1. ' This First Rent Appeal under section 21 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance (hereinafter called the said Ordinance) is directed against the order dated 11-6-1983 passed by the VIth Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi, whereby the eviction application of the respondent was allowed and the appellant was directed to hand over vacant possession of the disputed premises within two months from the date of the order.
2. ' The facts which give rise to this appeal are that the respondent is owner of building on Plot No, S. R.
3. 7/32 Serai Quarters, Karachi and the appellant is tenant in respect of the ground floor of the said building at the monthly rent of Rs, 340. The respondent filed eviction application bearing No, 2201 of 1982 against the appellant on the grounds of default and personal requirement for his own use. The appellant resisted the application. The appellant pleaded in its written-statement that the respondent has not come with clean hands. It is emphatically denied that he required the premises in good faith for his own use.
4. ' The respondent filed his own affidavit-in-evidence and he was cross-examined by the counsel of the appellant. In rebuttal the appellant examined its Managing Director Taiyab Saifuddin and he was cross-examined by the counsel of the respondent. The appellant also examined Ashique Ali, Assistant Controller, K. D. A.
5. ' The learned Rent Controller, on the basis of the evidence produced by the parties and taking into consideration the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, decided Issue No, 1 in the negative and Issue No, 2 in the affirmative and allowed the eviction application on the ground of personal use, only, vide his order dated 11-6-1983.
6. ' The appellant above named, being aggrieved by order dated 11-6.1983 of the VIth Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi, has preferred this First Rent Appeal on the grounds mentioned in the memo. Of appeal.
7. ' Mr. Sayed Inayat Ali, the learned counsel for the appellant, has contended that the learned Rent Controller has : (a)(1) misread and misinterpreted,
(ii) omitted from consideration and
(iii) glossed over material pieces of evidence on record having vital bearing on the character, validity and veracity of the case.
(b) The learned Rent Controller's approach to and treatment of the case and the discussion and analysis of the evidence on record is arbitrary, capricious, ad hoc and perfunctory.
8. ' On the other hand Mr. Naseem Ahmed Farooqui, the learned counsel for the respondent, has urged that the learned Rent Controller has not misread the evidence. The order is not perverse but is in consonance with the evidence on record.
9. So far as the propositions of law are concerned, by now they are well settled. On account of the conditions which the World War II had created, there was a great demand for accommodation, particularly in big cities like Karachi. After partition there was influx of refugees from India, as such there was great demand for accommodation. In those days it became apparent that the landlords were exploiting the situation to their advantage. Not only the rent racketing was in vogue, but several malpractices were employed to enhance the rent and evict the tenants, if they are not amenable to their pressure. In order to check such exploitation and to bring the situation under control, the Government of Sind promulgated Ordinances from time to time. In the year 1979 the Governor of Sind promulgated. An Ordinance in pursuance of the proclamation of the fifth day of July, 1977 and the Law (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977. This Ordinance was known as Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (Ordinance XVII of 1979): The preamble to the said Ordinance clearly indicates that it was promulgated to make effective provisions for regulation of relations between landlords and tenants and protect their interests in respect of rented premises within urban areas. Therefore, it is obvious that the Legislature wanted to make a provision for better control, of premises and to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom.
10. ' The whole object of the said Ordinance is to provide for control of rents and eviction. Sections 14 and 15 of the said Ordinance specifically enumerate the grounds which will entitle the landlords to evict their tenants. Clause (vii) of subsection (2) of section 15 contains one of such grounds namely, that the landlord requires the premises in good faith for his own occupation or use for the occupation or use of his spouse or any of his children. Then section 15 of the Ordinance provides that when the landlord, who has obtained the possession of the premises under section 14 or under clause (vii) of section 15, relets the building or premises to any other person other than the previous tenant or puts it to a use other than personal use within one year of such possession-
(i) he shall be punishable with fine which shall not exceed one year's rent of the building of the premises, as the case may be, payable immediately before the possession was so obtained;
(ii) the tenant who has been evicted may apply to the Controller for an order directing that he shall be restored to possession of the building or premises, as the case may he, and the Controller shall make an order accordingly. It is further clear that these provisions have been enacted solely for the benefit of the tenants."
