This is an application under section 50,
1. R. O., by the Electric Lamp Manufacturers of Pakistan Ltd., to which I will refer as the company, seeking interpretation of the provisions of the settlement arrived at between the Company and the collective bargaining agent in the establishment of the company, to which I will refer as the C. B. A., on 13th August, 1979, in regard to the eligibility of the workers entitled to receive gratuity. The provisions contained in the settlement in ques--tion in this behalf read as follows:- ---That the management has agreed that those workers who have more than 3 years continuous satisfactory service but less than 10 years service will be given gratuity 25 days basic wages for each completed year of service. Similarly, those workers who have more than 10 years continuous service will be given 30 days basic wages for each completed year of sorvice as gratuity. The calculation of gratuity will be .On. Basic pay last on pay roll."
Although the said settlement was due to expire on 12th August, 1979, its period of operation, has admittedly been extended by the settlement, dated 20th September, 1981, by another year.
2. According to the company, the need for the interpretation of the aforesaid provisions in the settlement of 1979, has arisen because whereas the company is of opinion that only those workers are entitled to gratuity whose wages do not exceed Rs. 800 per month, the stand of the collective bargaining agent is that all workers irrespective of the quantum of their monthly wages are entitled to receive gratuity if they have completed the requisite period of service with the company.
3. I have heard Mr: Mahmood Abdul Ghani, who appeared for the Company, and Mr. Abdul Qadir, the learned counsel for the collec--tive bargaining agent. It was submitted by Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani that the scheme of gratuity, which was in addition to the provident fund scheme, was introduced in the company, upon the demand of the collective bargaining agent, through a settlements, arrived at on 18th July, 1966, and in the subsequent settlements, finally culminating in the settlement of 13th July, 1979, various amendments in the gratuity scheme were effected and hence for proper understanding of the scheme and its scope and resolving the issue as to the eligibility of workers entitled to receive gratuity, it is necessary to refer to and take into due consideration not only the settlement by which the scheme was originally introduced but the subsequent settlements by which the scheme was modified from time to time. The settlement of 1966 by which the scheme of gratuity was for the first time introduced in the company, provided as follows:- "Demand. No. 3 : Gratuity.-The management has agreed as a gesture of goodwill that it will introduce retiring gratuity as indicated below and subject to the conditions hereinafter stated :-
(1) (a)Permanent worker who retires after he has rendered to the company continuous satisfactory service of 8 years or more but less than 12 years service will be eligible to one week's wages for each completed year of his service (calculation of average wages is shown in the Annexure attached.
(b) A permanent worker who retires after he has rendered to the company continuous satisfactory service of 12 years or more but less than 15 years will be eligible to one and a half weeks average wages for each completed year of service (for calculation of average wages Annex. A).
(c) A permanent worker. Who retires after he has rendered to the company continuous satisfactory service of 15 years or more will be eligible to two weeks average wages for each completed year of service subject to a maximum of 30 weeks average wages for the entire service (see Annexure A for calculation of average were).
(2) Subject to the above terms and conditions gratuity will be pay--able to the permanent workers on termination of employment on account of retrenchment /death on acceptance of resignation or disablement certified as on medical grounds as the case may be and provided that at the time of termination he has rendered not less than eight continuous years satisfactory service.
(3) No gratuity will be payable to a worker who at the time of retirement or termination of employment for whatever reason has not completed 8 years continuous satisfactory service with the company or who is dismissed from service for misconduct who resigns to avoid disciplinary action for misconduct or whose average monthly wages exceed Rs. 500."
4. It will be seen that the gratuity scheme, as first introduced, was made applicable only to permanent workmen. The scheme laid down the period of service qualifying for payment of the gratuity, the number of days, depending upon the length of service, the average wages where--of were payable as gratuity, the mode by which the average wages were to 'be computed, the type of cessation of employment on which the gratuity was payable and the maximum wages of worker to whom the gratuity was payable.
5. On 1st May, 1971, another settlement was arrived at between the parties. Which modified the provisions regarding payment of gratuity to the workers as follows:- "It is agreed between the management and the union to amend the existing rules of gratuity and the revised rules will now read as follows :-
(1) (a) A Permanent worker who retires after he has rendered to the company continuous satisfactory of 6 years or more but less than 10 years service will be eligible to one and a half weeks' wages salary for each completed year of his service (calculation of average wages/salary for this purpose is shown in the Annexure 'A' attached).
