MOHAMMAD AZAM KHAN, CJ. --- The captioned appeal by leave of the Court arises out of the judgment of the High Court dated 3.9.2012, whereby writ petitions No. 700/2011, 1388/12 and 1452/12 have been dismissed.
2. Muhammad Asif & others filed Writ Petition No. 700/2011 on 24.4.2011 alleging therein that they are first class State subjects and eligible to be appointed as constables in the Police Department under rules. They were appointed as constables in the Police Department vide orders dated 26.4.2008, 29.4.2008, 2.5.2008, 29.4.2008, 6.5.2008, 14 7.2008, 26.6.2008 and 6.5.2008, respectively. During their contract period, the respondents advertised some vacant posts of constables in daily "the. NEWS" to fill in the same on permanent basis. The advertisement was challenged through writ petition titled Shakoor Bashir & others v. Azad Government & othere, which was accepted vide judgment dated 17.7.2009. The said judgment was challenged by the respondents through an appeal before the Supreme Court which was dismissed on 11.5.2010. A review petition filed by the respondents was also dismissed on 8.11.2010. 1p the light of the judgment of the High Court dated 17.7.2009, appointment orders of the petitioners in that writ petition were issued but the appellants, herein, were not permanently inducted in the service on the ground that they were not party in the aforesaid writ petition. They requested for their permanent adjustment under the provisions of Sections 13 and 14 of the Police Act, 1861 (to be referred as the Act hereinafter) read with rule 2.9 of Chapter II of the Police Rules, 1934 (to be referred as the Rules hereinafter), as laid down by the Supreme Court. It was further claimed that the Government vide notification dated 9.3.2010, with mala fide intention for depriving them of their accrued vested rights of permanent absorption and to frustrate the judgment of the apex Court, have amended Rule 2.9 and sub-rules (4) and (5) have been added in the Rules. A direction was sought for their permanent absorption in the regular force. The rules were also challenged on the ground of being ultra vires, against. The accrued vested rights and mala fide. In writ petitions No. 1388/12 and 1452/12, the petitioners alleged that respondent No. 2 advertised vacant posts of constables. The petitioners being qualified, applied for the same, participated in the test/interview and were declared qualified for recruitment. In the result they were appointed on contract basis against the quota of different units as constables.
After completing the training from Police Training School, Muzaffarabad they are performing their duties at different projects and schemes. It was alleged that the respondents advertised the posts of constables in daily "Khabrain" on 3.7.2012 to fill in the posts on permanent basis. They further alleged that through notification dated 9.3.2010 the Government introduced sub-rules (4) and (5) in rule 2.9 of the Rules, which came in their knowledge after filing of objections by the respondents.
They sought a direction for their permanent absorption against the post, under Sections 13 and 14 of the Act read with Rule 2.9 of the Rules and also requested for cancellation of notification dated 9.3.2010 and advertisement dated 3.7.2012.
3. The respondents filed written statement and claimed that the petitioners have no locus standi to file writ petitions. They have claimed their rights on the strength of the judgment of High Court dated 17.7.2009. After the said judgment, the Rules were amended through notification dated 9.3.2010, whereby the Government has been empowered to appoint constables for additional police force on contract basis and the Government has properly appointed them on contract basis after induction of sub-rules (4) and (5) in rule 2.9 of the Rules. After necessary proceedings, the High Court dismissed the writ petitions, vide impugned judgment.
4. Mr. Sadaqat Hussain Raja, advocate, counsel for the appellants,, argued that the judgment of the High Court is gainst law and the facts. The petitioners in writ petition No. 700/11 were appointed as constables in the result of test/interview conducted by the authority on 26.4.2008, 29.4.2008, 2.5.2008, 29.4.2008, 6.5.2008, 14.7.2008, 26.6.2008 and 6.5.2008 and in the light of judgment of this Court delivered in Shakoor Bashir's case, decided on 11.5.2010, they are entitled for permanent absorption in the regular police force. The learned counsel argued that in Shakoor Bashir's case, Sections 13 and 14 of the Act and Rule 2.9 of the Rules were interpreted whereby the High Court and this Court declared that under the provisions of rule 2.9, there is no concept of contract service in the Police Department. The persons appointed temporarily have a right to be inducted permanently wehever permanent vacancies occur in the Department. In th light of Shakoor Bashir's case, the permanent vacancies occurring in the Police Department cannot be advertised. It is enjoined upon the authorities to appoint the appellants against the vacant posts, The advertisement is bad in law. The learned counsel argued that through the notification dated 9.3.2010, sub-rules (4) and (5) have been added in rule 2.9 after sub-rule (3), whereby appointment for additional police force can be made on contract' asistance, is against the provisions of the Act. The learned counsel contended that for the purpose of writ petition No. 700/2011, newly added rules (4) and (5) cannot be applied because the appellants, petitioners in writ petition No. 700/11, were appointed as constables in the year 2008, prior .To introduction of sub- rules (4) and (5) in rule 2.9. The operation of these rules is not retrospective rather these rules are prospective. Sub-rules (4) and (5) are not applicable in the case of the petitioners in writ petition No. 700/11. The judgment of the High Court on this count is against law and not maintainable. The learned counsel vehemently argued that sub-rules (1) to (3) of rule 2.9 are the parts of the Rule from the very beginning. The Rules were framed to carryout the purpose of sections 13 and 14 of the Act for creation of additional Police force. Sub-rules (4) and (5) of rule 2.9 of the Rules are directly in conflict with sub-rules (1) to (3) of rule 2.9 and both cannot co-exist. There is a long standing practice of the Department for recruiting additional police force in the light of sub-rules (1) to (3) of rule 2.9 of the Rules. It cannot be defeated by amending the Rules. The accrued vested rights cannot be taken away by introducing sub-rules (4) and (5) in rule 2,9 of the Rules. The learned counsel submitted that two different yardsticks cannot be applied for the same subject-matter.
