1. MUHAMMAD GUL, J.-This judgment deals with the above Civil Appeals by leave of this Court and is directed against the judgment of a Division Bench of the late High Court of West Pakistan (Lahore Seat) dated the 9 January 1969. The appeals raise a common question of law as to the validity of transfer of the first respondent in each appeal made by the Provincial Government from a post held by him under the Lahore Municipal Corpora--tion to similar or equivalent post in another District of the Province. The learned Judges of the Division Bench declared the transfers of the respondents to be without lawful authority because certain statutory rules under which these transfers purported to have been made were ultra vires the statute.
2. The essential facts are these : The respondents entered service, in what was then Lahore Municipal Committee as constituted under the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (Punjab Act III of 1911), which later became Lahore Municipal Corporation under the City of Lahore Corporation Act, 1941 (Punjab Act XV of 1941). By order dated the 7th August 1967. The Provincial Government transferred among others, the respondent in each appeal from the post held by him in the Lahore Municipal Corporation to an equivalent post in an outlying District indicated below- Name From To
1. Mr. Mahboob Ali Deputy Chief Officer, Deputy Chief Officer, (respondent in L. M. C. District Council,th C. A. 175). Sialkot.
2. Mr. M. S. Farooki, Chief Officer, Chief Officer, District (respondent in L. M. C. Council, Multan.
3. C. A. 176).
3. Mr. Mohammad Manzoor Accounts Officer, Accounts Officer.
4. Ahmad L. M. C. District Council, (respondent in Lyallpur.
5. C. A. No. 178).
6. The transfers did not entail any loss of salary or status for the respondents. They nevertheless moved separately writ petitions to challenge their transfers on the ground that having been initially appointed to serve the Lahore Municipal Committee, under the terms and conditions of their service, they were not liable to be transferred to places outside the territorial limits of the Corporation and that the rules under which these purported transfers were made were ultra vires the statute.
7. To explain the nature of the order made by the High Court it would be convenient at this stage to refer to the organizational changes brought about in the Municipal administration throughout the country following the enact--ment of the Basic Democracies Order of 1959 (P. O. 18 of 1959) and the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1969 hereinafter respectively called the Order and the Ordinance. The Order repealed, inter alia, the Punjab District Boards Act, 1883 (Punjab Act XX of 1883) and by Article y provided for the creation of for tiers of "Local Councils" namely Union Councils at the basic level in rural areas, Thana Councils or as the case may be Tehsil Councils, District Councils and Divisional Councils in that ascending order throughout the country. The Order, by Article 44 provided for the first time, for the establishment of an integrated service called the Local Councils Service for each Province and empowered the Provincial Government to specify posts in Local Councils which shall he filled by members of the said service. Article 44 is in these terms "(1) There shall be constituted a Local Councils Service for each Province in such manner and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed.
(2) The Government map from time to time specify the posts in the Local Councils which shall be filled by persons belonging to the Local Councils Service of the Province."
8. For the purpose of this Article, the specified posts are the posts of the Chief Officer, the Deputy Chief Officer, Accounts Officer, Taxation Officer, Education Officer and Social Welfare Officer. The three respondents are among such officers.
9. Under Article 45 of the Order as originally enacted, the power of appoint--ment and transfer vested in the "Controlling Authority". Clause (5) ibid which is material in these appeals read :- "The Controlling Authority may transfer any of the persons appointed under clause (1) from one Local council to another Local Council within its jurisdiction."
10. By section 19 of Act XVI of 1965, the expression "Controlling Authority" wherever it occurred in Article 45 of the Order was replaced by the words "Prescribed Authority".
