AJMAL MIAN, J: --Since the above three appeals involve common question of law as to the interpretation and scope of section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance, we intend to dispose of the same by a common judgment. In the above cases, leave was granted to consider, whether under section 14 of the Ordinance the landlord, as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Ordinance, can file an application should he or she be owner.
2. Before dealing with the above legal aspect, it may be pertinent to state the facts of each case which have given rise to the above litigation.
Civil Appeal No.287-K of 1986 The appellant filed Rent Case No.438a of 1981 in September, 1981, in the Court of Vlth Rent Controller and Senior Civil Judge, Karachi, under section 14 of the Ordinance averring therein that he was employed in the Government of Pakistan as a Senior Research Officer, Department of Agriculture and Livestock Products Marketing and Grading, and that he was to retire from the said service with effect from 17-11-1981. It was also averred that it was difficult for the appellant to support his family consisting of three marriageable daughters, two sons studying in Polytechnic Institution and one wife after his retirement and, therefore, he wanted the suit shop which was let out to the respondent at the rate of Rs.150 per month on 25-3-1968. It was also averred that requisite legal notice under the above provision of the Ordinance, namely, section 14 was already served on the respondent. However, in paras.1 and 2 of the application, following averments were made:-- "1. That the applicant being landlord and owner of the building bearing No.2/874-A, Liaquatabad, Karachi, rented out shop No.7 measuring 28' x 11-1/2' of the above building to the opponent on a monthly rent of Rs.150 p.m. On 25th day of March of 1968. The photostat copy of agreement is produced as Annexure `A'.
2. That in 1974 the above said building was transferred by the applicant through gift to his wife, the wife of the applicant authorised him to collect the rent of the building from the tenants and the applicant has been collecting and receiving rent including the rent of Shop No.7 in possession of the opponent and the applicant has been issuing receipts to the tenants including the opponent, therefore, the applicant is the landlord of the building bearing No.2/874-A, Liaquatabad, Karachi, under section 2(f) & (g) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The photostat copy of mutation and counter receipts are produced as Annexures `B', `C' and `D' "
The above application was resisted by the respondent and in reply to the above quoted paras.l and 2 of the application, the following averments were made in paras.l and 2 of the written statement after raising legal objections:--- "1. That the contents of para.l of application are not denied to the extent that the opponent is tenant in respect of Shop No.7 of building on survey plot No.2/874-A, Liaquatabad, Karachi, owned by Mst.
Kaneez Haider Zaidi, who is the landlord thereof receiving monthly rent of Rs.150 per month, whereas the remaining contents thereof in the manner they are put in are denied as being misleading and mischievously mala fide. It is submitted that alleged agreement Annexure `A' to application had long ago become infructuous after the applicant transferred the property by way of gift in 1974 in favour of his wife.
2. That the contents of para.2 of the application are denied except that the applicant transferred the property in favour of Mst. Kaneez and appraised the opponent of this fact and he started paying rent to the landlady Mst. Kaneez through the applicant to whom the monthly rent is being handed over on trust basis as her husband. It is denied that the landlady/owner had ever authorised him to collect rent as alleged. It is also denied that the applicant is landlord as falsely and mischievously alleged."
On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the learned Rent Controller:-
(1) Whether the applicant is a competent person to fall within the definition of landlord so as to file the ejectment application?
(2) Whether any cause of action has accrued to the applicant to seek ejectment on the ground of his retirement?
(3) Whether the applicant is entitled to ejectment of the shop under the provisions of section 14 of the Ordinance, 1979?
(4) What should the order be?
After recording the evidence and after hearing the parties, the learned Rent Controller by his order dated 23-5-1982 dismissed the above application by holding as follows:- I am, therefore, of the opinion that the words "personal use and requirement" mentioned in the said section mean and cover the personal use and requirement of the specified person namely the owner of the property and not any other person authorised to collect rent. In this view of the matter the ejectment can be sought by Mst. Kaneez Fatima for her personal use not by her husband. The applicant has, therefore, no cause of action to file the present application."
Against the above order, the appellant filed F.R.A. No.714 of 1982 which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge by his judgment dated 17-10-1985. The operative portion of the judgment reads as follows:- "In the present case the title to the wife is admitted by the appellant himself. As the appellant is not the owner he could not file application under section 14 of the Ordinance. The appellant was merely a rent collector on behalf of the landlady. In these circumstances he could not file the application."
3. Thereupon, a petition for leave was filed in which leave was granted by this Court by an order dated 19-5-1986 to consider the above question.
Civil Appeal No.106-K of 1987 The respondent filed an application under section 14 of the Ordinance against the appellants averring therein in paras.1 to 4 as follows:-
(1) The applicant is one of the landlords in respect of premises No.64/1, Nishtar Road, Karachi. A copy of the extract from the City Deputy Collector showing the name of the applicant as one of the landlords is filed herewith and marked as X-1.
(2) The opponents No. 1(i) to (iv) are the legal representatives of the original tenant late Rahim Bux, in respect of the above said premises and Qadri Bros. Are sub-tenant inducted by the opponent without consent of the applicant.
(3) The applicant is a widow and she needs the said premises in the occupation of the opponents for her personal use to establish her business in the said premises.
(4) The applicant is not in occupation of any premises owned by her in any locality."
4. It was further averred that requisite notice under section 14 of the Ordinance was served by respondent through her Advocate on 27-6-1985, to which the appellants' Advocate sent a reply on 8-7-1987. The above application was resisted by the appellants inasmuch as a written statement was filed in which two preliminary objections as to the maintainability of the application and bona fides were raised, but as regards the above quoted contents of paras. 1 to 4 of the application, the following averments were made in the written statement:- "(1) The contents of paragraph 1 as narrated are not admitted. The opponents were tenants of Ebrahimji Essaji Antria and after his death no statutory notice has been sent to the opponents. The applicant has also not filed any letters of administration or order from any other Court or relevant papers to show that the property has devolved upon her.
(2) In reply to paragraph 2 it is admitted that the opponents No.1 (i) and 2(iv) are the legal heirs of deceased Rahim Bux. It is categorically denied that the Opponent No.2 are the sub-tenants.
(3) The contents of paragraphs 3 and 4 are absolutely false and therefore denied."