(b) A permanent worker who retires after he has rendered to the company continuous satisfactory service of 10 years or more, will be eligible to two weeks' average wages salary for each completed year of service (for calculation of average wages/salary for this purpose, Annexure A' and further subjected to a maximum of 30 weeks average wages/ salary for the entire service). (See Annexure A-1).
(2) Subject to the above terms and conditions gratuity will be pay--able to the permanent workers on termination of employment on account of retrenchment/death, on acceptance of resignation of disablement certificate on medical grounds as the case may be and provided that at .The time of termination, he has rendered not less than 6 years continuous satisfactory service.
(3) No gratuity (will be payable to a worker who at the time of retirement or termination of employment for whatever reason has not completed 6 years continuous satisfactory service with the company or one who is dismissed from service for miscon--duct as envisaged in section 15(3) of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (as amended by the Provincial Assembly on 8th May, 1968) or who resigns to avoid such disciplinary action for mis--conduct any person whose gratuity amount at the time of leaving the service exceeds more than Rs. 4,000 (Rupees Four Thousand only) shall get only maximum of Rs. 4,000 and no more. This clause shall not apply to Managerial executives."
6. A further amendment in the gratuity scheme was trade by the settlement arrived at between the parties on 4th June, 1975. The modi--fications introduced by this settlement were as follows :- "That the management has agreed that the gratuity instead of being paid at 200 days maximum will be paid at 320 days on the pre--vious terms and conditions and rate will be as per past practice, Note :-This gratuity scheme will be only applicable to the workers drawing wages salary up to Rs.
800 per month.
7. A still further amendment in the conditions on which gratuity was payable was made by the settlement arrived at between the parties on 9th July, 1977. The modifications made read as follow :- "That the management has agreed that those workers who have more than 3 years continuous satisfactory service but less than 10 years. Service will be given gratuity at the rate of 20 days basic wages for such calculated year of service. Similarly, those workers who have more than 10 years service will be given 25 days basic wages for each completed year of service as gratuity. The calculation of gratuity will be at basic pay last on pay roll."
8. Finally there was the settlement of 13th August, 1979, the relevant provisions whereof have already been reproduced.
9. The main contention of Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani for the company was that as the conditions of maximum limit of wages of the worker entitled to grant of gratuity and the mode of cessation of employment entitling or disentitling the worker to grant of gratuity were essential conditions of the gratuity scheme, as originally introduced and revised from time to time. These 2 conditions would be deemed to be subsisting; though no reference to these conditions or to the earlier settlements containing these conditions have been made in the settlement of 1979. Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani attempted to support his contentions, particularly the stand of the company that only workers drawing pay not exceeding Rs. 800 per month were entitled to grant of gratuity, as provided in the settlement of 4th June, 1975, on 2 grounds, firstly that the gratuity scheme was a permanent scheme and hence the scheme as a whole subsisted even after the period of validity of the settlement under which it was introduced, had expired, and secondly, that unless the aforesaid 2 conditions were maintained and followed, the scheme will be unworkable and would be contrary to the intentions of the con--tracting parties.
10. In support of his first limb of argument, Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani cited the authorities reported as Workmen of New Elephinstone Theatre v. New Elephantine Theatre ((1961) 1 L L J 105), South India Bank Ltd. v. Ghacko (A. R.) ((1964) L L J 19) and Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. Chittagong v.
Chairman IInd Labour Court, East Pakistan (1972 PLC 192). 1n support of his second limb of argument Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani cited the cases Lt.-Col. Nawabzada Muhammad Amin Khan v. Controller of Estate Duty and others (PLD 1961 SC 119), Karachi Electric Supply Corporation v. K. E.
S. C. Ltd. Labour Union (1967 PLC 691), Taibtun Textile Mills Ltd. Karachi v. Central Board of Revenue (PLD 1971 Kar. 333), Shakeel Ahmad v. State (PLD 1972 Lah. 374) and Province of West Pakistan v.
Mehboob Ali and .Another (PLD 1976 SC 483).
11. On the other hand, it was urged by Mr. Abdul Qadir, the learned counsel for the respondent collective bargaining agent, that the settlement made prior to 13th August, 1979, had not only expired but were superseded by the settlement of 13th August, 1979, which con--tained all the necessary provisions relating to the payment of gratuity to workmen. He further contended that even the company was fully aware and realized that under the new settlement all workmen, irres-- pective of pay drawn by them, were entitled to payment of gratuity subject to the conditions specified in the settlement of 13th August, 1979, and hence workers whose pay exceeded Rs. 800 per month were all paid gratuity by the company and there was no worker who was denied gratuity on the score that his wages exceeded Rs. 800 per month, except worker Suleman A.