11. It appears that because of the complexity of urban life, separate provisions were considered necessary for municipal administration in urban areas. Hence the promulgation of the Ordinance in 1960 "to amend and consolidate the law relating to the Municipal Administration in Pakistan". The Ordinance by section 4 repealed, inter alia, the City of Lahore Corporation Act but at the same time preserved all appointments, Rules and Regulations etc. Made under the repealed Acts so far as the same were not inconsistent with the provisions of the Ordinance. For the purpose of these appeals, section 29 of the Ordinance is of crucial importance. The section incorporated in the Ordinance by reference, Chapter VIII Part II of the Order mutaris mutandis. Article 44 of the Order, which as pointed out already, provided for the creation of Local Councils Service occurred in that Chapter and therefore became part of the Ordinance as well. Section 29 of the Ordinance is in these terms "The Government may from time to time specify the posts in the Municipal Committees which shall be filled by persons belonging to the Local Councils Service constituted under Article 44 in Chapter VIII of Part II of the Order, and the other provisions of that Chapter shall mutatis mutandis apply in relation to the servants of Municipal Committees as they apply in relation to the servants of Local Councils as if the said provisions had been enacted in this Ordinance, and
(a) any reference to a Local Council were a reference to a Municipal Committee ;
(b) any reference to the Controlling Authority were a reference to the Controlling Authority under this Ordinance d
(c) any reference to the Order were a reference to this Ordinance ; and---------. "
12. From the above provisions of the Order and the Ordinance it becomes evident that. The object was to create a common cadre of officers to man "the specified posts" both in the Local Councils and the Municipal Committees. It is also important to point out that under the legal instruments which had hithertofore remained in force in relation to Local Self-Government institutions, no such integrated service existed for the purposes either of District Boards, of Municipal Committees. Each such institution, apart from the general supervisory control by the Provincial Government, functioned in isolation and had its own set of be-laws or rules to regulate the terms and conditions of its servants who were not transferable to another Municipal Committee or as the case may be District Board.
13. Pursuant to the provisions set out above, the West Pakistan Local Councils and Municipal Committees Service Rules, 1963, (here--inafter called the 1963 Rules), were framed by the Provincial Govern--ment under Articles 44 and 89 of the Order and section 29 read with section 121 of the Ordinance. The invocation of power for the frame of Rules both under, the Order and the Ordinance and the nomen--clature of the Rules are highly significant and underline the creation of a common cadre of service for the purposes of Local Councils and Municipal Committees. By rule 2(h) of the 1963 Rules, the definition of "Local Council" was extended to cover "for the purposes of these Rules, Municipal Committees constituted under the Municipal Administration Ordinance of 1960. Though Local Council" was defined in Article 2(24) of the Order as under :- "Local Council" means a council constituted under this Order, and includes a Town Committee and a Union Committee, but does not include any such Committee as in mentioned in Article 30."
14. By rules 6 ibid, members of the Local Council Service are classified as Class I, Class II and Class III.
15. Each class was sub-divided into Senior Grade and Junior Grade. Persons belonging to Senior Grade in Class I are liable to transfer anywhere in the Province and those in the Junior Scale of Class I, to transfer within the region. Vide memo No. 228-S. O. (S) 64 dated 1-4-1964 issued by the Provincial Government, pursuant to rule 6 of the Rules, what C was designated as the Lahore Region, comprised the existing Province of the Punjab excluding the Bahawalpur Division. Rule 8 provided, inter alia, that on coming into force of these Rules, officials other than the engineers and health officers shall be deemed to have been appointed to the service in the corresponding class and grade.
16. The respondents in the three appeals, though initially employed by Lahore Municipal Corporation have been treated as members of the W. P. Local Councils Service, being a common service for Local Councils and Municipal Committees. Of them Mr. M. S. Farooki, respondent in C. A. No. 176 was in senior scale of Class I service and therefore, under a liability for transfer to any place in the Province. The respondents in the other two appeals were in junior scale of Class I service and therefore liable to be transferred within the region, which in their case was Lahore Region. The impugned order transferring the respondents was issued by the Provincial Government which had been designated as the "Prescribed Authority" under rule 2 of the W. P. Servants of Local Councils and Municipal Committees (Prescribed Authority and Prescribed Terms of Conditions) Rules, 1965, under Article 45 of the Order which too stood incorporated in the Ordinance.
17. In the High Court, the respondents abjured their status as members of the West Pakistan Local Councils Service and therefore disowned their liability for transfer to any post outside the territorial limits of the Lahore Municipal Corporation or unconnected with the affairs. They further urged that their transfer to any place beyond the aforesaid limits, in any event, adversely affected their terms and conditions of service by which they had hitherto been governed and under which they were not liable to be transferred beyond the territorial limits of Lahore Municipal Corporation. In support of this part of their case, reliance was placed on the proviso to rule 8 of the 1963 Rules according to which the terms and conditions of service of persons absorbed in the newly established service "shall not be less favourable than the terms and conditions admissible to them immediately" before the coming into force of the Rules.