5. It seems that after the filing of the above written statement by the appellant, the respondent filed her affidavit in evidence on or about 21-12-1983. Upon the above affidavit, she was cross-examined on 10-2-1986 by the learned counsel for the appellant as follows:- "Re-called and re-affirmed. xxxxxaoa to Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan Advocate for opponent.
It is a fact that Seth Ebrahimji Issaji was the owner of the disputed premises. He had not gifted the said property in his life time. He did not have any will. It is a fact that Seth lbrahimjee died on 14-5- 1970. It is a fact that my husband expired on 13-8-1967. The rent is collected by son of mine. I am Shia by sect."
6. It may be observed that the appellant instead of filing affidavit in evidence in rebuttal, filed an application on 10-2-1986 averring therein as follows:- "Application That the premises No.64/1 Nishtar Road, Karachi, was owned by Seth Ebrahimjee Essaji Antaria. The said Ebrahimjee Essajee Antaria died on May 14, 1970.
(2) His son Fazal Abbas, husband of the applicant died on August 13, 1967.
(3) It is thus evident that the husband of the applicant pre-deceased his father Seth Ebrahimjee Essajee Antaria, the owner of the rented premises.
(4) The applicant is not a legal heir of Seth Ebrahimjee Essajee Antaria and has, therefore, no locus standi to file the present application.
(5) In view of the above it is respectfully prayed that the case filed by the applicant may be dismissed at 10 times costs as she has no locus standi and therefore the opponents do not want to lead evidence.
7. Upon receipt of notice of the above application, the respondent filed a written reply to the above application alongwith the certified and photostat copies of the documents mentioned therein.
Suffice to reproduce hereinbelow paras. 1 to 5 of the above reply, which read as follows:- "(1) The predecessor-in-interest of the landlord and tenant viz. (applicant and opponents herein) filed a rent case No.704/1967 as applicants Nos.1 and 2 against the sub-tenant M/s. Mercantile Corporation and 2 others as opponent, the said case is proceeding in the VII Court of Sr. Civil Judge and Controller (South), Karachi.
(2) The applicant No.1 Ibrahimjee Essajee Antaria died during the pendency of the case No.704/67, the legal representatives of the applicant No.1 were brought on record by the consent of the applicant No.2. The applicants Nos.1 and 2 filed joint amended application in Rent Case No.702/1967. A certified copy of the said case is filed herewith and marked as `A'.
(3) The opponent M/s. Mercantile Corporation and 2 others filed an application and taken objection therein regarding the ownership of the L/Rs. Of the applicant No.1. The Advocate Mr. Niazi A. Khaliq appearing for the legal representatives of Rahim Buy, the applicant No.2 filed objection to the said application dated 16-12-1982 filed by the Mercantile Corporation and others and stated therein viz-- "It is submitted that only entry in column 8 is relevant in which applicants are shown as owners and not the government throughout."
"Original extract dated 22-2-1983 is filed herewith".
A certified copy of the said objection as well as the certified copy of the extract from C.D.C. Are filed herewith and marked as B & C respectively.
(4) The names of the owners of the property are also entered in the department of Excise and Taxation. A photo copy of the PT-1 is attached herewith and marked as D.
(5) The opponents are paying taxes in respect of the property to the Excise and Taxation department. Since the change of the name as owners in the department, the tax vouchers are also being prepared in the name of Mst. Sara and others and the opponents paying the tax through these vouchers. Five (5) photo copies of the paid vouchers from the year 1981 to 1985 in the name of Sara & others are filed herewith and marked as E to I.'
8. It seems that the appellants filed a rejoinder dated 29-3-1986 to the respondent's above written reply to the aforesaid application in which inter alia it was averred that the Annexures A to I filed with the above written reply were not filed alongwith written statement (probably means application) copy with the affidavit in evidence nor were produced during the cross-examination.
In para. 2 of the rejoinder as to the legal status of the respondent, the following averments were made:- "2. It has clearly come out in the cross-examination of the applicant that the rented premises were owned by her father-in-law E.E. Antria. These rented premises were not given to her by way of gift, nor was any will in her favour made by the said E.E. Antria. The husband of the applicant died before E.E. Antria. The applicant was the daughter-in-law of the late E.E. Antria and cannot inherit his property. A daughter-in-law is not a legal heir of the property left behind by her father-in-law."
9. The appellants did not lead any evidence in rebuttal to the respondent's aforesaid affidavit in evidence and the documents produced alongwith it. It seems that after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the learned Rent Controller held that the respondent's above application under section 14 of the Ordinance was maintainable. He recorded inter alia the following reasons:- "From the perusal of the written statement it is clear that the opponents have not specifically mentioned that the applicant is not the landlord of the disputed premises. The application filed by the opponents on 10-2-1986 in which they have challenged the landlordship of the applicant does not bear any provision of law under which they have filed that application. Since in the written statement the opponents have not denied the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant, therefore, by filing application dated 10-2-1986, they are not obliged to deny the relationship of landlord and tenant by challenging that the applicant is not a legal heir of lbrahimji Essaji. The rent case cannot decide the dispute of title between the parties but the rent case can be decided on the material documents placed before the Court by the parties.
From the perusal of true copy of extract of property register Annexure `C' it is clear that the applicant is one of the owners of survey No.64/1, therefore, it is proved that the applicant is one of the landlords of the disputed premises and I hold that the application is maintainable.
The applicant has supported the contents of rent application in evidence and the opponents' counsel has not shattered the evidence of applicant in cross examination, therefore, I havo no option but to believe the version of applicant. It is admitted fact that the applicant had served a notice under section 14 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, upon the opponents which was duly replied."
Against the above order of the Rent Controller, the appellants filed FRA No.308 of 1986, which was declined by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Sindh through a detailed judgment dated 9-7-1987. Thereupon, the appellants filed a petition for leave, which was granted by this Court on 30-9-1987 inter alia to consider the above broad question.