Rehman's, who had filed a complaint before the Labour Court against the management for failing to comply with and implement the terms of the settlement of 13th August, 1979. The learned counsel expressly referred to the names of 3 workers, namely, (1) Muhammad Shiraz, (2) Kamal Khan, and (3) Syed Ahmed Hassan, who, according to the affidavit of the General Secretary of the collective bargaining. Agent, were drawing wages exceeding Rs. 800 per month and yet were paid gratuity, in addition to the provident fund on their ceasing to become employees of the company.
One of these workers, namely, Syed Ahmed Hassan, has also filed his affidavit asserting that he was drawing a total. Salary of Rs. 1,483 per month, though his basic salary was Rs. 975 per month, and that he was paid his gratuity, in accordance with the settlement of lath August, 1979, on the termination of his services. The payment of gratuity to these 3 workers has not been denied by the company in the counter-affidavit filed by the General Manager of the company. Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani, while conced--ing this position sought to argue that merely because the company had wrongly paid gratuity to some workers not entitled to the same, this would not mean that under the settlement of 1979, the conditions regarding limit of wages of workers entitled to payment of gratuity of the eligibility or non-eligibility of workers to receive gratuity on account of the mode of termination of their employment were not enforceable or binding on the parties. He sought support for his contention from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Karachi Electric Supply Corporation. That case involved the interpretation of settlement arrived at on 31st December, 1964 between the -K. E. S. C. v. The & E. S. C. Ltd. Labour Union in regard to the revision of rates of pay of non-officer employees. The Supreme Court, held, that as the settlement itself was expressed to be an amendment of the earlier office order of 5th October, 1964, it follows that for a proper construction of this agreement it should be laid side by side with the said office order and construed so that the latter order is amended only to the extent indicated in the terms of the agreement. As on a proper construction of the settlement of 31st December, 1964, read with the office order of 5th October, 1964, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the claim of the union to higher fixation of pay of non-officer employees was not justified, it refused to consider the prayer made on behalf of the workers that as the settlement had already expired and it would work very hard. On the employees who were paid wages in excess of their entitlement, if they ::ere asked or required to refund such excess amounts, the Supreme Court may allow such workers to retain the excess amounts, paid to them. The facts of the reported case, however, are distinguishable from the facts of the p sent case. In that/ case, the settlement arrived at between the parties specifically referred to the earlier office order and the settlement, therefore, had to be read in conjunction with that office order. In the instant case, as already stated, though there is specific mentioned in the settlements, dated 1st May, 1971, 27th June, 1973 and 4th June, 1975, that they were making amendments and modifica--tions in the gratuity rules conditions, as laid down in the settlement, dated 18th July, 1966, there is absolutely no reference to or mention in the settlement of 13th August, 1979, of the earlier settlement and hence the settlement of 1979 is to be considered to be self-contained and to have superceded the earlier settlement.
12. It remains to examine the decisions cited by Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghadi in a support of the 2 limbs of his arguments. I will first refer to the authorities cited in support of Mr. Mahmood Ghani's contentions that notwithstanding the fact that the earlier settlement had expired and no reference was made to them in the settlement of 13th August, 1979, the provisions of the earlier settlements disentitling workers drawing pay exceeding Rs. 800 per month would continue to apply, as also the condition regarding eligibility or non-eligibility for the payment of gratuity depending upon the mode of cessation of employment. In the case of the Workmen of New Elephinstone Theatre, the Labour CourtKarachi , was required to deal with a demand raised by the workmen for introduction of a scheme of gratuity. There was a prior award fixing a gratuity scheme for workmen employed by various theatres, to which the employers in the said case were also a party, known as the Shastri Award.