18. The learned Judge of the Division Bench in the High Court however, upon an examination of the above provisions of law including the 1963 Rules came to the conclusion that with the repeal of the Punjab Act XV of 1941 and coming into force of the Order and the Ordinance and the Rule framed thereunder, the respondents had become members of the W. P. Local Councils and Municipal Committees Service and therefore became subject to the terms and conditions of service laid down therein. As to their liability for transfer to places outside the territorial limits of the Lahore Municipal Corporation, Shamim Hussain Kadri J, who wrote the leading judgment observed that this was a matter "incidental to the exigency of service" and it would therefore not be possible to nullify their transfers on that score.
19. Notwithstanding the above conclusion, the learned Judges held the respondents' transfer to be without lawful authority, firstly because the transfers were not made by the comp.-tent authority, which in their case was the Controlling Authority as provided in section 29 and defined in section 3(10) of the Ordinance and secondly, that rule 2(h) of the 1963 Rules in so far as it extended the meanings of "Local Council" beyond its meaning as defined in Article 2(24) of the Order so as to cover the Municipal Committees, in the absence of corresponding amendment in the Order or the Ordinance was without any legal sanction. The learned Judges opined that even though the expression "Controlling Authority" in Article 45 of the Order had been replaced by words "Prescribed Authority" by the amending Act XVI of 1965, no corresponding amendment was made in section 29 of the Ordinance which also spoke of the words "Controlling Authority" and the amendment in Article 45 could not ipso facto be read into section 29 of the Ordinance. In support of their conclusion, the learned Judges relied on the Privy Council judgment in Secretary of State v.
20. Hindustan Cooperative Insurance Society Limited (AIR 1931PC149). Therefore, the learned Judges opined that in spite of creation of common cadre of service under rule 8, persons serving Municipal Committees at the time of coming into force of 1963 Rules continued to remain a different class from the persons serving the Local Councils. On these premises, Shamim Hussain Kadri, J, who wrote the leading judgment observed- "No doubt specified posts in the Municipal Committees shall have to be filled by persons belonging to Local Council service, but both the categories of servants cannot be absorbed into one service unless amendment is made in Article 9 of B. D. O. And Municipal Committee is included in that or necessary amendment is made in section 29 of the M. A. O. So as to include the Local Councils as well."
21. On this reasoning the learned Judges concluded that persons serving in the Municipal Committees could not be transferred to Local Councils though "they could certainly be transferred from one Municipal Committee to another Committee within the jurisdiction of their "Controlling Authority."
22. Similarly, Karam Elahi Chohan, J. In his concurring judgment opined that rule 2(h) of the 1963 Rules in so far it extended the meaning of the expression "Local Council" to include a Municipal Committee and rule 6 ibid in so far as it operated to abolish all distinction between the employees of Local Councils and employees of Municipal Committees, in the absence of corresponding amendment in any of the parent statute are ultra vires.
23. Leave was granted to consider, whether the conclusion of the learned Judges in the High Court proceeded on correct interpretation of the two statutes and relevant rules framed thereunder?
24. Argument was addressed on behalf of the appellant Government only. In the course of argument, it transpired that of the three respondents concerned, Mahboob Ali and M. S. Farooki (respondents in C. A. 175 and 176) have since retired and Manzoor Ahmad (respondent in C. A. No. 178) is due to retire later this year.
25. Needless to say, that the whole purpose of the interpretation of a statute is to ascertain the intention of the law maker and to make it effective. The basic principles governing the interpretation or construction of statutes are well settled. But these have seldom been regarded as inflexible, except perhaps where a statute is plain, certain and free from any ambiguity so that a bare reading of it would suffice. In essence, in such case, interpretation is unnecessary. Barring such plain cases statutes would be construed liberally or strictly according to their subject-matter, the object or purpose intended to be achieved, or whether it is in any way in derogation of any common law or inherent right. For instance, it is well settled that penal or fiscal statutes or statutes impinging upon common law rights, are to be strictly construed and any ambiguity or imprecision is to be resolved in favour of the subject. On the other hand it is equally well settled that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed so as to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief. So also empowering statutes are generally liberally construed so as to effectuate and not to stultify the power conferred. Modern cases provide many instances of the Judges' reluctance to stand upon the letter of the law strictly in the interpretation of a statute falling under the second category.