Under sub-rules (1) to (3) of rule 2.9, as laid down in Shakoor Bashir's case, the Department is bound to absorb permanently the persons appointed in additional police force and under sub- rules (4) and (5) after completion of contract period, their service will be terminated. The rules have provided an opportunity to the Government to exercise the powers arbitrarily.
5. As regard the petitioners in other writ petitions, who are appointed after 9.3.2010 on contract basis, the learned counsel argued that sub-rules 4 and 5 are directly in conflict with sub-rules (1) to
(3) of rule 2.9. These cannot coexist. The learned counsel argued that when there are two provisions in an Act or rules, one beneficial to and in the interest of subjects shall be adopted. Sub- rules (1) to (3) of rule 2.9 provide that persons appointed in the additional police force be absorbed in permanent police whenever a permanent vacancy occurs while sub-rules (4) and (5) of rule 2.9 deprive the petitioners, appellants herein, of such an opportunity or right. He argued that notification dated 9.3.2010 is against the accrued vested rights of the appellants. He requested for striking down the same. He lastly argued that for interpreting law, the Act as a whole be read. He referred to the cases reported as In the matter'of Reference by the President of Pakistan under Article 162 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan [PLD 1957 SC (Pak.) 219], Ghulam Hassan Punjabi v. Government of Azad J&K & others [PLD 1975 AJ&K 81], State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Merdantile Mutual Insurance Company Limited & others [1993 SCMR 1394] and 2010 PTD (Trib.) 519.
In the case reported as In the matter of Reference by the President of Pakistan under Article 162, of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan [PLD 1957 SC (Pak.) 219] it was held by the Supreme Court of Pakistan that it is the duty of the Courts to have recourse to the whole instrument, if necessary, to ascertain the true intent and meaning of any particular provision. If there appears any apparent repugnancy between different provisions, the Court should harmonize them if possible.
In the case reported as Ghulam Hassan Punjabi v. Government of Azad J&K & others [PLD 1975 AJ&K 81], it was observed that the rule-making power of the President is an incidental power that must follow and not run parallel to the parent Act.
In the case reported as 2010 PTD (Trib.) 519, it was observed as under:- ".... Though the first and foremost duty of a Court is to ensure harmonious construction, yet if a conflict is found out amongst the diWent sections of the Ordinance, it is then to normally resolve in favour of the subject of the State....
5. While controverting the arguments of the counsel for the appellants, Ch. Shaukat Aziz, the learned Additional Advocate-General, argued that the judgment of the High Court is perfectly legal. Shakoor Bashir's case is not applicable in the case because the posts were advertised on 3.7.2012 while sub-rules (4) and (5) of rule 2.9 were introduced through notification dated 9.3.2010.
He admitted that operation of rules is prospective and the advertisement was issued after introduction of sub-rules (4) and (5). The learned Additional Advocate-General emphasized on the word 'necessity' incorporated in sections 13 and 14 of the Act and argued that additional police is recruited whenever 'necessity' of additional police force arises and necessity has arisen for some projects of national importance i.e. Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project and other projects for earthquake affected areas of Azad Jammu & Kashmir, which are being run by Chinese experts and for the purpose of security of Chinese nationals working on the said projects. He referred to the appointment orders of the appellants and argued that the appointment orders have been issued for a specific contract period. After accepting the conditions laid down in the contract orders, the appellants are estopped from challenging the same. He requested for dismissal of appeal.
