not filed by a duly authorized person as no resolution of the Board of Directors was produced on the record. He placed reliance on Muhammad Khalil v. District Judge, Rawalpindi and 4 others (1989 CLC 1865), Muhammad Yousif v. Syed Wali Muhammad Shah through his Legal Heirs (1994 CLC 132), Muhammad Luqman v. Bashir Ahmad (PLD 1994 Karachi 492) and Pergo Trading Limited v. Trust Leasing Corporation Ltd. Through Chief Executive and another (2001 MLD 942).
13. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. We will like to take up the case of the auction-purchaser first. The learned executing Court pressed rules 84 and 85 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure against the auction-purchaser to set aside the sale for not having deposited the 1/4th and 3/4th of the sale price in cash. The aforesaid rules are reproduced hereunder for facility of reference:-- "84.Deposit by purchaser and re-sale on default.---(1) On every sale of immovable property the person declared to be the purchaser shall pay immediately after such declaration a deposit of twenty-five per cent. On the amount of his purchase-money to the officer or other person conducting the sale, and in default of such deposit, the property shall forthwith be re-sold.
(2) Where the decree-holder is the purchaser and is entitled to set off the purchase-money under rule 72, the Court may dispense with the requirements of this rule.
85. Time for payment in full of purchase-money.----The full amount of purchase-money payable shall be paid by the purchaser into Court before the Court closes on the fifteenth day from the sale of the property: ' Provided that, in calculating the amount to be so paid into Court, the purchaser shall have the advantage of any set off to which he may be entitled under rule 72."
A perusal of these rules shows that there is no express requirement for payment of 1/4th or the balance of 3/4th of the sale price in cash. We have also perused the proclamation for sale. It also did not direct deposit of 1/4th or the remaining sale price in cash. The 1/4th of the bid money was paid in the form of two cheques which were duly received by the Court Auctioneers and reason, therefor, was recorded by them. The cheques were accepted by the Court by seeking their encashment which were duly realized.
14. The learned executing Court relied on "1999 MLD 3205". There is no judgment reported on the said page. However, to be fair to him, the learned counsel for the auction-purchaser brought to our notice judgment of the Peshawar High Court in Messrs Ali Match Industries Ltd. Through Managing Director and 3 others v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan through Manager and another (1999 MLD 2127), according to which, the 1/4th of sale price was required to be paid in the form of a Bank draft or cash and Messrs Dawood Flour Mills and others v. National Bank of Pakistan (1999 MLD 3205). We have examined the said judgments. The sale and its confirmation in the case of Ali Match Industries (supra) was set aside by the learned Peshawar High Court on the grounds that the biding appeared to be collusive, authenticity of the auction proceedings was doubtful and the property sold had not been attached. In the background of these facts it was observed that payment through cash or bank draft was avoided.
15. In taking the aforesaid view the learned Peshawar High Court was persuaded by the fact that cheque could be dishonoured. The provisions of rule 71 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure duly take care of the situation. According to the said rule if the resale is to be directed on account of purchaser's default, any deficiency in the sale price and all expenses attending resale are recoverable from the defaulting purchaser under the provisions relating to the execution of a decree for payment of money. Therefore, if the resale was to be directed on account of non- encashment of the cheques, the auction-purchaser was liable to pay deficiency in the sale price and all expenses in case of resale of the property. In the case of Messrs Dawood Flour Mills (supra) confirmation of Court sale was questioned by the judgment-debtor. This Court found that although the learned executing Court had evaluated the sold property at Rs,4,12,41,708 yet it was sold for Rs,48,00,000. Thus, this Court held that the sale stood vitiated. It was also noted that the judgment- debtor had deposited the entire decretal amount with the decree-holder Bank. In these facts, it was observed that 1/4th deposit was required to be made in cash instead of the cheque. This Court also noticed that it was not clear from the record as to when the cheque for 1/4th amount was realized. From this report we could not find whether the 3/4th of the sale price was or was not paid by the purchaser. The observations of this Court in the said case have to be read and understood in the facts of the said case.
16. In this case neither the decree-holder nor the judgment-debtors or any other person ever raised any objection within the contemplation of rules 89, 90 and 91 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. We have perused the objection petition of the objector which does not contain any allegation of fraud or irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale in question.
17. The question whether payment made in the Court through a cheque was valid payment came under consideration before the Supreme Court of India in the case of K. Saraswathy (supra). In the said case the decretal amount was required to be deposited by a successful decree-holder in the suit for specific performance under an order of the Supreme Court. The said amount was deposited in the Court in the form of a cheque. The High Court rejected the said payment The Supreme Court while interfering observed: "In Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay South, Bombay v. Ogale Glass Work Ltd., Ogale Wadi, AIR 1954 SC 429 it was laid down by this Court that payment by cheque realized subsequently on the cheque being honoured and encashed relates back to the date of the receipt of the cheque, and in law the date of payment is the date of delivery of the cheque. Payment by cheque is an ordinary incident of present day life, whether commercial or private, and unless it is specifically mentioned that payment must be in cash there is no reason why payment by cheque should not be taken to be due payment if the cheque is subsequently encashed in the ordinary course. There is nothing in the order of this Court providing that the deposit. By the appellant was to be in cash."