Civil Appeal No.147-K of 1987
10. The respondent filed Rent Case No.4715 of 1982 in the Court of VIth Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi, under section 14 of the Ordinance against the predecessors-in-interest of the appellant, namely, late S.M, Hamza son of S. Inayat Hussain, averring therein that he was landlord/owner of House No313/14 Nasirabad, F.B. Area, Karachi, which he had let out to the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, namely, late H.M. Hamza son of Inayat Hussain at Rs.133.70 per month. It was also averred that the respondent was in Government service serving as an Assistant in Air Headquarters posted at S.P.S. Shahrah-e-Faisal, Karachi, and that he was due to retire with effect from 30-12-1982 and, therefore, he needed the suit premises for his personal use. It was also averred that he had already served requisite notice under section 14 of the Ordinance.
The above application was resisted and inter alia it was pleaded that the respondent's wife Mst.
Sarwari Begum was the landlady which was evident from PT-10. It was also averred that the ownership of the property in dispute was not vested in the respondent. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed:-
(1) Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties exists?
(2) Whether the applicant is entitled to the relief claimed in this case?
(3) What should the order be?
After recording evidence and after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the learned Rent Controller recorded his finding on above Issue No.1 in the affirmative, whereas finding on Issue No.2 was recorded in the negative on the ground that respondent owned a quarter at Karachi which was in his possession and in respect of which the alleged gift given by the respondent in favour of his son was not complete. In view of the above finding on Issue No.2, the application was dismissed under Issue No.3 through the order dated 11-6-1983. Against the above order, the respondent filed FRA. No.576 of 1983 in which the only question which was agitated was, whether the gift in favour of the respondent's son to respect of the quarter was complete or not. The learned Single Judge for the following reasons reversed the findings of the learned Rent Controller on the question of gift and allowed the ejectment under section 14 of the Ordinance:- "The learned Controller observed that "gifting of his ownership appears to be really a device to make on the ground for filing the case." These observations of the learned Controller are conjectural in nature. It is settled law that a Muhammadan can gift his property orally. The essential requisites for a valid gift as held in case of Mir Haji Ali Ahmed Khan Talpur and 2 others v.
Government of Sindh PLD 1976 Kar. 316 are (a) declaration of gift by the donor (b) acceptance of the gift, express or implied, by or on behalf of the donee, and (c) delivery of possession of the subject-matter of the gift by the donor to the donee. In the present case Naved Ahmed Khan, the son of the appellant filed his affidavit in evidence and stated that his father orally gifted quarter No.2/133 on 8-5-1978 and he accepted the gift. In view of this matter the finding of the learned Controller is based on surmises and conjectures. The quarter was gifted to his son who accepted the gift. The appellant does not own the quarter and the same belongs to his son. The appellant is residing in a quarter which does not belong to him in such circumstances. It cannot be said that the appellant is residing in his own premises."
11. Having referred to the relevant facts of the above three appeals, we may revert to the question of law on which leave was granted, namely, whether under section 14 of the Ordinance, the landlord as defined in clause (f) of section 2, can file an application or should he or she be the owner. Before touching upon the merits of each of the above appeals, it may be appropriate at this juncture to refer to the relevant provisions of the Ordinance, namely, section 2(f), (g), section 14, section 15(1)(2) & (viii), section 15-A and section 18, which read as follows:- Section 2(f) & (g) of the Ordinance "2(f) "landlord" means the owner of the premises and includes a person who is for the time being authorized or entitled to receive rent in respect of such premises;
(g) "personal use" means the use of the premises by the owner thereof or his wife (or husband), son or daughter;"
Section 14 of the Ordinance "14. Delivery of vacant possession.---(I) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Ordinance or any other law for the time being in force, the landlord of a building who is a widow, or a minor whose both parents are dead or a salaried employee due to retire within the next six months or has retired or a person who is due to attain the age of sixty years within the next six months or has attained the age of sixty years, may, by notice in writing inform the tenant that he or she needs the building for personal use and require him to deliver vacant possession of the building within such time as may be specified in the notice, not being earlier than two months from the receipt thereof: Provided that nothing in this subsection shall apply where the landlord has rented out the building after he has retired or attained the age of sixty years or, as the case may be, has become widow or orphan.
(2) The landlord shall not be entitled to avail the benefit of subsection (1) if he is in occupation of a building owned by him in any locality.
(3) Where the tenant has failed to deliver the possession of the building under subsection (1), the Controller shall, on application by the landlord in this behalf, order eviction of the tenant from the building in a summary manner, by using such force as may be necessary."
Section 15(1), (2) & (vii) of the Ordinance: "15. Application to Controller: --(1) Where a landlord seeks to evict the tenant otherwise than in accordance with section 14, he shall make application to the Controller.
(2) The Controller shall, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the premises within such period as may be specified in the order, if he is satisfied that -
(vii) the landlord requires the premises in good faith for his own occupation or use or for the occupation or use of his spouse or any of his children."
Section 15-A of the Ordinance "15-A. Where the landlord, who has obtained the possession of a building under section 14 or premises under clause (vii) of section 15, relets the building or premises to any person other than the previous tenant or puts it to a use other than personal use within one year of such possession:- -
(i) he shall be punishable with fine which shall not exceed one year's rent of the building of the premises, as the case may be, payable immediately before the possession was so obtained.
(ii) the tenant who has been evicted may apply to the Controller for an order directing that he shall be restored to possession of the building or the premises, as the case may be, and the Controller shall make an order accordingly."
Section 18 of the Ordinance "18. Change in ownership. Where the ownership of a premises, in possession of the tenant has been transferred by sale, gift, inheritance or by such other mode, the new owner shall send an intimation of such transfer in writing by registered post, to the tenant and the tenant shall not be deemed to have defaulted in payment of the rent for the purpose of clause (ii) of subsection (2) of section 15, if the rent due is paid within thirty days from the date when the intimation should, in normal course, have reached the tenant."
12. A perusal of the above quoted definition of the term "landlord" given in clause (f) of section 2 indicates that the primary meaning of the term is, the owner of the premises. This meaning has been extended artificially by providing that it includes a person who is for the time being authorised or entitled to receive rent in respect of such premises. It may further be noticed that the words "personal use" have been defined as means the use of the premises by the owner thereof or his wife or husband, son or daughter. The latter beneficiaries have also been specified in the above quoted clause (vii) of subsection (2) of section 15 of the Ordinance. It may be observed that section 14 is a new provision enacted in the Ordinance for the benefit of the persons specified therein.