The said award was made in 1947 and had expired by passage of time. Relying on observations made by the Bombay High Court in the case of Mangaldas Narandas v. Payment of Wages Authority ((1957) 2 L L J 256), it was held that notwithstanding the expiry of Shastri Award by lapse of time, the obligation under the said award arising under the Gratuity scheme conferred on the employees by the adjudication continued and will continue until replaced by another scheme by consent of parties or by fresh adjudication. In the case of the South Indian Bank Ltd., the Supreme Court of India, while construing the pro-, visions of section 19 of the Indian Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which corresponds with section 40, I.R.O., 1969, took the view that the period for which the award is to have binding effect is in regard only to special provisions of the Act, such as strikes, lockouts and breach of the terms of the settlement, but does not make the award inoperative after the expiry of the period mentioned in the law or the award, and even after the expiry of the said period, it will operate as a contract and would continue to govern the relations between the parties till it is displaced by another contract.
13. In the case of Pakistan Tobacco Company, a Division Bench of the Dacca High Court examined the legal effect of notice given under section 40(2) by a party to an award of its intention to revoke.
The interpretation put by the Dacca High Court on the provisions of section 40(9) that during the period of settlement agreed upon by the parties, the settlement will remain binding on the parties and after the expiry of the said period, it would also continue to remain binding on the parties until notice is given by. Either party to the settlement expres--sing its intention no long to be bound by the settlement was that the binding effect of .The settlement to the extent that the terms of the settle--ments cannot be negotiated or agitated during operation of the settlement ceases to be effective, on the giving of the notice of the expiry of the said period. But it does not mean that the parties are placed into the position of status quo ante, as it will be contrary to the well-recog-- nized principle of the law that once a contract of settlement is arrived at and acted upon mere passage of time of its operation or any expres--sion of intention unilaterally of one of the parties to the contract or settlement to terminate its binding effect does not and cannot put an end to the obligations flowing therefrom nor are they reverted hack to the position of status quo ante.
14. A different view, however, has been taken by a learned Single Judge of the Karachi High Court in the case of Avelene Silk Mills v. Labour Court, Karachi (1981 PLC 4). The facts of that case were that on 4th January, 1972, a settlement was arrived at between the employer and his workers, one of the conditions whereof was that gratuity will be given on resignation also and in the event of death, it will be given to the legitimate heirs of the deceased worker. After the expiry of the said settlement, another settlement was arrived at on 6th September, 1973, but the said settlement contained no provision with regard to the pay--ment of gratuity. After the expiry of this settlement, a demand was made by the workers' union for payment of gratuity but this demand was not accepted by the management and hence it was not incorporated in the settlement which was in operation from 4th September, 1974 to 3rd September, 1975. Some of the workers of the employer, who were laid of due to adverse market condition, applied to the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, claiming gratuity. The Authority rejected the claim for gratuity. On appeal, the Labour Court held that the workmen were entitled to gratuity on the original agreement and that benefits of gratuity once extended to the workers under an agreement cannot be withdrawn to their disadvantage. Rejecting the claim of the workers for payment of gratuity, it was observed by the learned Single Judge as follows :- "The agreement between the petitioners and the workers union which provided for gratuity to be given to the workers on resigna--tion or in the event of death or any one of them to his heirs, was in force for only one year from 4th September, 1972 to 3rd September, 1973. Under subsection (2) of section 40 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance,1969 this-settlement was only binding till 3rd September, 1973, the fact that workers' union included their demand of gratuity in their two subsequent Charters of Demands dated 5th September, 1973, and 5th September, 1974, clearly shows that this facility of gratuity to the workers was not to continue after 3rd September, 1973. In spite of the demand of gratuity made by the workers' union in the two charters, it was not conceded and included in the two subsequent agreements. This only proves that facility of gratuity to the workers was withdrawn after 3rd September, 1973. There was discharge of the agreement dated 4th September, 1972, which was substituted by new contract. Reference is made to the following passage from Anso's law of Contract, at gage 395-contract rests on the agreement of the parties as it is their agreement which binds them, so by their agreement they may be loosed.
And this mode of discharge may occur in one of your ways ; by rescission of a contract which still executory by accord and satisfaction; by the substitution of a new contract ; or by the operation of some provision contained in the contract itself."
1969 PLC 341, it was held that if a period of time in settlement is fixed by con. Tract, the contract will automatically lapse after that period. It follows that the agreement which was in force for one year from 4th September, 1972 to 3rd September, 1973, automatically lapsed after 3rd September, 1973, and the facility of gratuity provided in the agreement was no more available to workers after 3rd September, 1973. Reference in this connection is also invited to 1974 PLC Note 76 p. 42=PLJ 1974 Tr.
Cases 22, Remarks at page 24."
