1. ' The appellant has impugned the order dated 30-1-1999 passed by learned VIth Rent Controller Karachi (East) whereby an application under section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, filed by the appellant against the respondent for ejectment of the latter was dismissed.
2. ' The appellant is landlord/owner of flat bearing No,1/3, on Plot SOL-B-2/62, Soldier Bazar, Karachi, hereinafter referred to as the rented premises. According to appellant the respondent's father was tenant in respect of this flat and after his death, respondent was allowed to continue as tenant on his request. The rate of rent was Rs,1,000 per month till August, 1995 but later on by mutual agreement it was enhanced to Rs,1,500 per month from September, 1995. The respondent paid Rs,500 in cash and Rs,1,000 through money order for the month of September, 1995, but failed to pay rent from October, 1995 and onwards. The appellant stated in his application that he required the said premises for his son, therefore, on the ground of default and personal bona fide need he asked the respondent to vacate the premises, but the latter declined and filed a Suit No,230 of 1996, asserting therein that the rate of rent was Rs,200 per month, ' The respondent in his written statement denied the rate of rent and pleaded that up to November, 1995 he paid rent regularly at the rate of Rs,200 per month and thereafter he paid an amount of Rs,600 for the months of December, 1995, January and February, 1996 for which the appellant did not issue rent receipt despite repeated demands. In order to avoid default he sent Rs,1,000 by money order to the appellant as rent for the months of December, 1995 to April, 1996 which the appellant accepted. Again he sent the rent for three months through money order but the appellant did not accept the same and the money order was returned with endorsement that the appellant was not available. Thereafter, he deposited the rent regularly in the Court of VIth Rent Controller, Karachi (E) in M.R.C. No,225 of 1996. Regarding the ground of personal bona fide need of the appellant, he pleaded that the appellant intended to relet the rented premises to fetch Pagri and higher rent, otherwise, he (the appellant) had sufficient accommodation of his own in Nazimabad and he was living in a Posh area oLKarachi whereas the rented premises admeasures only 133 square yards.
3. ' Learned Rent Controller framed the following points for determination:---
(1) Whether the applicant has required the premises question for personal need'for his son?
(2) Whether the opponent has committed default in payment monthly rent from October, 1995?
(3) What should the order be?
4. ' The appellant, his son Asim Muhammad and the respondent filed their affidavits-in-evidence and were subjected to cross-examination. On assessment of the evidence learned Rent Controller recorded his findings in the negative on points Nos.1 and 2 and dismissed the application.
5. ' I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. ' Learned counsel for appellant after making submissions to some extent, in respect of the ground of default did not press this ground in view of the evidence on record but confined his arguments to the point of personal requirement of premises for use of appellant's son. He submitted that the appellant's one son Khalid is going to America but the rented premises is required for appellant's son Asim and irrespective of the accommodation available with the appellant, it is the prerogative of appellant/landlord to choose the accommodation. He placed reliance on the authorities Wasim Ahmed v. Shaikh Karim Riaz 1996 SCMR 1055 and Muhammad Atique v. Hand Khan 1966 SCMR 1260.
7. Learned counsel for respondent, on the other hand, contended that the appellant failed to establish that he required the rented premises honestly for the use of his son. He argued that the ground taken in the application was canvassed in vague terms without any details, about the shortage of accommodation and even the fact of marriage of his son was not mentioned in this application. On the contrary, appellant's son admitted in the Court that his marriage was not postponed. He pointed out that the appellant has also admitted that he has taken Pagri of Rs,1,25,000 and has enhanced the rent in the past. In support of his contentions he placed reliance on the cases Sultan Press Ltd. v. Muhammad Hassan PLD 1985 Kar. 624, Mrs. Shahnoor Fazal v.
8. Ghulam Akbar Mangi 1987 SCMR 2051 and Mst. Farukh Nisa v. Safdar Ahmed and 6 others PLD 1985 Karachi 639. In rebuttal the learned counsel for appellant submitted that receiving of goodwill would not debar the landlord from seeking ejectment on a ground otherwise available to him.