11. From the phraseology used in clause (vii) of subsection (2) of section 15 of the said Ordinance, it is further clear that the landlord has to prove that he requires the premises in good faith. The expression "requires in good faith" has been considered by superior Courts on several occasions Broadly stated mere wish, convenience, whim or fancy of the landlord would not be enough to show that the landlord 'requires the premises in good faith'. The landlord must allege and prove certain circumstances or facts which go to prove his requirement. The law does not require a landlord to establish need or absolute requirement without which h shall have no shelter over his head. What is meant by "requires in good faith" is that the landlord requires the premises for his reasonable needs and that he is not seeking eviction on the pretext of requiring additional accommodation with an oblique motive of realising some extraneous purpose. The term 'requires' means that there must be an element of need before a landlord can be said to require premises for his own use and occupy the premises. What is necessary is that he should need them for his own use and occupation. The need has to be reasonable and bona fide. The onus of proof of this is certainly on the landlord. Although the word 'reasonable' does not appear in the Ordinance, the question of reasonableness is relevant in deciding the bona fides of the landlord. Gross unreasonableness may in proper circumstances lead the Controller to reach a conclusion that the landlord's requirement is not in good faith. Therefore, while deciding the question of good faith, the reasonableness of the need or requirement is relevant. Full effect will have to be given to the expression used in the clause, namely, "requires in good faith". The words 'good faith' mean honestly and not actuated by bad faith or oblique motive. Mere wish or intention of the landlord is not sufficient to give him a right to evict the tenant. As already observed the Ordinance is promulgated with the avowed object of protecting tenants against unreasonable eviction and at the same time it makes a provision that the landlords will be entitled to get the possession of their premises on the grounds enumerated therein. One of such grounds is that a landlord requires the premises in good faith for his own occupation. Subsection (2) of section 15 further enjoins a duty upon the Controller to enquire into the requirement of the landlord and if on enquiry the Controller is satisfied that the requirement of the landlord will be met by occupation of the premises, then he has to pass an order of eviction. Therefore, all the relevant factors will have to be objectively considered before such a question is decided by the Controller.
12. I am of the humble opinion that for considering the true scope of clause (vii) of the said Ordinance, the landlord has to make out a case for his requirement of the premises in good faith. For this purpose he must place before the Rent Controller all the necessary details which are required for granting relief. A mere ipse dixit of the landlord that he, requires the premises for his personal occupation or use is not enough. He must give details as to whether he requires the premises for residence or godown. If for residence, he must give details as to number of members of family and how he requires the premises. If for expansion of business, he must give details as to whether it is inadequate or if for new business, details of new business, his sources. If he owns other houses or buildings, he must show whether they are occupied and if vacant, why it is not available. If he owns other building which he sold, he must show under what circumstances it was sold. Unless the landlord gives such details, the tenant cannot be expected to meet the case of landlord. The statement of the landlord must be supported by valid reasons as to how his requirement is genuine or in good faith.
13. ' It is not disputed that it is a non-residential building and it was let out to the appellant where it is running a press and carrying on printing work under the name and style of Messrs Sultan Press Ltd.
14. For the last more than 35 years.
15. The sole question for my consideration is whether the respondent has proved that he bona fide proposes to commence a business in the premises in question. It is not disputed that he is a businessm an. He is running Motor Training School, alongwith his father. He wanted to start his own business of Motor Training School in the premises in question. The learned Rent Controller held that his request was bona fide or in good faith.
16. ' In the eviction application a vague ground was given that he wanted to start his own business of Motor Training School. In paragraph 3 of affidavit-in-evidence a different stand was taken, that is, he gained much experience in the said business and he wanted to expand his business. In paragraph 5 of his affidavit still a different stand was taken, that is, he wanted to start his own branch of Motor Training School in his own property, as such he wanted the premises in possession of the appellant for his personal use.