15. In the instant case, not only the previous settlements had expired but they were replaced by the settlement, dated 13th August, 1972, which made no reference either to the earlier settlement or to the conditions or rules embodied in the earlier settlement relating to pay--ment of gratuity and hence the settlement of 1979 in regard to the payment of gratuity must be considered to be self- contained and compre--hensive and no other limitation on the payment of gratuity can be incorporated therein. The Indian decisions are also otherwise not very helpful in the instant case as not only the Indian Law is somewhat different but further the 2 Indian rulings are in respect of awards and adjudications and there were no subsequent awards or adjudications.
16. I will now proceed to examine the authorities cited by Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani in support of his second limb of argument that the intention of parties should be deemed to be governed by the conditions as to the maximum were of workers entitled to payment of Gratuity as also to the entitlement to receive gratuity being dependent upon the mode of termination of employment, and if there is omis--sion of these conditions in the settlement of 1979, these provisions should be read into this settlement and be made applicable. The authorities cited by Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani, all refer to omissions in Statutes. A cardinal principle of Interpretation of Statutes is that the Courts must give effect to the manifest and undoubted intention of the Legislature and if due to the draftsman's error or for want of skill, there is a manifest error or omission, the Courts can modify the language of a Statute. -In the case of Lt.-Col. Nawabzada Muhammad Amin Khan, the Supreme Court found that though the scheme of Estate Duty Act, 1950, was amended by the Estate Duty (Amendment) Act, 1953, and the Central Board of Revenue was replaced by the Controller of Estate Duty but no corresponding amendment was made in section 57 of the Act, in which reference to the Central Board of Revenue Con--tinued to remain. It was held by the Supreme Court that this was an obvious error or omission and hence it was entitled to correct the error and to supply the omission.
17. In the case of Zaibtun Textile Mills Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue, a Full Bench of the Karachi High Court, while dealing with the question of the power of a Court to supply an omission in law or to alter its language, observed as follows:-- "The principles which follow from these observations are that where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended a cons--truction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence, because, where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intract--ability of the language used. Even though, as a general rule a Court of law is not authorised to supply a cassus omissus or to alter the language of a statute for the purpose of supplying a meaning, yet in certain circumstances it is permissible for the Court to give effect to the true and patent intention of the law--maker to supply the omission in order to avoid doing a manifest injustice."
18. In the case of Shakeel Ahmed it has urged before Division Bench of the Lahore High Court that though section 364-A was introduc--ed in the Pakistan Penal Code . By the Criminal Law Amendment Act. 1958, the Central Legislature failed to make any consequential amendment in the Second Schedule to the Criminal Procedure Code with the "result that the said section did not find place therein and this failure on the part of the Legislature, it was urged, rendered the new law ineffective and the conviction by the District Judge under section 364-A, P. P. C. Invalid. Repelling this contention, it was observed by the High Court as follows :- "The case here is, that sofa r as substantive law is concerned, the legislature has made their intention very clear and it is on account of unintentional omission in the procedural law that it is sought to be argued that the substantive law has become ineffective. This failure on the part of the Legislature cannot be permitted to make the law hand in the air and exonerate the guilty persons Notwithstanding the failure of the insertion of section 364-A in the Second Schedule of the Code, a complete procedure for hearing a case under section 364-A is discoverable. We are, therefore, of the view that the trial was in order and no prejudice whatsoever was caused to the appellant."
19. The Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Province of West Pakistan v. Mahboob Ali, while referring to the basic principles govern--ing interpretation of statute and expressing the need for the avoidance by construction of cassus omissus observed as follows :-- "Needless to say, that the whole purpose of the interpretation of a statute is to ascertain the intention of the law-maker and to make it effective. The basic principles governing the interpretation or construction of statutes are well settled. But these have seldom been regarded as inflexible, except perhaps where a statute is plain, certain and free from any ambiguity so that a bare reading of it would suffice. In essence, in such case, interpretation is unnecessary. Barring, such plain cases statutes would be construed liberally or strictly according to their subject-matter, the object or purpose in--tended to be achieved, or whether it is in any way in derogation of any common law or inherent right. For instance, it is well settled the penal or fiscal statutes or statutes impinging upon common law rights, are to be strictly construed and any ambiguity or imprecision is to be received in favour of the subject. On the other and it is equally well settled that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed to as to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief. So also empowering statutes are generally liberally cons--trued so as effectuate and not to stultify the power conferred. Modern cases provide many instances of the Judges' reluctance to stand upon the letter of the law strictly in the interpretation of a statute falling under the second category.
