1. ' MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J.--This appeal was instituted through Mr. Hakam Qureshi, learned Advocate Supreme Court, who has passed away. Mr. Noman Hakam Qureshi, Advocate High Court, his son, who is not an Advocate of this Court has sought the permission of the Court to argue the matter on the premise that the appellant has no resources to .Engage a new counsel; that he had even argued the case before the learned High Court, out of which the impugned judgment has arisen.
2. Thus we grant him special permission to argue the appeal.
3. ' This appeal, with leave of the Court dated 28-7-2006, entails the facts, in that, the appellant is a pre-emptor, who instituted the suit for pre-emption on 10-7-1994 and the same day the learned Trial Court in terms of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 (the Act) directed him to deposit zar-e- soem within thirty days. The deposit was made on 9-8-1994. The respondents however agitated that the deposit made was beyond the period of thirty days, thus sought dismissal of the suit in view of the noted section 124(2)], but the learned Trial Court disallowed the application. However, in the revisional jurisdiction invoked by the respondents, the learned Additional District Judge vide order 9-12-2003 accepted their plea and dismissed the suit. The above decision, when challenged by the appellant through W.P. No,10146 of 2004, was upheld vide impugned judgment and it has been ordained, that the day on which the order of zar-e-soem was passed by the learned Trial Court i,e, 10-7-1994, has to be included within the thirty days time prescribed by law and thus reckoning that day, the deposit made was a day beyond thirty days. Leave was granted in this case to consider "The learned counsel submitted, inter alia, that the suit was instituted on 10-7-1994 and Zar-e-Soyam was deposited on 9-8-1994 which was within stipulated period of 30 days from 11-7-1994 in view of the provisions of sections 8 and 9 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956. As such the suit could not have been dismissed. The impugned judgment of the High Court was not sustainable at law. (2). Leave to appeal is granted to consider the above and other submission". Learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contentions that the day on which the order requiring the pre-emptor to deposit zar-e-soem has to be excluded, has relied upon the cases reported as Imran Ahmed and another v. The District Judge, Dera Ghazi Khan and 2 others (2003 CLC 1597), Ghulam Muhammad v. Ghulam Hussain alias Hussain (2001 YLR 2343), Muhammad Zubair and another v. Saleh Muhammad and 2 others (1993 CLC 1047), Sher Muhammad and 6 others v. Gul Faraz (1989 CLC 1344), Rehmat Elahi v. Messrs Hoyo Bakushiki Kaisha (PLD 1992 SC 417), Fazal Elahi v. Noor Ahmed and 2 others (PLD 2006 Lahore 318), Mian Muhammad Talha Adil v. Mian Muhammad Lutfi (2005 SCMR 720), Muhammad Arshad v. Rafi Ahmad and 5 others (2007 CLC 1621) and has further relied upon sections 8 and 9 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956 and in this context the judgment reported as Messrs Malik Muhammad Nawaz, Haji Aziz Ahmad, Commission Agents, Chakwal v. Syed Mehmood Hussain (1997 SCMR 264). Contrarily, learned counsel for the respondents however while placing reliance on the case reported as Muhammad Aziz v. Akhtarain Begum (2004 SCMR 1709) has argued, that the day on which the order was passed should necessarily include within the compass of thirty days, thus the deposit made was beyond the period of thirty days, and hence the penal provisions of section 24 ibid were duly attracted to the case in hand and, therefore, the suit was rightly dismissed by the revisional court and the order was validly upheld in revision by the learned High Court.
2. Heard. In the judgment, Messrs Malik Muhammad Nawaz supra, to which reference has been made by the learned counsel for the appellant, while considering the effect of section 9 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956, it has been held as under:- "8. A perusal of the above-quoted para indicates that in case of any Statute or Rules, a calendar month is taken as the period on one month running from an arbitrary date, which would expire with the day in the succeeding month immediately preceding the day corresponding the date upon which the period starts. However, by virtue of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, period of one month for the purpose of an order is computed by excluding the date on which order is passed".
4. ' In the case reported as Muhammad Arshad v. Rafi Ahmad and 5 others (2007 CLC 1621), the learned High Court while dealing with the akin proposition has held:-- "The said provisions of law came up for consideration in the said case of "Fatal Elahi" being relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner and it was held that the word "of' used in the first proviso to section 24(1) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 is to be construed as 'from" armed thus, the day of institution of the suit is to be excluded. In my humble opinion the said reasoning of his Lordship is supported by a judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Muhammad Yousaf and 3 others v. Zafarullah and another 1992 SCMR 117, wherein their Lordships construed section 8 of the Provincial General Clauses Act, 1956. Thus, even going by the interpretation placed on the said order of the learned Courts below the date of institution i,e, 26- 10-2001 has to be excluded. In fact, to my mind the day of the said order i,e, 27-10-2001 is also liable to be excluded. Be that as it may, after exclusion of the said date i,e, 26-10-2001 the deposit was to be made within thirty days i,e, 27-10-2001 to 30-10-2001 equal to four days and 1-11-2001 to 26-11-2001 equal to twenty six days; total 30 days. The deposit in fact was made on 26-11- 2001 and as such was both in accord with the order of the Court as also the said Statutory provision.