There was no parallel section in the late West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, or in any other earlier Rent Laws.
It may be pointed out that section 14 commences with the non-obstante clause by providing that notwithstanding anything contained in this Ordinance or any other law for the time being in force, the landlord of a building who is,
(i) widow; or
(ii) minor, whose both parents are dead; or
(iii) a salaried employee due to retire within the next six months or has retired; or
(iv) a person who is due to attain the age of sixty years within next six months or has attained the age of sixty years; may by notice in writing inform the tenant that he or she needs the building for personal use and require him to deliver the vacant possession of the building within the period specified in the notice not being earlier than two months from the receipt thereof. It may also be pointed out that the proviso to subsection (1) of section 14 provides that the above subsection shall not be applicable where the landlord has rented out the building after he has retired or attained the age of sixty years or, as the case may be, has become widow or orphan. It may further be pointed out that subsection (2) of section 14 further provides an embargo on the right of the aforesaid specified persons to the effect that-they shall not be entitled to avail of the benefit of subsection (1) if he or she is in occupation of a building owned by him in any locality. It may be observed that subject to the above proviso to subsection (l.) of section 14 and the provision contained in subsection (2) in case the tenant fails to deliver the possession of the building after the receipt of the notice under subsection (1) of section 14 the Controller under subsection (3) is required to order eviction of the tenant from the building in a summary manner using such force as may be necessary.
13. It may also be pointed out that subsection (1) of section 15 provides the procedure for seeking ejectment of a tenant otherwise than in accordance with section 14. It may further be stated that subsection (2) of section 15 provides various grounds on which a landlord can seek ejectment of a tenant, which includes the ground of personal requirement contained in above quoted clause (vii) of subsection (2) of section 15, which provides that the landlord requires the premises in good faith for his own occupation or use or for the occupation or use of his spouse or any of his children.
14. It may further be pointed out that section 15-A which was enacted by Ordinance No.II of 1980 and then substituted by Ordinance No.IV of 1984 caters for the situation where a landlord, after obtaining possession of a building under section 14 or premises under clause (vii) of subsection (2) of section 15 instead of occupying the same for personal use within one year of obtaining possession, relets the building or premises to any other person than the previous tenant by providing punishment in the form of a fine to the extent of one year's rent. It also gives the right to the tenant to apply to the Controller for an order directing that he be restored the possession of the building.
It may be stated that section 18 imposes an obligation on the part of a new owner of the building to intimate to the tenant by registered post where the ownership of premises in his possession has been transferred by sale, gift, inheritance or by such other mode in favour of the new owner. It also provides that the tenant shall not be deemed to have defaulted in payment of rent for the purpose of clause (ii) of subsection (2) of section 15 if the rent due is paid within thirty days from the date when the intimation should, in the normal course, have reached the tenant.
15. The controversy in issue is, as to whether for the purpose of the above quoted section 14 the extended definition of the term "landlord" as contained in above clause (f) of section 2 be applied as to include not only the owner but also a person who is for the time being authorised or entitled to receive in respect of the premises, or should the primary meaning of the term "landlord" as means "the owner" be applied.
16. Mr. S.M. Abbas, learned AOR appearing for the appellant in the above first appeal, has relied upon the following three cases in order to contend that any person falling within the definition of the landlord as given in above clause (f) of section 2, is entitled to press into service section 14 of the Ordinance:-
(i) Moeen Afridi v. Capt. M.R. Choudry 1982 CLC 1116; in which the facts were that the respondent, claiming to be the owner/landlord of the premises, served a notice under section 14 of the Ordinance on the ground that he was due to retire from the Karachi Post Trust service. The above notice was replied to by the appellant and it was alleged that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant, as the premises did not belong to the respondent.
Since the appellant had not vacated the premises after the service of the above notice, respondent filed an application under section 14 of the Ordinance. The above application was resisted by the appellant and in his written statement inter alia it was pleaded that the respondent's wife was the landlord/owner, who had been recovering rent. Before the Rent Controller, a number of documents were produced by the parties, however, the Rent Controller allowed the above rent application. Against the above order of the Rent Controller, an FRA was filed, which was disposed of by the above reported judgment by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Sindh. In the above judgment it was held that the respondent was the owner/landlord of the premises and, therefore, was entitled to invoke section 14 of the Ordinance. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:- ---... In view of the lease it can safely be said that the respondent is owner/landlord of the premises. His wife's claim that the agreement was entered into on her behalf was obviously an attempt to meet the requirement of section 14 of the Ordinance but was not correct. In any case, in the absence of any direct and reliable evidence as to ownership the claim made by the wife cannot be held to be binding on the respondent. As regards notice of rent case (Exh.1-G) no question was put to the respondent concerning the alleged rent case nor was certified copy of the application or and order passed thereon produced. Therefore, mere production of a notice does not in any manner, advance the case of the appellant."
The learned Single Judge, after having concluded as above, also made the following general observation:- "15. Even otherwise, if the respondent was not the owner of the premises, he was authorised and entitled to receive the rent which fact cannot be disputed for the appellant had been paying rent to him by cheques drawn in his name. Accordingly, within the meaning of section 2, clause (f) of the Ordinance, the respondent was the landlord."
From the above quoted portions of the judgment, it is evident that the High Court as a finding of fact concluded that the respondent was the owner/landlord in terms of section 14 of the Ordinance, but at the same time made the above quoted general observations contained in para. 15. Though the above quoted general observations support the appellant's case but they cannot be pressed into service, as at the most they were obiter. The finding of fact recorded was that the respondent was the owner/landlord.
