A tenant has, by this second appeal filed under section 15(4) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, impugned the order dated 4-7-73 passed by a learned Rent Controller (affirmed in first appeal on 20-12-74) whereby application of the respondents (landlords) for his eviction from a shop on the ground of their bona fide requirement was allowed.
2. The respondents had asserted grounds of default in payment of rent as also damage to the property. Following issues were framed: "(1) Whether the respondent has committed default in payment of rent?
(2) Whether the petitioner needs the disputed property for his personal use?
(3) Whether the respondent has damaged the disputed property and impaired its value?
(4) Relief."
3. Issues Nos. 1 and 3 were answered in the negative. The decision thereon was not challenged by the respondents either through cross-objections or otherwise during the arguments before the learned first appellate Court. The learned Rent Controller as also the first appellate Court held on issue No. 2 that Sultan Ahmad Khan respondent, one of the co-owners of the shop,-the other being Nisar Ahmad Khan respondent-, in good faith required the shop in dispute for his own use as also for his children. He was previously in service and having retired, therefrom, it was held, he wanted along with his sons to run a business in the shop.
4. Learned-counsel for the appellant has raised the following conten--tions:
(i) that the shop is owned by two co-owners, namely, Sultan Ahmad and Nisar Ahmad respondents. Thus, there are two landlords and though in section 13(3)(a)(ii)(a) of the Ordinance the reference to the landlord is in singular, by application of section 12 of the West Pakistan -- General Clauses Act, 1956, singular will also have to be read as plural. Therefore, unless the respondents prove that they (both of them) required shop in good faith for their use and/or the use of their children, i.e., children of both the landlords, the requirement of law qua bona, fide need would not be satisfied. That being so, the appellant is not liable to eviction;
(ii) that Sultan Ahmad Khan respondent (landlord), when pressed under cross-examination to disclose the details and nature of business which he and his sons wanted to start in the shop in dispute, was unable to give any satisfactory answer; therefore, on merits, it should be considered that the alleged requirement is not in good faith."
Learned counsel, in support of his first contention, heavily relied on an English case, McIntyre and another v. Hardcastle ((1948) 1 All E L R 696), wherein reliance was placed on an obiter by Acquith, L.
J., in the earlier case of Baker v. Lewis ((1946) 2 All E L R 592) He also referred to Sharpe v. Nicholls ((1945) 2 All E L R 55) as being relevant for consideration of the point raised by him. At the same time, he conceded that in so far as the superior Courts in Pakistan are concerned, there is only one reported .Ruling on the question raised by him but it goes against his contention. It is Syed Rashid Hussain and 2 others v. Hussain Haji Ahmed (PLD 1973 Note 138 at p. 209).
5. Learned counsel for- the respondents, relying on Dr. Miss 1. All Mohammad v. Mohammed Shafiq (PLD 1971 SC 494), contended that the definition of `landlord' in English law being materially different from that in Pakistan law, it-is--unsafe to invoke assistance of English decisions in construing the latter law. He also relied on the ratio in the ruling of Sind-13aluchistan High Court in the case of Syed Rashid Hussain. In this connection, he raised an alternative plea as well, namely, that the appellant acknowledged Sultan Ahmad Khan .As his landlord and executed rent note (Exh.
P/() is his favour (alone) and accepted therein that the latter would be competent to evict him as landlord, in case of default. On the question of bona fides of the respondents, learned .Counsel, relying on Mohammad Ishaq and another v. Mohammad Rafique (1972 SCMR 450), argued that this Court would ordinarily not set aside concurrent findings relating to the requirement in good faith of the landlord. He also pointed out that the proceedings in this case started in 1972. Sultan Ahmad was to start business in the shop when it was available for the use of the landlords.
Moreover, he was to start a business along with his sons. Therefore, if he was honest enough to admit that though he needed the shop to start a business therein the nature of the business in the above circumstances had not by then been decided, this is not enough circumstance to come to a conclusion that the entire claim with regard to requirements in good faith was fake.