17. ' In paragraph 5 of the affidavit he has taken a different stand, that is, the premises in possession of the appellant is sufficient for his branch as he would be able to park his cars inside the premises and at the same time he would be able to establish his office therein and the area is sufficient') for parking twelve cars. That itself shows that the application is lacking in bona fides or in good faith and it cannot be said that the respondent has established his bona fide requirement for occupation.
18. ' In the application he has stated that for his own business of Moto Training School for which he has no other place of his own except the premises in possession of the appellant.
19. ' It has come in evidence that he has one building in Ratan Talao. According to him he sold the building. He replied to a question in cross-examination that he is not dealing in selling and purchasing of th buildings. He replied to another question that he has no other property at Serai or Ratan Talao. He admitted in his cross-examination that it was his property but he sold it about two years ago. It is advantageous to reproduce extract from his cross-examination which reads as under :-- "It is not a fact that I am dealing in selling and purchasing of the buildings. I have no other property except the one in dispute. It is not a fact that I have property at Sirai at Ratan Talao. That was my property but I have sold it about two years back. It is not a fact that after making some additions and alterations I. Sold the premises again says I had given it to the agent for its reconstruction to whom I sold the building. I do not know how the said agent disposed of that building."
20. ' In these circumstances the burden was on him and he has to establish as to why he sold that building. He has not established in what circumstances he sold the building. The respondent failed to establish that Ratan Talao property was sold by him in good faith.
21. ' It appears that the respondent alongwith Muhammad Naqi purchased the building including the premises in dispute from Mst. Mariam Bai in the year 1977. The previous owner intimated the appellant. The appellant sent rent through cheque which w is received by the respondent but did nor encash it. The appellant thereafter deposited the rent in the Court. He also took the ground of default in the ejectment application which was decided against him. He did not prefer any appeal against that finding as he had abondoned his ground of default.
22. ' Ashique Ali, Assistant Controller of K. D. A. Was examined in the instant case. He stated that respondent approached K. D. A. For demolition of the building which was in his possession. The necessary permission was accorded to him for demolition of the portion in his possession. The appellant also applied for approval of plan on 20-7-1981 for constructing a building. The proposed building consists of shops and offices on the upper floor. It seems that the permission was not accorded to him as he did not comply with certain conditions.
23. ' The respondent had been trying to obtain the disputed premises from the appellant since as far back as 1977 and it was apparent that the respondent was any how went upon evicting the appellant from the disputed premises. If the respondent was really serious about starting new business of Motor Training School, he would not have waited for a period of four or five years before taking action to recover possession of the disputed premises from the appellant. These circumstances are borne out by the evidence on record.
24. A mere ipse dixit of the respondent that he requires the premises in dispute in good faith is not enough. It must be supported by valid reasons as to how his requirement is genuine. That is lacking in this case.
25. ' I am of the humble opinion that the respondent has failed to establish that he genuinely required the disputed premises. I hold that what the evidence showed was mere assertion on the part of the respondent that he wanted to start business of Motor Training School and that fell short of the proof required to establish that the respondent in good faith required disputed premises for starting business.
26. ' As already observed in earlier part of this judgment that the respondent has not established his bona fide need or his requirement in good faith for his occupation, a mere ipse dixit of the respondent that he requires the premises in good faith for his occupation is not enough. It must be supported by valid reasons as to how his requirement or need is genuine. That is lacking in the present case. In this context, therefore, it is the duty of the learned Rent Controller to properly appreciate the evidence on record and then to write an order indicating that the evidence has been fairly and properly dealt with.
27. ' In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the learned counsel for the appellant was right that the learned Rent Controller has failed carry out his duty, and, therefore, his order be set aside. I accordingly set aside his order and dismiss the ejectment application, and allow the appeal. There will be no order as to costs.