' ZIA MAHMOOD MIRZA, J.---The abovementioned two petitions, one sled by Muhammad Aslam and the other by Muhammad Latif, seek leave to appeal against a common judgment of a learned Single Judge of Lahore High Court allowing two revision petitions (C.R. 1316 and 1317 of 1994) filed by Muhammad Amin, respondent herein.
2. Facts relevant for the disposal of these petitions, briefly stated, are that Muhammad Aslam and Muhammad Latif, petitioners files} two separate suits against Muhammad Amin seeking specific performance of sale agreement. On 7-3-1993, both the parties showed willingness to have the dispute resolved on special oath on Holy Qu'ran. Plaintiffs' special attorney made an offer that if the defendant took oath on the Holy Qu'ran that the date for the performance of the sale agreement was 28-6-1983 which the plaintiffs had overwritten showing it as 28-8-1983; that he had remained present in Court throughout the day on 28-6-1983 for execution/completion of the sale-deed and that the agreement of sale was in respect of a different land, their suits be dismissed.
Defendant/respondent took the requisite oath and made the statement in the aforesaid terms. At that stage, it was agreed between the parties that the defendant/respondent would refund the advance amount of Rs,37,000 to each of the plaintiffs within sixty days failing which, the suits shall be deemed to have been decreed. It appears that the learned trial Court did not pass any decree on 7-3-1993 as the final decision of the suits had been stayed by the Appellate Court. The suits were, therefore, adjourned to 9-3-1993 to enable the respondent to withdraw his appeal from the Appellate Court on 8-3-1993. It was made clear in the order dated 7-3-1993 that 60 days' period specified for the refund of the amount would commence from 8-3-1993. It may be stated that the respondent withdrew his appeal on 8-3-1993 and the suits were accordingly disposed of on 9-3- 1993 in terms of the order dated 7-3-1993.
3. On 9-5-1993, the petitioners applied for execution of the decrees for specific performance alleging that their suits stood decreed as the respondent had failed to pay to them Rs,37,000 within the stipulated period. The respondent filed objections to the execution applications claiming that he had deposited the requisite amounts in Court on 8-5-1993 which was within time and as such there were no executable decrees in favour of the plaintiffs/petitioners. The executing Court repelled these objections vide orders dated 6-7-1993 holding that the deposit made by the respondent was not with the time prescribed in the decrees with the result that the suits. Stood decreed against him. The respondent filed appeals but with no better result as the same were dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge on 8-3-1994. He then approached the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction. His revision petitions, as stated above, were allowed by a learned Single Judge in the High Court holding that while computing the period of sixty days, the date viz. 8-3-1993 from which that period was to run, must be excluded and consequently the deposit made by the respondent on 8-5-1993 was within time as 7-5-1993 was holiday being Friday. In taking this view; the learned Judge drew upon the provisions of section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and held that even though these provisions do not in terms apply where the period is fixed in a decree or order of a Court, "yet as the principle underlying these provisions is one of equity and good conscience, it has to be applied even while computing time fixed by the Court". Reliance was placed by the learned Judge on the case decided by different High Courts reported in AIR 1938 Bombay 447, AIR 1935 Lahore 291, 1971 DLC 239, 1989 CLC 1344 and reference was also made to the principle of law stated in Asbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Volume 45, paragraph ).127.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and have also gone through the cases cited in the impugned judgment of the High Court which fully support the view taken by the learned Single Judge. In all these cases, it has been held that the principle embodied in section 9 of General Clauses Act and section 12 (1) of Limitation Act namely, the date from which the period prescribed is reckoned is to be excluded, is a principle of equity which should generally be applied for interpreting/construing the decrees and orders of the Courts. Section 9 of General Clauses Act in its relevant aspect provides "In any Central Act , it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word ' from' ----". This provision camp up for consideration in Puran Chand v. Muhammad Din and others (AIR 1935 Lahore 291) wherein it was held by a Division Bench of Lahore High Court that General Clauses Act embodies a principle of equity which should be applied to decrees apart from Statutes and that the date from which the period specified in the decree was to be reckoned should be excluded. Again in Ramchandra Govind Uneven v. Layman Salaam Range (AIR 1938 Bombay 447), the Bombay High Court while construing a decree, dated 23rd January, 1936 directing the defendant to pay Rs,200 "within fifteen days from this day" held that if these words occurred in a statute, the first day would be excluded by virtue of section 9 of General Clauses Act and the fifteenth day would expire on 7th February. It was further observed that section 9 would not apply in terms as the words did not occur in a statute "but it is desirable for the sake of uniformity that the same interpretation should be given to an expression occurring in a judicial order as would be given to it in a statute, and I think, therefore, the expression ' fifteen days' would mean fifteen clear days, and that the date of making the order should be excluded". Similar view was taken by Dacca High Court in the case of Abdus Sattar and others v. Abdul Khaliq and others (1971 DLC 239) wherein it was held that from a bare reading of the provisions of section 9 of the General Clauses Act and section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, it appeared that in computing thel'period prescribed in any order passed by the Court, the date on which the order was passed shall have to be excluded. It was also observed that there have been a series of decisions for the view that the equitable principle contained in section 9 of General Clauses Act should ordinarily be applied to the construction of decrees and orders passed by the Courts unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context. Support for the view that in computing the period mentioned in the order, the date of the order should be excluded was also drawn from Asbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edition, Volume 32, p.138 which is reproduced hereunder:-- "When a period of time running from a given day or event to another day or event is prescribed by law or fixed by contract, and the question arises whether their computation is to be made inclusively or exclusively of the first mentioned or of the last mentioned day, regard must be had to the contest and the purpose for which the computation has to be made. Where there is room for doubt, the enactment or instrument ought to be so construed as to effectuate and not to defeat the intention of Parliament or of the parties, as the case may be, expression such as ' from such a day' or 'until such a day' are equivocal since they do not make it clear whether the inclusion or the exclusion of the day named may be intended. As a general rule, however, the effect of defining a period in such a manner is to exclude the first day and to include in the last day. Both days must be included if the word ' inclusive' is added."
' Peshawar High Court in the case of Sher Muhammad and 6 others v. Gulfraz (1989 CLC 1344) also affirmed the afore noted view. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners was unable to cite any decision to the contrary nor did he dispute the factual position that if 8th of March, 1993 was excluded from computation of sixty days period, the deposit made on 8th May would be within time as 7th May happened to be Friday. He, however, sought to contend that the equitable principle relied upon by the learned Judge in the High Court could not justifiably be invoked in the instant case so as to exclude 8th of March because it was decided with the agreement of the parties that the period of sixty days would commence from the said date. This contention is not borne out from the proceedings recorded and the order passed by the Court on 7-3-1993 which shows that it was directed/clarified by the Court that the period of sixty days would commence from 8-3-1993. In any case, it was a part of the Court's order/decree. The learned Judge in the High Court was, therefore, right in holding that while computing the period of sixty days, 8th of March must be excluded in view of the settled legal position afore noted.
5. Upshot of the above discussion is that there is no merit in these petitions which are accordingly dismissed and the leave sought is refused.