This revision petition preferred by the defendant-vendees is directed against the judgment of learned Additional District Judge (II), Charsadda dated 4-6-1985 by which he accepted the appeal of the plaintiff-respondent and directed restoration of the pre-emption decree passed by the trial Court subject to the payment of the balance amount of Rs.58,000.
2. The relevant facts are that the claim of the plaintiff-respondent for pre--emption was accepted by the trial Court, passing a decree to that fact effect in his favour by judgment dated 25-10-1984.
The decree was, however, subject to the condition that the balance amount of pre-emption money of Rs.58,000 was to be deposited within one month of the order. The amount was deposited on 25- 11-1984 which the trial Court did not accept as being within one month as required under the order dated 25-10-1984 and accordingly it dismissed the suit. The plaintiff-respondent preferred an appeal. Therein it was contended that the trial Court had erred in reckoning the period of one month and the order passed by it as a result was not sustainable. It was also contended that the period of one month would commence on the next day of the order, i.e. On 26-10-1984 and would run to the corresponding day of the next month, i.e. 26-11-1984 and the deposit having been made on 25-11-1984 would be well within time. This plea prevailed and the learned appellate Court accepted the appeal and reinstated the decree. Hence this revision petition by the defendant- vendees.
3. There arises for consideration two points to resolve the issue, one, if the period of one month would commence from the day on which the order requiring payment of the balance pre-emption money was made i.e. 25-10-1984 or from the next day. Two, if the period of one month to be calculated would be of 30 days or 31 days.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner was of the view that the period would start from the very day on which the order was passed and it would be of 30 days as the months next following was of 30 days.
5. In reply the learned counsel for the opposite side basing on a judgment of Orissa High Court reported as AIR 1952 Orissa 279 has expressed the converse view. He submitted that the day of order would not be included and the period would run according to the calendar month to the corresponding day of the next month, i.e. 26-11-1984.
6. The situation examined in the above case was analogous to the one in hand. There also on the same day of the same month an order was passed that a sum of Rs.100 would be deposited as costs by the plaintiff. On 25th day of the next month the plaintiff applied to the Court for time to deposit the amount. The Court held that the time had expired and the case stood automatically dismissed. The plaintiff took out a revision petition to assail the order wherein after review of similar situations earlier examined it was held that the period of one month would terminate with the day of the succeeding month numerically corresponding to the day of its beginning less one and on this view the amount was allowed to be deposited.
7. In regard to the question how calculation of the period of one month was to be made, whether the first day had to be counted or excluded, the principles contained in section 9 of the General Clauses Act and section 12(1) of the Limitation Act were- followed. In paras 5 to 7 wherein the question was dealt with the Court observed as under:-
(5) The petitioner's main contention is that the period of one month given to him by the Court on 25-10-1948 must exclude that day by applying the equitable principles which have been recognised in section 9 of the General Clauses Act and section 12(1), Limitation Act. Therefore, if the 25th of October, 1948 was excluded, the period of one month which would ordinarily mean a calendar month would really expire at 4.30 p.m.On the 25th November, 1948. Mr. Pal therefore, urged that his client (the petitioner) had time till the end of the Court hours on the 25 November, 1948 and that consequently the Court had no jurisdiction to say on that day that the time had expired and that the Misc. Case stands automatically dismissed.
(6) Two important questions arise: (1) Whether the principles of section 9 of the General Clauses Act can be extended to decrees and orders passed by Courts; and (2) What meaning should be given to the expression `month' occurring in the order dated 25-10-1948.
(7) So far as the first question is concerned, there is abundant authority or the view that though section 9 of the General Clauses Act does not in terms apply to the construction of decrees or orders the equitable principle laid down therein should ordinarily be applied unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context. As pointed out in Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edition, Volume 32, p. 138: "When a period of time running from a given day or event to another day or event is prescribed by law or fixed by contract, and the question arises whether their computation is to be made inclusively or exclusively of the first mentioned or of the last mentioned day, regard must be had to the context and to the purposes for which the computation has to be made. Where there is room for doubt, the enactment or instrument ought to be so construed as to effectuate and not to defeat the intention of Parliament or of the parties, as the case may be. Expressions such as `from such a day' or `until such a day' are equivocal since they do not make it clear whether the inclusion or the exclusion of the day named may be intended. As a general rule, however, the effect of defining a period in such a manner is to exclude the first day and to include the last day. Both days must be included if the word `inclusive' is added".
In `Sankarn v. Rahman', AIR 1925 Mad. 743, it was pointed out that the equitable principle of section 10 of the General Clauses Act might properly be applied to the interpretation of decrees of Courts.
In `Puran Chand v. Muhammad Din, AIR 1935 Lah. 291, this decision was relied upon and theth equitable principle of section 9 of the General Clauses Act was applied for the construction of a decree. To a similar effect is the observation in `Ramchandra Govind v. Lazman Savleram' AIR 1938 Bom. 447: "It is true that section 9 would not apply here in terms as the words do not occur in a statute but in an order of the Court, but it is desirable for the sake of uniformity that the same interpretation should be given to an expression occurring in a judicial order as would be given to it in a statute and I think therefore, the expression `fifteen days' would mean fifteen clear days, and that the date of making the order should be excluded."
8. It can be seen that the principle of section 9 of the General Clauses Act was applied basing on some earlier cases examined by different Courts. Accordingly, same here as well will have to be followed and the first day, i.e., day on which the order was made 25-10-1984 will not be counted and computation will be made from the next day, i.e. 26-10-1984.
9. In settling the second question section 3(33) of the General Clauses Act was followed and in accordance with it the expression `month' was taken to mean the month reckoned according to the British calendar. In so doing also an earlier A case viz. Dadu v. Balgounda, 5 Bom. HCR (A.CJ.) 39 was followed, referring to the observation appearing therein in that behalf which here too is reproduced:- "From the practice which prevailed previous to 1860 when the Civil Procedure Code came into operation, and from the subsequent Acts of the Legislature. I think it may be rightly inferred that their intention was to express by the term `month' a British calendar month, and, so far as I am aware, all Civil Courts on this side of India have adopted this interpretation since the Code became law."
10. In resolving the question as to how many days would constitute a month where the commencing day was not the first day of the month, as is the case here, reliance was placed on the following passage occurring in Iyer's Law Lexicon:- "The term `month' whether employed in modern statutes or contracts, and not appearing to have been used in a different sense, denotes a period terminating with the day of the succeeding month numerically corresponding to the day of its beginning, less one. If there be no corresponding day of the succeeding month, it terminates with the last day thereof."
11. Applying the same meaning to the term `month' the period of one month will terminate here in this case on the 25th of November, 1984 and the deposit having been made on the last day before the end of Court hours will be deemed within time.
Accordingly, the revision petition is without merit and is hereby dismissed, but the parties are left to bear their own costs.