1. This is tenant's appeal against eviction from the bungalow in litigation situated on Plot No.24/E, Ghazi Salahuddin Road, Muhammad A.I Housing Society, Karachi.
2. Both the grounds were controverted by the appellant in the written statement and the same were alleged to be frivolous and mala fide.
3. After recording evidence of the parties, learned Vth Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi East, under his judgment dated 14-1-1993 ordered eviction of the appellant from the demised premises within a period of four months. While ordering so the learned Rent Controller in his judgment held that there was no default in payment of rent, but the ground of personal bona fide need was fully proved. Hence this appeal.
4. Mr. Munawar Malik, learned counsel for the appellant argued that default was alleged for the period from April, 1991. Learned counsel referred to letters dated 22-12-1990 and dated 23-12-1990 from respondent No.2 and respondent No.1 respectively to the appellant for vacating, the premises and argued that in none of these letters address of the sender was given and in such circumstances it was impossible for the appellant to send rent for April, 1991, onwards to anybody even by money order. It was added that even in the legal notice dated 27-3-1991 address of the senders was not given and hence in the circumstances the appellant deposited the rent on 15-4- 1991 in Miscellaneous Rent Case No.241 of 1991. In respect of the ground of personal requirement, learned counsel for the appellant referred to the seven agreements of lease between the respondent No.2 and the appellant, and argued that rent of the demised premises was increased from Rs.1,300 to Rs.10,000 after some intervals and that this was done under threat of eviction. In particular learned counsel referred to the legal notice dated 27-3-1991 where the grounds mentioned for eviction were identical with the grounds mentioned in the rent application. Learned counsel referred to para. 6 of the rent application, where respondent No.2 said that she was living with her eldest son at Rawalpindi. Learned counsel also referred to the General Power of Attorney dated 16-2-1992, copy filed in the trial Court at page 45, under which K .M. Saleem was authorised by the respondents inter alia to initiate legal proceedings for eviction of all the tenants or any tenant from any flat in Property No.24/E and it was argued that this indicated that the respondents had alternate accommodation for their residence. In support, learned counsel for the appellant cited the cases of Asif v. Mst. Raisa Khatoon Jafri (PLD 1988 Karachi 364) and Sultan Press Ltd. v.
5. Muhammad Hassan (PLD 1985 Karachi 624).
6. Mr. MA.M. Namazi, learned counsel for respondents referred to section 10 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, and argued that before depositing the rent in Court, it was incumbent upon the appellant to send the rent by money order to the respondents or to make deposit of rent in account of respondent No.2 as was being done previously. In respect of the ground of personal requirement it was argued that respondent No.1 was donee of a portion of the bungalow in litigation and he having married required the premises for accommodating his family. In support, learned counsel for the respondents cited the case of Zahid Mehmood and another v. Mst. Iqbal Begum (1989 SCMR 525).
7. The ground of default was decided against the respondents as their counsel did not press the same before the trial Court. Even otherwise at least up to March, 1991 the appellant has been regular in paying the monthly rent to the respondent No.2. The difficulty arose when respondent No.2 gifted out the bungalow to the respondent No.1 as per para. 3 of the rent application and para. 4 of the affidavit-in-evidence of K.M. Saleem, attorney for the respondents. This gift took place in 1988, but the appellant was informed about it under a letter dated 22-12-1990 from the respondent No.2, and this was confirmed by respondent No.1 in his letter dated 23-12-1990, where date of gift was mentioned to be 13-7-1988. Respondent No.1 in said letter claimed to have become absolute owner of the entire first floor of the bungalow. While in letter of the respondent No.2, dated 22-12- 1990 he was shown to have been gifted half portion of the bungalow on 13-7-1988. This contradiction could have raised doubt in the mind of the appellant as to how much rent out of the monthly rent could be sent to respondent No.2 and how much balance could be sent. To respondent No.1. On the top of it the respondents in their letters dated 22-12-1990 and 23-12-1990 have not given their addresses. In the circumstances, it was impossible for the appellant to send rent to any of the respondents. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that rent could be sent at the old Rawalpindi address of respondent No.2. It is preposterous to expect the appellant to send rent to the respondent No.2, at her Rawalpindi address when the latter made it clear in her letter dated 22-12-1990 that she had left Rawalpindi and was living at Karachi where she intended to live permanently. In the circumstances the appellant was left with no alternative but to deposit the rent in Court. It is not alleged if rent deposited in Court is lesser than the rent due. The point of default was rightly decided against the respondents.
8. Respondent No.1 is donee of a portion of the bungalow, having been gifted the same by the respondent No.2. Respondent No.1 did not enter the witness-box to tell the Court that he required the premises in good faith for his personal use. It has come on record that the respondents own flats also, where they can live. The power of attorney executed by the respondents in favour of K.M.
9. Saleem shows that the respondents own some flats also.
10. PLD 1988 Karachi 364), the view taken was that the effect of misstatement of a fact or suppression of a material fact in a rent case filed on the ground of personal requirement would be, that the Court would scrutinize the evidence of landlord with more care and caution than it would have done if the misrepresentation or the suppression of fact could not have been there. There can be no cavil with such view. In case of Sultan Press Ltd. (PLD 1985 Kar. 624) the landlord sought eviction of his tenant from commercial premises and the view taken was that a mere ipso dixit of the landlord that he requires the demised premises in good faith for his occupation is not enough and it must be supported by valid reasons, as to, how his requirement is genuine.
11. 1989 SCMR 525) the Supreme Court of Pakistan declined to interfere, with an order of this Court by which this Court resolved, by carefully considering the material brought to its notice, the facinal controversy with regard to transfer of possession by original tenant to sub-tenant which was a question of fact.
12. As a result of the above discussion, I am of the view that the respondents have failed to establish their requirement of the bungalow in litigation bona-fidely. Consequently, I accept this appeal and set aside the impugned order of eviction and dismiss the rent application with no order as to costs.