(ii) Bakhtiar Ahmad v. Ghulam Qadir Khan 1986 CLC 1760; In the above case the facts were that the respondent filed an application under section 14 of the Ordinance against the appellant on the ground that he had retired from service. The above application was resisted on the ground that the premises in question belonged to the respondent's children and not to him. However, the learned Rent Controller, in spite of the finding recorded by him that the premises were in the names of the minors allowed the above application. Against the above order of the Rent Controller, the appellant filed FRA which was disposed of by the above cited judgment and in which the order of the learned Rent Controller was maintained and the following observations were made:- ---........It is pertinent to note that the appellant denied the contents of para. 2 of the eviction application including the payment of rent through cheque in the month of August, 1984, but admitted in his cross-examination that he was inducted by the respondent and he has been paying rent to him. I shall assume for the purposes of this appeal that as contended on behalf of the appellant a specific person can succeed, where the building stands in his name only if he establishes that its true owner and the building is only nominally standing in the name of his wife or dependent child as the case may be. In the instant case it is to be noted that the respondent stated in his eviction application that the building belongs to his minor sons. Even this fact will not help the appellant. The respondent retired from service and he was asked to vacate official accommodation and he himself does not own another building, his sons are residing with him and they are depending upon him. He manages the property. It is not denied that the appellant has been paying rent to him. He was, therefore, entitled to file the application as he otherwise satisfied the requirement of law. The respondent could avail of the benefit of the provisions of section 14 and the notice issued to the respondent under section 14(1) of the Ordinance which he was entitled to issue the object of which was only to inform the tenant."
(iii) Muhammad Ali v. Mst. Hameeda Begum 1988 SCMR 705; in which the facts were that the widow after the death of her husband filed an application tinder section 14 of the Ordinance. The above application was resisted inter alia on the ground that the property of which the ejectment was sought, did not belong to widow before the death of her husband and that after the death of her husband, she succeeded as one of the legal heirs. The above contentions were repelled inter alia by this Court as follows:- "4. It is difficult to agree with the contention raised on behalf of the appellant. Quite obviously the object of section 14(1), ibid, is to lessen the hardship which a widow not infrequently faces on the death of her husband and to assist her in settling down again. Therefore, it will not be proper to construe this provision in a manner which would defeat the very purpose for which it has been enacted. The relevant words in the subsection are : "the landlord of a building who is a widow", There is no reason at all why these words should be taken to refer only to a widow who was the owner of the building before the death of her husband or who is sole heir of the original landlord.
Such a narrow construction would leave out from the benefit of the provision in question a widow with minor children who has to leave the residence which was formerly given to her husband by his employer or one who purchases a house for personal use from the funds made available to her on the death of her husband; there is no compelling reason for placing such a narrow construction on the provision. There is also no merit in the contention that an application made by a widow under section 14(1)--would be in derogation of the rights of the other heirs in the property. The proceedings before the Rent Controller here are intended merely to determine the liability of a tenant to ejectment under a special provision and it is difficult to see how an order made in these proceedings will have any bearing on the rights of the other heirs in the property. It may also be mentioned that the expression "landlord" has been used in the Ordinance in a wider sense for it includes a person who need not be the owner of the premises at all; all that is required is that he should be authorised or entitled to receive rent in respect of the rented premises. In this case all the other heirs of Pir Muhammad Nawaz had authorised the respondent not only to collect the rent of the house in dispute but also to deal with it all respects including to get same vacated and use it for her own occupation.-- On the other hand, Mr. Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim, learned counsel appearing for the respondent in the first appeal and for the appellants in the above second appeal, has referred to the following cases:-
(i) Muhammad Israil Biswa s v. Amrita Lal Chowdhry PLD 1961 Dacca 25; in which the facts were that an application under section 17 of the East Bengal Premises Rent Control Act (XVI of 1953), hereinafter referred to as the Act, was filed on the ground that the tenant was a habitual defaulter and secondly, that the premises were required for bona fide purposes for the occupation of the constituted attorney of the landlord. The above application was resisted by the tenant. The matter was agitated before the Rent Controller on the question of personal requirement of the attorney. The Rent Controller declined the permission on the ground that the case of the requirement of the constituted attorney could not be considered as of the landlord himself who was residing in India. However, upon appeal, the District Judge took the view that the power of attorney granted to the constituted attorney was a general power giving him absolute right to deal with the property mentioned therein in the way he liked just like a full owner and, therefore, bona fide requirement of the constituted attorney was a question entertainable in law.
He, therefore, granted the permission of ejectment on the above ground. Against the above judgment of the District Judge, a revision was filed which was upheld by a learned Single Judge of the Dacca High Court. It may be observed that the definition of the term "landlord" given in the Act was couched more or less in identical language which has been employed in the present clause
(f) of section 2 of the Ordinance, but the learned Judge was of the view that the personal requirement should be either of the owner or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held. It may be advantageous to reproduce the relevant observations contained in paras. 9 and 10 of the judgment, which read as follows:- "9. On the other hand, it is urged by the petitioners that if this interpretation is accepted, then the entire provision of section 17 of the Act could, at the sweet will of the landlord, be rendered entirely nugatory, for, by granting a power-of-attorney to any person in need of the premises, the landlord could evict the tenant with impunity. It is true that the definition of landlord given in the Act is of a very wide character and a constituted attorney may well come within that definition but, reading section 17 as a whole, it appears to me that by specifying the persons for whose occupation the landlord may lawfully evict a tenant the Legislature clearly intended to specify the category of persons whose requirements should be considered to be valid requirements under the Act. Since a landlord includes, according to the definition, a guardian, trustee or receiver, there would have been no point in the Legislature mentioning in clause (c) to the proviso in section 17(1) that the bona fide requirement should be either for the own occupation of the landlord or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held.
10. Again by subsection (4) of section 17 of the said Act, it is provided that, if the premises are not occupied by the landlord or such person 1 within two months of the date of the vacating of the premises by the previous tenant, then the Rent Controller may, on the application of the previous tenant, restore possession of the premises to him. This rather seems to indicate that in section 17 of the Act the word "landlord" has been used in its ordinarily accepted sense as the owner of the premises or the person entitled to receive the rent from the tenant and not to include persons receiving rent on behalf of such a person. Indeed if the occupation of this wide class of persons is to be held to be a sufficiently valid and bona fide requirement for evicting a tenant, then even a rent collector may well come within this category, for, he would also be a person receiving the rent of any premises on behalf of his employer landlord and for the benefit of that landlord and would thus be a landlord within the definition clause. This would be giving an absurd interpretation to clause (c) of the proviso to section 17(1) of the Act. In the circumstances, I am of the opinion that the use or occupation of a constituted attorney is not a use or occupation which can be considered to be a sufficiently bona fide requirement for the purpose of evicting a tenant."