9. ' Since the ground of default has not been pressed, it is needless to discuss the same. As regards the ground of personal need, the record shows that the appellant in cross-examination has admitted that he has not stated in the rent application that the rented 'premises was required for his son's marriage. He explained that his two sons are married and out of them one is in America and other resides with him, but he admitted that he has not sent notice to respondent for vacating the premises. His son Asim in his affidavit gave I conflicting version on the point of his marriage although this was the most significant aspect of the case. He stated that he was going to marry but the, entire programme was postponed for want of accommodation only. According to him, the marriage was scheduled on 8-2-1998 and the. Invitation cards were also printed and request was made to respondent to vacate the premises and hand over the possession so that the appellant (his father) may furnish the same and thereafter get his marriage arranged. In para. 4 of the affidavit he stated that the requirement of the appellant for premises was bona fide and further in plain words asserted that after marriage he would reside in the rented premises, but when he was cross-examined he admitted that his marriage was not postponed and that his marriage had already taken place on 8-2-1998. 4t would be pertinent to mention here that the affidavit- inevidence was duly shown by appellant's son Asim Muhammad on 18-3-1998 and this affidavit alongwith that of his father was filed in the Court on the same day. In cross-examination he admitted that the contents of the affidavitin-evidence were explained to him by his Advocate and he also admitted that he came to the Court at the instance of his father.
10. ' It is true that Asim is not appellant himself, but then he has asserted certain facts in his affidavit fully emphasizing the urging demand that his marriage, which was scheduled on 8-2-1998 was postponed only for want of accommodation and that after his marriage he would shift to the said.
11. Premises, It was in the cross-examination that he was constrained to divulge the truth that the marriage had already taken place. In this way, he has admitted that he made entirely false averments in the affidavit. It is quite amazing and unfortunate that the appellant's son for whose occupation the appellant, allegedly needed the premises, has gone to the extent of making flagrantly false statement on oath just to achieve the object of eviction of ' tenant.
12. ' On the other hand, respondent's attorney filed his affidavit on which he, was cross-examined mostly on the point of default which plea was given up at the time of arguments. He was also cross-examined on a new point that the opponent is not residing in the rented premises and has gone to. Multan. This plea is totally out of pleadings and needs no discussion. The dictum of Honourable Supreme Court in the case Binyameen and 3 others v. Ch. Hakim 1996 SCMR 336 may be cited with advantage on this point.
13. ' On a comparative assessm ent of the evidence led by parties it appears that the appellant, who was primarily responsible for establishing his case filed his affidavit in evidence and in his support he filed the affidavit of his son, but the affidavit of his son clearly demonstrates an act of perjury and false statement on oath.
14. ' The case-law cited by learned counsel for appellant is also not helpful to the case of appellant. In Waseem Ahmed Aden Walla v. Shaikh Karim Riaz 1996 SCMR 1055, it has been held that it is the choice of landlord to choose the house or building where he wants to reside but the facts of the said case were that the respondent/landlord was not residing in his own house and he was residing with his son who had rented out a house in that area. In the case Muhammad Atique v.
15. Muhammad Hanif 1996 SCMR 1260, the concurrent judgments of Rent Controller and the High Court declining the ejectment were upheld by the Honourable Supreme Court. In that case the main factor which had gone against landlord was that he did not disclose in the memo. Of rent case that he was already in possession of two rooms on the second floor. The consequence of suppression of this fact was that his credibility stood adversely affected. Indeed, in the instant case as discussed earlier, .The dishonesty on the part of appellant is the weighing factor which certainly militates against him, therefore, the principles laid down in these cases would not advance his cause.
16. ' On the other hand in the case 1987 SCMR 2051 same flat premises was lying vacant and it was observed by the Honourable Supreme Court that the landlord should make out a case that such flat was not sufficient for her needs and it was for that reason that the disputed flat was needed by her.
17. ' In PLD 1985 Kar. 624, while dilating upon the expression requires in good faith' used in section 15(2)
(vii) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, it was observed that the landlord must allege and prove certain circumstances or facts which go to prove his requirement. It was observed that the need has to be reasonable and bona fide and that the words "good faith" mean honestly and not actuated by bad faith and oblique motive. Recently, in the case S.M. Nooruddin v. Sega Printers 1998 SCMR 2119 the Honourable Supreme the Court observed that the concept of good faith in section 15(2)(vii) of Sindh Rented Premise Ordinance involves the elements of honesty of purpose and reasonableness.
18. ' In view of the principles laid down in the aforesaid authorities the landlord will be required to establish his case of personal bona fide use by proving that he required the premises honestly and in good faith without an oblique motive and that the purpose was reasonable and genuine. The circumstances of the instant case, however, show that the landlord admittedly at the time of commencement of tenancy received Rs,1,25,000 as goodwill and then set up a case of default in payment of rent which he could not prove and was constrained by the circumstances to abandon such plea, and lastly as regards the plea of personal bona fide use he filed affidavit of his son which was admittedly a false statement on oath. The dishonesty and unreasonableness of purpose are manifestly visualized from these facts. The appellant, under the circumstances, is not entitled to an eviction order in his favour and the learned Rent Controller was justified in declining the relief of ejectment sought by him.
19. ' In consequence of the foregoing discussion the appeal is without merits and must fail.
20. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.