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PLD 1997 Karachi 373

Syed MUHAMMAD HANIF vs Mst. TAJ BEGUM

CitationPLD 1997 Karachi 373
CourtSindh High Court
Case No.First Rent Appeal No,231 of 1994
Date1996-12-22
Judge(s)Kamal Mansur Alam
ResultAppeal dismissed

' This rent appeal is directed against the order dated 28-3-1994 passed by IIIrd Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi East, in Rent Case No,155 of 1993, whereby he allowed respondent's eviction application and directed the eviction of the appellant from the premises in question.

2. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent filed an application under section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, being Rent Case No,155 of 1993, praying for eviction of the appellant from premises, situated on Plot No,M-317, Muslimabad, Malir City, Karachi, on the ground that she had 8 children of whom 4 were living with her and that 3'of her sons, were jobless, and, therefore, the premises was required for 3 jobless sons for establishing business therein. The application was contested by the appellant who filed his written statement. The respondent then filed her affidavit-in-evidence and was duly cross-examined. The appellant too filed his affidavit- in-evidene, but the same was rejected for non-prosecution and no effort was made for the opening of his side.

3. The contention of Mr. Muhammad Yaseen Azad, learned counsel appearing for the appellant is that the respondent had not disclosed in her application or in her affidavit-in-evidence, the details of the business proposed to be done by her sons in the premises in question and bare statement that the premises was required for her sons was not enough, to establish her case of personal requirement of the premises. In this regard he placed reliance on the cases of Barkat Ali v. Sughra and others PLD 1980 Karachi 223; Jehangir Rustom Kakalia v. State Bank of Pakistan 1992 SCMR 1296 and Sultan Press Ltd. v. Muhammad Hassan PLD 1985 Karachi 624.

4. In the first case, it was observed that bare statement of the landlords that they required the premises for their personal use was not enough to prove the requirement. However, there the facts were distinguishable, in that, the landlords were already doing business from another premises and failed to explain as to why the new premises was required. Further, in that case the landlords had rented out the premises due to bad monetary condition and the tenancy agreement specifically provided that the tenant would not be ejected so long as he paid the rent regularly. In the second case, eviction application was dismissed as the landlord failed to satisfactorily explain as to why the premises already in its occupation was not sufficient for its need and to what use the rented premises would be put to. The third case is also distinguishable. There it appears, that during the preceding the landlord was not consistent in his stand and took different stand at different times with regard to the use to which the rented premises was to be put to, thereby creating doubts about this bona fides.

5. In the present case the landlady had clearly stated in her application that three of her sons were unemployed and that she wanted the premises in question for establishing business for them. This averment was repeated in her affidavit in-evidence and was not at all challenged in cross- examination. The statement was also not rebutted by the appellant. In these circumstances, I am of the view that the respondent has been able to establish that the premises was required by her in good faith for the use of her jobless sons. In the case of Mst.Saira Bai v. Syed Anisur Rehman 1989 SCMR 1366 it has been observed that: "Regarding the non-mentioning the nature of the business in application it may be observed that an applicant has to state in his application, the material facts i,e, facts which constitute cause of action. In a case of present nature the applicant has to state those facts which prima facie show that the requirement is according to law, and is made in good faith. This has been so stated in the application. It is not essential as it is not part of the cause of action to state the nature of business which the applicant intends to carry on. Take a case where the applicant states in the application that she requires the shop for her son for carrying on a particular business but later on pending hearing of the application or after eviction of the tenant, the applicant thinks that the business can no more suitably and profitably be carried on in the shop, the question might arise, could he change the nature of business or not? The choice of doing a particular business also depends on my other factors such as the nature of the locality or the nature of business being carried on in other shops in the neigbourhood. It also depends on the flow of customers and class of people residing in the area. Therefore, if there is any change in circumstances, the nature of business could also be changed. Accordingly, the answer would be that the applicant could change the nature of business with the change of circumstances because in law no restraint or bar is provided.

Therefore, the mentioning of the nature of business was not a material fact or so essential that without it the application must fail."

' Reference may also be made to the case of Hassan Khan v. Mrs. Munawar Begum PLD 1976 Karachi 832 where the mode of assessing the bona fide requirement of the landlord has been laid down in the following words:- "That the assertion or claim on oath by the landlord that he required the premises for his personal use, should be accepted by the Rent Controller as bona fide, if such claim or assertion, although by itself may be insufficient, yet is consistent with his averments in the application and is not shaken in cross-examination or disproved in rebuttal."

' The above opinion was approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Mst. Toheed Khanum v.

Muhammad Shamshad 1980 SCMR 593.

' For the reasons discussed above I find no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. The appellant will hand over vacant possession of the premises in question to the respondent within 60 days from today failing which writ of ejectment would issue without notice.

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