26. It is true that even in such cases. What is an obvious omission cannot be supplied by invoking the rule of liberal interpretation. In such cases rule of cassus omissus is generally applied. But when faced with a choice between a wide meaning, which carries out what appears to be object of the Legislature more fully and a narrow meaning which carries it out less fully or not at all, the choice of the Courts is often the former. Beneficial construction is a tendency, rather than a rule. (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 1969 Edn., p. 92). Province of East Pakistan v. Siraj-ul-Haq Patwari (PLD 1964 SC 854) in which the vires of section 57 of the Electoral College Act 1964 (Act IV of 1964) came under examination of this Court is a classical example of liberal interpretation with a view to achieving the legislative purpose of a beneficial statute. Incidentally a Full Bench of what was then the High Court of East Pakistan, had by a majority struck down the section as ultra vires the Constitution. But the majority decision was reversed by this Court.
27. Even the rule of cassus omissus is not inflexible. In Crawford's Statutory Construction, 1940 Ed., it is observed is section 169 at pp. 269-70 - "But, inasmuch as it is the intention of the Legislature which constitutes the law of any statute, and since the primary purpose of construction is to ascertain that intention, such intention should be given effect, even if it necessitates the supply of omissions, provided, of course, that this effectuates the legislative intention. Some decisions seem to indicate a trend in this direction, and allow words omitted by oversight to be supplied, if the statute is otherwise meaningless, or if an amendment without interpolation is ineffective . . . . .It is proper for the Court to supply such omissions because they are in fact a part of the statute, having been intended to be included in the statute when drafted and enacted.
28. The foot note refers to a number of precedents in support of the above statement and it is pointed out- "A cassus amissus should be avoided by construction, if reasonably possible . . . . . . . . . And especially do the Courts show an inclination to confine the rule of cassus omissus to penal or criminal statutes . . . . . . . . And to reject it where remedial statutes arc concerned."
29. As stated in the beginning the plain object of fusion of Chapter VIII of the Order with the Ordinance was to streamline the administration of the Local Self-Government both in rural and urban areas and for that purpose to establish an integrated cadre of service for filling specified posts in Local Councils and Municipal Committees. The deleterious effect of serving in one position or in one office throughout the period of one's service is too obvious, and is not permitted except in the lowest rung of public service. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the incorporation of Chapter VIII of the Order in section 29 of the Ordinance with the ultimate object of establishing a common service for manning specified posts which were posts of responsibility In Local Councils and Municipal Committees was for a better administrations of their affairs which was indeed a beneficial purpose. Consequently, the; statutory provisions designed to effectuate that purpose will, on the principles explained above, bear liberal interpretation. It might' even extend to supplying of omissions, if any, unless there is something in the statute itself which points to the contrary.
30. If I may say so with respect, this aspect of the case has been entirely overlooked by the learned Judges in the High Court, and the validity of rule 2(h) and rule 6 has been tested with reference to the provisions of the statute as a purely theoretical proposition.
31. The prime reason which weighed with the learned Judges to declare rule 2(h) and rule 6 of the 1963 Rules ultra vires was that the former extended the meaning of Local Councils beyond what was defined in Article 2(24) of the Order in that the rule operated to include the Municipal Committees which in the opinion of the learned Judges was not possible without the textual amendment in the Order or the Ordinance. In the absence of any such amendment they considered the rule 2(h) repugnant to the statutory definition of Local Council in Article 2(24) and therefore was ultra vires.
32. Rule 6 makes the employees of the Local Councils and Municipal Committees mutually inter- transferable which the learned Judges thought virtually abolished all distinctions between the Municipal Committees constituted under the Ordinance and the Local Councils established under Article 2(24) read with Article 9 of the Order which the learned Judges opined was not possible except under the express provision made in the statutes.