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The matter needs interpretation of Sections 13 and 14 of the Act and sub-rules (1) to (3) of rule 2.9 and newly introduced sub-rules (4) and (5) of rule 2.9 of the Rules. Before proceeding further we deem it necessary to go through the provisions of Sections 13 and 14 of the Act and sub-rules (1) to (3) and newly introduced sub-rules (4) and (5) of rule 2.9 of the Rules. For proper appreciation these are reproduced as under:--- "13. Additional Police Officers employed at cost of individuals.---It shall be lawful for the Inspector General of Police, or any Deputy Inspector General, or Assistant Inspector General, or Additional Inspector General or for the District Superintendent, subject to the general direction of the Magistrate of the District, on the application of any person showing the necessity thereof, to depute any additional number of police officers to keep the peace at any place within the general police- district, and for such time as shall be deemed proper. Such force shall be exclusively under the orders of the district Superintendent, and shall be at the charge of the person making the application:--- Provided that it shall be lawful for the person on whose application such deputation shall have been made, on giving one month's notice in writing to the Inspector General, Deputy Inspector General or Assistant Inspector General or to the district Superintendent, to require that the police officers so deputed shall be withdrawn; and such person shall be relieved from the charge of such additional force from the expiration of such notice."
"14. Appointment of additional force in the neighbourhood of railway and other works.---Whenever any railway, canal or other public work, or any manufactory or commercial concern shall be carried on, or be in operation in any part of the country, and it shall appear to the Inspector General that he employment of an additional police force in such place is rendered necessary by the behaviour or reasonable apprehension of the behaviour of the persons employed upon such work, manufactory or concern, it shall be lawful for the Inspector General, with the consent of the Provincial Government, to depute such additional force to such place, and to employ the same so long as such necessity shall continue, and to make orders, from time to, time, upon the person having the control or custody of the funds used in carrying on such work, manufactory or concern, for the payment of the extra force so rendered necessary, and such person shall thereupon cause payment'to be paid accordingly."
"2.9. Additional Police under Sections 13 & 14.--(1) Sections 13 and 14 of the Police Act V of 1861, regulate the employment of police officers at the cost of individuals, and the appointment of police officers in the neighbourhood of railways and other works. Such police are designated "Additional Police" whether extra policemen in excess of regular establishment are enlisted or not.
(2) If extra men are enlisted, they shall be deemed part of the district Police force and shall, if suitable and eligible, be absorbed in the regular establishment as vacancies occur, being replaced by new enlistments, who are subject to discharge on reduction of the additional police.
(3) Superintendents are required to give early information to Deputy Inspectors-General of their inability to provide for additional police coming under reduction in order that arrangements may be made to absorb them in other districts where vacancies may exist."
(4) Additional Police shall be recruited in as many numbers, as approved for the respective project on contract basis. Approval of Inspector General of Police shall be obtained for such recruitments required to be made on contract basis.
These recruitments shall purely be project specific and shall not in any case confer any right towards permanent absorption."
7. Writ Petition No. 771/2008 was filed by Shakoor Bashir and 36 others whereby they challenged the advertisement on the ground that there is no concept of contract service in additional police. The writ petition was dismissed in limine. Shakoor Bashir and others filed petition for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court. The appeal was accepted and the writ petition was admitted for regular hearing on 27.5.2009 and the case was remanded to the High Court for decision while considering rule 2.9 of the Rules. The writ petition was accepted and the advertisement was quashed on 17.7.2009. It was observed by the High Court as under:- "The argument of the learned advocates for the respondents, that conditions of the appointment of the petitioners cannot be challenged in writ jurisdiction is correct but where the authority itself has committed a fault, then the petitions cannot be penalized for the acts committed by the authorities. A perusal of the advertisement made at the time of induction of the petitioners reveals that these posts were to be filled in for the purpose of the projects mentioned, therein, hence, the induction was within the purview of Sections 13 and 14 of the Police Act and in case of availability of new vacancies in the Department, it was proper for the competent authority to adjust the petitioners in view of Chapter II, Rule 2.9 of the Police Rules.
The upshot of the above is that accepting the petition, the advertisement under challenge is hereby quashed. The respondents are, therefore, directed to absorb the petitioners according to their merit, prepared at the time of their induction."