(ii) A.S. Mughal v. Mst.Khurshid Azmat Ali PLD 1982 Kar. 406.
In the above case, a learned Single Judge of the Sindh High Court, while allowing first rent appeal against the order of ejectment passed by the Rent Controller, held that the requirement of a daughter of a widow was not covered by the provisions of section 14 of the Ordinance.
(iii) S. Moin-ul Hassan v. A.H. Junaid 1985 CLC 882.
The brief facts of the above case were that the respondent was employed in Pakistan Burmah Shell Limited. He owned a house which he had let out to the appellant. The respondent, after serving a notice under section 14 of the Ordinance, filed an application for ejectment under the above provision of the Ordinance on the ground that he was to retire from service. The above application was resisted by the appellant inter alia on the ground that section 14 was not applicable, as the respondent was not the owner of the property. However, the learned Rent Controller granted the ejectment order. Against the above order, the appellant filed first rent appeal in which the question, whether a landlord as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Ordinance could press the above section 14 or should he be the owner himself, was agitated. A learned Single Judge of the Sindh High Court, after analysing the above provision of section 14 of the Ordinance, held that the term "landlord" used in section 14 and even in subsection (2) clause (vii) of section 15, has been used for the owner of the premises. The relevant observations read as follows:- "Now can it be said that the rent collector or an agent who is not the owner of the property but a landlord within the meaning of section 2(i) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance can file an ejectment application if he needs the premises for his own occupation or for occupation of his spouse or any of his children? Perhaps not. Similarly an agent or attorney who has been collecting rent on behalf of a lady who has become widow or a minor whose both parents are dead or any employee who has retired or attained the age of 60 years cannot spring up to claim possession for himself on the happening of the eventualities relating to the owner for whose benefit this agent was working and technically speaking is covered by the definition of landlord. To hold otherwise is bound to create a confusion. The special concession allowed to the owners of the property may be exploited by the owners themselves if the term landlord used in section 14 and section 15(2)(vii) is interpreted in its extended meaning as given in the definition clause in the Ordinance. Even a non- resident owner or an owner holding other property would appoint a rent collector who in turn would press his demand for personal need successfully and throw out a tenant from the premises. 1, would therefore, hold that the term landlord used in section 14 and even in subsection (2)(vii) of section 15 has been used for the owner of the premises."
In the above case reliance was placed on the above Dacca case in extenso and also upon the dissenting judgment in the case of Sharpe v. Nicholls 1945(2) All England Law Reports 55. In the above English case decided by the Court of Appeal of England, the controversy was whether the plaintiff, claiming as the personal representative of her deceased husband/landlord, was entitled to seek possession on the ground of personal requirement of the landlord in terms of the provision of Schedule I, para. (h) to the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions (Amendment) Act, 1933. The two Lords,who had given the majority judgment and who had remanded the case on the question of facts, had not dilated upon the above controversy. However, Morton, L.J. Had touched upon the above aspect as follows:- " .... The plaintiffs whole case, as I have shown from their pleadings, is based upon the allegation that they were the owners as personal representatives. I cannot find any admission at the trial in any shape or form that the widow had any beneficial interest in the house. I do not know in the least who was entitled to the house. For all I know, Sharpe may have made a will leaving it to a nephew or to any other dwelling-house is reasonably required by the landlord------------.For occupation as a residence for himself' when the plaintiffs are legal personal representatives suing in that capacity and one of them wants to live in the house? In my opinion, such a case is not within the terms of para. (h) at all. Strange results would follow if that were not so. For instance, you might have four legal personal representatives, none of whom was related to the testator at all, and one of them might require the house as a residence for himself, having no beneficial interest whatsoever in the property. I am clearly of opinion that such a case could not possibly be within the terms of para (h). It is also to be observed that the words "himself or any son or daughter of his---------..Or his father or mother" seem to refer to a person who is the landlord not in the sense that he is one of several personal representatives but in the sense that he is the sole owner of the property subject to the tenancy. It seems to me, therefore, that the plaintiffs entirely failed to prove that they came within para (h); and if they failed to prove that they came within para (h) it seems to me that the words of section 3 of the Act absolutely precluded the county Court judge and would preclude this Court, from making any order for the recovery of possession."
17. From the above cited cases it seems that the first two judgments relied upon by Mr. S.M. Abbas do not directly dilate upon the controversy in issue though it can be said that they proceeded on the assumption that a landlord as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Ordinance, can press into service section 14 of the Ordinance. The third case which is a judgment of this Court, relied upon by him does not militate against the view, which we are inclined to take. It lays down that a widow as one of the legal heirs of the deceased owner can press into service Section 14 of the Ordinance and that liberal construction be placed on the above provision.
The cases relied upon by Mr. Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim have in fact touched upon the controversy in issue and the view which found favour, seems to be that the extended definition of the term "landlord" provided for in clause (f) of section 2 of the Ordinance cannot be pressed into service for invoking the aid of section 14 of the Ordinance and that the primary definition of "landlord", namely, the owner is to be made applicable.
18. We may observe that a definition clause in a statute is of a declaratory nature though normally the definitions provided for in the definition clauses are to be read into the provisions of the Act while interpreting the defined terms/words, but if the contents of the provisions of the Act indicate otherwise, the definition clause cannot override a main provision of the statute. In the present case, section 2 makes it explicit by providing that "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context".
19. In this behalf, reference may be made to the case `of The Bank of Bahawalpur Ltd. Through its Manager v. The Chief Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore and another PLD 1977 SC 1964 and the case of Iftikhar Ahmad and others v. President, National Bank of Pakistan and others PLD 1988 SC 53. In the above first case the controversy was, whether the protection of section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, could be extended to the occupants of Big Mansions. The majority view was that on the basis of the facts of the case, the above protection was not available. The minority view which was written by Muhammad Afzal Cheema, J. Was contrary to the majority view on the above question. In the above minority view, the effect of the definition clause in the statute has, been commented upon as follows:- ------------Although normally an expression if defined in a Statute has to be given the same meanings wherever it occurs therein, yet there is ample authority for the principle of interpretation that a definition of a term in a Statute is merely declaratory in nature and should not be unnecessarily inflicted where it does not fit in with the subject and context and might lead to anomalies and absurd results. Further strength is lent to this justifiable invocation of the above principle by the express qualification or exception with which section 2 was prefaced, namely, "unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context". From this, it is abundantly clear that the definition of "house" or of "possession" like any other definitions contained in section 2 would apply only where it is in consonance and fits in with the subject and the context and not otherwise.
