This is a revision petition filed under section 115, C.P.0 by the defendant who is respondent herein against the order dated 15-2-2002 of the learned District Judge, Dera Ismail Khan whereby appeal of the plaintiff was accepted and the case was remanded to the learned trial Court for further proceedings. The brief facts, giving rise, to this revision are that the plaintiff who is respondent herein brought a suit against the defendant for possession through pre-emption of Shop No,3679/C, situated in Chhota Bazar, Dera Ismail Khan, as detailed in the heading of the plaint. It was alleged in the plaint that the defendant purchased the suit shop without any notice to the plaintiff through a registered sale-deed dated 2-4-2001 for a sum of Rs,2,60,000. However, in order to ward off the right of pre- emption of the plaintiff, the defendant entered an inflicted amount Rs,3,50,000 in the sale deed. The suit was filed before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Dera Ismail Khan on 21-7-2001 but the same was allotted to the learned Civil Judge-V, Dera Ismail Khan for disposal which came up for preliminary hearing before him on 23-7-2001 and on that date, the learned counsel for the plaintiff made a request that as the pre-emption money, being a huge amount, the plaintiff may be given at least three months to deposit the same in Court. The request was granted. However, the learned . Trial Court passed the following order:-- "In view of the submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff, I, however, grant two months' period for deposit of 1/3rd of the amount of the total amount mentioned in sale instrument which is Rs,3,50,000. Summons be issued to the defendant for 26-9-2001."
3. When on the fixed date, the suit came up for hearing, the learned trial Court found that as the plaintiff has deposited the pre-emption money beyond the stipulated period, as such, his suit was dismissed vide order dated 26-9-2001. Feeling aggrieved of the foregoing order, the respondent went in appeal and the learned District Judge found that as the last date for deposit of the pre- emption money fell on 23-9-2001 but that date, being holiday, as such, the respondent had rightly deposited the pre-emption money on 24-9-2001 which was not violation of the impugned order of the learned trial Court. Accordingly, the learned District Judge by an order dated 15-2-2002 accepted the appeal of the respondent, set aside the impugned order of the learned trial Court and remanded the case to it for further proceedings. Aggrieved by the foregoing order by the learned District Judge, the defendant has filed the present revision petition.
4. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record.
5. In support of the revision, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that as the impugned order for deposit of the pre-emption money was passed on 23-7-2001 and counting the period of two months from the same, the last date for deposit of pre-emption money fell on 20-9-2001 but the plaintiff has deposited the same on 24-9-2001 which is late by four days. The learned trial Court has, therefore, rightly dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. He further contended that in the impugned order of the learned trial Court, the word used is ' month' and normally a month is considered a lunar month of 30 days. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the dictionary meaning of the word wherein some of the dictionaries, the month has been defined as a lunar month, the number of days of which depending upon complete revolution of the moon around the earth.
6. However, this argument is without force on the ground. That if a particular word has not been defined or its meaning has not been given in a statute, then resort has to be made to the ordinary dictionary meaning of the word but the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987 being a Provincial Statute, the provisions of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956, adapted by the N.-W.F.P. Adaptation of Laws. Order, 1975 would be applicable thereto and according to clause (38) of section 2 of this Act, morith has been defined to mean a month reckoned according to the British Calendar. As such, in the present case, the period for deposit of pre-emption amount in Court would be reckoned according to British Calendar.
7. It may be pointed out here that while counting such period, the day on which the order was passed, is to be excluded. In this connection, reference is made to (1) 1970 (1) Andh. L.T.98, (2) 1989 CLC 1344 and (3) 1992 SCM R 117. After excluding such a day, if the next day from which the period is to be counted falls on the first day of the month, then it will present no difficulty because in that case, the period would be taken from the first to the last day of the month. However, if the next day falls on any other day of the month, then it will present some difficulty. In order to resolve this difficulty, reference is made to the following authorities in which the counting of the calendar month has been given:--
(a) According to the Words and Pharases, Parmanent Edition, West Publishing Company:-- "The term 'month' whether implied in modern statutes or contracts and not appearing to have been used in a different sense denotes period terminating with the day of succeeding month numerically corresponding to the day of its beginning, less one. If there be no corresponding day of the month, it terminates with the last day thereof."
(b) In Iyer's Law Lexicon, the term 'month' has been defined as follows:-- "The term 'month' whether implied in modern statutes or contracts and not appearing to have been used in a different sense, denotei a period terminating with the day of succeeding month numerically corresponding to the day of the succeeding month, it terminates with the last day thereof."
(c) In the Words and Phrases, legally defined by John B. Saunders, Second Edition, 1969, Vol. 3 at page 289, the following passage appears:-- "When the period prescribed is a calendar month running from any arbitrary date the period expires with the day in the succeeding month immediately preceding the day corresponding to the date upon which the period starts; save that, if the period starts at the end of a calender month which contained more days than the next succeeding month, the period expires at the end of the latter .Month."
(d) In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 86 on page 840, the following definition of the word "month" occurs:-- "The term 'calendar month' is also defined, but in a different sense, as meaning the time from any day of a month of the Gregorian Calendar to any corresponding day (if any; if not, to the last day) of G. The next month, and in this sense a calendar month refers to a length of time and not to a specific month; it commences at the beginning of the day of the month on which it starts and ends at the expiration of the day before the same day of the next month. A calendar month is made up of a specified number of full, clear days, and is not to be computed by counting a less number combined with fractions of two other days."
8. From the foregoing authorities, it is clear that in a case where the day from which the period is to be counted, does not fall on the first day of the calendar month but on any other day, then it will start from that day, ending with the day of next month numerically corresponding. Applying this principle to the present case and after excluding the day on which the order was passed i,e, 23-7- 2001 from counting, the first month of the period would start on .24-7-2001 and will end on 23-8- 2001 and the next month from 24-8-2001 to 23-9-2001 but 23-9-2001, being closed holiday, on account of Sunday, the respondent, under section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was entitled to deposit the pre-emption money on the next day i,e, 24-9-2001, on which, the Court re-opened as such, the order of the learned District Judge is quite correct and calls for no interference.
9. As a result, this revision petition fails and is hereby rejected.