This judgment was challenged through an appeal in this Court, which was dismissed on 11.5.2010. It was observed in para 6 as under:- "6. It is admitted that respondents have been appointed on recommendation of the selection committee for security of Chinese Engineers. They were appointed for three years on contract basis through the same process as the general Police is appointed. It is also made out from the record that they had earlier appeared in the test for the post of Constable (B-5) and had qualified but couldn't attain merit position against the available vacancies, hence, were not regularly appointed but were subsequently appointed as additional police force. It is lawful for the Inspector General of Police or the Deputy Inspector General of Police to depute any additional number of police officers to keep peace at any place within general police district for such time as shall be deemed proper under Sections 13 and 14 of. The Police Act, 1861. Under rule 2.9 of the Police Rules, 1934, the Police so deputed is called additional police and are deemed to be part of the district police force, who are entitled to be absorbed in the regular establishment as vacancies occur subject to suitability and eligibility. In the case in hand it appears from record that vacancies have occurred in the Police Department on account of which they issued advertisement on 8.11.2008. In the were of the vacancies having occurred it was incumbent upon the appellants to adhere to Rule 2.9 of Part II of the Police Rules to evaluate suitability and eligibility of the respondents for appointment against the vacancies and then advertise the posts after absorbing additional police force (respondents)."
8. The Government filed a review petition which was also dismissed by this Court. The Court settled the law that provisions of rule 2.9 of Chapter II of the Rules are mandatory in nature and it is incumbent upon the authorities to adhere to rule 2.9 of chapter II of the Rules to evaluate the suitability and eligibility of the men enlisted in additional force for appointment against the vacancies and then advertise the posts after absorbing the persons serving in additional police force. The judgment of the High Court was delivered on 17.7.2009 while the notification, whereby sub-rules (4) and (5) were introduced in rule 2.9 of the Rules, was issued on 9.3.2010. Section 13 of the Act empowers the Inspector General of Police, Deputy Inspector General and Assistant Inspector General or the District Superintendent to depute any additional number of Police officers to keep peace at any place within the general police District under the directions of the District Magistrate for such period as deemed necessary. A proviso is attached to the Section which provides that the person on whose application such additional police force has been deployed, shall, on giving one moth's notice in writing to the Inspector General of Police, Deputy Inspector General, Assistant Inspector General or to the District Superintendents, to require that the additional police force so deployed shall be withdrawn and such person shall be relieved of the charge of such additional police from expiration of such notice. The concept of additional police force is that whenever in addition to regular police, the necessity arises that additional number of police is required for a project, the Inspector General, Deputy Inspector General, Assistant Inspector General or District Superintendent may depute such number of additional police force which is necessary. Section 14 of the Act further clarifies the position that whenever it appears to the Inspector General of Police that for a work like Railway, Canal or any other public work, or any manufactory or commercial concern, shall be carried on or be in operation in any part of the country and it appears to the Inspector General that deployment of an additional police force in such place is rendered necessary by the behaviour or reasonable apprehension of the behaviour of persons employed upon such work, manufactory or concern, then the additional police shall be deployed by the Inspector General of Police as long as such necessity shall continue and the Inspector General may make such orders for deployment of such additional police force from time to time. The Section further lays down that such orders be passed on the request of person having the control or custody of the funds used in carrying on such work, manufactory or concern on payment for the additional force so rendered necessary. From the plain reading of Sections 13 and 14 of the Act it is abundantly clear that mode of enlistment of extra men for additional police is not provided in sections 13 and 14 of the Act.
9. The mode of enlistment in the establishment of additional police is provided under rule 2.9 of the Rules. Under sub-rule (2) of rule 2.9 of the Rules, extra police men in additional police force are recruited when it is not possible to deploy the required number of police from regular force for a public purpose, a project of public work or any other project, for a specified period. The expenses of additional police have to be met from the funds allocated for the said project. Sub-rule (2) of rule 2.9 further provides that extra men enlisted in the additional police shall be part of the district police force and shall, if suitable and eligible, be absorbed in regular establishment whenever permanent vacancies occur. The extra men so enlisted in additional police when absorbed in regular establishment on the occurrence of vacancies, they shall be replaced by new enlistment, who will be subject to discharge on reduction of additional police. The spirit behind sub-rules (1) to
(3) of rule 2.9 of the Rules is also not that every person inducted in the additional police force has to be absorbed in the regular police force in all circumstances. The wisdom behind sub-rules (1) to
(3) is that the person, who were recruited in additional police, they were trained police persons, they have got the experience, therefore, whenever permanent vacancies occur, it is enjoined upon the authorities to induct them under rule 2.9(2) of the Rules after evaluating the suitability and fitness. The phraseology implied in the rule appears to be mandatory. The word "shall" has been used while declaring such extra enlisted men as part of the district police force and again the word "shall" has been implied for absorbing them in the regular establishment as and when vacancies occur. The only condition attached is that at the occurrence of vacancies, their suitability and eligibility is to be judged. This Court in the case titled Shakoor Bashir & others v. Azad Government & others (supra) has already held that under Sections 13 and 14 of the Act and under rule 2.9 of the Rules, the police so deputed shall be deemed to be a part of the district police force, who are entitled to be absorbed in the regular police as and when vacancies occur, subject to the suitability and eligibility. The scheme of rules further appears to be mandatory from the language of sub-rule (3), which postulates that the Superintendents are required to give early information to the Deputy Inspector General of Police of their inability to provide for additional police coming under reduction in order that arrangements may be made to absorb them in other districts wherever vacancies may exist. The rule entitles the extra men who are enlisted in additional police to be absorbed whenever vacancies occur in the said district or any other district.