6. The case from the English Courts relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, namely, that of McIntyre as also the case of Sharpe together with some other cases from English Jurisdiction were noticed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in their ruling in the case of Dr. Miss 1. Ali Mohammad and after consideration thereof it was observed that "in view of the substantial differences between the English Statutes and the Ordinance, it would be unsafe to invoke the assistance of English decisions in construing the relevant provisions of the Ordinance as was pointed out by the Privy Council in the eases of Mst. Ramanandi Kuer v. Mt. Kalawati Kuer (AIR 1928 P C 2) and Thiagaraja Boagavathar v. Emperor (PLD 1947 P C 103) may be cited with approval". To the same effect are some of the observations in the Karachi case of Syed Rashid Hussain. In the latter case, the English decisions were analysed in detail and it was held that the construction of the tenancy law in England in McIntyre's case was too literal to be accepted. Some comments from authors-English and Indian-on the law of tenancy were also noticed and after citing Adamali Hasan .Ali v. Mst. Rabab Bal (PLD 1965 Kar. 408), Adamali Hasan Ali v. Mst. Rubab Bai (PLD 1967 Kar. 437) and Agha Mohammad Ryas v. Masjid Committee, Rahimyar Khan PLD 1968 Lab. 863 , it was held that the Courts in Pakistan would rather give liberal construction to the law contained in the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. 1 am in respectful agreement with the reasoning in the Karachi ruling and adopt the same; and would, therefore, keep out of consideration English decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contention no. (i) noted above.
7. On the positive aide in respect of the same contention, it has beer, held in the case of Syed Rashid Hussain that there is nothing in subsection (3) of section 13 of the Ordinance to support the view that the Legislature intend--ed to draw an invidious distinction between the requirements of co-owners for their property and the requirement of a sole proprietor of a property and similarly there is nothing in the subsection to support the view that the Legislature intended to draw a distinction between tenants of property owned by several landlords and tenants of property owned by a single landlord. But the necessary consequences of literal construction of this subsection would be to draw such a distinction between the claims of landlords and the rights of tenants.
Therefore, the word "he" in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the subsection can be read both as "they" and as "any of them". The construction of the pronoun "he" meaning only "they" was not accepted, for it would result in bazari consequences some of which were visualises in the detailed judgment. I am also in respectful agreement with the reasoning and interpretation o section 13(3) in so far as the liberal construction of the expressions used therein is concerned. I also have, in several cases, pointed out that the superior Courts in Pakistan have, in so far as it has been possible, adopted liberal as compared to literal mode of interpretation of statutes.
8. The above discussion ordinarily would have sufficed to dispose of the legal contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. But I have: also considered the same in another aspect. It was held in Khalique Ahmed v. Abdul Ghani and another PLD 1973 SC 214 , that a suit for possession can be brought in case of a property owned by more than one persons by all the co- owners jointly,, but it is open to one of them also to sue for possession with one condition that he must join the other co-owners as defendants and the decree would be--fore joint possession and not in favour of a co-owner alone. Unlike that, a: suit for ejectment can be filed by one of the co- owners without joining the others as defendants. This was the difference pointed out between an action' for possession and an action for ejectment. It needs to be noticed that this ruling was given by their Lordships in the context of the provisions contained in section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance----Section 2(c) of the Ordinance defines "landlord" as meaning 'any person for --the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf or for the benefit of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person, and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised and every person from time to time --deriving title under a landlord'. One obvious conclusion drawn from the' definition, to which the learned counsel for the appellant also agreed, is that in case of co-owner landlords, if one receives the rent on behalf of the others, it shall be treated as payment to all. Thus, the principle of represen--tation qua the co-owners has, at least indirectly, been accepted and visualised in the definition of landlord ac contained in the Ordinance. Section 12 of West Pakistan General Clauses Act relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, in so far as it relates to numbers, reads as follows:- "12. Gender and Number.-In all West Pakistan Acts, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,- (1)---------------------------------------------..
(2) words in the singular shall include the plural and vice versa."
Section 2 of the Ordinance also commences with the purview,- "2. Definition.-In this Ordinance unless there is anything repugnant is the subject or context.-"
Three inferences can straightway be drawn from the combined reading of the above provisions: One, that subsection (2) of section 12 of General Clauses Act cannot be read in isolation of the subject or context of the statute which needs to be interpreted through this general law of interpretation; Two, that this provision of the General Clauses Act is an inclusive definition and is not restrictive one. It is permissible sometimes to treat "singular" with reference to subject or context as "plural", but it is not necessary to construe singular as plural in all circumstances. In other words, the Legislature permitted singular to be interpreted in plural only when the circumstances justify such a course to be taken; Three, that it is not necessary that a word may be construed in singular or in plural. It is not in- permissible in so far as the language of the relevant provisions is concerned to construe the same word as singular as also plural if the circumstances so require."
Definition of 'landlord' in section 2(a) of the Ordinance as already noted would include more than one landlords who are co-owners in a property, but in the same circumstances one would be competent to act on behalf of the other. There is nothing in the language of section 13(3)(a)(ii)(a) whether quits own context or in the context of definition of 'landlord'-to adopt a restrictive scope for interpretation of the word "landlord" or the pronoun "his" as to mean,-when there are more than one landlords-,'all' and not 'any' of them. In other words, the provision permits the interpretation of the words "landlord" and "his" as including all the landlords as also any of them. This interpretation is not violative of the provision contained in subsection (2 of section 12 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act nor it is repugnant to the subject and context of the provisions contained in the Ordinance, rather it (this interpretation) is in conformity with those provisions.
9. Sub-clause (a) of clause (ii) of subsection (3)(a) of section 13 provides that in the case of non- residential building or a scheduled building or rented land, if the landlord "requires it in good faith for his own use or for the use of any of his male children", this would be a good ground for directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession. If out of more than one children of a single landlord, requirement of one only can be considered as good ground for eviction, there is no reason to assume that the Legislature intended that when there are more than one landlord, requirement of one of them would not be enough for the same purpose. Similarly, if that would be enough it would not be in consonance with the same purpose and intention to assume that if there are more than one landlord, requirement of children of all of them would be the ground for eviction. Such like anomalous' results could not be intended by the Legislature. Therefore, the interpretation that section 13(3) of the Ordinance provides for all these situations, namely, if there are more than one landlords and all jointly require the premises or. There are more than one child of more than one landlord and a plural number of children require the premises, or, out of the plural number of landlords and/or their plural number of children only one landlord and/or one child require the premises; the condition laid in subsection (3) of section 13 in this behalf would stand satisfied. This interpretation is on the one hand in accord with the language used in section 13(3) and the underly--ing intention and, on the other band, it does not in any way go beyond the interpretation clause contained in subsection (2) of section 12 of the General Clauses Act or in section 2(c) of the Ordinance.
10. In the light of the above discussion, I have come to the conclusion that the requirement of one or more children of a single landlord or of more than one landlord can be the basis of eviction under section 13. In this ease, as the requirement is one of the two landlords together with his children, therefore, it is not in contravention of section 13(3)(a)(ii)(a) of the Ordinance as interpreted above. The legal argument of the learned counsel for the appellant thus fails.
11. After going through the relevant evidence, I agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that 'there is no justification for setting aside the concurrent findings of fact reached by the learned Rent Controller and the learned first appellate Court on the question of bona fides of the respondents qua the requirement of the shop in dispute for their own use. The mere fact that Sultan Ahmad, when under cross-examination, was not able to straightway indicate the business he and his sons wanted to start in the shop, is not enough to dilute the effect of the concurrent findings. In a given case there *an be circumstances justifying postponement of a decision as to the nature and details of business. The time when the premises become available for occupation by the landlord cannot be ignored. One business may suit a particular individual for a particular locality at a particular time, but the same may not be suitable at another time. If the landlords in this case decided to postpone the decision with regard to the nature of the business one of them together with his children wanted to start, it would not show that the requirement was not bona fide. The second argument of the learned counsel also has no substance.
12. None of the arguments raised by the learned counsel has succeeded. This appeal is dismissed.
The appellant, however, is allowed two months' time to vacate the shop. There- shall be no order as to costs.