The repugnancy is only too obvious and incapable of resolution on any other, reasonable hypothesis."
20. The above quoted observations in the minority view were approved recently by this Court in the case of Iftikhar Ahmad and others (supra), wherein following observations of similar effect have been made:-- "10. It is difficult to subscribe to the view taken by the learned Judges in the High Court. No doubt, the award given by the Wage Commission is not included in the definition of the term 'award' as given in section 2(ii) of the Ordinance, but then as the governing clause of section 2 itself states the definitions given therein are to be read subject to anything repugnant in the context in which the defined terms occur. Apart from that, as held by this Court in Bank of Bahawalpur v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner (PLD 1977 SC 164) that although normally an expression if defined in a Statute has to be given the same meaning wherever it occurs therein, yet there is ample authority for the principle of interpretation that a definition of a term in a Statute is merely declaratory in nature and should not be unnecessarily inflicted where it does not fit in with the subject or context:'
21. Reference may also be made to the following extracts from Craies On Statute Law Seventh Edition, Crawford on Interpretation of Laws 1940 Edition, and Maxwell On The Interpretation of Statutes Twelfth Edition:-- Craies on Statute Law Seventh Edition: "It is a sound rule of construction , said Cleasby B. In Courtauld v. Legh, (1869) L.R. 4 Ex. 126, 130.
Lewise v. Cattle (1938) 2 K.B. 454, 457. R. v. Belfast JJ. (1947) N.I. 191) "to give the same meaning to the same words occurring in different parts of an Act of Parliament". The presumption that the same words are used in the same meaning is however very slight and it is proper, "if sufficient reasons can be assigned, to construe a word in one part of an Act in a different sense from that which it bears in another part of an Act. (Per Turner L.J. In Re National Savings Bank (1866) L.R. 1 Ch. App. 547, 550). For instance, if, as Fry L.J. Said in Re Moody and Yates' Contract, (1885) 30 Ch. D. 344, 349) "a word is used inaccurately in one section of a statute, it must not be assumed to have been used inaccurately when it occurs in another section of the same statute". And, in fact, a word may be used in two different senses in the same section of an Act. (Maddox v. Storer (1963) 1 Q.B. 451). "It is obvious", said North J. In Re Smith, Green v. Smith, (1883) 24 Ch. D. 672, 678) "that the word `property' is used in section 54 of the repealed Bankruptcy Act, 1869 in two totally different senses". The Court said, in Doe d. Angell v. Angell (1846) 9 Q.B. 328). "Considerable difficulty arises in the construction of the Real Property Limitation Act, 1833 by reason of the word `rent' being used in two different senses throughout viz. In the sense of a rent charged upon land, and of rent reserved under a lease".
Similarly, in R. v. Allen (1872) 1 C.C.R. 367, 374) the Court held, as to the word "marry" in section 57 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861 (which enacts that "whosoever, being married, shall marry any other person during the life of the former husband or wife---------shall be guilty of felony") that "it is at once self-evident that the proposition that the same effect must be given to the term `marry' in both parts of the sentence cannot possibly hold good."
This rule of construction is clearly recognised by Parliament, since it is now usual in the interpretation clause of every Act, to insert the words, "unless a contrary intention appears" or "unless the context otherwise requires", or other similar words cutting down the general application of the definition."
Crawford on Interpretation of Laws 1940 Edition Strictly speaking, construction and interpretation are not the same (U.S. v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat.
(U.S.) 76, 5 L. Ed. 37), although the two terms are often used interchangeably (U.S. v. Keitzel, 211 U.S. 370, 53 L. Ed. 320, 29 S.Ct.123). Construction however, to be technically correct, is the drawing of conclusions with respect to subjects that are beyond the direct expression of the text, from elements known and given in the text (U.S. v. Farenholt, 206 U.S. 226, 51 L.Ed. 1036, 27 S. Ct.123; People v. Comrs. Of Taxes, 95 N.Y. 554), while interpretation is the process of discovering the true meaning of the language used (Bloomer v. Todd, 3 Wash. T. 599, 19 Pac. 135, 1 L.R.A. 111). Thus, the Court will resort to interpretation when it endeavors to ascertain the meaning of a word found in a statute, which when considered with the other words in the statute, may reveal a meaning different from that is apparent when the word is considered abstractly or when given ` usual meaning (Anderson v. City of Hattiesburg, 131 Miss. Miss. 216, 94 So. 163). But when the Court goes beyond the language of the statute and seeks the assistance of extrinsic aids in order to determine whether a given case falls within the statute, it resorts to construction (Union Trust Co. v. McGinty, 212 Mass. 205, 98 N.E.
679). The process to be used in any given case will depend upon the nature of the problem presented. And, as is apparent, both processes may be used in seeking the legislative intent in a given statute. If the legislative intent is not clear after the completion of interpretation, then the Court will proceed to subject the statute to construction (2 Williston, contracts (1920) 1160-1161).
Maxwell On The Interpretation of Statutes Twelfth Edition "The words of a statute, when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment (Towerfield (Owners) v. Working ton Harbour and Dock Board (1949) P.
10. Per Scott and Asquith L. JJ., and Freed v. D.P.P. (1969) 2 W.L.R. 390). Their meanings found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety off' language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject, or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained (Per cur., R. V. Hall (1822) 1 B. & C. 123). Grammatically, words may cover a case but whenever a statute or document is to be construed it must be construed not according to the mere ordinary general meaning of the words, but according to the ordinary meaning of the words as applied to the subject-matter with regard to which they are used, unless there is something which renders it necessary to read them in a sense which is not their ordinary sense in the English language as so applied (Lion Mutual Marine Insurance Association V. Tucker (1883) 12 Q.B.D. 176, per Brett M.R.).