10. The expenses of additional police have to be met from the project where they are deployed and included in the cost of the project. The funds for creation of additional police shall not be a part of regular recurring budget of the Police Department. There may be instances when a short number of extra men in additional police force are enlisted for some project and in future it is easy to absorb such additional police force whenever permanent vacancies occur but when a large number of projects of national/public importance have to be initiated in the country and a large number of additional police force is required for such projects, it will not be easy for the Government to absorb all such persons in the permanent police force.
11. The newly introduced sub-rule (4) provides for enlistment of additional police force for respective projects on contract basis. The marked difference between the phraseology implied in sub-rules (1) to (3) and sub-rule (4) is that in -former, there was no concept of contract employment. The extra men enlisted in the additional police were deemed part of the district police while extra men recruited under sub-rule 4) are declared contract employees. Sub-rule (5) lays down that extra men recruited in additional police shall purely be for the project specified and this recruitment shall not confer any right towards permanent absorption. Sub-rule (5) is directly in conflict with sub-rules (2) and (3) Sub-rule (2) in unequivocal terms declares the extra men enlisted in additional police as part of the district police force and they are guaranteed a right for permanent absorption in regular force whenever a vacancy occurs, subject to suitability and eligibility. The question is, whether two provisions, which are self-contradictory, can co-exist or not.
The cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes is that the law should be interpreted in such a manner that it should rather be saved than destroyed. The law must be interpreted in a broader and liberal manner giving effect to all its parts and the presumption shall be that no conflict and repugnancy was intended by the framers while interpreting the words of an Act. Where two "co- ordinate sections", according to Halsbury, are apparently inconsistent an effort must be made to reconcile them, if it is impossible, the later will generally override the earlier. We may refer here to the Crawford's Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Statutes, page 262; which is as under:--- "...The Court should seek to avoid any conflict in the provisions of the statute by endeavouring to harmonize and reconcile every part so that each shall be effective. It is not easy to draft a statute, or any other writing for that matter, which may not in some manner contain conflicting provisions.
But what appears to the reader to be a conflict may not have seemed so to the drafter.
Undoubtedly, each provision was inserted for the definite reason. Often by considering' the enactment in its entirety, what appears to be on its face a conflict may be cleared up and the provisions reconciled.
Consequently, that construction which will leave every word operative will be favoured over one which leaves some word or provision meaningless because of inconsistency. But a word should not be given effect, if to do so gives the statute a meaning contrary to the intent of the legislature. On the other hand, if full effect cannot be given to the words of a statute, they must be made effective as far as possible. Nor should the provisions of a statute which are inconsistent be harmonized at a sacrifice of the legislative intention. It may be that two provisions are irreconcilable, if so, the one which expresses the intent of the law-makers should control. And the arbitrary rule has been frequently announced that where there is an irreconcilable conflict between the different provisions of a statute, the provision last in order of position will prevail, since it is the latest expression of the legislative will."
This Court in the case reported as Rafique Akhtar Chaudhary v. Azad Jammu & Kashmir Government [PLD 1982 SC (AJ&K) 124] has held as under:- "27. It is also permissible that the Court should seek to avoid any conflict in the provisions of the rules or law by endeavouring to harmonize and reconcile every part so that each shall be effective.
If full effect, however, cannot be given to the words of a rule or statute, they must be made effective as far as possible, It has also been frequently announced that where there is an irreconcilable conflict between the different provisions of a statute, the provision last in order of position will prevail, because that last provision shall contain the latest expression of the legislative will. This rule is to be applied where an irreconcilable conflict exists between different sections of the same Act or rule.........
A well-settled principle of the interpretation of statutes is that the Court will avoid reading a provision or enactment in the manner, the effect of which is to make nugatory another enactment unless they are totally irreconcilable when it will be driven to hold that later in point of time impliedly repeals the earlier one. Sometimes when an enactment is added or amended in a statute, the earlier enactment with regard to the same subject is not expressly repealed, in such a situation, the later enactment shall impliedly repeal the earlier enactment. The Courts while interpreting such enactments are bound to harmonize such inconsistencies, if it is possible. In the case reported as Fazal Dad v. Khadim Hussain & another [1995 MLD 1299], it was observed as under:- "25. According to Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol.82, page 901. An amended Act is ordinarily be construed as if the original statute has been replaced and a new and independent Act in the amended form had been adopted in its stead. Then on page 904 of the same '...Similarly where a Section of a statute is so amended, the substituted amendment becomes for all purposes in the future, the Section of the original Act, the new Section is substituted for the old one and every provision of the old Section is replaced.'
