' This judgment shall dispose of CRs, Nos. 1316 and 1317 of 1994 in which common question fall for determination.
2. Briefly stated the facts are that the respondents in these two petitions filed two separate suits against the two petitioners seeking specific performance of agreements of sale. On 7-3-1993, the parties stated before the trial Court that if the petitioners/defendants take oath on the Holy Qur'an that the date for the performance of sale agreement was 28-8-1983 and that the petitioners had remained in the Court for execution of the sale-deed and also that there was no agreement in respect of the land comprised in Qilas Nos.7 and 13 of Square No,14, the suits be dismissed provided the plaintiffs/respondents repays the amounts received by them within 60 days. It was further agreed that in the event of non-payment of the amount within the stipulated period, the suits shall be considered to have been decreed. It is common ground between the parties that the petitioners took the special oath and made statement to the above effect on 7-3-1995. It was observed by the Civil Judge that he could not pass any decree as the final decision of the suits had been stayed by the appellate Court.
' The suits were therefore adjourned to 9-3-1993 so as to enable the petitioners to withdraw their appeal. The suits were finally disposed of on 9-3-1993 in terms of order dated 7-3-1993.
3. On 9-5-1993, the respondents applied for execution of the decrees of specific performance averring that as petitioners had failed to pay Rs,37,000 to them, the suits for specific performance stood decreed. The petitioners objected to the execution on the ground that they had in compliance of the decrees deposited the amounts in Court on 8-5-1993 and there was no executable decrees in favour of respondents. These objections were repelled by the executing Court which held on 6-7-1993 that the deposits made on 8-5-1993 in Court were not within the period prescribed in the decrees with the result that the suits stood decreed against the petitioners.
Aggrieved the petitioner challenged that order by filing the appeals which were dismissed by the Additional District Judge on 8-3-1994. Hence, these petitions.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that while computing period of 60 days fixed in the decree for refund of the amounts received in advance by the petitioners the date from which the time of 60 days was to run i,e, 8-3-1993 should have been excluded by the Courts below and as 7-5-1993 was holiday being Friday, the deposit made on 8-5-1993 was within time.
5. The learned counsel for respondent has however maintained that it is evident from the order passed by the trial Court on 7-3-1993 that the period of 60 days was to run from 8-3-1993 and there was no justification of excluding that day.
6. It is common ground between the parties that according to the decree passed on 9-3-1993 and earlier order of the trial Court dated 7-3-1993 which was to form part of the decree, the petitioner was required to refund the amounts within 60 days starting from 8-3-1993 as specifically provided therein. The question which, however, falls for determination is as to whether while computing the period of 60 days the date from which the period was to run i,e, 8-3-1993 should be included or excluded. Learned counsel for respondent does not dispute that in view of section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 if the period had been prescribed by any Central Act or Regulation, 8-3-1993 had to be excluded. Similarly there is also no cavil that if question had arisen in connection with computation of period of limitation prescribed for filing appeal or revision or any other application, the date from which the period of limitation was to be reckoned had to be excluded vide section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908.
7. However, the argument of the learned counsel for respondent is that as the time was fixed with the consent of the parties by the Court in the decree; order neither section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 nor section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 has any application. This argument is correct to the extent that section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 do not in terms apply where the period is fixed in the decree or order of a Court. This conclusion does not in any manner advance the case of respondent inasmuch as even though section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 may not be applicable but yet as the principle underlying these provisions is one of equity and good conscience, it has to be applied even while computing time fixed by the Court. Indeed it has been observed by Bombay High Court in Ramchandra Govind Unavne v. Laxman Savleram Ronghe AIR 1938 Bombay 447 that it is desirable for the sake of uniformity that the same interpretation should be given to an expression occurring in a judicial order as would be given to it in a statute.
8. The question as to how words "from today" interpreted in a decree came up for consideration before a Division Bench of Lahore High Court in Puran Chand v. Muhammad Din and others AIR 1935 Lahore 291. It was observed that General Clauses Act embodies the principles of equity which should be applied to decrees apart from statute and as such the date from which the period of time prescribed in the decree was to be reckoned should be excluded. The same view was taken by the Dacca High Court in Abdul Sattar and others v. Abdul Khaleque and others 1971 DLC 239 and also by the Peshawar High Court in Sher Muhammad and 6 others v. Gulfraz 1989 CLC 1344.
9. Before parting with this aspect, principle of law stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Volume 45, 'paragraph 1127 may be reproduced with advantage:- "Expression such as 'from such a day' or 'until such a day' are equivocal, since they do not make it clear whether the inclusion or the exclusion of the day named may be intended. As a general rule, however, the effect of defining a period in such a manner is to exclude the first day and to include the last day."
10. It follows from the above discussion that while computing period of 60 days, 8-3-1993 the date from which that period was to run must be excluded. Learned counsel for respondent has however attempted to argue that as the period of 60 days was fixed with the consent of the parties, it could not be extended by the Court. There is no cavil with this proposition which has however hardly any applicability here as the question before this Court is not of extension of time but of construing of the decree and order of the trial Court so as to find out the date from which the period of 60 days was to run.
' For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned orders are set aside and the execution application filed by the respondents are dismissed with no order as to costs.