22. We are inclined to hold that the word "landlord" used in section 14 refers to its primary meaning, namely, the owner and not to its extended meaning. In our view, an attorney or an agent simpliciter who is authorised to receive rent on behalf of the owner of the property concerned cannot press into service section 14 of the Ordinance for his personal benefit. An application under section 14 can be maintained by the persons specified therein (or on their behalf), who should have interest in the property as the owner, either as the sole owner or as one of the co---owners. We may further observe that the Court, while construing section 14 will place liberal construction as to advance the object for which, it has been enacted rather to defeat it, but at the same time, the benefit of the above section cannot be extended to the persons other than those specified therein. The above conclusion is fortified by the fact that the definition of the term "personal use" given in clause (g) speaks of use of the premises by the owner thereof and/or his wife or husband, son or daughter.
Subsection (2) of section 14 of the Ordinance refers to "a building owned by him in any locality".
Furthermore, section 10 of the Ordinance contemplates service of a notice by the new owner on the tenant j through a registered letter in case of change of ownership because of sale, gift, inheritance or by some other mode. It does not provide for service of a notice on account of change of a landlord who includes an attorney or a person for the time being receiving rent on behalf of the owner.
23. Having dealt with the above legal aspect, we may now revert to the merits of the above appeals. In the above first appeal, there is a concurrent finding of the two Courts that the appellant was not the owner. The above finding is founded on the appellant's own averment contained in above quoted paras.1 and 2 of the application referred to hereinabove in para.2. In this view of the matter, the appeal has no merits. It is, therefore, dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.
24. As regards the above second appeal (Civil Appeal No.106-K of 1987), it may be observed that there is a concurrent finding of the two Courts below to the effect that the respondent was the owner of the suit premises. However, Mr. Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in the above appeal, was at pains to urge that above finding be sustained in view of the admitted fact that tile respondent was claiming to be the owner by virtue of inheritance from late Seth Ibrahimjee Essajee and as admittedly she was not one of tire legal heirs, she could not inherit [lie same. Reliance was placed by him on the cross-examination of the respondent reproduced hereinabove in para.5 and also upon the appellants' application dated 10-2-1986 referred to hereinabove in para.6.
On the other hand, Mr. Badarudduja Khan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, invited our attention to the respondent's written reply to the appellants' above application dated 10-2-1986 and the documents produced before the learned Rent Controller. It seems to be an admitted position that after the death of said Seth Ebrahimjee Essajee, inter alia the name of the respondent was brought on the relevant record as one of the legal heirs, namely, in the record of rights and the Excise and Taxation Department etc. It is also an admitted position that Rent Case No.704 of 1967 for ejectment was filed by late Ebrahimjee Essajee and the appellants against M/s. Mercantile Corporation and two others. After the death of Ebrahimjee Essajee, with the consent of the appellant, inter alia the respondent was brought on record as one of the legal heirs of deceased Ebrahimjee Essajee. In other words, upto the time of filing of the present case, both the parties proceeded on the assumption that the respondent was one of the owners/landlords of the suit premises, which is evident from the respondent's above written reply to the appellant's above application dated 10-2-1986 and the supporting documents reproduced in para.7 hereinabove. In our view, it was not open either to the appellants to have denied the factum that the respondent was one of the owners/landlords before the Rent Controller nor it was open to the Rent Controller to have concluded otherwise in view of the above factual position on record. It may be observed that section 14 does not contemplate holding of a full-dressed enquiry but it provides a summary procedure for the benefit of the specified persons. If eve were to hold that in a proceeding under section 14 Rent Controller is required to decide the complicated question of ownership, it would frustrate/defeat the object for which section 14 of the Ordinance has been enacted, namely, to provide a speedy relief unfettered with the technicalities of the procedure. In our view, if prior to the filing of an application under section 14 of the Ordinance, there is no controversy on the question that who is the owner of the suit property and the person who is the landlord is also the owner, the tenant cannot be allowed to raise a plea under section 14 that factually the landlord was not the owner of the suit premises. The concurrent findings of the two Courts in the present case cannot be disturbed.
25. It was vehemently urged by Mr. Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim that an entry in the record of rights merely raises a rebuttable presumption, which in the present case, has been rebutted by the appellants through the cross-examination of the respondent in which it has come on record that she was not one of the legal heirs of deceased Ebrahimjee Essajee. Reliance was placed by him on the following cases:--
(i) Gangabai and others v. Fakirgowda Somaypagowds Desai and others (AIR 1930 P C 69);
(ii) Maharaja Sir Kesho Prasad Singh Bahadur v. Bahuria Mt. Bhagjogna Kuer and others (AIR 1937 P C 69);
(iii) Nitai Lal Dutta v. Gobinda Bhushan Sen and others (AIR 1936 Pat. 142);
(iv) Parmeshri Das and others v. Girdhari Lal (AIR 1915 Oudh. 181);
(v) Abid Ali Khan and others v. Secy. Of State and another (AIR 1951 Nag. 327);
(vi) Mst. Alfan v. Muhammad Nur (PLD 1965 (W.P.) Lah. 401);
(vii) Haji Muhammad Ramzan v. Mian Jamil Shah (PLD 1967 Pesh. 380).
There cannot be any cavil to the proposition that an entry in the record of rights does not conclusively establish the ownership of the person in whose favour the entry has been made but it merely provides a rebuttable presumption. However, the same does not affect the present case as we have already observed hereinabove that till the date of filing of the present rent case by the respondent, the appellants had admitted and acted upon the factum that the respondent was one of the owners/landlords. The Rent Controller could not have disturbed the above established position in a summary proceeding under section 14.
26. Then it was urged by Mr. Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim that the Rent Controller should have asked the respondent to file a suit in terms of the judgment of this Court given in the case of Rehmatullah v.
Ali Muhammad and another (1983 SCMR 1064). In our view, the above case has no application because of the above factual position. The appeal has, therefore, no merits and it is accordingly dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs.
27. Adverting to the above last appeal, it will suffice to observe that the only question which was agitated before the High Court was, whether the gift effected by the respondent in favour of his son was complete or not. The High Court for cogent reasons has recorded a finding on the above question of fact in the affirmative. The same cannot be disturbed by us in this appeal. In view of the above finding, the respondent was entitled to invoke section 14 of the Ordinance as he was not in possession of any other building owned by him in any locality. The above appeal, therefore, has no merits. It is, therefore, dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs.