' CH. MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM ZIA, J.---The titled appeal by leave of the Court has been filed from the judgment of the High Court dated 05.08.2014, whereby the appeal filed by the appellant, herein, has been dismissed.
2. The precise facts of the case are that the appellant, herein, filed a writ petition before the High Court while challenging the award of Gold Medal to respondent No,
7. It is claimed that she (appellant) and respondent No,, 7 are students of M.Sc. Physics, in the University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Muzaffarabad. Both of them secured 4.0 CGPA during session 2009-2011. The appellant claimed that she secured first position in the relevant discipline, thus, she is also entitled for award of Gold Medal under rules. The learned High Court after . Necessary proceedings dismissed the writ petition vide impugned judgment dated 05.08.2014. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner has now filed the instant appeal by leave of the Court.
3. Sardar Abdul Sammie Khan, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellant after narration of necessary facts submitted that the impugned judgment of the High Court is result of misconception of facts and law. The learned High Court has wrongly relied upon the report of the Committee which on the face of it is contrary to the rules on the subject. He submitted that according to the statutory provisions dealing with the specific proposition, the findings recorded by the High Court are totally against law. Rule 15 of the Semester Regulations of the University clearly speaks that for awarding Gold Medal to the students who obtained CGPA of 4.0, the merit will be determined on (exclusively) over all percentage basis. The method adopted by the Committee, on the basis of which the impugned judgment has been passed, on the face .Of it is contrary to these statutory provisions. He further submitted that the Committee in its report at one hand relied upon referred rule but at the same time violated the same while compiling the report. The Committee has also observed that there is no set rule for evaluating the overall percentage. The Committee has brought on record two methods which remained in practice in past. He submitted that according to one of the methods or formulas, the (exclusively) overall percentage of both the contestants is one and the same, whereas, the other adopted formula is totally against the spirit of the rule and having no statutory backing. The appellant has categorically challenged the findings of the Committee but this point has not been considered by the learned High Court, The whole judgment is based on the disputed findings of the Committee. He also referred to the document (Annexure 'PK') and submitted that the respondent-University in such like cases has already awarded joint Gold Medals. Therefore, while accepting this appeal and setting-aside the impugned judgment, the appellant may be declared entitled for Gold Medal.
4. Conversely, M/s. Mushtaq Hussain Gillani and Farooq Hussain Kashmiri, Advocates, the learned counsel for the respondents, forcefully defended the impugned judgment and submitted that the report of the Committee is in accordance with law and the past practice. The version of the appellant that the overall percentage of both the contestants is equal, is not correct. According to the report of the Committee there is difference in overall percentage of the appellant and the contesting respondent. The respondent's overall percentage comes to 85.579, whereas; that of the appellant's comes to 85.537, thus, the respondent's overall percentage is higher by 0.042 percent than the appellant which is remarkable difference. Thus, the whole process has been conducted according to law and no illegality or irregularity is committed. The learned High Court has rightly dismissed the writ petition, thus the same is liable to be upheld.
5. We have considered the arguments of learned counsel for the parties and also examined the record made available: The only point which requires determination in this case is the evaluation of the merit of the contesting parties for awarding the Gold Medal. The parties have placed on record the undisputed result intimation documents (Annexures 'PD' and 'PE') which contain the course- wise details of percentage of marks obtained, CGPA and the Grade. According to these admitted documents both the contestants have obtained 4.0 CGPA and 'A' Grade in all the courses. The enforced rule of Semester Regulations in this regard, as relied upon by the Committee, reads as follows:-- "15. Award of Distinction and Medal: A student, who completes his/her degree requirements in his/her respective discipline and never fails in any subject and obtains overall CGPA at least 3.5 and also stands first in his/her class, shall be awarded Gold Medal.
' If two or more students obtain same CGPA between.
3.5 and 3.9 then Gold Medal will be decided by computing their CGPA up to any decimal point, if two or more students obtain CGPA of 4.0 then the Gold. Medal will be awarded on their (Exclusively) overall percentage basis."