33. As respects rule 2(h) it has already been pointed out that it merely enlarged the definition of Local Council in Article 2(24) and that too for the purpose of the 1963 Rules. The question therefore is whether it is correct to say that rule 2(h) is repugnant or inconsistent to Article 2(24) and should therefore be condmned as ultra vires. According to the Oxford Dictionary the word "repugnant" means "contrary or contradictory to, inconsistent or incompatible with, divergent from, standing against something else." In Union SS Co. Of New Zealand v. The Commonwealth ((1925) 36 C L R 130) it was observed that no doubt the word repugnant is often used loosely or rhetorically but in considering the Acts of parliament the strict meaning should prima facie be applied. According to Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 42 P. 541 the word "inconsistent" is of broad signification implying contradiction, qualities which cannot co-exist, not merely a lack of uniformity in details; and judicially defined as meaning contradictory inharmonious, logically incompatible; contrary the one to the other, so that both cannot stand; mutually repugnant or contradictory. Things are said to be inconsistent when they are contrary the one to the other, or, so that one infers the negation, destruction, or falsity of the other; or the acceptance or establish--ment of the one implies the abrogation or abandonment of the other, as in speaking of 'inconsistent defenses?, or the repeal by a statute of all laws inconsistent herewith. Having regard to the judicial interpretation of the word inconsistency and repugnancy I have no doubt whatever, in my mind that it is not right to suggest that merely because the definition of Local Counsel has been enlarged in rule 2(h) so as to include Municipal Committees, it becomes so inconsistent as to be destructive of the statutory definition of the term. Rather the definition has been enlarged only "for the purpose" of the 1963 Rules, and this is in keeping with the general purpose and tenor of both the statutes as manifested by the fusion of Chapter VIII of the Order into the Ordinance. Not only that. According to Article 92(6) of the Order, the Rules framed thereunder, shall be deemed to form part of this Order and shall have effect accordingly. This is a complete answer to any question as to the vires of rule 2(h) and also rule 6.
34. It would also be pertinent to point out that the arrangements envisaged under the 1963 Rules to create a common cadre of officers for the purposes of both the Local Councils and Municipal Committees, with liability for inter-transfer from Local Councils to Municipal Committees is by no means unprecedented. The creation of C. S. P. As the common service for the requirements of the Central Government and the Provinces would be a very apt analogy. It will be recalled that with the coming into force of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the former I. C. S. Was abolished as established service though its individual members who opted to serve any of the two successor Dominions continued in service on the terms and conditions of service as had hitherto been applicable to them subject to certain qualifications which are not material for our immediate purpose. It is also noteworthy that prior to Independence the former I. C. S. Was not an integrated service for what was then British India. It was a single service divided into a number of cadres on provincial basis. Officers appointed to the service were then allocated to various provinces and they remained members of I. C. S. Cadre of their respective provinces throughout their careers. The Central Govern--ment met its needs by deputation of officers belonging to I. C. S. From the Provinces. This then was the structure of the former I. C. S. Immediately before its abolition on the eve of Independence. Subsequent to the Inde--pendence pursuant to an agreement between the Governor-General and the Governors of then Provinces in Pakistan under section 263 of the Government of India Act, 1935, a new service common to the Centre and the Provinces called the Civil Service of Pakistan was established. Section 263 envisaged the creation of service "common to the federation and one or more of the provinces or common to two or more provinces . . . . . . . ., "
35. Contrary to the structure of the former I. C. S. The C. S. P. Was created on centralised basis with a single unified cadre so that unlike the pre-Independence practice, the officers were sent on deputation from Centre to the Provinces to cater for the provincial needs. It is important to observe that all this was achieved by means of Rules, called the Civil Service of Pakistan (Composition and Cadre) Rules, 1954. These Rules comprehensively provided for the reserva--tion of superior posts on the executive, judiciary and revenue departments at the Centre and in the Provinces and other related matters concerning the administration of service. Apart from general empowering provisions in sections 241 and 263 of the Government of India Act, nothing is said in the sections as to the manner in which the service so created and maintained is to be administered. The 1954 Rules have remained in the field far more than a quarter of a century, yet nobody has questioned their vires on the ground that they cover matters not expressly provided for in the Government of India Act.
36. It remains to consider whether the Provincial Government which made the impugned order of transfer was the "Prescribed Authority" within the meaning of the W. P. Servants of Local Councils and Municipal Committees (Prescribed Authority and Prescribed Terms and Conditions) Rules, 1965. Rule 2 of these Rules designated for the relevant purpose, the Provincial Government to be the "Prescribed Authority" in certain specified cases and in other cases the Control--ling Authority, which generally is the Divisional Commissioner. The objection taken by the respondents and which prevailed in the High Court on the basis of the Privy Council decision in the case of Hindustan Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd. Noticed earlier is, that at the material time the respondents were servants of the Lahore Municipal Corporation and therefore as respects them, the Controlling Authority remained as named in section 3(10) of the Ordinance and not as designated in the 1965 Rules. Section 3(10) of the Ordinance is in these terms :- "'Controlling Authority' means in the case of such Municipal Committees or class of Municipal Committee as the Government may from time to time; by notification in the official Gazette, specify in this behalf, the Government, and in all other cases the Commissioner."