In the above quotations the view is the same as adopted by' the Supreme Court of Pakistan that between amendment and repeal there is no difference.
26. In order to attract the provisions about effects of repeal it is not necessary that the word repeal should have been used. It may be seen that it is an everyday occurrence that at times the law- maker does not use any specific word while intending to revoke or annul a legal provision. These are the cases which fall in the category of implied revocation or annulment. To illustrate the point that repeal may be inferred although this specific word has not been used, we may refer to the following extract from Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol.82: 'An express repeal is the abrogation or annulment of a previously existing law by the enactment or a subsequent statute which declares that the former law shall be revoked and abrogated. A statute, or portion thereof, may be repealed directly by an express provision or declaration in a subsequent statute."
27. The following recitals from Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol.44, are also instructive: 'A statute or a part of a statute may be repealed by a subsequent statute, or an intention that the earlier statute should be repealed may be inferred from the nature of the provision made by the later statute.'
The rule is that one provision repeals another by implication if, but only if, it is so inconsistent with or repugnant to that law that the two are incapable of standing together.'
We may also notice that in Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary the word "repeal" has been assigned the following meaning:- 'The abrogation of a statute or part of a statute by a subsequent statute. It may be either i.e. Specially enacted, or it may be implied, i.e. The necessary result of the subsequent enactment.'
28. We thus form the opinion that, unless the intention gathered from the subsequent enactment is otherwise, if a law or provision of law is superseded or revoked, through a legislative measure it is to be taken as a repeal."
12. It was vehemently argued by Mr. Sadaqat Hussain Raja, advocate, counsel for the appellants, that when two interpretations of provisions of law are possible, one beneficial to the citizens to be adopted. It is a golden principle of the interpretation of statutes that whenever there are two provisions applicable with regard to the rights of a citizen, one favourable to the subjects, be given preference over the other. Now it is well-settled principle of construction that where it is possible without doing any violence to the language of the statute, a beneficial construction may be adopted while interpreting a statute, which infringes upon the right of a citizen or a party. This Court recently in a case titled lmran All v. Public Service Commission & 4 others (Civil Appeal No. 92/11, decided on 11.1.2013), held as under:--- ....................... It is a celebrated principle of interpretation of Statutes that when two interpretations are possible, the one beneficial to the subject has to be adopted. In a case reported as Ch. Javaid Mehdi v. Chief Election Commissioner and others [PLJ 2004 SC (AJ&K) 245] it was observed as under:--- '36. We have already dilated on the question that the right to contest the elections is a fundamental right enshrined by the Constitution and if the question of interpretation of provision of any election statute is involved, then very clear and unambiguous interpretation should be adhered to. There are not two views about the fact that to deprive a person from taking part in the elections tantamount to depriving him and his voters from the right of franchise and it falls within the purview of fundamental rights. With regard to fundamental rights, if two views are possible from reading a provision of law, then the view which favours the citizens may be given preference over the second view. The aforesaid 'celebrated principle of law is supported by the authorities titled The State v. Syed Qaim Ali Shah [1.992 SCMR 2192 (2216)], B.P. Biscuit Factory. Ltd. Karachi v.
Wealth Tax Officer and another [1996 SCMR 1470 (1475-C)] and Rafiq Akhtar Chaudhry v. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government [1982 P.S.C. 1025 (1030) para 14].'
(underlining is ours)
In another case titled M/s. Amin Spinning Mills v. Deputy Collector Central. Excise and others [2004 SCR 223] it was observed as under-- '6. If the two views are possible from reading a provision of law, then the view which favours the citizens may be given preference over the second view. The aforesaid solitary principle of law is supported by the authorities titled The State v. Syed Qaim Ali Shah [1992 SCMR 2192] and B.P. Biscuit Factory Ltd, Karachi v. Wealth Tax Officer and another [1996 SCMR 1470] Similarly in the case reported as Province of West Pakistan and another v Mahboob Ali and another [PLD 1976 SC 483] itrvvas observed as under:- "Needless to say that the whole purpose of the interpretation of a statute is to ascertain the intention of the law-maker and to make it effective. The basic principles' govrning the interpretation or construction of statutes are well-settled. But these have seldom been regarded as inflexible, except perhaps where a statute is plain, certain and free from any ambiguity so that a bare reading. Of it would suffice. In essence, in such, case, interpretation is unnecessary: Barring such plain cases statutes would be construed liberally 2 ' or strictly according to their subject- matter, the object or purpose, intended to be achieved, or whether it is in any, way in derogation of any common law or inherent right: For instance, it is well-settled that penal or fiscal statutes or statutes impinging upon common law rights, are hi be ,strictly construed and any ambiguity or imprecision is to be resolved in favour of the subject. On the other hand it is equally well-settled that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed so as to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief. So also empowering statutes are generally liberally construed so as to effectuate and not to stultify the ( power conferred. Modern cases provide many instances of the Judges' reluctance to stand upon the letter of the law strictly in the interpretation of a statute falling under the second category. It is true that even in such cases, what is an obvious omission cannot be supplied by moving the rule of liberal interpretation, In such cases rule of cassus-omissus is generally applied.