17-A. There is yet another aspect of the matter. The two cheques for 1/4th of bid money were handed over to the Auctioneer, who received them and deposited these in the Court. These were presented for encashment and were duly realized. Likewise the remaining 3/4th was paid through cheque which was also received by the Court official, presented for encashment and was duly realized. Therefore, there is merit in the contention of the learned counsel that if the payment of 3/4th was not acceptable through cheque (1/4th having already been realized), the auction- purchaser should have been directed to deposit the cash. Therefore, the principle that none should be allowed to suffer for the act of the Court is also attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case.
18. We may, also like to observe that the value of immovable property now runs into millions of rupees and in this case the 1/4th amount of bid money was 52,50,000. There is merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the auction-purchaser, that it was neither practicable nor desirable from the security view-point that the auction-purchaser should have carried the aforesaid amount in cash. We may further observe that an auction-purchaser cannot anticipate the exact amount which he may require for payment of 1/4th of the bid money in case he succeeds. Therefore, it does not appear to be realistic practicable and logical that an auction- purchaser should carry huge unknown amount of cash with him. Therefore, the provisions of rules 84 and 85 are to be construed in view of the changed circumstances. We, accordingly, hold that payment through cheques of 1/4th of the bid money and the remaining 3/4th. Of the sale price was a valid tender within the contemplation of rules 84 and 85 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure.
19. As far as the case of the objector is concerned, rule 58 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for investigation of claims and objections to attachment while rule 59 provides that claimant or objector must adduce evidence to show that at the time of attachment he had title to, or right or interest in the attached property. In accordance with rule 60, if the executing Court, on investigation, is satisfied that the objector had title to, or right or interest in the said property, the Court shall direct release of the property from attachment. And, by virtue of rule 62 all questions regarding right, title or interest of a claimant or objector in the attached property are required to be adjudicated upon and determined by the executing Court and no separate suit lies to establish such title, right or interest. In accordance with rule 59 aforesaid the objector was entitled to an opportunity to adduce evidence in support of his objection petition which was denied to the objector on the ground that an agreement to sell did not confer any right except a suit for specific performance.
20. It would have been proper for the learned executing Court to have first recorded evidence of the objector and if the agreement to sell, delivery of possession to the objector under the sale agreement, and deposit of an amount of Rs,4,40,00,000 by the objector in the account of one of the judgment-debtors was established, only then the effect thereof should have been examined.
However, since the learned executing Court has non-suited the objector on the ground that he had no right in the property, we are examining the issue for a limited purpose i,e, whether the .Objection petition was maintainable in the facts and circumstances of the case?
21. The Transfer of Property Act was promulgated in the year 1882 and section 54 was originally there according to which a contract for sale does not of itself create any interest in or charge on the property. Section 53-A was added to the aforesaid Act by virtue of Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 1929 (No,20 of 1929) which provided protection to a person in possession of the property under a contract of sale or an unregistered instrument of transfer not completed in the manner prescribed therefor, by the law for the time being in force if the conditions of the aforesaid section are satisfied. The transferor is debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract. On the one hand a person, who holds an agreement to sell is protected against his dispossession from the property (subject to fulfilment of the conditions of that section) while on the other it abridges and curtails the right of ownership of the transferor inasmuch as that a transferor could only enforce the terms of the contract and nothing beyond it. Therefore, to our mind, subject to the investigation and proof of certain facts, the objector could legitimately urge that he had a right to remain in possession of the property, which right was sufficient to maintain an objection petition under rule 58 of Order )00. We may, also refer to the first proviso to section 50 of the Registration Act, according to which, a person in possession of the property under a unregistered document would be entitled to the rights under section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (IV of 1882), if the conditions of the said section are satisfied. His right to enforce the contract is subject to the provisions of clause (b) of section 27 of the Specific Relief Act, in accordance with the second proviso to section'50 of the Registration Act. The aforesaid two provisos were added by Registration (Amendment) Ordinance, 1962, (No, XLV of 1962). The right to possess immovable property is a valuable right. Objector's claim to protection of possession of the disputed property is duly supported by the judgments cited by the learned counsel for objector and we do not consider it necessary to examine them in details.