' According to this rule, there are two classes of the students; one falling in the line who obtained CGPA between 3.5 and 3.9 and the other who obtained CGPA of 4.0. For determination of the merit of these two classes, there is a clear distinction. For the first class, the CGPA has to be computed upto any decimal point, whereas, for the later class the basic formula for determination of merit is (exclusively) overall percentage. In the report of the Committee, the formula adopted, in our opinion, appears to be akin to, the standard prescribed for the first class of students who obtained CGPA between 3.5 and 3.9. For such class, for computation of CGPA upto any decimal point, the calculation will be made. For calculation of the CGPA according to the rules, the credit hours are one of the factors for calculation of the grading system as prescribed under rule 12 of Semester Regulations. But in our opinion this formula does not appear to be more relevant for calculation of overall percentage. For calculation of the overall percentage the Committee itself has mentioned the formula which speaks that the calculation shall be made on the basis of: Overall %age = Marks obtained x 100 Total Marks
6. According to the system, for every course the marks are mentioned on percentage basis. The calculation of both the contestants according to the admitted documents (i.e,, result intimation cards) shows that, the total sum of percentage of marks of both the contestants comes to 1965, whereas, the total marks of the course are 2300 as per interpretation furnished by the authorities.
Therefore, according to the formula (i.e,, 1965/2300 x 100) the (exclusively) overall percentage of both the contestants is 85.43. Thus, by application of the first formula as mentioned by the Committee in its report the overall percentage of both the contestants is equal. The Committee in its report has also observed that there is no set formula or rule for evaluating the overall percentage. It is further mentioned that in past, the percentage had been calculated on two different formulas, which are reproduced as under:
(i) Overall %age = Marks obtained x 100 Total Marks
(ii) Overall %age = %age of marks x Credit hour Total credit hour ' It appears that, the Committee has adopted the second formula which in our opinion is not more nearer to for determination of overall percentage rather it appears to be nearer to for determination of Grade and CGPA. According to the rule of administration of justice, it is now almost settled principle of law that when there are two methods or . Provisions, the method or provision which favours the citizens has to be A adopted. In this regard reliance can be placed on the judgment reported as Muhammad Asif Khan and others v. Azad Government and others [2014 PLC (C.S.) 534]. The same view has been expressed in the case reported as Ch. Javaid Mehdi v.
Chief Election Commissioner and others [PLJ 2004 SC(AJ&K) 245] and Messrs Spinning Mills v.
Deputy Collector Central Excise and others [2004 PTD 2479]. This principle of law has also been followed by this Court in the latest judgment reported as Imran Ali v. Public Service Commission and 4 others [2014 PLC (C.S.) 442], in which it has been observed as follows:-- "12. There is some weight in the argument of senior counsel/ amicus curiae, Mr. Abdul Rasheed Abbasi, that when the appellant is a State Subject, his rights are guaranteed under the Constitution. He is being deprived of his service rights due to some notifications issued by the Government. In such circumstances, the principles of beneficial construction of interpretation of Statutes have to be applied. It is a celebrated principle of interpretation of Statutes that when two interpretations are possible, the one beneficial to the state subject has to be adopted. In a case reported. As Ch. Javaid Mehdi v. Chief Election Commissioner and others PLJ 2004 SC (AJ&K) 245 it was observed as under:-
36. We have already dilated on the question that the right to contest the elections is a fundamental right enshrined by the Constitution and if the question of interpretation of provision of any election statute is involved, then very clear and unambiguous interpretation should be adhered to. There are not two views about the fact that to deprive a person from taking part in the elections tantamount to depriving him and his voters from the right of franchise and it falls within the purview of fundamental rights. With regard to fundamental rights, if two views are possible from reading a provision of law, then the view which favours the citizens may be given preference over the second view. The aforesaid celebrated principle of law is supported by the authorities titled The State v. Syed Qaim All Shah [1992 SCMR 2192 (2216)], B.P. Biscuit Factory Ltd. Karachi v. Wealth Tax Officer and another [1996 SCMR 1470 (1475-C)] and Rafiq Akhtar Chaudhary v. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government PLD 1982 (AJ&K) 124 para 14]."