37. The learned Judges opined that since section 19 of Act XVI of 1965 amended only Article 45(5) of the order without making a consequential amendment in section 3(10) of the Ordinance, the latter would take effect according to its terms. Therefore, the impugned order of transfer remained ineffective for want of competency.
38. The Privy Council case of Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society Limited arose out of a claim for compensation in respect of property acquired under the Calcutta Improvement Act (Bengal Act V of 1911) (hereinafter for convenience, called the local Act). That Act gave wide powers to Board of Trustees under the Act for the acquisition of immovable property within certain specified area for the purpose of the Act directly, instead of leaving the matter to be dealt with under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. (Hereinafter for convenience called the general Act). Under the general Act,.
39. The land is acquired by the Local Government and the compensation is in the first instance assessed by the Collector who makes the "Award". Any person interested who does not accept the Award may require the Collector to refer the matter to "the Court" which as defined means, the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction. "The Court" then proceeds to deal with the matter on the lines laid down in the Act and its proceedings again terminate in an "Award" from which appeal lay under section 54 to the High Court. According to the Privy Council dictum in an earlier case viz : (Rangoon Borataung Co. v. Collector of Rongoon (391 A 197) no further appeal lay to the Privy Council on the ground that the proceedings throughout were in the nature of arbitration proceedings and that no appeal being provided in terms, to His Majesty in Council, no such appeal lay. Under the local Act, the Trustees were also to proceed as if under the: general Act. But tire local Act modified the general Act in certain respects. One of these was that for the purposes of the determining disputes as to the compensation, "a Tribunal" was to take the, place of "the Court" under the general Act. By section 71 of the local Act, the Tribunal was to be deemed to be "the Court" under the general Act "except for the purpose of section 54 of that Act". This exception operated to omit from the local Act, the general right of appeal to the High Court and this was emphasised by the further provision in section 71 that the award of the Tribunal "shall be final". But shortly after passing of the local Act, it was amended by Act XVIII of 1911 which provided for appeal to the High Court on a certificate of fitness by the President of the Tribunal, but subject to certain qualifications. Later the general Act was also amended by Act XIV of 1921 by which a new subsection was added by which "Award" of "the Court" was to be deemed "to be a decree" and the grounds of the award "judgment" as defined m C. P. C. The amending Act also replaced section 54 of the general Act by a new section which in terms gave right of appeal to the Privy Council from any decree passed by the High Court, on appeal from an Award of "the Court".
40. The question which came up for decision by the Privy Council in the precedent case was whether in a case for compensation under the local Act, there was also a right of appeal to the Privy Council based upon the amend--ment of the general Act by Act XIV of 1921 ?
41. Having regard to the provisions of section 71 of the local Act, under which the Tribunal was not to be deemed to be "the Court" for the purpose of section 54 of the general Act, their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the amendment of section 54 of the general Act would not sustain the claim for right of appeal to the Privy Council under the local Act. In reaching that conclusion it was pointed out that the combined effect of toe two enactments was to give a special and strictly limited sight of appeal to the High Court from an Award of the Tribunal, and to provide that, subject to this right, the Award shall be final. Their Lordships had no doubt, that the provision for finality was intended to preclude any further appeal. It was in that context that the Privy Council had in the precedent case held that as existing Act incorporated is subsequent Act by reference, any repeal or the amendment of the first Act, shall not affect the operation of the subsequent Act.
42. In the instant case we are not faced with any such limiting provision in the Ordinance comparable to section 71 of the local Act in the precedent case. Here as pointed out already, we are concerned with legislation of a different kind altogether. And on the principles explained in the earlier part of the judgment, I do not find any unsurmountable difficulty in holding, that in consequence of section 29 of the Ordinance which provides for the application of Chapter VIII of the Order mutatis mutandis to the Ordinance the expression is equivalent to saying subject to necessary changes in its details". The intention of the law maker, plainly was to apply to the servants of Municipal Committees the provisions, Inter alia, of Article 45(5) of the Order. And there is no reason why Article 45(5) should not be applied in its amended form keeping in vies' the purpose and the general scheme of the legislation. That would be only giving effect to what - plainly was the legislative intendment. '
43. For all the foregoing reasons I would accept these appeals and direct that the writs issued by the High Court be recalled. I would however, leave the parties to bear their own costs.