22. Reference may, however, be made to the following observations in Mst. Razia Ghafoor v. Messrs Eastern General and others (1987 CLC 777):-- "The aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered prior to the amendment of rule 60 of Order XXI, C.P.C. By Ordinance XII of 1972. This rule as amended by Ordinance XII of 1972 has already been reproduced earlier. Substantial amendments have been made in rules 58, 59, 60, 61 and 62 of Order XXI, C.P.C. By Ordinance XII of 1972 and according to the amended provisions, an investigation of claims and objections under rule 58 of Order XXI, C.P.C. Relates not to possession but to title, right or interest of the intervenor in the attached property. In my view, on account of the amendments made in the aforesaid rules, the intervenor cannot make out a case for release of attachment in an application under Order XXI, rule 58, C.P.C. By only establishing that he was in possession. He will have to establish that the possession is such, which is recognized by law as a right or interest in the property. For example, a trespasser or a bare licensee is not a person, who can be said to have any title to or right or interest in the property. On the other hand, a person having obtained possession under an agreement of sale having paid part or all the consideration would be a person having a right or interest in the property."
23. It may also be noted that an objector. Within the scope of rules 58 and 60 of Order XXI, was required to prove that he had title, right, or interest in the property. According to the section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act a contract for sale does not, of it self create an interest in or charge on such property (underlining is ours). The omission of the expression "right" from the said provision is of importance. This "right" may be based on an imperfect title or equitable. The word "title" has many dimensions which, inter alia, includes absolute title, equitable title and imperfect title. These expressions have been defined in the Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) as follows:-- "Absolute title.---As applied to title to land, an exclusive title, or at least a title which excludes all others not compatible with it. An absolute title to land cannot exist at the same time in different persons or in different governments.
Equitable title.---A right in the party to whom it belongs to have the legal title transferred to him; or the beneficial interest of one person whom equity regards as the real owner. Although the legal title is vested in another.
Imperfect title. ---One which requires a further exercise of the granting power to pass the fee in land, or which does not convey full and absolute dominion."
A perusal of the definition of the 'Equitable Title' shows that the case of the objector fell in the above said definition and even on this score he was entitled to maintain the objection petition besides claiming that he was entitled to claim protection of his possession.
24. As far as the objection raised by the auction-purchaser and decree-holder that the objection petition was filed beyond one year of the date of attachment is concerned, it has not, in the facts and circumstances of the case, impressed us. Limitation provided in rule 58 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is one year from the date of attachment in execution of the decree (emphasis supplied). The attachment in this case was not, undisputedly, made in execution of the decree. Therefore, to our mind the said provision is not applicable. The other provision we noticed was Article 11 of the Limitation Act. It also provides a limitation of one year from the date of the order of attachment but it refers to limitation for a suit and is not either applicable. Therefore, the only article applicable to the objection petition filed by the objector in this case was Article 181 of the Limitation Act which provides a limitation of three years and the starting point is when the right to apply accrues. According to the averment of the objection petition the attachment came to the knowledge of the objector on 27-10-1999 when proclamation was pasted at the disputed property.
Not only the appellant in F.A.O. No,112 of 2000 is objecting to the attachment, in fact the sale was also being objected to and if the attachment is ultimately found not to be in accordance with law, the sale in question shall also stand vitiated.
25.We are mindful that in accordance with the rule laid down by the Hon'able Supreme Court in Mohyuddin Molla v. The Province of East Pakistan (PLD 1962 SC 119), even an auction-purchaser is bound by the agreement of the judgment-debtor to sell the property before attachment provided that the auction-purchaser had notice of the earlier agreement. However, by virtue of rule 62 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as inserted by Ordinance XII of 1972, a separate suit is no more maintainable. Therefore, the right and claim of the objector is necessarily required to be determined by the executing Court and not by a separate suit. We are also of the view that if, the objector is asked to file a suit for specific performance it will only give rise to multiplicity of the suits and prolong the agony of the parties because even if a suit for specific performance is filed the questions arising therein will be the same. Reference may be made to Muhammad Rafi and others v. Muhammad Ashfaq, Civil Judge, Hasilpur and others (1993 CLC 1903), wherein it was held that a claim or objection under the provisions of rule 58 was no longer restricted to the matter of possession, but the Court could determine questions relating to any right, title, or interest asserted in the attached property.
26. The contention of the objector that the price fetched by the property was grossly inadequate, has no merit. Only the decree-holder or judgment-debtor could legitimately raise such an objection and undisputedly neither the decree-holder nor the judgment-debtor has any grievance on this score.
27. For what has been stated above, we allow both the appeals set aside the impugned order, dated 6-4-2000 in so far it directed resale of the property and rejected the objection petition of the objector. The matter of confirmation of the sale in favour of the auction-purchaser shall be decided alongwith decision of the petition of the objector. The parties will be allowed to lead evidence in support of their respective pleas. The learned executing Court will finally decide the matter within three months. It may be clarified that the observations recorded by us in this judgment are only with regard to maintainability of the objection petition and it will be for the executing Court to finally determine all the questions arising between the parties after recording their evidence. No order as to cost.