5. The civil revision is accordingly allowed. Both the impugned judgments and decree are set aside."
6. ' Be that as it may, the interpretation of Section 24 of the Act, its application and the consequences in the light of Section 8 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956 came under consideration in the judgment reported as Fazal Elahi v. Noor Ahmed and 2 others (PLD 2006 Lahore 318); however before referring to this judicial opinion it is expedient to reproduce section 24 of the Act and section 8 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956, respectively:-- "24. Plaintiff to deposit sale price of the property.---(1) In every suit for pre-emption, the Court shall require the plaintiff to deposit in such Court one-third of the sale price of the property in cash within such period as the Court may fix: ' Provided that such period shall not extend beyond thirty days of the filing of the suit: ' Provided further that if no sale price is mentioned in the sale deed or in the mutation, or the price so mentioned appears to be inflated, the Court shall require deposit of one-third of the probable value of the property.
(2) Where the plaintiff fails to make a deposit under subsection (1) within the period fixed by the Court, or withdraws the sum so deposited by him, his suit shall be dismissed.
(3) Every sum deposited under subsection (1) shall be available for the discharge of costs.
(4) The probable value fixed under sub-section (1) shall not affect the final determination of the price payable by the preemptor."
7. "8. Commencement and termination of time. --In any Provincial Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time to use the word 'from" and for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time to use the word "to "."
8. 3 In Fazal Elahi supra, it has been held:-- "The precise question to be considered and determined in this case, is whether the day on which the order of Zar-e-Soim was passed by the Court, should be excluded or included. Section 24(1) of the Act, empowers rather cast a duty upon the Court to pass an order directing the plaintiff to make the deposit within such time, as may be fixed by the Court. However, a rider under proviso to this section has been placed upon the authority of the Court that such time shall not exceed 30 days of the filing of the suit). The word "of" appearing in this proviso is of an immense significance and therefore needs proper interpretation. According to the Black's Law Dictionary Sixth Edition at page 1080 the word "of' means "A term denoting that from which anything proceeds; indicating origin. The word has been held equivalent to after at, or from." As per Chambers Concise 20th Century Dictionary at page 671, the word has been defined to mean 'from; ". Thus on the basis of the above meaning, it is clear that the expressions/words "of', "from" or "after" are inter-changeable and analogous terms, which have been used by the legislature in the different statutes but to signifying the same meaning, therefore, when the word "of" is construed in its proper context, as used in the proviso, it shall mean that 30 days' time, shall be reckoned after the date of the institution of the suit. The above interpretation of this word is also in consonance with the provisions of section 8 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956, which reads as below:- "It shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time to use the word 'from" and for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time to use the word "to ". "
9. ' According to the above section, the first day in the series of days providing a particular period for doing same act or performing a duty, has to be excluded.
10. ' Almost a similar proposition came under consideration of this Court in the case reported as Imran Ahmed and another v. The District Judge, Dera Ghazi Khan and 2 others 2003 CLC 1597 and in paragraph 11 of the judgment, the Court has held as such that "The day when the order was passed i,e, 1-10-1999, has also to be excluded under section 8 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956. The rationale behind this provision of law appears to be that the day when the order is passed should not be counted, because, it is impossible that the order is passed at the tail-end of the day and the litigant is not in a position to avail that day in compliance with the order, therefore, through this provision a benefit is given to a litigant which is his right". Another judgment of this Court reported as Ghulam Mustafa Khan v. Ashiq Hussain and others 2003 CLC 1661 also has ordained to exclude the day from 30 days period, on which, the order itself was passed. Thus on account of the reasoning given in paragraph No,4 and on the basis of these two judgments, I am constrained to hold that the day, on which the order has been passed by the Court, directing the pre-emptor to make the deposit, should be excluded and thus by exclusion thereof the deposit made by the petitioner in this case, shall be within 30 days time and resultantly, no delinquency ad default can be attributed to the petitioner, therefore the dismissal of the petitioner's suit by the trial Court for non-compliance of the deposit of Zar-e-Soim, is illegal and without jurisdiction, and the judgment and decree in appeal upholding that order also cannot be sustained, resultantly, this petition is accepted and the impugned order and the judgment and decree are set aside."
11. ' We find that the law laid down in the afore-referred judgment (Fazal Ellahi's case) is the correct enunciation of law and is an apt and complete answer to the proposition in hand which is being fully endorsed by this Court vide instant judgment. Therefore, in light of the above, it is categorically held, that the day on which the order directing the preemptor to make the deposit of zar-e-soem has to be excluded, but it may be pertinent to mention here that even by excluding such day the period A of 30 days, as has been mandated by Section 24 ibid, in any case should not exceed as this aspect has been duly explained in the judgment reported as Hasnain Nawaz Khan v. Ghulam Akbar and another (PLD 2013 SC 489). The judgment, to which reference has been made by the learned counsel for the respondents, is not applicable and attracted as it involved different proposition and also distinct facts. Therefore, the deposit made by the appellant on 9-8-1994 was well within time.
4. In light of the above, this appeal is allowed, the impugned judgments of the learned Revisional Court as also the High Court are set aside and the matter is remanded to the learned Trial Court to deal with the pre-emption suit filed by the appellant in accordance with law.