SALEEM AKHTAR, J.--1. The petitioner is a private limited Company and owns a building constructed on plot of land bearing survey Nos. 19, 29, 21 and 22 situated at Club Road, Karachi. The building was constructed in the year 1953 and consists of ground and four upper floors. The petitioner let out the building to another private limited Company known as Hotel Metropole (Pvt.) Limited on rent and occupancy charges amounting to Rs. 11,86,360 per annum. It has been alleged that this building was never held for the purpose of business of construction, sale or letting out the property but it is used as hotel and some of the rooms in this building were also let out to various tenants. For the assessm ent year 1981-82 ending on 30th June, 1981, the petitioner submitted its return under the Wealth Tax Act, 1963 showing nil liability. The respondent No. 2 did not agree with this treatment and held it to be an asset within the meaning of section 2 clause (e). The petitioner filed an appeal against this order, which is still pending. The Petitioner also filed this petition challenging the levy of Wealth Tax as without jurisdiction. The respondent No. 2 while passing the assessment order relied on the judgment of B.P. Biscuit Factory Limited, Karachi v. Wealth Tax Officer, Circle-II, Karachi (1981 PTD 217) = (45 Taxation 17). In this judgment section 2(e) was interpreted to mean that properties built for purpose of letting out can be treated as asset. The assessee in that case filed appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which was allowed and section 2(e) was interpreted in the following manner; "Section 2 of the Ordinance amended clause (e) of section 2 of the Act by substituting the definition of the expression 'assets'. The new definition, so far as it is relevant for the disposal of these appeals, reads as follows; 'assets' includes- .......................... ..........................
(ii) in the case of a firm, an association of persons or a body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, and a company, immovable property held for the purpose of the business of construction and sale, or letting out, of property."
It was further observed; "We do not think that the speach of the Finance Minister is of much help in interpreting the definition of the expression 'assets'. However, the definition does not seem to be very happily worded. It can be interpreted as referring to three different categories of immovable properties, to wit:~
(i) immovable property held for the purpose of ....letting out of property,
(ii) immovable property held for the purpose of business of letting of property, and
(iii) immovable property held for the purpose of business of construction and sale or business of construction and letting out, of property." and finally it was observed; "It is equally well-settled that when the language of a fiscal statute is ambiguous and several interpretations of the same provision are possible, the doubt should be resolved in favour of the citizen. See Muhammad Amir Khan v. Controller of Estate Duty (PLD 1961 SC 119) and observation of Mohammad Gul, J. In West Pakistan v. Mahboob Ali (PLD 1976 SC 483). Following this principle of interpretation, we would hold that only such immovable properties as are held for the purpose of business of construction and sale or of letting them out fall within the definition. It is not the case of the Department that the immovable property of the appellants brought to tax was being held for the purpose of business of construction and letting out. We would, therefore, accept these appeals and declare the notices served and assessment made upon the appellants as without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The appellants shall also have their costs in these appeals."
The dictum laid down by the Supreme Court equally applies in the present case with full force. The petitioner has not been held to be engaged in business of construction for the purpose of sale or letting out. Therefore, the property in dispute cannot be treated as 'assets' as defined by section 2(e).
2. We, therefore, allow the petition and declare that the impugned order passed by respondent No. 2 is without lawful authority and of no legal effect.