But when faced With a choice between a were meaning, which carries out what appears to be object of the Legislature more fully and a narrow meaning which carries it out less fully or not at all, the choice of the Courts is often the former Beneficial construction is a tendency, rather than a rule."
13. Sub-rules (1) to (3) of rule 2.9 postulates that extra men enlisted in-the additional police force shall be part of the district police and be entitled for permanent absorption in regular force whenever vacancies occcur, subject to the suitability and eligibility while newly introduced sub- rules (4) and (5) declare that extra men enlisted in additional police shall be contract employees and such contract will confer, no right for permanent induction in the police force. Under the former rule extra men enlisted in additional police shall have a right to be inducted in regular police, as has been observed in earlier part of the judgment that there is wisdom behind the rule that after having experience of working in the additional police force, can perform better while newly introduced rules debar such entitlement. As we have already observed that if two provisions are conradictory, the later shall prevail even' if the later snatches some rights available in the earlier provision. In the case reported as State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Mercantile Mutual Insurance Company Limited & others [1993 SCMR 1394] while dealing with the amendment in an Act, it was observed as under:- "...Where, any statutory law is changed there is a presumption that it affects change in the legal rights to.
The extent provided by such amendments. The amending provisions have to be read alongwith the unamended provisions as they are part of the same Act. Sutherland in Statutory Construction, 3rd Edition, Vol.III, page 412 writes as under:- 'Because it is defined as an Act that changes an existing statute, the Courts have declared that the mere fact that the Legislature enacts an amendment indicates that it thereby intended to change the original Act by creating a new right or withdrawing an existing one. Therefore, any material change in the language of the original Act is presumed to indicate a change in legal rights.
The Legislature is presumed to know the prior construction of terms in the original Act, and an amendment substituting a new term or phrase for one previously construed indicates that the judicial or executive construction of the former term of phrase did not correspond with the legislative intent and a different interpretation should be given to the new term or phrase. Thus, in interpreting an amendatory Act there is a presumption of change in legal rights. This is a rule peculiar to amendments and other Act purporting to change the existing statutory law...And as to changing statutory law there is a presumption against the implied repeal or amendment of any existing statutory provision. In accord with this conservative attitude, an amendatory Act is not to be construed to change the original Act or section further than expressly declared or necessarily implied.'
Further, Crawford, in. Statutory Construction has observed as follows:--- 'Since an amendment becomes a part of the original statute, both must have construed together as if they constituted one enactment, even if the amendment occurs merely by implication. Their provisions should be harmonized, if possible, but where there is irreconcilable conflict, the provisions of the amendment must prevail over those of the original statute on the theory that the former constitutes the last expression of the will of the Legislature. The amended statute should also be construed as if it had been originally passed in its amended form, since the amendment becomes a part of the original enactment and words used in original statute should, at least be presumed to be used in the same sense in the new statute.'
The principle of beneficial construction is not applicable in the case. Both the rules i.e. Sub-rules (1) to (3) and. Sub-rules (4) and (5) are framed under the Act and do not offend the provisions of the Act. In the former, the incumbents in additional police were entitled to be absorbed in regular police when vacancies occur but this right was snatched by a later amendment in the Rules, which is incorporated due to necessity of a large number of projects of national importance, is a valid piece of legislation. The enlistment of persons in additional police for a particular project can validly be made under sub-rule (4) and (5) of the Rules.
14. Mr. Sadaqat Hussain Raja, advocate, argued that the appellants, who were petitioner in writ petition No. 700/11, were inducted into service in the year 2008 under sub-rule (2) of rule 2.9 while sub-rules (4) and (5) were introduced vide notification dated 9.3.2010. The operation of said notification is prospective. Sub-rules (4) and (5) are not applicable in the case of the appellants.
Their case be treated under rule 2.9(2). It is now well-settled law that if a right is vested in a person under law and later on the said right is snatched by an amendment, the operation of such amendment shall be prospective and not retrospective. This Court in the case titled Mst. Sardar Begum v. Rehmat Khan & 11 others (Civil Appeal No. 19/2006, decided on 1.10.2012), held as under:--- "10. It is well-established principle of the interpretation of the statutes that the law affecting substantive rights of the persons cannot have a retrospective effect unless it is so provided in the Act. It is or it could be established by necessary intendment. In the case reported as Adnan Afzal v.