' In another case titled M/s. Amin Spinning Mills v. Deputy Collector Central Excise and others 2004 PTD 2479 it was observed as under:--
6. If the two views are possible from reading a provision of law, then the view which favours the citizens may be given preference over the second view. The aforesaid solitary principle of law is supported by the authorities titled The State v. Syed Qaim Ali Shah [1992 SCMR 2192] and B.P. Biscuit Factory Ltd. Karachi v. Wealth Tax Officer and another [1996 SCMR 1470].
' Similarly in the case reported as Province of West Pakistan and another v. Mahboob Ali and another [PLD 1976 SC 483] it was observed as under:-- ' "Needless to say that the whole purpose of the interpretation of a statute is to ascertain intention of the law maker and to make it effective. The basic principles governing the interpretation or construction of statutes are well settled. But these have seldom been regarded as inflexible, except perhaps where a statute is plain, certain and free from any ambiguity so that a bare reading would suffice. In essence, in such case, interpretation is unnecessary. Barring such plain cases statutes would be construed liberally or strictly according to their subject-matter, the object or purpose intended to be achieved, or whether it is in any way in derogation of any common law or inherent right. For instance, it is well settled that penal rights, are to be strictly construed and any ambiguity or imprecision is to be resolved in favour of the subject. On the other hand it is equally well settled that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed so as to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief. So also empowering statutes are generally liberally construed so as to effectuate and not to stultify the power conferred. Modern cases provide many instances of the Judges' reluctance to stand upon the letter of the law strictly in the interpretation of statute falling under the second category. It is true that even in such cases, what is an obvious omission cannot be supplied by invoking the rule of liberal interpretation. In such cases rule of cassus omissus is generally applied.
But when faced with a choice' between a wide meaning, which carries out what appears to be object of the Legislature fully and a narrow meaning which carries it out less fully or not at all, the choice of the Courts is often the former. Beneficial construction is a tendency, rather than a rule.'
' The Constitution guarantees the right in service and the appellant is being deprived of the fundamental right due to act of the Government. In such eventuality, the principles of beneficial construction have to be applied, but the difficulty before the Court is that the notifications dated 12.3.1972 and 24.8.1972, dealing with the subject of quota in the Government service, specifically provide "refugees of Jammu and Kashmir settled in Pakistan" and "refugees from occupied Kashmir settled in Pakistan", respectively. It has been observed in para 10 of this judgment that the intention of both the notifications appears that the quota has been reserved for refugees from occupied Kashmir, settled in Pakistan and not for the State Subjects, who migrated from Azad Jammu and Kashmir under compulsion, therefore, the principle of beneficial interpretation for extending the definition of word "refugee" to Mangla Dam displaced persons settled in Pakistan is not applicable in the case and such persons cannot be considered as "refugees" for the purpose of aforesaid notifications."
Thus, the formula according to which the overall percentage of both the contestants is equal and favours them, has to be adopted according to the celebrated principle of administration of justice.
7. The produced record speaks that, the University has already in such like cases awarded the Gold Medals to more than one students whose merit was equal. The document produced as annexure 'PK' in this regard has not been denied by the respondents, therefore, in view of the above discussed reasons and past practice of the University the appellant also deserves for award of Gold Medal in M.Sc. Physics.
8. We may also deem it necessary to observe here in public interest and with reference to the observation of the Committee that for removing the ambiguity, the concerned authorities should make rules more clear and definite so that such like disputes may not arise because every student has not such sources or determination to seek his right at the judicial forum which also amounts to bear heavy financial burden and the agony of litigation.
9. For the above stated reasons we are constrained to accept this appeal, recall the impugned judgment of the High Court and grant the writ while declaring that as both the appellant and respondent No,7 obtained 4.0 CGPA and according to rule 15 of Semester Regulations their overall percentage is equal, thus, both are entitled for award of Gold Medals.
' This appeal stands accepted in the terms indicated above. No order as to costs.