It is true that even in such cases what is an obvious omission cannot be supplied by invoking the rule of liberal interpretation. In such cases rule of cassus omissus is generally applied. But when faced with a choice between a were meaning, which carries out what appears to be object of the Legislature more fully and a narrow meaning which carries it out less fully or not at all, the choice of the Courts is often the former. Beneficial constructions is a tendency, rather than a rule. (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 1969 Edn. p. 92) Province of West Pakistan v. Siraj-ul-Haq Patwari (1) in which the vires of section 57 of the Electoral College Act, 1964 (Act IV of 1964) came under examination of this Court is a classical example of liberal interpretation with a view to achieving the legislative purpose of a beneficial statute. Incidentally a Full Bench of what was then the High Court of East Pakistan, had by a majority struck down the section as ultra vires the Constitution. But the majority decision was reversed by this Court.
Even the rule of cassus omissus is not inflexible. In Crawford's Statutory Construction, 1940 Ed. It is observed in section 169 at pp. 269-70 :- 'But, inasmuch as it is the intention of the Legislature which cons--titutes the law of any statute, and since the primary purpose of construction is to ascertain that intention, such intentions should be given effect, even if it necessitate the supply of omissions, provided, of course, that this effectuates the legislative intention. Some decisions seem to indicate a trend in this direction, and allow words omitted by oversight to be supplied, if the statute is otherwise meaningless, or if an amendment without interpolation is ineffective------------.It is proper for the Court to supply such omissions because they are in fact a part of the statute, having been intended to be included in the statute when drafted and enacted.'
The footnote refers to a number of precedents in support of the above statement and it is pointed out-- `A cassus omissus should be avoided by construction, if reasonably possible------.And especially do the Courts show an inclination to confine the rule of cassus omissus to penal or criminal statutes ......And to reject it where remedial statutes are concerned."
20. The above authorities, in my respectful view are wholly un--helpful to the case of the applicant for as already pointed out not only is the language of the settlement of 1979 with regard to the payment of the gratuity to workers clear and unambiguous, but the, provisions in this behalf are self-sufficient and are not wanting in any material particulars.
No doubt, there is no mention in the said settlement of the maximum wages of the workers who are entitled to payment of gratuity under the settlement, but the absence of any limit as to the wages of worker on the one band would indicate that the limit of Rs. 800 provided in the settlement of 1975 had been abandoned or given up and on the other hand the more rational policy of granting gratuity to every worker was presum--ably adopted.
21. The broad principles to be followed in construing deeds and documents have been laid down by the Indian Supreme Court in the case of Chunchun Jha v. Ebadat Ali (AIR 1954 SC 345). In paragraph 6 of the Judgment at page 346 of the report it is observed as follows:- "The first principle is that the intention of the parties is the deter--mining factor: see 'Balkishen Das v. Legge, 22 I A 58 (P C) (A). But there is nothing special about that in this class of cases and here as in every other case, where a document has to be cons--trued, the intention must be gathered, in the first place, from the document itself. 1f the words are express and clear, effect must be given to them and any extraneous enquiry into what was thought or intended is ruled out. The real question in such a case is not what the parties intended or meant but what is the legal effect of the words which they used. If however, there is ambiguity in the language employed, then it is permissible to look to the surrounding circumstances to determine what was in--tended."
22. The adoption of the policy resulting in the payment of gratuity to workers drawing wages exceeding Rs. 800 per month, as indicated in the affidavit of the General Secretary of the collective bargaining agent, does not mean that every employee of the company was entitled to gratuity on retirement or resignation. Since the settlement was made under the I.R.O. And gratuity was payable only to workers, the definition of worker' as contained in the I. R. O. Would apply. This means that not only the managerial staff was excluded from eligibility to receive gratuity under the settlement but also Supervisors drawing wages exceed--ing Rs. 800 per month, who are performing or are required to perform functions mainly of managerial nature.
23. The upshot of the above discussions is that in my view, since there is no reference to the earlier settlements, particularly the settlement of 1975, in the settlement; dated 13th August, 1979, which appears to be self-contained and complete, all workers as defined in the I.R.O. And whom alone the collective bargaining agent is entitled to represent are eligible to the payment of gratuity on the conditions contained in the said settlement, notwithstanding in the fact that they may be drawing wages exceeding Rs. 800 per month.