Capt. Sher Afzal [PLD 1969 SC 187], it was observed as under:- 'The general principle with regard to the interpretation of statutes as laid down in the well-known case of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Wing (1905 A.C. 369) is that if the matter in question be a matter of procedure only the provisions would be retrospective. "On the other hand, if it be more than a matter of procedure, if it touches a right in existence at the passing of the Act", then "in accordance with a long line of authorities extending from the time of Lord Coke to the present day", the legislation would not operative retrospectively unless the Legislature has either "by expressed enactment or by necessary intendment" given the legislation retroactive effect.
To the same effect are the observations of Jessei, Master of the Roles, in the case of In re: Joseph Suche and Co. Ltd. (1875) 1 Ch. D. 48 where it was observed that as "a general rule when the Legislature alters the rights of parties by taking away or conferring any right of action, its enactments, unless in expressed terms they apply to pending actions, do not affect them. It is said that there is one exception to that rule, namely, -that, these enactments merely affect procedure and do not extend to rights of actions, they have. Been held to apply to existing rights".
The question for consideration there was regarding the right of a secured creditor of a company to prove for the full amount of his debt without deducting the value of his securities in the course of the winding up. That was held to be, in substance, a right of action for the recovery of a debt and, therefore, Section 10 of the English Judicature Act was held not to apply retrospectively.
The principle has been admirably put by Crawford in his book on Construction of Statutes, 1940 edition, page 581, as follows:--- 'As a general rule, legislation which relates solely to procedure or to legal remedies will not be subject to the rule that statutes should not be given retroactive operation. Similarly, the presumption against retrospective construction is inapplicable. In other words, such statutes constitute an exception to the rule pertaining to statutes generally: Therefore, in the absence of a contrary legislative intention, statutes pertaining solely to procedure or legal remedy may affect a right of action no matter whether it came into existence prior to, or after the enactment of the statute. Similarly, they may be held applicable to proceedings pending or subsequently commenced. In any event, they will, at least, presumptively apply to accrued and pending as well as to future actions.'
This principle has also been fully adopted by this Court in the cases of The State v. Muhammad Jameel [PLD 1965 SC 681] and Muhammad Alam v. The State [PLD 1967 SC 259].
The next question, therefore, that arises for consideration is as to what are matters of procedure. It is obvious that matters relating to the remedy, the . Mode of trial, the manner of taking evidence and forms of action are all matters relating to procedure. Crawford too takes the view that questions relating to jurisdiction over a cause of action, venue, parties, pleadings and rules of evidence also pertain to procedure, provided the burden of proof is not shifted. Thus, a statute purporting to transfer jurisdiction over certain causes of action may operate retroactively. This is what is meant by saying that in change of forum by a law is retrospective being a matter of procedure only. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that if in this process any existing rights are affected or the giving of retroactive operation cause inconvenience or injustice, then the Courts will not even in the case of a procedural statute, favour an interpretation giving retrospective effect to the statute. On the other hand, if the new procedural statute is of such a character that its retroactive application will tend to promote justice without any consequential embarrassment or detriment to any of the parties concerned, the Courts would favourably incline towards giving effect to such procedural statutes retroactively."'
(Mohammad Azam Khan, CI)
In the case reported as Nizam Din & another v. Custodian & 15 others [2011 SCR 390], it was observed as under:--- "....The golden principle of interpretation of statutes is that no statute is to be construed to have retrospective effect unless its language so necessitates or unless it is expressly so provided. Where a matter stands decided and the decision attains finality as a transaction past and closed, the subsequent amendment in the law will not affect the decision in absence of express intention of the law if it touches a right or existence of a right at that time unless expressly provided, it will not operate retrospectively."
1'5. The operation of notification dated 9.3.2010 is prospective. It is not applicable to the case of the appellants, petitioners in writ petition No. 700/2011, which shall be governed under the provisions of rule 2.9(2) of the Rules.
The result of the above is that the appeal is partly accepted. The appeal to the extent of writ petition No. 700/2011 is accepted. The respondents are directed to absorb the petitioners of writ petition No. 700/2011 in regular police force against the available vacancies after judging the eligibility and suitability while appeal to the extent of writ petitions No. 1388/12 and 1452/12 is dismissed with no order as to the costs, however, the authorities are at liberty to consider their experience while judging the eligibility and suitability at the time of permanent induction in regular police force. They shall also be provided an opportunity of filing applications for permanent induction, if they have already not filed the same.